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Youth and Status in Tamil Nadu, India
Abstract
This sociocultural anthropological study looks at youth culture in Tamil Nadu, India, focusing on collegeage youth in Madurai and Chennai. The dissertation first shows how youth experience their position in the
larger Tamil society as “being outside of.” This exteriority is manifest in youth concepts of status and
gender, the signs and activities which express such status and gender, and the social spaces in which
such signs and activities are played out. In particular, the dissertation focuses on how the youth peer
group is dually shaped as an exterior space of youth status negotiation—as exterior to adult norms of
authority (and thus a space of status-raising qua transgression) and as exterior to norms of hierarchical
ranking (and thus an egalitarian space of status-leveling, intimacy, and reciprocity). It is this tension
between status-raising and -lowering which the dissertation shows to be crucially at play in how youth
engage with and deploy various status-ful signs. In particular, the dissertation focuses on youth’s
engagement with English and Tamil-English hybridized slang, commercial hero-centered Tamil films and
their heroes, and (counterfeit) Western brands and fashion. In addition to focusing on youth engagement
with such forms, the dissertation also looks at the production and circulation of youth-oriented Tamil film
and (counterfeit) branded garments. The dissertation argues that we can only make sense of such
cultural forms and their production and circulation by situating them with respect to youth concepts of
status and their negotiation in the peer group. Based on this discussion the dissertation offers critical
commentary on academic literatures of globalization, film reception, and the semiotics of the brand.
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இந்தியாவில் இ க்கும் நண்பர்க
ஆராய்ச்சிக்காக அளவிட

க்கு மிக்க நன்றி: ெசந்தில் குமார் – என்

யாத வைககளில் நீங்கள் எனக்குச் ெசய்த உதவிக

நட் ம், அன் ம் என்ன என்ப

பற்றி எனக்குக் காட் யதற்கும் நன்றி; உங்க

க்கும்,

ைடய

கு ம்பம் எல்ேலா ம் எனக்குக் காட் ய பாசத் க்கும் நன்றி. ராதா விஸ்வவாநாதன்
மற் ம் கு ம்பத்தினர்கள் – நீங்கள் அளித்த உதவிக்கும் ஆதர க்கும், அன் க்கும்,
இந்தியாவில் எனக்கு இரண்டாவ

கு ம்பமாக இ ப்பதற்கும் மிக்க நன்றி. “தங்க

தங்ைக” விஜய்ஸ்ரீ, உமா ேதவி மற் ம் தமிழ்ச் ெசல்வி, ஜார்ஜீனா (Georgina), கர்திக்,
(ெசந்தில் குமாாின் தம்பி) ரவி,
உதவிக்கு மிக்க நன்றி. அ

வராஜ், ஸ்ரீநித்தி ெஜயேகாபால், ஹாி குமார் – ஆராய்ச்சி

ஷா ஹாிஹரன் – தமிழ்த் திைரப்பட கதாநாயகர்கைளப்

பற்றிய சுவாரசியமான உைரக்கு நன்றி.
ஜான் பால், ராபின்சன், அஞ்சிட் சிங் (Anjiet Singh), அரவிந்த், ஹாிஹரன், சதிஷ்
மற் ம் ம ைரயில் நம் வி தி நண்பர்கள் எல்லா ம், விஜயானந்த், விக்ேனஷ், ெசந்தில்,
ஸ்தான்லீ, கிங்ஸ்லீ, சங்கீதா, பா , பவித்ரா, குமார், கண்ணதாசன், ஸ்ரீேதவி, சீமா,
ேதானி ேஜம்ஸ், ெசன்ைனயில்

ட் ேபா கிற பசங்க எல்ேலா ம், ம ைரயி

ெசன்ைனயி

ாி நண்பர்கள் – உங்க

அ

ம் மற்ற நம் கல்

ம்

ைடய வாழ்க்ைகைய ம்

பவங்கைள ம் வ ங்கால எதிர்பார்ப்ைப ம் பற்றி எனக்குக் கற் க்ெகா த்ததற்கும்

மற் ம் பல உதவிகள் ெசய்தைமக்கும் மிக்க நன்றி. எனக்கு உதவிய மற்ற
இைளஞர்க

க்கும் ெராம்ப நன்றி. நான் உங்கள் எல்ேலாைர ம் மறக்கேவமாட்ேடன்!

மதிப் க்குறிய டாக்டர் பாரதி, டாக்டர் வாசு ெரங்கநாதன், தி மதி ெஜயந்தி ஆகிய
ேபராசிாியர்க

க்கு ஒ

ெவகு விேசஷமான நன்றி(கடைம): உங்கள் உதவி இல்லாமல்

என்னால் இந்த இனிய ெமாழியான தமிழ் ெமாழிையக் கற் க்ெகாண்
தமிழ்க் கலாச்சாரத் க்குள்ேள

கியி க்க

க்க

யா ;

யா ; என் ஆராய்ச்சிையப்
vii
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என்பதற்கு என் நன்றிையத் ெதாிவித் க்ெகாள்கிேறன்.

க்கு என் நன்றிையத் ெதாிவித் க்ெகாள்ள சாியான வார்த்ைதகள் இல்ைல.

உங்களால் என் உயிாில் தமி க்கு ஒ
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ABSTRACT

YOUTH AND STATUS IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA
Constantine V. Nakassis
Asif Agha (supervisor)
This sociocultural anthropological study looks at youth culture in Tamil Nadu, India,
focusing on college-age youth in Madurai and Chennai. The dissertation first shows how
youth experience their position in the larger Tamil society as “being outside of.” This
exteriority is manifest in youth concepts of status and gender, the signs and activities
which express such status and gender, and the social spaces in which such signs and
activities are played out. In particular, the dissertation focuses on how the youth peer
group is dually shaped as an exterior space of youth status negotiation—as exterior to
adult norms of authority (and thus a space of status-raising qua transgression) and as
exterior to norms of hierarchical ranking (and thus an egalitarian space of status-leveling,
intimacy, and reciprocity). It is this tension between status-raising and -lowering which
the dissertation shows to be crucially at play in how youth engage with and deploy
various status-ful signs. In particular, the dissertation focuses on youth’s engagement
with English and Tamil-English hybridized slang, commercial hero-centered Tamil films
and their heroes, and (counterfeit) Western brands and fashion. In addition to focusing on
youth engagement with such forms, the dissertation also looks at the production and
circulation of youth-oriented Tamil film and (counterfeit) branded garments. The
dissertation argues that we can only make sense of such cultural forms and their
production and circulation by situating them with respect to youth concepts of status and
ix

their negotiation in the peer group. Based on this discussion the dissertation offers critical
commentary on academic literatures of globalization, film reception, and the semiotics of
the brand.
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A note on pronunciation: th = dental stop த்; d, t = alveolar retroflex stop ட்; ch = palatal
stop ச்; nj = palatal nasal ஞ்; ng = velar nasal ங்; n = dental/alveolar nasal ந்/ன்; N =
retroflex nasal ண்; zh = retroflex frictionless continuant ழ்; l = alveolar lateral ல்; L =
retroflex lateral ள்; r = flapped fricative ர்; R = trilled fricative ற்; Tamil has long vowels
and short vowels. Long vowels are represented by doubling the Roman letter (e.g., a =
அ; aa = ஆ).

To keep transcripts as close to the original as possible, I use spellings for spoken
Tamil words rather than their written counterparts. I use italics for words used by my
informants when speaking in Tamil. Otherwise italics are used for emphasis or for titles
of books, films, etc. ‘Single quotes’ are used for English glosses of other languages
(Tamil, unless otherwise indicated). “Double quotes” are used for reported speech, either
in Tamil or English. In transcripts, [square brackets] indicate anaphoric referents;
(parentheses) indicate elided constituents or grammatical category; and <angle brackets>
indicate kinesic movement, types of film shots, or other editorial notes.
I use the following abbreviations: adv. = adverbial suffix; +/-hon. = presence/absence
of honorification; lit. = literally; n. = noun; nom. = nominalization (verbal noun); pers. =
grammatical category of person; Vrb = verb; VrbAVP = adverbial form of the verb (Vrb +
past tense marker + u); b. = born; dir. = director.

Note on names
All names are pseudonyms to protect the privacy of my informants, except for major
places (e.g., Chennai, Madurai, Erode, Tiruppur, etc.), public figures (e.g., Rajinikanth,
Vijay, etc.), or films. For such proper names I use the standardized transliterations rather
than the transliteration system used in the dissertation (e.g., Tiruppur instead of
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Thiruppuur, Madurai instead of Mathurai, Paruthiveeran instead of Paruththiviiran).
Similarly I maintain the spellings of words commonly used in the English language
literature rather than use the transliteration system of the dissertation (e.g., dharma
instead of tharma).
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Youth and Status in Tamil Nadu, India

1. Introduction
When I arrived in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu to conduct my fieldwork, I
originally thought I would be working on the dynamics of college students’ engagement
with films about college students. Instead I found myself drawn to other questions,
particularly related to issues of classification. Indeed, to make sense of the social world of
the youth around me required me to delve into and understand how various classifications
made the social realities at hand pragmatically intelligible for them. I found myself
wondering “what do goatee beards, sunglasses, English, motorcycles, love, Western
brands, earrings, smoking, drinking, long and dyed hair, riding the bus from the outside
while hanging onto the window with one hand, casually combing one’s hair, whistling in
the cinema hall, music television video jockeys (VJs), (college) rowdies (‘thugs’), and
film heroes like Super Star Rajinikanth have in common? Why and how are these
commodity signs, grooming habits, leisure activities, interpersonal emotions, and massmediated personae seen as similar and talked about in similar ways? Why do they
populate youth’s social reality and imagination? And what are the entailments to such
classifications?” In small part, through its discussion of youth peer groups, concepts of
gender and status, film representations and their re-animation in the peer group, and the
production and consumption of (counterfeit) brands this dissertation speaks to my own
fascination with the contingencies and necessities of classification and their imbrication
in the (meta-)pragmatics of Tamil youth’s everyday lives.
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One way to frame the materials dealt with in the dissertation is as consisting of a
shifting terrain of register formations centered around ‘youth’ (as per Agha’s work on
registers: 2003, 2005, 2007a, n.d.). 1 When we speak of a register we speak of a repertoire
of signs linked to a particular model of conduct and the performable figures of
personhood characteristic of (or that emblematize) such conduct, relative to some social
domain of individuals. The register, then, describes a regularity of meta-pragmatic
construal (or stereotype) linked to some classification of signs. 2 This classification is
often multi-modal, including, for example, speech, dress, and bodily comportment. Under
the register’s meta-pragmatic regimentation all such signs are seen as (by degrees) iconic
with each other, belying a meta-semiotic leakage across sign forms, so that, for example,
speech forms seem like (and similarly act as indexes like) dress forms. The register,
however, is a model of conduct; that is, a regularity (or we might say, a genre following
Bakthin [1986]) of meta-pragmatic activity regimenting instances of sign use vis-à-vis
their socially normative construal (and thus, if felicitous, pragmatic efficaciousness) in
context. This means that registers, as a normative principle (the norm of the register), are
subject to, and in fact live through, their (re-)contextualization; that is to say, through
tropic reformulations of the register. It is the dialectic between norm and trope (and their
relative volatility) which accounts for both the maintenance of register formations sociohistorically and the emergence of new registers. If so meta-semiotically reanalyzed and
construed, the normalization (or enregisterment) of such tropic textualities leads to new
1

When talking about youth qua young people I don’t use single quotes. When talking about the age
category ‘youth’ I use single quotes.
2
Meta-pragmatic refers to that which is about the pragmatics of some other thing. A meta-pragmatic
construal, then, is a construal of the pragmatics of some sign (e.g., that the pronunciation of a certain word
sounds ‘dumb,’ ‘smart,’ ‘beautiful,’ etc.). Meta-pragmatic regimentation, then, is the ability/attempt to
control (or regiment) the pragmatics of some set of other (object) signs.
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register formations, which too may be troped upon (and re-normalized) ad infinitum. We
can see, then, that the register is simply the most robust and salient case of a larger
semiotic dynamic between the creativity of signs in context and their canalization into
socially perdurable social facts (with respect to their intelligibility and construal) through
reflexive semiotic acts.
In short, the notion of the register is a way to understand difference—between types
of signs, types of construals, types of users, and types of meta-semiosis—and thus a way
to theorize classification as it is imbricated in contexts of reflexive semiosis. It is in its
sensitivity to and theorization of the contextual embeddedness and socio-historical
volatility that the register concept differs from accounts of classification that are familiar
to us from the history of social thought: from Kant’s (1998[1789]) attempts to ground
secure knowledge in transcendent cognitive classifications; Morgan’s (1970[1870]) work
on kinship structures; Durkheim and Mauss’ (1963) and Levi-Strauss’ (1963[1962])
interest in totemism and kinship; Saussure’s (1986[1915]) exploration of the arbitrariness
of the linguistic sign; Foucault’s (1984[1966]) “order of things”; Bakthin’s (1986)
heteroglossia of speech genres and chronotopes; to classic linguistic anthropological
discussions on the relationship between language and culture (Boas [1974(1889)] and
Sapir [1949(1925)] on the phoneme; Whorf [1956] on grammatical classifications). All
such authors treat classifications as pre-given objects for analysis. As the above
discussion shows, however, the register concept is nothing without the specification of
the semiotic principles upon which classifications come into being and change (trope,
reanalysis, meta-pragmatic regimentation, etc.) and how the social life of registers is the
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life of its classifications (rather than somehow exterior to it) as they act as conditions of
possibility for semiosis in context.
I have suggested, then, that we may see male youth culture in Tamil Nadu as
organized by a terrain of register formations whereby the “college hero,” “college
rowdy,” “matured youth,” “chinna paiyan” (‘small boy’), TV VJs, and film heroes like
Rajinikanth are performable figures of personhood linked to semiotic repertoires (ripped
jeans, Tamil-English hybridized slang, motorcycles, etc.) for a social domain (young
men) that enable particular pragmatic effects in context, and thus serve as inputs for other
sorts of social activities (e.g., status-raising in the peer group, impressing a girl, etc.).
That said, however, I have not organized the dissertation according to named (or
unnamed) registers of ‘youth.’ Instead I have posed the question as such: what is the logic
which makes all of these semiotic forms enregisterable in similar ways, such that there is
a meta-semiotic leakage between the sub-registers that fall under the (enregistered) ageset ‘youth’ (i.e., that the college rowdy [‘thug’], the matured youth, Rajinikanth all
fractionally function in the same way)? I treat ‘youth,’ then, as a kind of meta-register
which organizes a number of sub-registers or “voices” (Agha 2005) that center around
personae which themselves are variously indexed by the semiotic forms mentioned
above. Rather than focusing on the differences between these semiotic repertoires, I have
instead looked at the leakage of these forms into each other—that is, their commonality
across sub-registers—and thus organized my discussion around the logic of these partial
and overlapping register formations. What is the overall logic of this classification, its
semiotic repertoires and their indexical values, and their enmeshment in the social
contexts of youth interaction?
4

The short answer is that it is tropes of exteriority—themselves reanalyses off of the
“objective” age structure/hierarchy in Tamil Nadu which youth are by degrees exterior
to—which motivate the construal of different sign forms as indexically linked to different
social types: that is, the semiotic repertoire of signs linked to ‘youth’ (and its various subregisters) are all seen as ‘exterior to’ ‘society’ (‘society’ being an equally enregistered set
of alter [sub-]registers: the periya aaL [‘big man,’ ‘adult’], the actual rowdy, the whitecollar office worker). Further, as the dissertation shows, this logic of ‘youth,’ or
‘exteriority,’ only has traction in the lives of youth insofar as it is able to speak to their
concerns—which themselves are organized by the same logic of exteriority—as they play
out in the peer group—itself constituted by such activity as an exterior space. The caveat,
then, is that classifications live through their ability to be contextualized and
recontextualized, regularized over multiple moments of semiosis and troped upon, by
degrees, in various contexts and for various goals.
Indeed, youth culture is, like all social terrain, a constantly shifting ground. The
assumption of the dissertation, then, is not only that there is a particular kind of
coherence to Tamil youth cultural forms, but to unpack this is to understand that social
life is reflexively built upon signs in use (object-signs in context) and typifications of
signs in use (meta-signs in context). We see this in chapters 2 and 3 through youth’s
meta-semiotic troping upon signs from (adult) ‘society’ to achieve pragmatic aims in the
peer group (status-raising and -leveling). In chapters 4 and 5 we look at how filmic
representations are meta-pragmatically prefigured so as to be re-animated (and thus
recontextualized) in the kinds of interactional work described in chapters 2 and 3. In
chapters 6–8 we take up the consumption and production of branded forms, looking at
5

how particular semiotic objects like brands come to be meta-semiotically imbued with
particular indexical valences so as to achieve the kinds of status work discussed
throughout the dissertation.

2. Liberalization in India
This dissertation is not about liberalization or globalization in India per se, though
economic liberalization and the changes wrought by it are a crucial backdrop to my
discussion. Since independence, the official ideology of national development (a
projection of the imagination of the [old] middle classes) was entrenched within the
Nehruvian nationalist vision of a “gradual” or “passive” revolution (Frankel 1978). With
time the linkage between the interests of the middle classes and this Nehruvian vision
was loosened and governmental policy was increasingly reoriented toward this new,
splintering middle-class imaginary (Kaviraj 1997; Khilnani 1999; Brass 2000;
Deschpande 2003). This began at the policy level in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi with
the mild liberalization of certain economic sectors (e.g., electronics, especially as linked
to television). Such changes were expanded with the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the
early 1990s which began with the 1991 Union Budget. This was necessitated by the crisis
of balance of payment and the increasing pressure, post–USSR breakup, from the United
States, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank to liberalize the economy
(Pendakur and Kapur 1997; Pathania 1998; Jenkins 1999; Rajagopal 2001). India’s debt
had reached an all-time high and the NEP aimed at stabilizing the foreign exchange
deficit. More than that, however, it also aimed at a fundamental break with the Nehruvian
discourse of the “socialistic” pattern of society (Rajagopal 2001).
6

The NEP decreased the number of restrictions and controls on state monopolies,
liberalized industrial licensing, lessened controls on manufacturing consumer goods and
their prices, lowered taxes, reduced customs duty on electronics, increased foreign
exchange allowance, and made remittances from non-resident Indians easier. In short,
this meant opening up the Indian economy to global capital. Foreigners were allowed to
raise their equity to 51 percent in Indian companies and increasing amounts of money
were approved for foreign investment (Jenkins 1999: ch. 2). In effect, this reversed the
Nehruvian economic policies of import substitution and emphasis on heavy industries
toward export-oriented production, on the one hand, and a service-sector economy and
consumerism on the other (Pendakur 1991; Rajagopal 1999; Jenkins 1999; Fernandes,
2000a, b, 2001; Mazzarella 2003, 2005; Lukose 2009).
This change in economic focus was accompanied by a number of other changes
which form the context for my study. First, there was an increased availability of
consumer goods on the market, both from imports and from domestic production. The
latter can be divided into two types: goods made for domestic consumption and goods
made for export (which inevitably leak into the local market via export surplus and
counterfeiting; chapter 7). The effect, in short, was the increased proliferation of
consumables and Western branded forms. It is precisely these which have been taken up
by youth in their own activities, as I discuss in chapters 3 and 6.
This went along with the explosion of media—especially (satellite) television, home
entertainment, and later the internet—and thus advertising as well (Mazzarella 2003).
This was itself spurred by the presence of more players (global or otherwise), cheaper
hardware and investment by the government in infrastructure. A number of authors have
7

linked this expansion of media to the increased presence in mass-media representations of
the “new” middle classes as modern, global, urban, and conspicuously consuming (Ninan
1995; Brosius and Butcher 1999; Mankekar 1999; Chaudhuri 2004[2000]; Fernandes,
2000a, b; Butcher 2003; Mazzarella 2003, 2005). I would point out that such a changing
media landscape, in addition to being class-specified, is marked by age as well,
foregrounding ‘youth’ as a particularly vibrant, if vulnerable, part of this new aspirational
atmosphere (Butcher 1999, 2003, 2004; Juluri 2002; Lukose, 2005a, 2009). 3
In addition to the expansion of television, internet, and print media, after
liberalization film—the dominant medium in Tamil Nadu, then and today—became
reoriented toward youth. The increase in television watching went along with a shift in
film theater audiences. With the increased time available for broadcasting, there was a
large increase in time for programming without an equal increase in original
programming content, leading to films and film-related shows crowding the air (Agrawal
1998; Pendakur 2003; Page and Crawley 2001; Butcher 2003). This has contributed to
older people going to the theater less and less (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995;
Nakassis and Dean 2007). Moreover, the increasing availability of relatively inexpensive
VCD and DVD technology (itself made possible by liberalization), piracy, and the lack of
renting have meant that profits must be recouped in theaters (or at least are so perceived
by film producers). As the family as cinema-watching unit has receded, youth have
become the main component of the audience (Derne 2000; Osella and Osella 2004;
Nakassis and Dean 2007). And because moviegoing is problematic for young women

3

This also played into the figurement of higher education as central to such projects of social mobility, and
increasingly as a commodity itself to be consumed so as to further the nation and better the self (Lukose
2009). See below for more discussion.
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given norms of female modesty in public (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Lukose 2009) this
has meant that movies, even more than before, are increasingly tailored to young men and
their peer groups (chapters 4–5).
Liberalization has also resulted in changes to colleges. In Tamil Nadu, the
privatization of college education and the increase in engineering colleges (Fuller and
Narasimha 2006), semi-private “autonomous” colleges and self-financing programs, 4 and
“parallel colleges” and private tutoring centers (of which spoken English learning centers
are a huge part) (Lukose 2009) has catered to and created an increase in the demand for
higher education across social community, sex, and region (urban, rural) (Chitnis 2003). 5
The linkage of higher education to social mobility (Beteille 1993[1991]; Osella and
Osella 2000b; Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009), both in terms of getting jobs (especially
for men) and in terms of marrying up (especially for women) (Vatuk 1972, 1982, 1994;
Sharma 1986; Dube 1988; Uberoi 1993; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 1994; Mukhopadhyay and
Seymour 1994; Mukhopadhyay 1994; Seymour 1994, 2002; Ullrich 1994; Singh 1996;
Ahmad 2003) is an important reason for the increase in the number of people going to
college. This has expanded ‘youth’ both in terms of age and social domain, due to the

4

An autonomous college is a college whose administration and funding structure is left relatively free from
governmental direction. Such colleges have, thus, more scope for changing syllabi, creating departments,
and disciplining students. Self-financing refers to courses where the costs of the instructors, classrooms, etc.
are borne by students’ tuitions rather than government subsidies. Self-financing courses are linked to the
privatization of higher education whereby the government decided not to provide funding for courses not
already in the educational curriculum. In contrast to self-financing, aided means that the government
subsidizes the college for such courses, both in terms of instructors’ salaries and students’ tuitions.
5
The Government of India reports 9,954,000 students (40 percent women) in 16,885 colleges, a growth in
number of students of thirty-three times since Independence (Government of India, Dept. of Education
2006; Visaria, 1998: 37). In Tamil Nadu, there are twenty-two universities, over four hundred colleges and
over three hundred technical institutes (Pillay 2004), with over 480,000 students (Government of India,
Dept. of Education 2006), though the numbers were certainly larger when I did my fieldwork from 2007 to
2009.
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extended time spent in education as well as the increased pressures on young people to
earn (and recuperate capital spent on education) before marriage (Jeffrey et al. 2008).
The privatization of education has also had other effects on colleges (Sebastian n.d.).
The growth of the Information Technologies (IT) sector (itself made possible by
liberalization) has led to the demand for more engineering courses to funnel labor into
such high-paying sectors (Fernandes 2000b; Fuller and Narasimha 2006). This has led to
decreased interest among the “creamy layer” (those with the highest marks or the most
money) in liberal arts colleges and the civil service employment that liberal arts colleges
traditionally served as a means to; within liberal arts education, this has lead to increased
interest in computer science, commerce, and science courses (that can lead to Masters
degrees in IT) and English (that can lead to call center jobs) to the detriment of other
disciplines. 6 Privatization has also resulted in many colleges instituting self-financing
courses to meet the demands for such new courses, which has lead to increased numbers
of women on traditionally all-male campuses. 7 There has emerged, then, a division
between types of colleges (engineering versus liberal arts) and within liberal arts colleges
between departments linked to speculative future income and thus (economic) status.
Aided government colleges are the most affected by this, and their student bodies—like

6

Departments have clear rankings within the colleges. These are mapped onto perceived status of
profession, which itself is a speculative calque from the economic opportunities afforded by various jobs.
Hence commerce positions (which allow the possibility of MBA positions) and computer science positions
(which allow entrance to the IT sector) are more valued than physics and mathematics. Physics and
mathematics allow a student to study a Masters of Computer Applications, and thus are more valued than
English. English, however, allows increased access to call center jobs, and thus are more valuable the other
sciences (chemistry, botany) which in turn are more valued than the humanities. The lowest departments in
this hierarchy are economics, history, and Tamil. Such departments have, in recent years since the
emergence of engineering colleges, suffered increasingly lower enrollments and decreased quality of
students (as reckoned by administrators and teachers at least) (see chapter 3, section 3.3).
7
This is because administrators want to have a maximum-sized applicant pool. By only having men apply
that pool is cut in half. Further, self-financed courses are subject to the decisions of the administration more
directly and less tied to (conservative) bureaucratic structures which control decisions for aided courses.
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those of liberal arts colleges in general—increasingly come from more working-class
(and thus presumably lower-caste) and rural backgrounds. This means that many college
students have likely not gone to English-medium schooling. While colleges are supposed
to be mainly conducted in English, this tension between English level and expectation
produces a particular kind of dynamic surrounding English use involving the
simultaneous desire and necessity to speak in English coupled with an anxiety about not
speaking it well enough or speaking it too well (discussed in chapters 2 and 3).
In short, liberalization has resulted in the availability to youth of new commodity
signs, media programming, and institutions that increasingly appellate them. This has
itself changed the contours of the category ‘youth’ and how it is engaged with,
performed, and troped upon by young people. While my discussion in the dissertation
does not specifically focus on liberalization per se it will be clear in the discussions of
youth peer groups and social spaces (chapter 2), concepts of status (chapter 3) and their
extensions in film (chapters 4 and 5) and branded forms (chapters 6–8) that liberalization
is the most general context in which all such activities unfold.

3. Where, what, and with whom I studied
My fieldwork was situated in three areas of study in the south Indian state of Tamil
Nadu (figure 1.1) from June 2007 to May 2009: (1) among (college-going) youth in
Madurai and Chennai (section 3.1 below); (2) in youth-targeting media: primarily, music
television channels (in Madurai and Chennai) and commercial film (in Chennai) (section
3.2 below); and (3) the production and distribution of branded garments, authentic and
counterfeit (in Madurai, Chennai, Erode, and Tiruppur) (section 3.3).
11

Figure 1.1 Map of Tamil Nadu

3.1. College students and other youth
3.1.1 Madurai
The first city I did my research in was Madurai, a (r)urban center (population of
roughly one million people) in the largely rural south of Tamil Nadu, India. Madurai is
often described as a ‘large village’ due to its reputation as a relatively conservative place
where “Tamil culture” is still followed and ‘pure’ Tamil is still spoken; its close ties with
agricultural production in the city peripheries; and the constant influx of migrants from
rural areas. I picked Madurai because: (1) I had previously conducted research there; (2)
it is presumably more conservative and less cosmopolitan than other cities in the state
like Chennai or Coimbatur but is undergoing rapid change; and (3) it has a large number
of colleges of repute and age which attract a highly mixed population (by location, class,
caste/community, etc.).
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In Madurai I worked in three colleges over the span of an academic year: a Christian
liberal arts men’s college (though its graduate departments are coed and its self-financing
undergraduate departments went coed in 2007); a Christian women’s liberal arts college;
and a (Hindu) coed liberal arts college. The Christian colleges are of high repute in the
city and cater to relatively higher-income families, though the recent changes described
above have entailed a sizable rural and working-class population. Both Christian colleges
are highly mixed by caste, religion, class, region and language. The Hindu college caters
to a slightly more working-class and rural-commuting population, though it is also a
college of repute in the city. All three colleges have both aided and self-financing
programs.
I lived in two undergraduate (UG) hostels in the Christian men’s college during my
time in Madurai (a self-financing hostel for four months, an aided hostel for five months;
the first hostel with two third-year roommates, the second with two first-year
roommates). I attended classes in multiple departments, aided and self-financed,
undergraduate and postgraduate (PG). I participated in youth activities inside and outside
of the college: sitting on campus chatting and people-watching; going to restaurants, tea
shops, bars, parks, and temples; shopping trips; roaming the city; cinema outings;
watching television; going to concerts and other functions; playing sports, etc. I also
conducted a series of film screenings and targeted television-watching sessions with the
hostel students followed by group discussions. I did interviews with day scholars
(‘commuting students’) and hostel students individually and in groups, both male and
female, UG and PG. I also did interviews with college administrators and teachers.
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In the Hindu men’s college I went to UG and PG classes in multiple departments
(aided and self-financed); interviewed male and female UG (aided, self-financed) and PG
students, administrators and teachers; went to college functions (including an overnight
trip to an intercollegiate competition in Coimbatur); and generally hung out and
participated in college social life.
In the women’s college I conducted interviews with administrators, teachers, and UG
and PG students; screened films for the hostel students followed by group discussion; and
hung out with the students on campus as described above.
In addition to my work with college youth, I also kept a residence in north Madurai
where I interacted regularly with a group of local youth (in their mid to late twenties)
some of whom had gone to college, but most of whom had not. This peer group was
mixed by caste/community (Dalit, Thevar, Pillaimar, Brahmin, and Muslim) and class,
but mainly lower(-middle) class. They were engaged in semi-permanent work. I also did
some research (interviews and participant observation) with a branch of the Rajinikanth
fan club in Madurai.

3.1.2 Chennai
I picked Chennai as a site because: (1) It is the state capital and the most
cosmopolitan city in the state; and (2) it is the center of film production and much of
television and print production.
In Chennai I did research in two colleges: a Christian college of elite standing (though
also undergoing the same processes detailed above) and a government college of historic
repute but much affected by the changes in student body detailed above. Both colleges
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have aided and self-financing programs. Both were all-male at the UG and coed at the PG
level, though the Christian college had two coed departments at the UG level.
At the elite college I stayed in one of the hostels for approximately four months with
a single first-year UG roommate who was part of the coed department in which I spent
most of my time. I attended classes in various departments (UG, aided and self-financed);
interviewed hostel students and day scholars (male and female, aided and self-financed),
administrators, and teachers; and generally hung out (as described above). I focused most
of my time on one particular coed department, and attended college functions and
culturals competitions with them, as well as went on a week-long college tour
(‘excursion’; discussed in chapter 2, section 3.3.5).
In the government college I attended UG (aided and self-financed) and PG classes in
a number of departments; interviewed hostel students and day scholars, administrators,
and teachers; and generally hung out on campus. I spent most of my time, however,
among students of a particular bus route (students who ride the same bus route to
college), hanging out with them both inside and outside of the college (e.g., at their bus
stand, on the bus). I attended and participated in their annual bus day, which I discuss in
more detail in chapter 3, section 2.3.1. While in the elite college I interviewed and hung
out with both men and women, in the government college I mainly spent time with men.
As I did in Madurai, in Chennai I kept a nearby residence. There I spent time with a
group of middle-class bachelors working in low-level IT industries, as well as young
working-class men who lived in the area. Both groups informed my research.
In the dissertation I often simply speak of “youth.” I do this when my observations of
college youth are consonant with the non-college-going youth that I spent time with.
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Otherwise I explicitly specify college-going youth. Similarly, for observations that apply
to both male and female youth, I do not qualify “youth” (see chapter 2, section 2.1 for
discussion of this).

3.2. Mass-media production
3.2.1 Television
While in Madurai I did participant observation at a local music television station for
over two months. Here I was particularly interested in compering (‘television hosting,’
‘VJ-ing’), fashion, and the use of Tamil and English on air. I became interested in this
because youth often cited music television comperes as exemplary users of TamilEnglish hybridized slang (“Tanglish”) and fashion, both of which they typified as statusful (“style”). To investigate this I spent time at the studio, interviewed comperes,
technicians, and program directors. I even hosted a couple of shows myself, including a
Valentine’s Day special where I fielded live calls in Tamil about love with my wife
(fiancée at the time). (No other Madurai couple was willing to appear on camera to share
their love experiences!)
In Chennai I worked at Southern Spice (SS) Music, a music television station of
regional (and national) repute. While founded as a south Indian multilingual station (it
boasted VJs who spoke in the south Indian languages of Tamil, Kannada, Telugu, and
Malayalam; as well as Hindi and English), it was mainly an English and Tamil-language
station when I worked there (itself a recent change in the history of the channel). SS
Music was something like the MTV of south India, and at one point was in talks with
Viacom to become their face in south India. This station was very popular among urban
youth and college-going Madurai youth. Here I interviewed producers, technicians
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(editors, camera men, stylists), the VJs, program directors, and marketers. I did work for
the station on shoots, writing scripts and web content, as well as hosting one show and
being a reality-television participant in another. While in Chennai I also interviewed
producers and comperes from a Tamil-language music television station popular among
youth across the state.

3.2.2 Film
While in Chennai I did extensive work on the production of youth cinema. This
included interviews with producers, directors, actors, cameramen, editors, music
directors, fight choreographers, dance choreographers, costumers, and stylists. I also did
participant observation on one particular movie (for a total of four months), doing script
copyediting, location scouting, working on film and photo shoots, and attending editing
sessions and meetings with producers. I also attended film industry functions (film
puujas, 8 audio releases, film releases, 100 day ceremonies) and industry social events
(birthday parties, release parties). I also did library research in Chennai on film reviews
of past youth-oriented films.

3.2.3 Print and radio
In Chennai I conducted interviews with those involved in the English- and Tamillanguage print press that focused on youth. I also did a set of interviews with youthoriented radio programmers and radio jockeys in Madurai.

3.3 Textiles

8

A puuja is a Hindu worship ceremony; in this case to ensure the successful undertaking of the film.
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The third part of my research focused on the production of branded garments and
accessories that were popular among the youth I worked with. This work took place in
Madurai (where I interviewed retailers of export-surplus and counterfeit brands); Chennai
(where I interviewed retailers, distributors/wholesalers, a sourcing agent for Western
brands, and producers and designers of counterfeit brands and quasi-brands); and Erode
and Tiruppur (where I interviewed distributors, wholesalers, and producers of authentic
branded goods for export and counterfeit branded goods for the local market; as well as
with factory owners and owners of retail outlets [for both authentic and counterfeit
goods]). I spent time in the districts for wholesale counterfeit and export-surplus sales in
Chennai, Tiruppur and Erode, as well as visited a number of factories and workshops in
Tiruppur, Erode, and Chennai.

4. Overview of the chapters
I have divided the dissertation into three parts:
Part I. Age, Status, and Gender (chapters 2–3),
Part II. Style and Film (chapters 4–5),
Part III. Style and the Brand (chapters 6–8).
In chapter 2 I look at the age category ‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu as the intersection
between (understandings of) the life cycle, institutions of schooling and marriage, and
mediatized discourses such as fashion and film. I show how central to this age category is
a trope of exteriority; that is, youth are figured as exterior to ‘society’ (i.e., kin and caste
hierarchy), as liminally situated between and constantly distancing themselves from the
age categories ‘child’ (chinna paiyan, lit. ‘small child/boy’) and ‘adult’ (periya aaL, lit.
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‘big man’). I then look at how this trope organizes youth spaces, youth peer groups, youth
activities and their associated semiotic registers.
In particular, I show how youth peer groups—the main site of youth activity and
status negotiation—are constructed through two inflections of exteriority: exteriority
from norms of ‘society’ and its authority structures and exteriority from age and caste
hierarchies. Thus, the peer group is simultaneously a space that motivates status-raising
acts through transgression and a space marked by intimacy, egalitarianism (or at least the
idea of it), and constant status-leveling and peer pressure. The main aim of chapter 2 is to
show how the construction of ‘youth’ is diagrammatic, or indexically iconic, of (a)
youth’s positionality vis-à-vis ‘society’ and (b) their concepts of status as they are played
out in various contexts. In later chapters I explore how this diagrammaticity is mapped
onto various semiotic registers such as youth film (part II) and branded apparel and
accessories worn by youth (part III).
In chapter 3 I examine youth concepts of status, in particular, style and geththu (akin
to ‘cool’ and ‘badass,’ respectively, in the U.S.). I show how these are iconic with ‘youth’
in their logic (both diagram exteriority) while at the same time reinscribing the diacritics
of ‘adult’ ‘society’ that they eschew through troping on them, whereby ‘child’ and ‘adult’
are re-signified as relative terms for deficient and valorized youth masculinity. I compare
and contrast style and geththu with regards to the semiotic registers of which they are
typifications, as well as to the meta-pragmatic stereotypes of (class-linked) personhood
such terms invoke. I then situate these concepts in the dynamics of the peer group; in
particular, I look at how status-raising typified as style or geththu is mediated in the peer
group through genres of status-leveling (teasing, ragging, humor, gift giving, fighting).
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This is an extension of the discussion in chapter 2 where I argue that the dialectically
linked forces of the youth peer group—status-raising and -leveling—are the result of the
construction of ‘youth’ and the zones of its deployment (youth peer groups) as
simultaneously exterior (and thus status-transgressive) and highly intimate (and thus
status-conservative). I show how these forces produce highly hybridized and negotiated
youth cultural forms, thus revealing the ambivalence of youth status. I then return to the
question of gender and why doing style is so problematic for women. I conclude with
reflections on globalization and the idea that youth “negotiate” globalization in their
activities.
If in chapters 2 and 3 I am concerned with how particular signs are taken as iconic of
‘youth’ and thus are capable of indexically entailing status in face-to-face activity, in
chapters 4 and 5 I am concerned with the mass-mediation of ‘youth’ and how youth
engage with such mass-mediated representations of youth status. In chapter 4 I analyze
commercial Tamil hero-oriented cinema as the narrativization of youth status as played
out in the peer group. I give particular attention to the popular actor Rajinikanth, looking
at the representation of status and style in his oeuvre. I then turn to the villain and
comedian as characters who are constructed as inverse images of the hero, and thus as
deficient models of status (the villain as excessive status; the comedian as mismatched
status). What I show is that the image of status portrayed in such films is completely
intelligible within the logic of the youth peer group (both in terms of the semiotic
repertoires involved, the meta-pragmatic typifications of such repertoires, and the
dynamics of status negotiation), thus articulating a critique of approaches to Tamil
cinema which discuss such films through notions of realism/fantasy and (in)coherence. I
20

conclude with comments on the effects of liberalization on such cinema, arguing that they
have intensified the logic of ‘youth’ already present in such films, thus making youth
status even more central to Tamil film and its social life.
In chapter 5 I look at how youth engage with and re-animate the images of status
presented in the kinds of film discussed in chapter 4. First I look at how film acts as a
source register for youth’s own status work. Next I look at the commonsensical
hypothesis that youth imitate their favorite film heroes as an explanation for the fit
between film images and youth performances of status. I argue that this hypothesis is
flawed in a number of ways. Instead I argue that youth use film images because they are
pragmatically efficacious in their own status and identity work (as discussed in chapters 2
and 3) and that this use is independent of ‘liking’ or identifying with a film or its hero.
Moreover, I show that hero-oriented films are designed with such active use and
recontextualization in mind; that is, filmic forms presuppose a particular model of
spectatorship so as to increase their own circulation (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis
2009). I further go on to show that film heroes themselves must negotiate their own status
on- and off- screen according to the same logic of the youth peer group, and that this is
the case because youth engage with heroes’ status-raising performances as they would
with their own peers’ status-raising. I then go on to show how the construction of a
status-ful filmic persona is done in and outside of the filmic text. I conclude the chapter
arguing that the paradigm of “reception” is a flawed way of understanding Tamil youth’s
engagement with filmic representations, arguing for the analytic frame of “re-animation”
instead.
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In part III I look at the consumption (chapter 6) and the production and circulation
(chapter 7) of branded forms on garments worn by Tamil young men. Chapter 6 looks at
how and why youth use branded forms in their efforts at status-raising in the peer group. I
focus on youth’s interest in branded forms in general without a concomitant interest in
particular brands as brands. I investigate this willful ignorance of brands under what I call
the “aesthetics of brandedness” and link this to the concept of style. Over and above the
brand concept, I argue that youth’s aesthetics of brandedness explain how and why youth
are both interested and ignorant of branded forms, whether they be authentic, duplicate,
fictive, or only loosely linked to existing branded forms. I conclude my discussion of
chapter 6 by arguing that what is at stake for youth are not brands at all, but rather an
alternative ontology (that of style), and thus that concepts like glocalization, while correct
in highlighting the complexities of semiotic forms in the era of globalization, ultimately
misunderstand the issue through assuming that we are talking about the “same” thing (of
such-and-such a type) circulating from one place to another.
In chapter 7 I look at how such branded forms are produced and circulated in south
India. First I look at the role of export surplus in circulating particular brands and in
providing particular models to be copied by small-time garment producers. I argue that it
is because export surplus is calibrated with respect to markets outside of India that it can
serve as a source register for the production and circulation of branded garments within
India, both through providing cheap materials and through providing designs that are
assumed by producers to be inherently attractive (and thus viable commodities for their
target market: youth). I then look at how duplicates and the various deviations from
branded designs get produced. I show that, just as in youth’s use and consumption of
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branded forms, the production of such branded forms operates according to a willful
ignorance of brands under an aesthetic of brandedness. It is this logic that explains both
the variability of branded forms and their formulaic-ness. I conclude by arguing that
some of the main assumptions of work on counterfeit brands—that they induce
“confusion”; that they “dilute” brand image; or that they leach off of the “demand” for
authentic brands—are only intelligible under the ontology of the BRAND as understood in
brand meta-discourses of advertising and marketing, as well as intellectual property law;
an ontology that I demonstrate not to be in play among the Tamil consumers or producers
of such branded forms.
The discussion of chapters 6 and 7 returns us to the question of classification, though
ultimately as I have shown, the issue of how different semiotic forms are classified (e.g.,
as authentic, fictive, or counterfeit) cannot be understood outside of, on the one hand, the
meta-semiotic discourses which imbue them with intelligibility and indexical value and,
on the other hand, their situatedness in actual contexts of use (i.e., status-raising in the
peer group). I theorize this in chapter 8 by relating my discussion of Tamil youth’s use of
branded forms to work on brands in the social science and marketing literatures. I argue
that ultimately the brand is a meta-semiotically regimented relationship between a set of
tokens with respect to a brand type; and that such a type–token regularity holds under the
larger ontology BRAND. I argue that this meta-semiotic organization of the brand is
crucial to understand how and why it is that the brand concept holds little traction among
Tamil youth. As I show, this raises serious questions for how we are to understand the
brand in the West, if only because all analysis to date has essentialized and naturalized
this category.
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Having theorized the brand from the perspective of its ontological reanalysis by
Tamil youth, I go on to look at the brand from the perspective of the duplicate or
counterfeit. I do this by discussing Baudrillard’s concepts of simulation and simulacrum.
I show that such concepts ultimately are of the same sign–meta-sign organization that I
explicate earlier in the chapter, though of a special type. I apply this to the concept of the
brand showing how, while the counterfeit under the ontology of BRAND is a
Baudrillardian simulacrum (and thus ultimately reinvests the BRAND ontology with its
reality), the Tamil youth usage of branded forms counts as a simulation of the BRAND
ontology. This, however, forces us to reevaluate the implications of simulation as it is
understood by Baudrillard. I argue, in fact, that we can use the concepts of simulation and
simulacra as semiotic configurations that can and must be empirically investigated and
that have no necessary entailments about the liquidation of reality or history, and thus
need not be accompanied by the burdensome and normative anxieties about the creeping
shadow of capitalism.

In addition to being a contribution to the literatures on youth culture, mass media, and
brands, one of the goals of the dissertation is to understand how the construction of
‘youth’ as an age category among others (and thus, in a sense, as a sociohistorically
located fact of “social structure”) is diagrammatic of a particular tropic logic of
‘exteriority’ from ‘society’ (a reanalysis of that “social structure”) that recruits a range of
signs in multiple media to perform a range of social personae linked to ‘youth’ that have
regularity in their indexical entailments (e.g., of status-raising) and meta-pragmatic
typification (e.g., as style, geththu).
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Methodologically this dissertation demonstrates the necessity of studying social
processes (and the signs through which they live) by articulating how their contexts of
production, circulation, and consumption (or re-animation and use) are coordinated (or
not). This often requires us to link otherwise disparate social contexts. For example, to
understand the brand or film representations I argue that we must have a firm grasp on
the dynamics of the youth peer group, insofar as the logic of the latter is a condition of
possibility on the social life of the former. Further, as I argue in parts II and III this often
requires us to attend not only to discourses about youth, film, and brands, but also to how
these metasemiotic discourses are taken up (or not) in everyday life. It is this movement
between micro- and macro-, between object- and meta-sign that I show to be essential if
we ever want to get a firm understanding of the social reality of Tamil youth.
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Part I. Age, Status, and Gender
Chapter 2 – Youth as Exteriority

1. Introduction
In this chapter I look at how age, status, and gender are articulated in the concept of
‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu. In particular, I show how the construction of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis the
life cycle and age hierarchy (i.e., “social structure”) as ‘in between’ and ‘outside of’ is
reanalyzed by youth through a trope of exteriority from the reified agent ‘society.’ I show
how this is the central logic of youth culture, a theme that I build on variously throughout
the dissertation. I then go on to analyze the constitution of youth spaces and the youth
peer group as ‘exterior’ spaces that make the performance and experimentation with
‘youth’ and its forms possible. In particular I show how the youth peer group is
constituted both as a space of status-raising and -leveling, a theme that I take up in
chapter 3.

2. Age, status, and gender in Tamil Nadu
2.1 ‘Youth,’ diagrammaticity, and gender
In this section I look at the conceptualization of age set in Tamil society, focusing on
the category of ‘youth.’ The literature on youth in Tamil Nadu is scant (Cormack 1961;
Rogers 2008, 2009, forthcoming are exceptions), though a number of authors have
focused on youth in Kerala (Osella and Osella, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b: ch. 7, 2002, 2004;
Lukose 2005a, b, 2009) and Karnataka (partly among Tamil youth; Nisbett 2006, 2007),
both neighboring south Indian states. Work on age in other areas of India and South Asia
is more common: for example, on youth (Liechty 1995, 2003; Derne 1995, 2000;
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Saraswathi 1999; Parameswaran 2001, 2002; Juluri 2002; Verma and Saraswathi 2003;
Verma and Sharma 2003; Abraham 2004; Butcher 2004; Chopra 2004; Mathur and
Parameswaran 2004; Srivastava 2004a, b; Jeffrey et al. 2008), adulthood (Madan 1965,
1981; cf. Osella and Osella 2000b, 2006: ch. 2–3), and old age (Lamb 2000, 2002;
Dumont 1960; Madan 1965, 1981).
This chapter contributes to this literature by looking at the construction of ‘youth’ in
Tamil Nadu. My specific interest is how the construction of ‘youth’ diagrams concepts of
status and gender as they extend into social space and interaction. By diagram I draw on
Peirce’s (1992) notion of iconicity. 1 The diagram is an internally complex icon whereby
the internal relations of one semiotic object—in this case, the construction of ‘youth’ as
an age set—is similar to, is projected onto, and acts as a condition of intelligibility for
some other set of phenomena (e.g., concepts of status, social spaces, socially desirable
figures of personhood, commodity forms) as socially meaningful and thus pragmatically
efficacious.
My interest in the diagrammaticity of youth culture resonates with early work in
British Cultural Studies. What British Cultural Studies pointed out clearly and effectively
is that youth cultural forms diagram the liminal positionality of youth; in their case, of
post–World War II British youth subcultures’ positionality vis-à-vis the “parent culture”
(as both oppositional to and reproductive of its parents’ class position), the mainstream
culture (as selectively appropriating its forms and troping on them), and social class
relations more generally (Willis 1981[1977]; P. Cohen 1993[1972]; Clarke et al.

1

The icon is the semiotic configuration wherein two objects are similar to each other in some regard such
that one of them (the representamen) can stand in for, or represent, the other (the object) to the extent that
they are seen to fulfill such roles (i.e., produce an interpretant).
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1997[1975]; Hebdige 1979). While their analysis of this diagrammaticity as necessarily
instantiating the dualism of ideology and resistance (or individual and society [Williams
2001]) is highly problematic, 2 the more general idea that the conditions under which
‘youth’ is constructed are recursively diagrammed in the cultural forms which make up
that youth culture is analytically useful.
In this dissertation I focus mainly on male youth and often use the elliptical, or
unqualified, term youth. I do this because the concept of ‘youth’ as used by Tamils
themselves implicitly assumes that ‘youth’ and youth culture are prototypically, or
tendentiously, male (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 307). Engaging with youth culture
and being a ‘youth’ for women is, as I discuss variously in the dissertation, problematic
for a number of reasons. Young women—more specifically, their chastity (kaRpu)—are
assumed to be metonyms for the honor of the family, kin group, caste group, and “Tamil
culture” writ large (David 1980; Reynolds 1980; Ram 2000; Ramaswamy 1997;
Niranjana 2001: 48–55; Anandhi 2005; Seizer 2005; Rogers 2008: 90; on other areas of
South Asia see Vatuk 1972; Bennett 1983; Das 1988; Dube 1988; Tarlo 1996; A. Kumar
2002; Ahmad 2003; Sodhi and Manish 2003: 124; Abraham 2004; Lukose 2009). As
such, controls on young women tend to be more stringent, and thus their participation in
youth culture—which, for both young men and women, is proportional to the extent that
they are disengaged from the control of the older generations—is limited and often
problematic (Liechty 1996, 2003: 233; Saraswathi 1999; Verma and Sharma 2003;

2

One recurrent critique is the overfocusing on class, and hence the insistence on reading resistance into
every act (McRobbie 1991; Straiger 2005; S. Cohen 2002[1972]). This is something that follows from the
generally thin ethnography (see S. Cohen 2002[1980]; Murdock 1993[1989]; Griffiths 1996; Peterson 2003
on this point). Nevertheless, even in Hebdige’s (1979: 88–89) discussion there are brief discussions of
youth subcultures which are tangential to class, but instead, for example, take up issues of gender.
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Abraham 2004; Chopra 2004; Lukose 2009). This isn’t to say that young women don’t
have an experience of ‘youth’ that is comparable with that of young men. They do. What
it is to say, however, is that youth culture in Tamil Nadu is masculinized by its very
construction. My discussion, then, focuses on male youth, though I discuss women’s
participation in, and experience of, youth cultural forms and practices where relevant.

2.2. ‘Youth’ as exteriority
‘Youth’—iLainjar, pasangka, valiban, teenager, youngster, or youth—as it is
understood in Tamil Nadu today is a relatively new age category (see Liechty 1995,
2003; Saraswathi 1999; Nandy 2004[1987] for discussion on the emergence of ‘youth’ in
other areas of South Asia). ‘Youth’ is located at the intersection of (understandings of)
the life cycle and age hierarchy; institutions of schooling and marriage; the home; and,
since liberalization, particular kinds of mediatized discourses (e.g., youth-oriented
marketing, mass media, commodity addressivity). 3
First I show how the organization of the life cycle into hierarchically graded age
categories middles ‘youth.’ Then I argue that it is this liminality that youth reanalyze
through tropes of exteriority, which form an organizing logic for a number of youth
practices, concepts of status, and social spaces, most important of which is the peer
group.

2.2.1 ‘Youth’ as social category

3

For a similar understanding of ‘youth’ in Kerala see Lukose 2009: 13 and Osella and Osella 1998: 191.
On youth as an appellated addressee of mass-mediated discourse in South Asia see Liechty 2003;
Mazzarella 2003; Osella and Osella 2000; Lukose 2005a, 2009 (cf. Frank 1997, Clarke, Hall, Jefferson, and
Roberts 1997[1975] for discussion in the contemporary West).
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Within the life cycle ‘youth’ is negatively defined as in between the age sets
kuzhanthaikaL (‘children’) and periyavarkaL (‘adults’; lit. ‘big/important people’); for
men the more colloquial terms are chinna paiyan (lit. ‘small boy’) and periya aaL (lit.
‘big/important person/man’).
While children are contained within the school and the home, adults head households
and institutions (e.g., of schooling). Children are dependents and adults have dependents.
Children and youth are (expected to be) unemployed or do part-time, non-permanent
work (Jeffrey et al. 2008), while male adults as householders are expected to engage in
permanent full-time work. In short, children’s and adults’ place is linked to the
household. Children and adults are within the fold of what youth refer to as the reified
agent ‘society’ (samuugam, samuthaayam, society). ‘Society’ in such Tamil youth usage
refers to, proximally, the kin and caste group and more abstractly to those who set the
rules for legitimate social interaction (i.e., status-ful male adults or their proxies). 4
Where does this leave ‘youth’ then? In this scheme, ‘youth’ is located in between the
objective age categories ‘child’ and ‘adult,’ and thus outside of the kin and caste group
(literally and figuratively). 5 As non-adults, they are excluded from participating in
particular kinds of social activities and decision making (e.g., kin group decisions, caste
politics, financial decisions), as well as from economies of status negotiation involving
mariyaathai (‘respect’) and gauravam (‘prestige’) and their associated indexes (e.g.,
4

In my discussion of ‘adult’ ‘society,’ neither ‘adult’ nor ‘society’ should be taken as descriptions of how
such entities work in the world, but how they must be taken to work by youth so that youth’s own activities
and experiences (which rely on such reifications) are intelligible to them and pragmatically efficacious.
Indeed, I do little to unpack what one could possibly mean by ‘society’ as an analytical construct useful for
describing social life. Instead I use it as a placeholder (as youth themselves use it) to explicate youth
sociality.
5
I mean “objective” here in the sense of being relatively perduring social facts that exist trans-subjectively
such that they can be presupposed across many social contexts. I don’t mean “objective” in the sense of
“natural” or “universal.”
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having dependents [wife, children], patronage, owning land, sartorial codes [e.g., wearing
a veeshdi]). (For discussion of the Tamil concept of mariyaathai see D. Mines 2005: ch.
4). These are the concerns of adults, while young men don’t have, and aren’t entitled to,
any of these things (cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 191; 2000b: ch. 7). 6 Moreover, youth are
explicitly ranked below adults hierarchically, as reflected in prescribed honorific address
and related deference behavior. On the other hand, youth are exempt in large part from
the responsibilities and duties linked to the maintenance of kin/caste honor and the
household, and thus afforded a modicum of independence from ‘society.’
As non-children, young men, while dependents, are given an increased amount of
freedom in terms of moving through public space; usage of their free time; and their
access to small amounts of spending money. This independence is amplified by
educational institutions—which create age-equal peer groups in a space (supposedly)
relatively unmarked by caste and kin—and by assumptions by both parents and
administrators that young men naturally will exert their independence at this age (and this
isn’t necessarily a bad thing).
Indeed, young men are assumed to flaunt and transgress ‘society’ and its norms of
authority (e.g., they will love, drink, smoke, cut class, fight, ‘do’ fashion, etc.). And while
such transgressive ‘youth’ activities are explicitly disapproved of, implicitly they are
expected and condoned and thus encouraged for young men (but not women). The double
standard of ‘youth’ and its ‘boys will be boys’ attitude is reflected in the following
proverb that one youth’s grandmother used to justify his transgressions:

6

Indeed, as per D. Mines (2005: ch. 4) discussion of mariyaathai (also see Dickey 2009a), being excluded
from status economies that accrue mariyaathai places young men exterior to the reference group of adult
men, i.e., ‘society,’ and thus without (or outside of) mariyaathai.
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“pasangka viiddukkuLLee irunthaa kedduppooyiduvaangka.
poNNungka viidde viddu veLiyee poonaa kedduppooyiduvaangka.”
‘If boys are kept inside the house, they’ll get spoiled.
If girls are allowed outside of the house, they’ll get spoiled.’
In addition to mapping youth masculinity vis-à-vis notions of interior and exterior space,
this proverb highlights why ‘youth’ culture problematically applies to young women.
Young women are treated as extensions, and thus emblems, of a hierarchically nested set
of social groupings: HOME < KIN GROUP < CASTE GROUP < “TAMIL CULTURE.” The home is
a feminized space for youth. The imperative for young men, then, is to be in public space,
outside of the gaze of the kin group, and thus by implication to roam around and do
‘mischief’ (see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 94, 179 on youth in Uttar Pradesh; Osella and Osella
1998, 2000b; Lukose 2009 on Kerala; Nisbett 2006: 132 on Tamil youth in Bangalore).
Indeed, one friend’s older sister complained to me that her son wasn’t getting good marks
at his technical college. I asked if he was cutting class and going to the movies instead (a
stereotypical youth activity). No, she replied, at least if he were doing that there would be
some “viiram” (‘heroism,’ ‘masculinity’) in it. He would be doing what other kids his age
do (i.e., getting more mature through bucking authority). As it is, she worries because he
stays inside the home instead.
In short, transgressive youth forms are, while exterior and often anathema to adults,
condoned by them as long as they are contained by the gendered age set. For young men,
they are expected to transgress because that is what boys do. More importantly, such
transgressions further maturation, they don’t spoil it. They don’t ruin the honor of the
family because young men are always already expected to be exterior to it. Compare this
to transgressions by women, considered interior to the family/kin group/caste
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group/culture. Transgressions are likely, in many households, to warrant a beating (if
minor) and even death (if major).
As located in between, young men are assumed to be, by degrees, exterior from both
the objective age categories ‘child’ and ‘adult.’ More than this, below I show that youth
themselves understand their position in ‘society’ as exterior; that is, youth reanalyze the
“social structure” in which they are imbricated via a trope of exteriority.

2.2.2 ‘Youth’ as reanalysis
If schooling (in particular, plus 2 exams 7 ) and eventually college inaugurate the
gradual withdrawal of youth from the spaces of the home and kin group (and thus the age
category ‘child’), marriage is its upper limit. Thus, the (normal) age of ‘youth’ for a man
goes all the way up to 35 years old, the normative upper boundary of marriageable age
(cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008: 31; Osella and Osella 1998: 191; Verma and Saraswathi 2003).
This marks the beginning of serious filial responsibility and duties (and more
importantly, being held to such responsibilities by one’s family). For our purposes here,
more important than the question of when youth are inducted into adult society is how
youth themselves understand this social fact. Youth talked about their experience of this
age before marriage as a time of freedom, before which ‘real’ responsibilities and duties
begin. Before that, they are ‘outside’ of the strictures and censure of the kin and caste
group. This was pithily explained to me by one friend, Vignesh, in a conversation we had
about the observance of caste. Vignesh explained that in the college, and in the peer
7

Plus 2 exams are taken in order to continue studying up to the 11th and 12th standards. Parents often push
for their children to study very hard for these exams. As it takes months for the results to be posted, after
the plus 2 exams youth are generally given a respite for pressures to study. Many youth told me that they
picked up their stereotyped ‘youth’ practices (drinking, smoking, using affinal kin terms with friends, etc.)
only after these exams.
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group in particular, caste was bracketed. Without missing a beat and with an air of regret,
he went on to say that he fully expected to have to increasingly orient himself to caste
after marriage. There was no choice, he noted matter of factly, ‘because that is how
society is here. It makes you observe caste.’ As he put it: ‘After marriage we (all) have to
go inside society/caste’ (“kalyaaNaththukku appuRam samugaththukkuLLee
poogaNum”).
At the same time that youth figure themselves as ‘exterior’ to the hierarchies and
logics that govern adult life and ‘society’, youth also figure themselves as exterior to
childhood as an age category marked by dependence upon adults and containment within
the home. They reject the idea that like children they are immature and without the
faculty and ability to fend for themselves, as students would often complain about the
excessive rules of the college.
This double distancing from childhood and adulthood is expressed in youth’s own
reflexive understanding of what being a ‘youth’ is all about. As they explained, ‘youth’ is
about playing, being free, not being tied down, being without responsibility, and
transgressing boundaries. Young men are assumed to be quick-tempered and
unreflective; direct and crude in their speech; bold, careless, and callous to the demands
of family and ‘society’ and thus self-centered (also see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 191). They
indulge themselves: they go to the movies, smoke cigarettes, drink, roam the town, do
style, love, fight, and do other ‘mischief’ (cheeddai). They are the inverse image of the
periya aaL ‘adult/big man,’ the responsible adult who upholds and enforces ‘society’ and
‘culture,’ who thinks before he speaks, who speaks indirectly and wisely with
mariyaathai (‘respect’), who is responsible not just for himself but for his dependents,
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and is thus fully entwined in ‘society’ (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and Gourishankar
1990; cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b; D. Mines 2005; Lukose 2009). They are also
the inverse image of the chinna paiyan ‘child’ who cowers before and aligns with the
authority of adults and ‘society.’
As such, youth feel themselves to be placed in a double bind: to obey and be
independent. As I show below through the example of facial-hair grooming, young men’s
reflexive response to their exterior position in social structure is the refusal of the forms
and diacritics of both childhood and adulthood. 8

2.2.3 Example: The mustache
In Tamil Nadu the mustache is the sign of masculinity (see Hall 2009: 155–156 on
the mustache in north India). As a commonly cited proverb states: ambiLLaikki miisai
thaan azhaku, ‘it is a mustache that is beauty for a man.’ Asking young men about the
social indexical values of the mustache, I would often get answers like aNmai
(‘masculinity’), kalaachchaaram (‘culture’) or “Tamil culture”; and even
panjchaayaththu thalaivar (‘headman of the village council’; often the leader of the
dominant caste in the village). 9 The mustache is traditionally linked to various kinds of
masculinity—often iconic with social status and aggression (the bigger the better) and
8

Note that this response is, as far as the youth that I spent my time with, a silent transgression behind the
back of, or outside of, ‘society.’ It isn’t rebellion in the face of authority (Juluri 2002). Youth cultural forms
aren’t about generational strife, then, but about exteriorized alterity (qua life stage). This is why the concept
of ‘youth’ in Tamil Nadu largely isn’t that of liberation of a generation per se (which is how it is conceived
of in the West, cf. Bucholtz 2002; Brown and Larson 2003), but of biding one’s time in a liminal life stage
until one is authorized to join the next age set.
9
This is, of course, related to the notion that the mustache is an index not only of individual status and
masculinity, but that of the caste group in general. Thus, historically, only the dominant (and martial) castes
of the village could sport large, beautiful mustaches. Within that, the leader of such castes would have the
rights to the biggest and most beautiful mustache. Lower castes would be required to either be clean-shaven
or to maintain smaller mustaches. Among Hindus, the exception would be religiously oriented castes—e.g.,
Brahmins—whose purchase on status does not hinge on displays of (hyper-)masculinity.
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thus with particular martial castes and professions (police officers, army men, etc.)—and
is identified by most youth as indexical of the periya aaL, the adult man of status,
property, respect. In short, the mustache is an emblem of the male adult world,
particularly of the rural man, the man who inhabits the space of ‘traditional’ “Tamil
culture,” the space maximally interior to ‘society.’ 10
My interest in mustaches was piqued by my viewing of the film Mustaches
Unlimited, a documentary screened at the peNthirai festival (Women’s Film festival) in
Madurai (August 3, 2007). While there, I asked a male college student sitting next to me
why he had never shaved his valiant, but ultimately rather sad attempt at facial hair. His
answer was that not having any facial hair would make him look like a chinna paiyan and
by implication he would be teased by his peers as a deficient youth.
Intrigued, in the following weeks I asked youth about their facial hair. Of those who
could grow full mustaches, few did. In fact, having a(n adult-looking) mustache could
equally draw teasing from one’s peers. Why? The mustache indexes a semi-stigmatized
rural identity (to an urban youth sensibility at least), and to this extent was considered
outdated and old-fashioned. But more importantly, such teasing worked off of the
assumption that an adult-looking mustache on a young man is status-inappropriate and
thus absurd. It associates the young man with an age set to which he does not belong,
presupposing status to which he has no access because by definition youth are excluded
from semiotic gestures that accrue mariyaathai (‘respect’). As another college student
noted, ‘at this age one shouldn’t look like a periya aaL,’ like authority incarnate. ‘We are

10

Note that the rural qua ‘interior’ is infused with a cluster of meanings: ‘traditional,’ following “Tamil
culture,” hyper-masculine; but also backwards, ignorant/uneducated, superstitious, poor, caste-oriented,
hierarchical, and patriarchal.
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youth. What does a college kid need a mustache for? You can’t expect us to act like
serious people (or take on such a persona).’ While facial hair of some kind may make you
look older and mature (i.e., not like a child, which is a good thing), sporting a mustache
makes you look too old which is both ‘ugly’ (asingkam) and embarrassing. 11
Not only is the mustache age inappropriate, it’s often seen as a direct challenge to
adult authority. Indeed, having an impressive mustache would cause trouble with the
school/college administration and parents. It would be an inappropriate sign of
(traditional) authority, an arrogant and threatening gesture to adults who, within the age
hierarchy, are superior to students (cf. Bastian 1996: 119–123 on Nigerian youth
fashion). Such facial hair would also not be tolerated by the college administration
because it indexes modes of masculinity (e.g., the rowdy ‘thug’; 12 or rural caste-linked
identities) antithetical to the socialization task of the college to produce middle-class,
“decent” citizens (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009; cf. Dickey 2009a on “decency” in
Tamil Nadu). Indeed, many students before they went on interviews for jobs or higher
education admission would make sure to—among other things like putting on a tie,
getting a short hair cut, and wearing cologne—shave their facial hair, conforming to their
idea of what a young professional should look like. 13
‘To shave or not to shave?’ became the question for those with the option. A number
of young men opted to shave. When I asked them about this, they indicated that being
clean shaven was a “fashion” (‘trend’) among young men. But why? The answer was
11

After marriage, though, almost all conceded that they would probably (have to) grow a mustache,
something I observed in older friends after their marriages.
12
See Dhareshwar and Srivatsan (1996) for discussion of the rowdy as a legal category in India. See Rogers
(2008) on the college rowdy persona in the Chennai city college that he worked at; cf. Weiss (2002: 103ff.)
on the persona of the wahuni (‘thug’) among Tanzanian youth.
13
Compare this with Jeffrey et al.’s (2008: ch. 3) discussion of the stereotyped comportment of the
‘educated’ in Uttar Pradesh.
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invariably “style,” “banthaa,” or “geththu” (‘cool’ or ‘badass’ in the parlance of
American youth status, see chapter 3 for discussion). Being clean shaven is “different”
from adults, ‘society,’ ‘tradition,’ ‘culture,’ and the village. As one Madurai student from
a village put it,
‘In a village people ask you why you don’t have a mustache, thinking you look
like a woman. In Madurai and other cities they’ll think it’s your style, or a
“fashion.” They’ll think you look like a north Indian.’
The lack of mustache indexes how ‘foreigners’ look, in this case either north Indians or,
as students often commented with confusion and delight when I sported a healthy
mustache, white foreigners. 14
If youth did grow facial hair, they preferred alternative kinds: the goatee (just the
chin); the French beard (what Americans call the goatee); trim (a five o’clock shadow); a
pencil-thin sculpted beard (inspired by urban American facial hair fashion); 15 or just
simply a beard. 16 Such alternative kinds of facial hair were seen as style, as youthful and
playful tropes on traditional norms of grooming.
Note that facial grooming, then, is diagrammatic of the construction and experience
of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis adult and child age sets as ‘different from’ and thus ‘exterior to’ via
grooming styles that index exterior fashions and places. Facial hair diagrams the move
14

My own mustache would often draw quizzical looks and laughs from students. Students got a kick out of
it telling me my mustache was bayangkaram (‘frightening’), thooraNai (‘badass’), but not appropriate for
the college or my age. Indeed, before one visit to a women’s college, my hostel-mates very seriously told
me to push down the ends of my upwardly curling mustache. It would literally be too aggressive and rough
for the college girls; it would intimidate them and thus impede my attempts at research. My shaving of the
mustache, on the other hand, drew comments like: positively, ‘you look like us now, a “youth”’; ‘you now
look like a “real” foreigner’; ‘you look like a “hero”’ (i.e., a film star); negatively, ‘you look ugly,’ or like a
‘small child’ (chinna paiyan).
15
The pencil-thin mustache can be added as a youth fashion from yesteryear, associated with the urban,
“decent,” suave masculinity of older youth film icons like Gemini Ganesan, MGR, and Ravichandiran.
16
Beards themselves are highly communicative; either of ‘love failure’ (kaathal thoolvi) (an association
solidified by the representation of failed love in the film Devdas [1953]) or depression more generally;
alternatively, the beard is seen as reflecting the rough masculinity of the rowdy (‘thug’).
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away from ‘society,’ reconverting alternate and exterior norms of grooming as
emblematic youth forms of status (cf. Weiss 2002 on urban Tanzanian youth’s hair
grooming and tropes of exteriority; Bastian 1996: 111ff. on tropes of masculinity in urban
Nigerian youth fashion).

3. Youth spaces
Youth spaces are those which are exterior to the family and the kin group, either
spatially or virtually through speech chains (i.e., word getting back to your family). They
are spaces where youth can congregate and operate without the censure of ‘society,’
where they can establish alternative norms and forms of status, where ‘youth’ is
performed, played with, and negotiated. As such, ‘youth’ activity constitutes these spaces
as youth social spaces through performances of exteriority (cf. Weiss 2002: 106; Nisbett
2006, 2007). These spaces form a topography of youth activity for college students, often
on route to or from the college campus. Below I give a brief discussion of some of these
spaces, looking at them as spaces whose (literal) exteriority is iconic and generative of, as
a condition of possibility, the enactment of ‘youth.’ I focus primarily on young men’s
spaces.

3.1 From tea stall to theater to college
Youth’s movement across public space maps out youth space (cf. Lukose 2009: 69,
81). One of the prototypical activities of young men is uur suRRathu ‘roaming about’: on
motorcycles (for those lucky enough to afford access to them), on buses, or on foot. The
rhythms of traversal and loitering define youth spaces, as a kind of destination-less
pilgrimage with temporary respites: the tea stall (Cody 2009) or café (for the urban
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elites); internet cafés (Nisbett 2006, 2007); the cinema hall; roadsides; parks (or in
Chennai the beach); temples; the bus stop and the bus itself; shopping complexes and
malls in large urban areas; and the college campus.
Such youth spaces are where youth congregate in their peer groups and form their
territories, their islands of authority. In Madurai such territorial hangout spots are known
by the local youth slang top; in Chennai as addi. In such spaces youth feel empowered:
they can tease and intimidate outsiders and each other; they can engage in jolly and horse
around; they can chat, smoke, and time-pass (n. ‘hanging out’) by listening to film songs,
smoking, and reading magazines. Such spaces are relatively anonymous spaces that
maximize human traffic, and thus the ability to look at other individuals, especially to
sight adi (‘ogle,’ ‘look at’) and comment adi (‘pass comments about’) girls. Such spaces
also maximize youth’s own visibility, allowing them to be foregrounded against the
background of the crowd.
The irony, of course, is that such spaces are visible and yet tend to occlude exposure
to those who are in, or who are connected to, one’s kin and caste network; that is,
hierarchical structures of authority to which youth are answerable. 17 Such spaces are
doubly-inflected in that they allow one to evade (known) authority and transgress
(unknown) authority via public acts of non-normativity. Thus, such spaces get co-opted
and turned into zones of jolly and entertainment, of transgression and youth status (style),
of the expression of autonomy and youth authority.

17

In general, youth spaces are unmarked for age and caste hierarchy; for example, for hanging out youth
tend not to go to small temples linked to particular caste deities, but large ones like the Meenakshi or
Azhagar temples in Madurai.
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The cinema hall is one such youth space par excellence, largely because film and film
watching as ritual practice are largely linked with ‘youth’ and exteriority. The film
theater is historically one of the first non-caste marked spaces in Tamil Nadu
(Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 5). Youth easily turn the cinema hall, with their loud, attentiongrabbing chanting, clapping, dancing, and singing into a space of youth exteriority, where
norms of society can be turned on their head in a carnivalesque inversion (cf. Osella and
Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 290). In the dark anonymous cinema hall one can scream and
yell, whistle, dance and shake, and lose oneself in the collective effervescence of youth.
Cinema in Tamil Nadu is itself, like ‘youth,’ exterior to ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ In
addition to the cinema hall (the physical space of consumption); the diegetic world (the
representational object of consumption) with its transgressive representations of love,
sexuality, and vigilant justice and the cinema industry, perceived as a morally corrupt
world without muRai (‘proper conduct’) (Seizer 2005), 18 are zones of transgression, of
experimentation with alternative cultural forms and normativities, and—especially since
the arrival of television and the receding of the family audience (Nakassis and Dean
2007; Nakassis 2009; Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995)—zones of young men’s
imaginative activity (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 245; cf. Armsbrust 1998 on
Egyptian cinema and youth). Indeed, going to the cinema in the peer group is one of the
first (and most emblematic) behaviors young men do when they begin to disengage from

18

Cinema in Tamil Nadu has always been seen as pornographic, obscene, debased, culture-less, mindless
mass entertainment (Sivathamby 1981: 20; Dickey 1993b: 130–133, 2009b; Rajadhyaksha 1993;
Vasudevan 1995: 2812; Srinivas 1999: 12–13; Derne 2000; Lukose 2009: 51; Mazzarella forthcoming).
Indeed within traditional conceptions of status cinema actors aren’t afforded ‘respect’ (mariyaathai). Even
great actors like Sivaji Ganesan were referred to with non-honorificating forms like cinemakkaaran or avan
(“Film News” Anand 2008). As many Tamils explained to me, ‘we can watch and enjoy such actors, but
nobody wants them in their family or wants people (especially women) in their family to be associated with
them/cinema.’ While this is changing, it is still highly relevant.
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the home. One of the first thrills of young men’s lives in establishing their maturity, their
distance from childhood and exteriority from adult life, is skipping school and furtively
going to the cinema show with one’s peer group. While children, women, and adults
largely only see films with the family, young men see cinema with other young men
(Osella and Osella 2004: 245; Lukose 2009: ch. 2). It’s no surprise, then, as I discuss in
part II, that film is one of the central source registers for youth expressive culture.

3.2 College as youth space
Like cinema, college is a youth space par excellence. This isn’t because it’s more
important as a youth space in terms of frequency or specificity of youth activities but
rather because, like cinema, it holds a particular place in the Tamil imaginary of what
‘youth’ is all about, as can be seen in the copious numbers of college-based films and
television programming of recent years (Nakassis and Dean 2007; cf. Lukose 2009: 49–
51; Osella and Osella 1998: 191 on “college culture” cum “cinema culture”). Indeed, to
the question ‘what did you expect college to be like before you came,’ most students
answered ‘like it’s shown in films.’ College is a chronotopic space–time where
prototypical ‘youth’ activities are supposed to take place: it’s a place for falling in love;
skipping class to go to the movies; doing galaadda (‘fighting,’ ‘creating trouble’);
drinking alcohol and smoking surreptitiously; doing fashion and style; and generally
being jolly and carefree.
College makes this experience of ‘youth’ maximally robust for a number of reasons.
First, college is thought to be, and in many ways is, a place outside of kinship, caste, and
thus ‘society.’ Its historical non-association with caste (as absolute criterion for
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admission) and its association with merit and achieved status (even if strongly ideological
notions) (Beteille 1993[1991]; Sharma 1986) make college a space where objective
hierarchical differentiation based on caste and kin group are partially bracketed; at least,
this was the case in the colleges where I worked (though see Jeffrey et al. 2008; Premi
2004; Rogers 2008; Lukose 2009).
Second, college is literally an exterior space. 19 While parents may ultimately condone
the transgression of its sons in anonymous exterior spaces, they certainly don’t allow
such transgression to take place in the physical space of the home or neighborhood (cf.
Osella and Osella 2000b: 230; Nisbett 2006, 2007). Like other exterior spaces, then, the
college campus affords new possibilities of relatively anonymous and transgressive
‘youth’ activities where society and its forms of hierarchy are deferred or bracketed.
Third, college is a place where everyone arrives relatively anonymous, as opposed to
the school where everyone knows you from a young age. It’s thus a space for the creation
of, and experimentation with, new identities (Parameswaran 2001, 2002; Lukose 2009).
Fourth, college is a space–time where new freedoms are allowed (e.g., of dress, of
how and with whom to spend one’s free time, of how to spend pocket money), but that is
still regulated by an adult-run administration. It thus provides a space for experimentation
and transgression precisely because there is a loosening of restriction but still the
presence of authority. Like the age category ‘youth’ itself, the college constructs youth
experience as a dialectic of freedom from and transgression of rules (largely linked to
administrators’ attempts to socialize students to a middle-class decent persona).

19

The college itself is made up of social spaces of relatively more or less exteriority: for example,
classrooms as interior spaces (populated largely by women) versus benches on walkways, the canteen, the
sports ground, and the front gate as relatively visible and exterior spaces populated mainly by young men.
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Finally, like schools, college brings together a large number of youth and organizes
them in ways that encourages peer group socialization (e.g., in hostels, in class cohorts, in
sports groups). Importantly, college organizes youth by department and year, thus
creating cohorts where age difference is suspended. In college, with few exceptions, one
does not take classes with students of other years or other departments. And because age
is one of the primary modes of reckoning hierarchical difference in Tamil Nadu, such an
organization creates (relatively) egalitarian groups (with respect to objective status
differentiation by age).
For these reasons college assembles youth outside of ‘society’ such that egalitarian
peer groups can be formed, creating new sets of possibility for engaging in youth culture
and establishing novel forms of status and authority. Below I discuss the different ways
that college is constructed and used as a space of transgression and exteriority, as well as
the attempts by the administration of the college to control that transgression and channel
it into the socialization of students to “decency” and individual self-control.

3.3. College and registers of exteriority
3.3.1 College, dress, fashion, and body grooming
College enables the experimentation with new forms of dress, fashion, and body
grooming that aren’t possible at school. Youth engaged in such forms precisely because
they were restricted at home and school.
For example, while the school system has uniforms, the colleges I worked at give
relatively more sartorial freedom. As one on my Madurai hostel roommates Stephen
explained to me, ‘kids feel like they can do whatever in college. No restrictions,
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especially with dress.’ When they get to college they often buy new clothing—
fashionable shirts, jeans, hats, rings, earrings, bracelets, etc.—and get new hair cuts, often
re-animating mass-mediated images of youth personae (music television VJs and popular
film stars). Many students who came in tailored slacks and checkered button-down shirts
within their first year had undergone total transformations, donning (duplicate) branded
shirts, ripped and embroidered jeans, sunglasses, earrings, bracelets, and hats.
Many students in my Madurai hostel grew out their thumb or pinky nails for no other
reason than the fact that in school you are required to keep your nails shortly clipped.
Similarly, one female Chennai college student explained that girls in college often get
new haircuts when getting to college. While potentially fashionable and aesthetically
pleasing, the main motivation is simply to not look like a little schoolgirl or an adult
woman with long plaited hair. (Compare this to the story of a school girl who was beaten
by her teacher and had her ponytail cut off in front of the class for not coming to school
with her hair plaited [Deccan Chronicle 2007].) In general, college students make every
effort to avoid seeming like school children.
At the same time, such college clothing, fashion, and body grooming couldn’t be
done at home. This was especially true for students who come from rural areas. In our
discussions of college life, youth often returned to the things that could be worn or done
at college but not at home. At home youth are less able to transgress and distance
themselves from adult ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ They are less able to express such
exteriority to the extent that in their native place (or sontha uur) their ascribed identities
of family background, caste and community are in play. The clothes that students would
wear in college would attract different looks (viththiyaasamaa paappaangka), scolding,
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and vicious teasing by adults and peers at home (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 6). When going
home male students would often remove their jewelry (especially earrings), cut their hair,
and change into more appropriate clothing. While fashionable in college, their college
attire would be interpreted as arrogance or rowdyism in their hometowns. Similarly, it
was not unheard of to see girls come to and leave college in one dress, but move within
the college in another (Tarlo 1996: 201).

3.3.2 College and language
College is also a place where in addition to new commodity registers, new linguistic
register competencies are learned and used. In addition to acquiring familiarity with
English in classrooms (the exterior language par excellence), college also provides casual
spaces for peer group interaction that facilitate adopting other forms of speech. For many
students (especially from lower-class and rural backgrounds) college affords the
opportunity to be exposed to and adopt new kinds of class-linked registers: decent
(urban) standardized Tamil; English-hybridized Tamil; and youth slang (cf. Jeffrey et al.
2008; Lukose 2009: ch. 5; Smith-Hefner 2007).
In addition, while in the college (but outside of the classroom) students can deploy
highly intimate and colloquial speech styles that are otherwise reserved for in-kin-group
usage. In particular, the use of non-honorific forms, curse words, and fictive (statusequal) affinal kin terms abound in peer groups in the college (and, more generally,
outside of the home). Students explained that at home one has to be more in control of
one’s speech. For example, addressing a close friend with tropic affinal kin terms while
one’s family was around would invite scolding and embarrassment from elders.
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Such censure of language at home, in contrast with the college, is especially true for
young women. In public (and sometimes even at home) young women are expected to be
calm and silent, while on campus they can selectively engage in teasing and boisterous
joking that is impossible otherwise. 20 Even within the college there are more or less
problematic spaces: interior spaces like the women’s hostel, empty classrooms, and the
library are freer, while public walkways and the college gate are more subject to censure
(see Lukose 2009: 54, 57, 147 on gender and space among young women in Kerala).

3.3.3 College and leisure: Love and other bad habits
The case is similar with leisure activity. As one student told me, college is the time
when a young man can learn ‘bad’ (but manly and thus valorized) habits. It’s a place
where one smokes with his peers on tea breaks; drinks with his peers after college (or
sometimes during college); skips class to go to the movies with friends; roams the
campus (or outside of it) looking at girls; spends money with relative abandon; teases
women and loves truly for the first time. At home, such social activity is likely to earn
you a bad reputation and a beating from your family.
Love is one of the most extreme ‘youth’ expressions of exteriority. Love is highly
transgressive, with respect to parents (and to their authority to dictate marriage and
control sexuality), to the kin and caste group (for it represents a break in the patriarchal
20

The disjuncture between home and college is acutely experienced by young women. A number of young
women complained to me that the things that colleges allow them to do are often inapplicable in their own
homes. One particularly intelligent and bold, lower-caste and -class Madurai girl explained to me how at
college they teach you to question, to be equal, and to speak freely with people of the opposite sex. But
when she comes home she isn’t even allowed to sit down when a man of an older generation is present
(e.g., her father, uncles, etc.). As she explained, to do so isn’t considered ‘respect(ful)’ (mariyaathai) to
them. She voiced frustration with her inability to enact the non-hierarchical relationships and different
gender roles that she learned in college. She explained that there is a “gap” because her parents can’t
understand such non-hierarchical relationships and non-traditional gender roles. College (and sometimes
the workplace) is one of the only places where such behavior is possible.
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chain of authority, as well as the possibility for unions with members of other castes), and
even the “culture” at large (which, in such discourses, is represented as one where
children respect elders’ prerogative to choose marriage partners).
And college is love’s chronotope. It’s a space–time where love is made possible,
where members of the opposite sex are given opportunity to see each other and to get to
know each other relatively freely. It’s no surprise, then, that college is the time and place
when most youth expect to ‘do love’ (lav paNRathu), something that largely isn’t
possible for ‘small boys’ (chinna pasangka) in school. To love, then, is to move out of
childhood, to cease to think about the opposite sex as one’s parents do, as a ‘bad word’
(kedda vaarththai). Indeed, for this reason college is seen by parents as an inherently
dangerous place because it’s a place where women’s honor and chastity is likely to be
damaged, and where young men make ‘mistakes’ (thappukaL) (cf. Dube 1988; Karlekar
1988: 159; Mukhophadhyay 1994; Derne 1994; Tarlo 1996: ch. 6; Parameswaran 2001;
Seymour 2002; Jeffrey et al. 2008).

In this section I have highlighted the ways that college is a space that allows youth
culture to flourish. I have stressed that it is college’s status as an exterior space, as a
space between the home and the school—and their associated signs and typification as
‘childish’—that makes it able to function as such a space. Below I look at how the
administrative and institutional organization of Tamil colleges also function to make
college a particular robust site for the expression and performance of ‘youth’ vis-à-vis
transgression.

3.3.4 Channeling transgression
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College functions as a youth space par excellence to the extent that it motivates
transgression through imposing a set of rules and the expectation that such rules will be
broken. Much of the ‘youth’ activity that college students engage in centers on breaking
the rules, either of ‘society’ more generally, or of the college authority more proximately.
Indeed, the colleges that I worked at had explicit rules which attempted to control youth
qua ‘youth.’ For example, for men long hair, dyed hair, earrings, jeans, tee-shirts, loud
colored clothing, ripped clothing, and too many pockets on pants were actively
discouraged or banned on campuses. This regulation of youth fashion is even more
extreme for women (especially in coed institutions) where wearing jeans, tee-shirts,
blouses, sleeveless kurtas, and not using the dupatta are often banned (see Lukose 2009:
86 for a similar case in Kerala). Cross-sex interaction is also often discouraged by
faculty, outright banned by certain departments and in certain colleges. Language spoken
in front of teachers is also highly regimented. Speech in Tamil should be devoid of bad
words, colloquial phrases, and regionalisms, or it should be in English (the academic
language of most colleges).
Such rules are meant to socialize youth to an upper-middle-class, professional
habitus: to be decent, modern subjects, and not local, lower-class, or rural (cf. Lukose
2009: ch. 5). To this end many departments have “formals” day when students are
required to dress the part of a white-collar professional. And indeed, many poorer and
rural students answered the question ‘what have you learned in college’ by saying that, in
addition to ‘youth’ habits like smoking, drinking, fashion, they had learned how to
inhabit a particular kind of valorized persona—the middle-class professional—while
shedding the local and crass habits from their (rural/low-class) background.
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At the same time, however, more often than not youth activity and dress attempts to
distance itself from such rules and from adult ‘society,’ either through pushing their
boundaries or by their transgression. Youth expressive culture in college, in addition to
troping on the indexes of childhood and adulthood in its negotiation between them, also
tropes on the class-based vision of masculinity imposed by administrators and parents.
Instead of dress slacks and button-down shirts with muted colors, youth prefer patterned
bell-bottom slacks and printed button-down shirts in bright colors. Instead of ‘proper
English’ or high-standard Tamil, youth prefer to pepper their colloquial Tamil with
English loan words and slang re-animated from cinema dialogues (cf. Smith-Hefner
2007).
A common point of view of college administrators is that students need rules and
discipline to be controlled. Without this surrogate patriarch students would go “berserk,”
one hostel warden explained, smoking cigarettes until their lungs burst, drinking alcohol
until they poisoned themselves, watching cinema until they went blind, and beating each
other in fights until thoroughly black and blue. However, as the assumption is that it’s
natural that students will break such rules (and thus expected), administrators often turn a
blind eye to students’ transgressions. 21
Hostel wardens, teachers, and other administrators are constantly engaged in a tug of
war with students, a cycle of rule enforcement and transgression. The rules produce the
transgression, as many students cogently explained. The rules make the thrill of exerting
21

There is variety by college, of course. In addition, as colleges have become increasingly privatized, the
level of control and restriction of students has increased. This is ironical because as the image of college as
space of total freedom was spread via the glut of commercial films about colleges in the 1990s the depoliticization and privatization of colleges (both due to liberalization, see chapter 1) has resulted in the
increased control by the administration over student unions and the student body more generally (cf.
Lukose 2009: ch. 4 on colleges and politicization in Kerala).
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one’s own agency and authority possible. Jumping over the walls after curfew; smoking,
drinking, playing cards in one’s hostel room; cutting class to go to the movies or the local
government bar; the collective ritual of making noise in the classroom or during silent
study period in order to provoke disciplining by teachers are all quintessential ‘youth’
moments in the college.
Ironically, this is precisely the reason why many students thought of school life as
better or more fun than college life. While college had more freedom, the presence of
freedom and the menacing implications of responsibility meant that rule breaking had
less thrill attached to it. This, of course, is one of the principles for why youth forms
become even more exaggerated in the college. Not only do increased freedoms allow for
more frequent expression of the forms, the forms must be even more extreme so as to
count as transgression.

3.3.5 Outside the outside: Culturals and the college tour
Among college students, youth cultural forms are expressed in their most extreme
form in college activities where college authority itself is bracketed. For example, college
functions like inter-college culturals competitions or hostel functions often afford youth
the opportunity to go wild, dance with abandon, and put on their best fashion. The college
rituals where this bracketing is the most robust are those take place outside of the college,
physically and cognitively. Below I discuss one such example: the college-sponsored
fieldtrip or tour. (In chapter 3 I discuss another such event from the working-class
government college in Chennai that I worked in: bus day.) Note that “taking place outside
of” does not mean the college is negated or erased. Rather it’s precisely because the
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college is constantly in mind—one is outside the college but with one’s college peers on
a college-sponsored trip—that it is necessary to continually transgress and eclipse the
rules and authority structures of the college. Note that this relationship between the tour
and the college is the same as between youth activity and ‘society’ more generally. The
exteriority of youth does not in any way negate or erase ‘society,’ but rather keeps it
constantly in play, reinscribing it through transgressing and troping on it.
I went on a tour with the third-year class of a coed department from an autonomous
Chennai college to the neighboring states of Kerala and Karnataka for roughly one week.
As one student from the group explained, ‘the college tour is about doing all the things
students do secretly (maraimugamaa) with respect to teachers: smoke, drink, roam,
dance, sing, do fashion, tease, and ogle and romance girls.’ On tour one can do such
things at a fever pitch in new and exterior places in the comfort of one’s peer group. This
is because on tour one is outside of (the rules of) the college, the hometown, and even of
the “culture.” The tour is a safe space for the quasi-ritualistic and orgiastic experience of
‘youth.’ It’s a space for possibility, a space where authority is lenient/absent, but present
(there were only four professors for roughly 120 students on the tour I went on) and one
is left to one’s own devices in the peer group.
This is most revealing for women. On tour young women are expected to, and do,
dress qualitatively different. All the clothes they aren’t allowed to wear in the home and
at college are worn on tour: jeans, tee-shirts, skirts, sneakers, and sunglasses. They let
their hair down (literally) and wear makeup. While normally a woman’s dress is an index
not just of her person, but of the family group, the kin/caste group, the culture, and the
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nation, in the exteriority and anonymity provided by the tour such indexicality is
neutralized.
Even youth who typically avoided stereotypical ‘youth’ expressions (and
transgressions) engaged with them while on the tour. This was most salient in youth’s
obsessive self-spectacularization in their almost compulsive photo-taking. In such photos,
students put on style-ish sunglasses, made muscles or crossed their arms, wrapped
bandannas around their heads or hands, put on their baddest look, and struck a pose like a
film star. Tour provides the opportunity—as does college more generally—to experiment
with, embellish, and exaggerate youth identity.
And as this was students’ own understanding of what the college tour was all about,
they worked hard at making it happen. There was always the anxiety that the reality of
the tour was not living up their expectations: “bore adikkuthu” ‘it’s boring’ was a
common complaint on the tour during the lulls between hyper-kinetic dancing on the bus,
singing film songs, ritualized teasing sessions among students, and drinking and smoking
in the hotel rooms and in the back of the bus.

In sum, youth spaces such as the college provide a literal and tropic exteriority that
enables youth activity, a playing field or stage on which certain semiotic forms can
embody and enact ‘youth’ through the transgression of norms of ‘society’ (or, as proxy,
the college). Just as important as the exteriority that such youth cultural forms index, is
the egalitarian peer group wherein such youth activity is put to use in the negotiation of
status (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2004: 245; Nisbett 2006, 2007 on the role of the peer
group as rite of youth passage; also see Kyratzis 2004: 626). Below I look at how peer
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groups as exterior interactional zones are both spaces of status-raising and of intimacy
and peer pressure. While I focus on the college because of its rich institutional
elaboration of egalitarian peer groups, the dynamics I describe also apply to the noncollege going youth with whom I did research (see Osella and Osella 1998: 191; Nisbett
2006, 2007).

4. Peer groups
4.1. Peer group as space of status-raising and -leveling
If youth spaces are ‘exterior’ spaces that license the experimentation and performance
of ‘youth,’ the peer group is the interactional unit that colonizes such spaces. And like
‘youth’ and the spaces the peer group inhabits, the peer group is constructed as exterior to
‘society’ and its perduring status hierarchies based on age. But what goes on in the peer
group? As we have seen, one of the major aspects of youth activity is the reflexive
distancing from childhood and adulthood. And importantly, such non-alignment to and
transgression of ‘society’ constitute status-raising acts. That is, to transgress authority is
to assert one’s own authority, and thereby constitute oneself as a status-ful individual, if
only through presupposing the status necessary to make the rules. In short, by virtue of its
exteriority to ‘society’ qua norms of adult authority the peer group is a space where youth
are continually engaging in status-raising acts. I take up such status-raising in chapter 3.
At the same time, by virtue of it being exterior to age hierarchy, the peer group is a
space of relatively egalitarian and reciprocal interaction, and thus a space of peer pressure
and intimacy. By egalitarian peer groups I mean peer groups where forms of status that
are ascribed and hierarchical are (relatively) neutralized (see Flanagan 1989). I am
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interested, here, mainly in same-sex peer groups. In mixed-sex peer groups gender is not
neutralized in the same way, and still functions as an axis of hierarchical differentiation
(though still less than it does outside of the peer group) (cf. Flanagan 1989: 213; Osella
and Osella 2000b: ch. 7). Such peer groups are egalitarian not in the sense of being
equalitarian—that is, where all individuals are necessarily equal—but in that (a)
institutionally perduring and ascribed forms of hierarchical status are (temporarily)
bracketed (cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b: ch. 7; Nisbett 2007; see Flanagan 1989:
261 on “egalitarian” as always elliptically modified by “relatively,” following Fried
1967: 28) and (b) the group abides by an ideology of egalitarianism (see Flanagan 1989:
248). Below I look at how the college, in particular, functions to construct the peer group
as egalitarian.

4.1.1 Age hierarchy and negation in the college
One general feature of all colleges I have seen in Tamil Nadu is the senior–junior
division, though the extent to which it is elaborated varies according to the institutional
control over students (e.g., colleges where academics are stronger have more elaborate
senior–junior divisions because of the focus on departmental unity) and the presence of
competing modes of student organization (e.g., bus route or area).
Senior–junior is a relative hierarchical relation (cf. ‘older than X’ or ‘younger than
X’). Hence a third-year undergraduate (UG) student is a senior to a second year and a
first year, and a second year is junior to third years and senior to first years. Postgraduate
(PG) students and alumni are super seniors to UG students (or mighty seniors in some
college slangs).
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This hierarchy is indexed in a number of ways. In address terms, at the beginning of
the year seniors demand asymmetrical honorification: through 2nd person pronouns, verb
agreement (seniors receive 2nd pers. pl. and give 2nd pers. sing.) and verb-final markers
(seniors give but do not receive daa [for men] and di [for women]), 22 as well as in the
usage of fictive consanguineal kinship terms like aNNan (‘older brother’) for seniors and,
less frequently, thambi (‘younger brother’) for juniors.
Within the college age is bracketed and thus less important than year. Hence a junior
who is older than his senior is still required to treat him as a senior. For some students
this created a cognitive dissonance and anxiety. Take, for example, Senthil who had
discontinued his studies at one college and then came to another college a year later,
making him one year older than his cohort members. Over the course of the two years of
my fieldwork he increasingly began to withdraw from the social life of the hostel
precisely because his self-image was hurt by the fact that his same-year cohort members
addressed and referred to him in ways that were dissonant with their age-differential but
consonant with their year equality. On top of that, his seniors, who were of the same age
as he, addressed and referred to him as a junior (and by implication, one of lower status).
Other respect forms, transplanted from “traditional” discourses of status, also apply
between juniors and seniors: juniors shouldn’t talk too loudly around seniors; shouldn’t
do too much fashion and style in front of seniors; shouldn’t smoke (or drink) in front of
seniors unless given permission; and shouldn’t be allowed to get away with breaking the
22

di is a less common usage, as it is considered more intimate/rude than daa which is used quite generally
between intimates. daa is the (relatively) unmarked category, while di is marked for feminine gender of
addressee. Youth in their peer groups use daa easily and commonly (to the extent of it being emblematized
in the youth-oriented music channel, SS Music’s show “College da [sic]”). di is also occasionally used
tropically between two men when one is putting the other down or teasing him, figuratively treating him as
a woman.
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college rules (e.g., using cell phones, wearing tee-shirts, etc.). Seniors are allowed to
scold their juniors, but the opposite would be grounds for a physical confrontation, as I
saw on multiple occasions. Seniors can question a junior and inquire about whatever
information he pleases, though this can’t be reciprocated. The property of juniors is the
public property of seniors, though juniors can’t use seniors’ property without permission.
In the hostels, the control of the television remote—always a contentious form of public
property—always rests in the hands of the seniors.
When I asked why all of these restrictions exist, students answered that it’s the
seniors way of showing their geththu (lit. ‘prestige,’ ‘power’), of figuratively showing
that they are the periya aaL in the college or hostel. Changes to this inter-year hierarchy
(e.g., democratizing access to the television remote), one third-year student explained to
me, would result in a fight, both between seniors and juniors and between seniors and the
administration. To cede their rights to juniors would create a gauravam (‘honor,’
‘prestige’) problem.
At the same time, seniors have duties toward juniors. They are supposed to help them
and give them advice in their college life, in their studies, and in their own intra-group
problems. Like a higher-status adult (periya aaL) it is the seniors’ duty to resolve
disputes among juniors and mete out judgment. There is also an element of affection (if
developed over time) mixed with the sense of distance, fear (of juniors toward their
seniors), and duty (cf. the aNNan–thambi ‘older–younger brother’ relationship).

4.1.2 Ragging
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As we noted above, juniors are made to be less free than their seniors. This is
institutionalized in the ritual of ragging (something like hazing in U.S. fraternities). 23
While ragging in India in recent years has gotten much negative press (CURE 2007;
Indiaedunews.net 2009; Jesudasan 2009; Oneindia.in 2009; Saqaf 2009; Sharma and
Bodh 2009; Vijay Kumar 2009; The Hindu 2010) and has been deemed illegal due to the
extreme cases of sadism licensed by it, ragging in a mild or light form was practiced as a
ritualized expression of the senior–junior relationship during my fieldwork. Ragging is
one of the processes by which seniors ‘control’ freshers (‘first-year students’). It usually
lasts from the beginning of the year until the first department or hostel function (for intradepartmental or intra-hostel ragging respectively), usually three months into the
academic year.
During this period freshers are forced by seniors to be figurative chinna pasangka to
their periya aaL. Through ragging, juniors are forced to give respect to seniors in
exaggerated rituals of status hierarchy. Ragging is a way to put freshers in their place, to
socialize them to the year hierarchy (and by implication to within-year egalitarianism),
and to the college rules. Indeed, it is really only during the ragging period that hostel and
department rules are made to be followed to the letter by freshers.
Ragging practices range from seniors, most often in a group (i.e., for an audience),
‘calling’ (kuuppiduRathu) juniors to where they are sitting (thus already instituting

23

Rogers (2008) wrongly glosses ragging as “bullying.” While ragging could be understood as a kind of
bullying, this term does not capture the cultural meanings associated with ragging insofar as ragging is
something particular to colleges (and only by extension to other organizational cultures); further, ragging
acts not as literal dominance but as diagrammatic of larger social and symbolic configurations. Moreover,
bullying imputes a particular kind of intentionality and outcome (dominance/submission) which isn’t what
ragging is always about. As I argue in this section, it is as much about the formation of intra-year cohorts
through the diagramming of social difference by year. Further, while one can bully someone of the same
year (or higher), one can’t rag someone of the same year (or higher).
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hierarchical difference) and asking them, roughly and directly, often invading the
physical space of the fresher, their name, their hometown, etc. A typical question–answer
turn-taking structure would be like this:
Senior: eey, ingkee vaa daa.

Senior: ‘Hey, come (-hon.) here man (-hon.).

nee entha uur?

Where are you (2nd pers. sing., -hon.) from?’
<direct eye gaze>

Junior: chennai.

Junior: ‘Chennai.’ <eyes downward>

S: avan chennai NNu sonnaan!

S: <To overhearers:> ‘He (-hon.) said (-hon.)
he’s from Chennai!’

Through asymmetrical address and question initiation, as well as repetition via reported
speech constructions a diagram of hierarchy between years is created. While third years
have the right to question, to comment, and to speak about another’s words, juniors are
expected to only talk when questioned (and only to the questioner), and to give concise
answers with eye gaze downward and body comportment consonant with submission.
Other kinds of ragging take the form of ritualized teasing, forcing a junior to do
something embarrassing; for example, hugging and kissing a tree; standing in one place
and repeating whatever the senior says while doing some other attention-requiring task;
singing a song (e.g., a film song, the college song, or at one Chennai Hindu college, the
college’s Sanskrit prayer) or, as in one Madurai college, doing the college salute (where
the junior is forced to put his hands on his crotch, gyrate his hips erotically, stamp his
right foot and then salute to his seniors); flirting with female strangers, professing their
love, or singing them love songs (something highly embarrassing for young students). I
have even seen a professor who, during class in an ice-breaking exercise, ragged a firstyear student by making him stand in front of the class and sing and dance. Then the
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student was ordered to pretend he was directing the current sexy-girl of Tamil cinema,
Namitha. In the name of ragging juniors are often forced to take seniors to the movies, to
restaurants, to go on errands for them (e.g., getting them cigarettes, food, or other items),
or to just straight-up give them money.
But ragging at these colleges isn’t just about lowering the status of juniors,
embarrassing and humiliating them (though it does this). Ragging is also about
minimizing status-difference between juniors. Thus, anything that typically raises the
status of the juniors is forbidden. For example, one of my Madurai hostel roommates at
the beginning of his first year was forced to only wear lungis in the hostel and not the
more style-ish tracks shorts that he was used to. 24 Nathan, a friend studying in Coimbatur,
told me over SMS that “one guy [a senior] physically forced me to remove my
Livestrong [bracelet].” 25 Nathan was also forced to stop wearing his hip-hop inspired
clothing, and instead switch to more dowdy “formals” (slacks and button-down shirts). In
a Chennai college that another friend studied at, first years are only allowed to wear
formal clothes (no tee-shirts, jeans) but always had to look “shabby”: their shirt couldn’t
be tucked in and they could only wear plastic bathroom slippers (i.e., no leather slippers,
no sneakers). Students are also often not allowed to do other typical ‘youth’ activities like
going to common hangout spots like the movies, the mall, or the beach. In short, freshers
are banned from activity which status-raises or performs ‘youth.’

24

A lungi is a stitched piece of patterned cloth worn by men that is wrapped around the body. In Tamil
Nadu, it is considered an informal kind of clothing, worn by many at home, but only by the low-class in
public.
25
The Livestrong bracelet is a rubber bracelet that, through purchase, supports cancer treatment. It was
started by Lance Armstrong, the famous cyclist. Such bracelets were considered ‘cool’ (“style”), and were
popular among young hip guys at the time.
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In effect, ragging attempts to make everyone in the age cohort equal. This gets
reflected in who gets ragged. Indeed, it’s those who status-raise or are viewed as higherstatus (e.g., the English fluent, the fashionable, the rich); those who do not acquiesce to
status-equalization and insist on their right to status(-raise) (cf. Lukose 2009: 190); and
those who stand out or stand up for themselves who get ragged most intensely. The
intensity of the ragging, thus, is proportional to the response to the ragging. One who
does not play along—a sign of resistance to the year hierarchy—gets ragged more. (One
can see how this can easily end up in runaway ragging that ends up hurting people,
physically and emotionally.)
In an interesting example that highlights how gender works into this, consider the
example of a female, first-year student in an predominantly male college. Only her
department and one other had female UG students. Because she speaks English fluently
and confidently; is visibly well-off and wears stylish clothes; was often visible in the
public spaces of the college campus; and speaks comfortably with members of the
opposite sex in public (all of which are considered ‘bold’ for women and presuppose
some level of status), the seniors of her department saw her as showing off, and thus in
need of being ragged (cf. Rogers 2008: 90; Lukose 2009: 193–194). Calling her to them,
they made her sing for them and then made her ask for their forgiveness. By contrast, her
classmate who is quiet and demure received little to no attention from the seniors in the
department, except for comments praising her ‘character.’
When ragging breaks down, that is, when a student will not participate to the point
that it becomes a showdown between senior and junior, drastic measures are taken. A
student who is defiant in the face of ragging risks physical beating. More interestingly, in
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colleges where hostel or department identity is taken very seriously, resistance to ragging
risks ostracization from the same-year group. Students who don’t share the experience of
ragging, who opt out of it, are intentionally excluded from the peer group throughout
their three years of college.
The hostel or department function which signals the end of ragging—a welcome
function for the first years—spectacularizes ragging in a public culturals event where
freshers are expected to take the stage and perform irrespective of their talent (and often,
in inverse relationship to it). Here public ragging in front of everyone, including
professors, is performed. Students are forced to perform under non-ideal conditions:
seniors will play the wrong song for them to sing; will force them to dance embarrassing
steps to songs they weren’t planning on dancing to; and will boo and heckle them if they
make mistakes (and sometimes even if they don’t). Here being on stage—where visibility
and display of talent presupposes status—entails being ragged. For those who don’t take
the stage, they are made to do funny things during other people’s performance (e.g.,
dance behind the performers on stage, walk in front of them and give the traditional
greeting gesture vaNakkam to the crowd, or go and “hold up” the trees which are
“falling”).
Ragging has two effects. First, it fosters inter-year familiarity. Juniors and seniors
learn each others names through the interactional ice being violently broken. Moreover,
forms of affection through common rites of passage are developed. Second, and more
importantly, it creates intra-year solidarity. 26 Egalitarian peer groups within years are

26

In one Chennai college I that worked in there was an attempt to stop ragging by having an orientation
function at the beginning of the year. The point of the orientation was to replicate the function of ragging in
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formed through the creation of hierarchical classes between years. Ragging is the time
when strong bonds among first years are formed and where their in-peer-group
nicknames are often generated (the embarrassing ragging event as baptismal event). Such
egalitarian groups are—just as with youth’s relationship to ‘society’ more generally—
formed in distinction to, and ‘outside of,’ the hierarchical organization of social groups
by year.
Indeed, at the Madurai and Chennai colleges that I lived in, many students, juniors
and seniors, lamented that not enough ragging was going on in their colleges. The
evidence for this, they said, was that there were too many divisions within year cohorts
because ragging had not forced solidarity among the students. This had resulted in
unnecessary fights among first years (who didn’t know each other) which had gotten out
of control (because seniors were not involved enough to regulate such “groupism”).
Moreover, many students expected and looked forward to the thrill of being ragged. Light
ragging was seen as jolly, as a necessary part of the college experience, by both students
and administrators. 27

4.1.3 Intimacy and the peer group
As an interactional space, as we have seen, the peer group is constructed as exterior to
‘society’; in particular, to perduring modes of hierarchical status-differentiation by age
(and within the college, year), and thus as a kind of egalitarian space. While on the one
hand such ‘exteriority’ motivates status-raising vis-à-vis transgression as central to the

another form (friendly, equalitarian socializing). Students were forced to meet each other, learn each
others’ names, and speak. Ragging continued on anyway, though under the radar and in attenuated form.
27
As one hostel warden noted, “I’m not supposed to say this, but ragging is necessary in the college.”
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peer group, it also motivates intimacy, reciprocity, and peer pressure toward conformity,
as I discuss below.
The peer group is an extremely tightly knit space of intimacy. Within the peer group,
everyone has rights over everyone else; property is common and youth share clothes,
beds, cell phones, notes, and food. The peer group is also a space of reciprocity. For
example, one mode of phatic communication among peers is the forward SMS. The
forward SMS is a text message not authored by the sender and not addressed particularly
to the addressee. It’s usually a poem, a joke, or a saying. Like the gift (Mauss 1954),
youth sent such messages not because they had denotational content relevant to anything
in particular, but because they established and maintained social relationships. Youth sent
such messages compulsively. They also complained if you didn’t respond in the form of
another forward SMS, as I found out when one student confronted me questioning my
commitment to our friendship because I was not reciprocating by sending forward SMSs
to him.
The reciprocity and commonness of property and space of the peer group assumes
and creates intense intimacy among youth, linguistically, emotionally, and physically.
Linguistically, in the age-equal peer group youth do not use honorific forms (in the verb:
-iingka, -aar, -aangka; pronominally: niingka, avar, avangka) in address or reference,
except ironically. Instead they address and refer to each other using intimate/impolite
pronouns (nee, avan, avaL), verb endings (-e, -aan, -aaL), address markers (daa, di), and
insult/curse words. The most common address forms in the male peer group are fictive
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kinship terms for affinal kin, 28 either of the same generation—maappiLLai (variants:
maapps, maappu), predominantly in Madurai; machchaan (variant: machchi),
predominantly in Chennai—or of an older generation—maamaa (variant: maamu,
maams). 29
Bracketing their literal kin meanings such address terms index equality, solidarity,
and intimacy among youth in the peer group, something like ‘dude’ or ‘brother’ in the
U.S. (Kiesling 2004; cf. Smith-Hefner 2007 on Indonesian youth slang). The tropic usage
of such forms begins for most youth around the same time they begin to go to the movies,
to smoke, to drink, and to love; that is, when they move outside of the home into their
peer groups. Note, again, how youth cultural forms reinscribe larger social relations from
28

Other fictive kin terms were also used—pangaaLi or pangu (lit., ‘men who share a stake in the property
of the patriline’); baavaa (equivalent to maamaa in Telugu)—though with less frequency. The term
pangaaLi is used primarily in Madurai and Theeni. Its fictive usage is slightly out-of-fashion in Madurai
(but not in Theeni as I observed), dated to the mid-1990s (Bernard Bate, personal communication, 9.15.08).
Women’s age-equal in-group usages didn’t, to my knowledge, use female affinal kin terms. Rather, English
words (e.g., girl, loose-u ‘crazy person’) and insult words (e.g., panni ‘pig’) were used. Or, among the
urban affluent (or in women’s colleges) men’s tropic affinal kin terms like machchaan or machchi were
reappropriated and used between women (cf. the higher usage of daa among women than di). Note the
masculinization here of women’s youth cultural forms.
29
The first two are literally terms for one’s male cross-cousin or sister’s husband, both kin positions being
the same under preferred cross-cousin arranged marriage in Tamil Nadu (Trautmann 1981). Maamaa
literally refers to classificatory mother’s brother. In northern Tamil Nadu maamaa is also used to refer to
mother’s brother’s son who is older than ego, while in southern Tamil Nadu machchaan is used for
mother’s brother’s son who is older than ego. In northern Tamil Nadu machchaan refers to mother’s
brother’s son who is younger than ego while in Madurai maappiLLai is used for this relation. In northern
Tamil Nadu maappiLLai is only used for the ‘groom’ (as it also is in southern Tamil Nadu). Such fictive ingroup meanings are a projection from Tamil kinship structures where one is more emotionally close with
one’s affines. Indeed, maamaa gives ego a daughter (Trautmann 1981; Kapadia 1995). Such cross-cousin
terms, then, trope on this kin intimacy and generalize it to intimacy among equal peers. Interestingly, such
terms are the most egalitarian in the kinship structure. While the relations of the patriline are fraught with
hierarchy, distance, and respect, cross-kin relations are marked with informality, fun, and intimacy. Hence
terms like (periya/chiththa-)appaa ‘(older/younger-)father’ (father or uncles) or aNNan/thambi
‘older/younger brother’ are avoided within the peer group. (The only exceptions to this are: [a] the joking
usage of chiththappu, a formation from chiththappaa [father’s younger brother], to refer to a member of the
class who is either older than everyone else [and hence is like an uncle] or who acts too much like an adult,
who is too responsible, etc.; and [b] pangkaaLi, though note that this is the only consanguineal kin-related
term which is symmetrical and thus age-neutralized in its semantics.) Within the cross-cousin terms those
used the most fictively among young men—maappiLLai in Madurai, machchaan in Chennai—in their kinliteral usages specify ego as of the same age or younger than addressee; that is, the terms where age-linked
status is neutralized in their literal semantic content are precisely the ones used tropically by young men in
their peer groups.
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‘society’ by tropically figuring themselves as exterior to, or transgressive of, those very
social relations.
Similarly, there is a high degree of physical intimacy among young men: for example,
sleeping in the same bed, holding hands, and sharing food. At this stage in life the peer
group, youth explained, is the substitute for the kin group, and the ‘attachment’ (paRRu)
between kin members is transferred to one’s peers. Indeed, within the peer group young
men actively distanced themselves from kin, tropically erasing kin relations by resignifying kin terms as in-peer-group usage. Moreover, amongst friends there was an
active avoidance of discussing actual kin relations.
Note that with the exception of youth peer groups, all such intimate acts are contained
within the caste (e.g., sharing the same plate is reserved for caste-mates) and kin group
(e.g., sharing property, using kin terms, feeding each other, sleeping in the same space).
While the institutions of caste and kin attempt to regiment such intimacy and contain it
within the group, youth peer group intimacy is highly transgressive of the hierarchical
norms implicit in the regulation of intimacy. Adults often find such physical and
linguistic intimacy disturbing precisely because they cross the lines of social grouping
drawn by ‘society’ (Osella and Osella 1998: 191, 2000b: ch. 7; Nisbett 2007). Youth peer
groups defer and bracket these lines and replicate them tropically within the youth peer
group.
Moreover, much of this intimate youth activity can’t be done outside of the peer
group as it is insulting to the (adult) onlooker. 30 Projecting the norms of the peer group

30

As one of Rogers’ (2008: 91) informants puts it (though Rogers’ gloss as “rebellion” is misleading):
“Explaining his [the informant’s] moral inconsistency toward female students, he noted that he had ‘two
personalities, one for the home and another for college life.’ At home in front of his parents, he had to
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outside of it is the quickest way to get taken down a peg (verbally or physically), and is
thus avoided.

4.1.4 Peer pressure and the peer group
Because peer groups are so closely knit, because there is no pretence of maintaining a
polite distance (to allow the other to maintain face), peers can be incredibly blunt and
critical of each other. As I found out, my increased acceptance within the hostel was
revealed when students began to stop holding back their criticisms of me. As I noted at
the time:
“One stage in the increase of intimacy here is the boldface statement of one’s
dislike for something about the person with whom intimacy has increased. E.g., 2
weeks have passed and now people I’ve become more comfortable with have no
hesitation in saying what they think: your arms are flaccid, you’re glasses don’t
look good, you looked better without a mustache, you don’t know anything about
Tamil, your Tamil has gotten worse, you’d look better with a haircut, etc.” (Field
notes, 7.26.07).
Such intimacy opens the doors to constant status-leveling and peer pressure to act or be a
particular way, thus creating status-sensitivity, an anxiety to keep up with and be
constrained by the peer group. Students often commented that when they came to college,
whether or not they looked forward to their ability to engage in youth fashion, they were
obliged to. Students explained, if everyone around you is doing X and you are doing Y
(where X is of equal or higher value than Y), you will naturally feel that you should do X.
Students felt the compulsion to dress a particular way—for example, switch from
wearing a lungi to wearing track pants; to get a nice cell phone, fashionable shirts, and
appear meek and studious; however, if his college cohorts were to take him seriously, he had to be seen as
being rebellious and nonchalant.”
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jeans—and to speak a particular way—for example, to lose their regional dialects. Youth
are constantly monitoring, borrowing and redeploying what others do. And they are
explicit about this logic: ‘everyone else is doing it, so I figured so should I.’
As the above discussion shows, then, there is an inherent tension in the youth peer
group. On the one hand, the peer group licenses the performance of ‘youth’ and the
transgression of adult authority as status-ful. The peer group, then, is a space of statusraising. On the other hand, as constructed based on the trope of exteriority from ‘society’
qua hierarchy, the peer group is a space of intimacy, egalitarianism, and reciprocity.
Thus, attempts to status-raise excessively (i.e., reintroduce hierarchical ranking within the
peer group), to project oneself as better than the rest of the group are met with statusleveling, as I discuss in chapter 3. There is, then, a tension between status-raising and
peer pressure to conform (status-leveling) which is inherent in the peer group and
resolved in interactions between youth in various sways (see chapter 3).

4.2. Note: Axes of peer group formation
Above I have discussed some features of peer groups in general. Peer groups, of
course, also form based on various interests and sociological factors within which they
are (relatively) egalitarian, as described above: for example, economic class and
community (caste, religion, ethnicity/language); department or bus route/area;
performance in academics; interests and leisure (e.g., music, film, sports, etc.); and youth
status (i.e., the more transgressive youth tend to hang out more together, versus the more
conventional; see chapter 3, section 2.1 for discussion). Below I describe caste and
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community; ethnicity, language, and social class; department and bus route; and
performance in academics.

4.2.1 Caste and community
Social grouping by caste and community is a touchy subject among (college-going)
youth because of the politicization of these categories (cf. Lukose 2009: 177 on the
unspeakability of caste in the college she worked in). While I was doing my field work,
serious caste conflicts taking place in Tamil Nadu’s law colleges (Vannan 2008;
Viswanathan 2008) and Christian-missionary targeting attacks in northern India
(Frontline 2008) heightened this sensitivity.
While in many government colleges in southern Tamil Nadu peer groups are
explicitly defined by caste affiliation—more precisely, perhaps, on the binary axis
“scheduled castes” (SC or Dalits) versus other castes (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers
2008; Lukose 2009)—in the colleges I worked at neither caste nor religion were explicit
ways that students organized themselves. Or at least, so they said. Indeed, some students
did orient themselves, sometimes unintentionally, by community. On learning that an
acquaintance was of the same caste, some individuals found themselves more at ease and
more comfortable, as youth explained. 31 Caste would emerge most saliently in the
college if a conflict took on a caste element (e.g., if one person insulted another based on
caste; or in an ad hoc way when one conflict—e.g., departmental or personal—escalated

31

In Jeffrey et al.’s (2008: 93) discussion of caste among young men in Uttar Pradesh, one of their
informants voiced an opinion that echoed how my own informants explained it to me: on meeting a castemate one feels “a strange feeling of happiness welling up from inside,” and feels obliged to help that
person.
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by mobilizing fellow caste-mates), or, as students alleged, during student elections where
candidates would use caste as a word-of-mouth campaign mobilizer for support.
However, explicit discussion of caste and religion, or even open recognition of an
individual’s or peer group’s caste makeup, was looked down upon (see Lukose 2009: ch.
5 on a similar situation in Kerala; Nisbett 2007 among Bangalorean youth). Students
disavowed caste. Caste, they opined, was something that adults observed, either in the
home (or hometown/village) or by the administration. (For a number of Christian
students, coming to college was the first time they actually learned their caste because
this was when they had to show their caste-affiliation document to the college
administration in order to be admitted.) One’s peer group was not about caste or religion,
or at least shouldn’t be, students proclaimed. Indeed, one third-year student in my hostel
in Madurai told me that he was excluded by members of his hostel age cohort in his first
year because when he came to the college he chose to spend his time with older members
of his (SC) caste. This was offensive to the other students (including other first-year SC
students) both because it distanced him from them by year, but also because it explicitly
prioritized caste as the basis for social relations. That said, during my research time I did
not observe any peer groups that were totally caste homogeneous. This was largely
because there were more important identities within the college: ethnicity/language,
social class, department, and area/bus route.
While there are a number of reasons that might account for why my analysis diverges
from other’s work regarding caste in colleges (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers 2008; Lukose
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2009), 32 one important reason is that I am concerned to draw out a particular age-based
logic that, at least according to my observations, was common across all peer groups, be
they caste mixed or homogeneous. I discuss this further in section 5.2.

4.2.2 Ethnicity, language, and social class
Ethnicity and language were clear divisions in all the colleges I went to, and students
often appealed to such divisions, either simply noting them or in disparaging members of
other groups. Hindi speakers, Malayalam speakers, and students from northeast India
were often self-contained groups. Such groups were relatively spatially separated (in
terms of hangout spots in the campus; classroom seating; seating in the mess),
interactionally distinct (they did not mingle as much with students of other groups and
spoke different languages amongst themselves), and ragged internally.
Social class was less often explicitly spoken of as a division between students, but
could be observed as a principle of differentiated peer groups (cf. Nisbett 2007). This was
compounded in two ways. First, many upper-class Indians are (semi-)fluent in English
due to English-medium schooling. This prestige code choice forced a clear separation
between those who could speak English and those who could not (and who could only
speak Tamil) (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion and his telescoping of this difference into a
difference of caste; Lukose 2009: ch. 5). Second, many richer students tended to be in
self-financing courses held at a totally different time of the day. For such students there

32

Some possible reasons are: four out of the five colleges I worked in were non-governmental, autonomous
colleges; three of them had substantial middle-class student populations (or, at least, such a reputation,
thereby providing a normative force for students of other backgrounds); three of the colleges were Christian
institutions; area was largely coterminous with caste in the Chennai government college (and thus perhaps
obfuscated by bus route/area); perhaps I simply was not looking for it in the right way; or perhaps it simply
was not in play during my fieldwork.
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was little overlap with their aided counterparts. This difference was often reanalyzed by
poorer students not as class per se but as the difference between students who showed off
(“scene pooduRathu”) with their style-ish clothes and English and those who did not.
That is, in cases where the egalitarian peer group could not sustain itself due to perduring
group-internal hierarchy rankings, students reorganized themselves into relatively statusequal peer groups (see Nisbett 2007 on a nice discussion of this). Sometimes, but not
always, this involved class. In chapter 3, section 2.4 I discuss differences between
concepts of status and social class in more detail; in chapter 6, section 2.4 I discuss social
class and use of branded forms qua status-ful objects.

4.2.3 Department versus bus route
In this section I compare the two colleges in Chennai where I worked. Both are
longstanding institutions in Tamil Nadu with very different student populations. One is
an elite college which draws heavily but not exclusively from an upper-middle-class
student body from all over Tamil Nadu and the other is a very affordable government
college whose student population is decidedly lower-middle-class from Chennai and its
surrounding (rural) areas. These two colleges embody very different kinds of masculinity
and peer group formation, as I discuss in chapter 3. While the elite college is typified by
its students and those of the other college as “style” and “decent” (i.e., fashionable and
[upper-]middle-class), the government college is a “geththaana” and “rowdy college”
(i.e., tough and working-class) (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion of the Chennai city college
that he worked at).
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In the elite college, one of the main principles of group formation and identity is
department. Students organize themselves based on their department and department
rivalry is common. Ragging takes place within the department; functions are by
department; tours are by department; and the spatial organization of peer groups on the
college campus is based on department. This is because students’ classes are assigned by
department and year (only language classes in the first year are cross-departmental). Thus
students spend almost all of their time with people from their own department–year
cohort with little chance to meet students from other departments or years. This is
compounded because, as this college is “autonomous”—in effect meaning that there is no
appealing administration decisions to discipline students—attendance regulation is
rigorous. Moreover, area (‘neighborhood’) is not a primary axis for peer group formation
because students come from all over the city, state, and country and thus neighborhood
concentrations of students are low. Further, the wide range of social classes of students
mean that transportation to the college is distributed: some come in car, some on bike,
some by bus, some on foot. As such, besides department–year at this college there is no
unified institutional principle to organize students’ peer groups.
This was not the case at the Chennai government college where I researched. Here (1)
many groups of students do come from the same area; (2) their socio-economic
background is relatively homogeneous and thus they mainly come to the college by bus;
(3) attendance is lax as administration control of students is weak and thus students spend
a lot of their time outside of the classroom in their (area based) peer groups. In addition,
(4) this college had been a training ground for political parties pre-1990s. As students’
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political identity was eroded in the 1990s by administrative and government action an
identity vacuum was left in its wake.
The result is that department is not a founding principle of peer group formation.
Rather, it is the bus route; that is, the group of students who ride the same bus route to the
college. The bus route is a named entity based on the name of the bus route, either as
number or name: for example, Route 99, T. Nagar Route, or Velachery Route.
In this college area and bus route are so dominant that the junior–senior divide is not
rigorously maintained, instead being subsumed by the route. (Ragging a member of
another route is a provocation for a confrontation between routes.) Ragging itself is
highly attenuated and not institutionalized through department functions. Instead there
exist powerful rituals and activities to socialize the students to route solidarity. The daily
ritual of riding the route everyday (route pooduRathu)—including, for many students,
when they were school children—is one such form of socialization.
Route pooduRathu is not just being on the bus, but hanging out and socializing on the
bus with one’s route-mates, even without the intention of going anywhere in particular
(including the college; indeed, even when there was college leave students would route
pooduRathu). Route pooduRathu also has its own expressive culture (see chapter 3,
section 2.3.1). Route pooduRathu involves singing the route’s song—a song which extols
that particular route as being the most status-ful and dominant—along with drum beats
created by students banging on the bus frame, and dancing. A second ritual of route
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solidarity is bus day, a day to celebrate the route where everyone on the route rides the
bus to the college at the same time (see chapter 3, section 2.3.1). 33

4.2.4 Those who study and those who don’t
Another division between students is their alignment to the goal of getting good
marks (‘grades’) in their classes: that is, ‘kids who study’ padikkiRa pasangka (or nalla
pasangka ‘good kids’) and those who fail in their studies or coolly shrug them off, kedda
pasangka ‘bad kids.’ In the classroom such students self-segregate spatially to some
extent. Stereotypically, the toppers—those with the top grades—sit in the front row while
those whose studies lack, the maappiLLai bench, sit in the back; hence their other
moniker, back bench boys. 34
What is interesting is that doing well in the college—which is seen as the institution
par excellence for class mobility (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009; Osella and Osella
2000b)—is not associated with concepts of youth status per se (at least not as I have
discussed it). Students who study well are neither idolized as a status-superior nor reviled
as ‘uncool’ (see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 21 for a similar point). (Students told me this type of
division was more salient in school.) I was surprised that students’ performance in
college was not much of a strong predictor of the kind of company they kept or the status
they were afforded by their peers. Rather, the issue was the degree to which they aligned
33

Note that this isn’t to say that the elite college didn’t have peer groups that were made up of routebuddies—for it did—or that department was not one reason why students of the government college were
friends—for it was. Rather, these aren’t the dominant organization principles of these colleges. Further, it is
possible, as in one of the Madurai colleges that I worked in, to have department and area/route mixed peer
groups (e.g., “The Swarm,” a self-named peer group of students all in the Economics department and from
the same neighborhood).
34
Immediately after marriage the ‘bride groom,’ or maappiLLai, is treated with extra care by his wife and
in-laws. He is expected to do nothing but rest, eat, sleep, and enjoy the attention of his new family. In this
way, students who take their studies lightly are like the groom, relaxing and taking life easily, as nothing
excessively important.
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with adult authority. This was, however, linked to grades to the extent that back bench
boys tended to be those who did other kinds of transgression in and outside of the
classroom. However, it isn’t their academics per se that figures them in this way, but the
notion that they don’t align with adult norms of authority.

5. Conclusions
5.1 Note on diagrammaticity
In this chapter I have traced the lines of articulation between youth’s institutional, or
objective, placement within the life cycle and their experience of that positionality to the
semiotic forms and spaces which make possible and indexically instantiate ‘youth.’ I
have argued that central to the logic of ‘youth’ in its various extensions is its
diagrammatic quality of being exterior to and transgressive of what youth figure as
‘society’ (the kin group, caste group). As I have shown, this diagrammaticity
simultaneously distances itself from ‘society’ while at the same time reinscribing its
social and cultural forms (often in tropic ways). What we see among youth, then, is an
ironic oscillation between replicating more general (or “traditional”) cultural logics while
at the same time motivating the use of non-traditional (or “modern”) cultural forms (e.g.,
sartorial fashion, linguistic forms). I explore this theme in chapters 3 and 6.

5.2 Beyond the Venn diagram approach to Indian society
In framing youth culture as reflexively constructed against age and caste hierarchies I
have attempted to sidestep a particular way of viewing Indian society as a sociological
Venn diagram, common in contemporary discourse about India.
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In an older Orientalist view, India was only and ever about caste (Dumont’s [1970]
Homo Hierarchicus being its anthropological apotheosis). As a redress, anthropologists
and sociologists rightly pointed out that there were other rubrics through which to think
about Indian society (Appadurai 1986b; Inden 2000[1990]: ch. 2): for example, class
(Beteille 1993[1991]; Caplan 1987), personhood (Daniel 1984), psychology (Nandy
1983), emotion and kinship (Trawick 1996[1990]), gender, urban–rural divisions
(Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995), or individuality (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and
Gourishankar 1990). Appadurai’s (1986b: 75) formulation of the changing of the guard
was a call “against holism.”
At the same time, the causal link between the idea and reality of caste posited by
Dumont was pointed out to be empirically problematic (Dirks 1987, 2001; Inden
2000[1990]; Cohn 1996; Berreman 1972, 1979; Fuller 1977; Raheja 1988; Fuller and
Spencer 1990) and was shown to be the essentialization of an otherwise more complex
and volatile social history. Dumont had confused the (relatively new colonial) map for
the (supposed timeless Indian) territory.
In the contemporary moment, the dictum is still “against holism,” though the specter
of caste has transformed itself in academic discourse from an ideational (or cognitive)
category to a placeholder of identity, demography, and political mobilization. Today we
formulate statements about India as the intersection of overlapping sociological
categories, as in a Venn diagram: caste, class, gender, region, language, religion, age, etc.
And rightly so, India is a diverse place and statements often require such qualification.
The result, then, attempts to reconcile the political (i.e., secularized) existence of caste as
basis for claims to the state (i.e., as a pure diacritic of difference) with the repudiation of
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it having ‘positive’ and thus natural content (either at the normative or descriptive
level). 35 Caste largely becomes a demographic category (ironically reproducing the
state’s own statistical understanding of caste), and its status as a reflexive category
relegated only to those political interests vying for dispensation from the state or in intercaste conflict.
Yet what I have tried to do in this chapter brackets this will to qualify and asks a
different question: how does the construction of ‘youth’ as an age set itself reflexively
figure caste and hierarchy as exterior to it in order to make itself intelligible? And what
are the consequences of this? Rather than the question, how is ‘youth’ differentially
experienced because of the existence of various hierarchies? (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Rogers
2008; Lukose 2009), how can we understand ‘youth’ and hierarchy as mutually and
reflexively constituted categories? As I have argued, the construction of ‘youth’ operates
precisely through differentiating itself from the logic of age and caste hierarchy
(‘society’) not in order to erase ‘society’ but to attempt to create a space exterior to it
whereby new forms of status negotiation and pleasure are created (cf. Osella and Osella
2000b: 242, 245). In order for ‘youth’ to be intelligible as exterior, representations of
‘society,’ whether they be true or ideologically distorted, must be assumed to exist. This
isn’t to say, then, that ‘youth’ and caste are non-overlapping categories (for clearly they
aren’t), but rather to say that the experience of each is made possible by keeping them
apart, like two magnetic poles create a field of attraction and repulsion. To do this,
35

This takes place largely within the debate about “substantialisation” of caste (Dumont 1980[1966]; Fuller
1996; Deliege 1996; Beteille 1996b; Dirks 1996a; cf. Sheth 1999: 2504 “classisation” of caste). In this
understanding caste is largely decoupled from overt hierarchies (Kolena 2003), leading a muted existence
in face-to-face public discourse, though being largely translated into euphemistic language of class and
cultivation (Fuller 1996; Beteille 1996b) and living on in marriage practices (Beteille 1996b; Vatuk 1972),
as well as becoming the grounds for caste-based political mobilization (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998;
Sheth 1999). See Osella and Osella (2000b: ch. 7) for a discussion and critique.
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however, we must be able to conceive of caste not only as a sociological dimension to be
crossed in a matrix with other variables but also as a category available to youth’s
reflexive awareness as part of their own identity and status work, in this case, through
(temporary) exclusion or deferral.
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Chapter 3 – Youth Status: Style, Geththu, and Other Status Concepts

1. Introduction
In this chapter I expand the discussion of chapter 2 by looking at particular models of
status among young men and how these play out in their peer groups. I begin by looking
at how youth concepts of status, while figured as exterior to the objective age categories
periya aaL and chinna paiyan, reinscribed them as relative terms within the peer group.
Having unpacked the terms style and geththu as class-linked models of youth status, I
show how both concepts are diagrammatic of the construction of ‘youth’ more generally,
as well as with young men’s experience of their positionality as exterior. I then go on to
look at how such concepts work in the economy of status negotiation in the peer group.
In the penultimate section, I come back to the question of style and gender, looking at
how women engage with concepts of youth status. I conclude with some comment on
globalization, arguing that the idea that youth “negotiate” globalization, “tradition,” or
“modernity” is problematically formulated.

2. Concepts of status and exteriority
2.1 Reinscribing the periya aaL and chinna paiyan
In chapter 2 I showed that the youth peer group is an exterior interactional zone that
licenses status-raising. Among the youth that I worked with such status-raising was
operationalized vis-à-vis the concept of being “mature.” To be status-fully independent,
to transgress authority is to be a mature youth. Interestingly, in youth’s own explicit
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discourse the “mature youth” figuratively approximates the periya aaL. 1 His alter, then,
is the “chinna paiyan.” 2 To call someone a chinna paiyan, as one youth explained, is to
not give that person value (mathippu). It’s to treat them as if they are an ‘ordinary person’
(saathaaraNamaana aaL), while the speaker is like a periya aaL or ‘big man.’ 3 Here,
then, youth concepts of status and masculinity are rearticulated through the terms mature
youth/periya aaL and chinna paiyan.
Unlike their homophonic objective categories, chinna paiyan and periya aaL in peer
group usages are relative terms: one is like a chinna paiyan to another, who is figured like
a periya aaL. Recalling the mustache example in chapter 2, section 2.2.3, while having a
mustache is avoided because it makes one look like a periya aaL and being unable to
grow facial hair might elicit the teasing designation chinna paiyan, having no facial hair
but being able to grow it is often described as an attempt to raise one’s relative status in
the peer group, showing how one is like the periya aaL of the group, an important and
‘cool’ person, thus inverting the default (i.e., adult) indexical value of the mustache while
calquing objective age categories as relative designators of status-ful individuals.
‘Maturity’ is most importantly mapped onto transgression of ‘society.’ The mature
youth cuts class and goes to the cinema; he sight adi-s (‘ogles’) girls; he does (outlandish)
fashion; he loves, and perhaps even has sex; he fights (and wins); he smokes, plays cards,
and drinks alcohol (and when he drinks, he drinks the more powerful and mainly hot
1

Note that “periya aaL” most often is used by youth in the peer group to refer to others doing status-raising
(with a slightly negative connotation) while mature is used to refer to status-ful youth (including speaker)
positively.
2
While normative youth masculinity is at times defined negatively with respect to women or alternative
masculinities (the “third gender” thirunangkai, or more derogatorily onbathu [lit. ‘nine’]; but interestingly
not the homosexual) it was most commonly defined negatively as not the chinna paiyan (‘little boy’).
3
It was also used to denigrate other social groups, as I learned when students from the government Chennai
college referred to the elite college as a bunch of “school kids.” And vice versa, the elite college students
described the rough masculinity of the government college as ‘childish’ (chinna puLLeththanam).

81

drinks [‘spirits’] rather than beer); and he uses bad words and talks to others without
using ‘respect’ (mariyaathai) (cf. Rogers 2008: 86; Lukose 2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71
on chethu). Instead of being inside (the home, the hostel) he moves through public space,
loitering in cinema halls, tea stalls, and on the road. Here spatial, temporal, and normative
distance acts as an icon of maturity: the further, the later, the more transgressively he
wanders the more mature he is. In the Madurai hostels I stayed at, jumping over the
college wall after curfew in the middle of the night and wandering the streets looking for
cigarettes and mischief was, in some students’ eyes, the height of maturity and cool. The
mature youth shows courage and ‘boldness’ (thairiyam) in breaking the rules, of which
the college provides many opportunities.
On the other hand, the chinna paiyan is afraid to do all of these things. He prefers,
instead, to align with the norms of authority, content to be contained within ‘society,’
within the home and other spaces which make one childlike and dependent (cf. the
concept of “mama’s boy” in the U.S.). Hostel students who went home at every possible
chance, who never roamed outside of the campus, were teased by other students as
chinna pasangka. Similarly, students who refused to drink, to smoke, to play cards, to
love, to fight—in short, to break the rules—were labeled as chinna pasangka. 4
At the same time, the mature youth is, like the periya aaL, a leader, one who can
make decisions, who can guide others, who dominates a conversation, and who bends
others to his will (cf. M. Mines 1994: ch. 2; M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990). But, of

4

Remember from chapter 2, section 4.2 that being seen as “mature” or like a “chinna paiyan” is also a
principle of peer group formation. Thus, for example, one of the major divisions between the third-year
hostel students at the Madurai hostel that I stayed at was typified based on this axis (in both directions). It
was operationalized by pointing to different interests and leisure patterns (i.e., one group liked to play
cards, smoke, drink, and ogle girls while the other group didn’t).
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course, he isn’t a periya aaL literally and actively attempts to distance himself from this
figure of personhood by bucking the rules and forming his own. This is unlike the chinna
paiyan who is skittish, afraid, uncertain, indecisive, passive, and whom no one listens to.
As one of my roommates in Madurai explained to me, the chinna paiyan requires
guidance, is afraid of authority, and thus is dependent on others to tell him what to do.
While this is appropriate for children in school, for college youth it isn’t. ‘Youth,’ he
explained, ‘don’t like authority, don’t want to be told what to do, they can and should be
able to make their own decisions.’
While such designations are perspectival—those labeled chinna pasangka call the socalled mature students undisciplined, without control, and morally questionable—the axis
of differentiation—legitimate disengagement from ‘society’ and attempts to establish
one’s own authority—is the same. Do you align with ‘society’ or to your own authority?
More importantly, can you pull off staking off a space of authority? Will others ratify it
as legitimate or not?
As is clear, the fluidity and relativity of such designations, and by extension the
concepts of status they presuppose, are subject to negotiation, revision, and change in the
peer group. For example, while drinking, smoking, fighting, loving, and doing fashion are
all associated with mature youth, doing them too much makes one like a chinna paiyan
who is unable to make responsible decisions. Note that what counts as mature and statusful, then, is never fixed precisely because ‘youth’ itself is a shifter defined by its
exteriority from the normative, perduring, and static, and thus is always capable of being
reformulated and troped upon. In contrast to youth’s understandings and experiences of
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adult authority structures, youth spaces of status negotiation are (made to be) emergent,
relative, and fluid.
What is most important to note here is that that even as youth distance themselves
from the diacritics of ‘society’ and its objective age ranking through their transgression,
the age statuses of ‘child’ (chinna paiyan) and ‘adult’ (periya aaL) are reinscribed within
the peer group as relative designators through, on the one hand, typifying excessive
obedience to (adult) authority as ‘childish’ and, on the other hand, valorizing normflouting as status-ful. Here what would otherwise be typified as ‘childishness’ or
irresponsibility by adults is inverted as status through transgression and irreverence
among youth. Simultaneously, alignment with the adult world is denigrated as non-status,
as indexing weak-mindedness and being afraid (of the Law). In this way, by the very
logic of its exteriority the activity of the peer group is diagrammatic of social relations
and concepts of status in Tamil society more generally and while differentiated from it,
replicates it tropically in the peer group (see Kyratzis 2004: 626 on this point more
generally; note the fractal organization of status, cf. Gal 2002).
In short, youth status involves the creation of islands of authority among one’s peers.
In such islands of authority traditional norms are bracketed while youth attempt to
become a tropic periya aaL (of the group), to accrue enough interactional status to be
able to be seen as status-ful, get other people’s attention, to be valued (mathippu). Table
3.1 schematically charts this.
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Table 3.1 Adult versus youth status 5
- Hierarchical
- Institutional/ascribed (viz. objective
periya aaL, chinna paiyan)
- Interior
- Alignment to norm

- Egalitarian
- Non-institutional/achieved (viz. the
relative periya aaL, chinna paiyan)
- Exterior
- Non-alignment to norm (transgression)

Examples of forms
- veeshdi, saree, formals
- (High) Tamil
- (Tropic) patrline kin term usage
(aNNan, thambi, appaa, ammaa) (+hon.)
- Honorification (e.g., in 2nd pers.
pronoun/verb forms niingka, -iingka)
- Arranged marriage

- Fashionable clothes, jeans, tee-shirts
- English-hybridized Tamil
- Tropic affinal kin term usage
(maappiLLai, machchaan, maamaa);
English address terms (dude, bro) (-hon.)
- Non-honorification (e.g., in 2nd pers.
pronoun/verb forms nee, -e; curse words as
address terms)
- Love

Typified (by youth) as:
- mariyaathai (‘respect’), saathaaraNam
(‘normal,’ ‘ordinary’)
- For ‘adults’ (periyavangka)

- style, geththu, thooraNai (‘cool,’
‘badass’)
- For ‘youth’

Below I discuss the concepts of youth status that instantiate such “maturity”: style,
geththu, and thooraNai. These concepts are used by youth with overlapping meanings—
insofar as each embodies the relative notions of the periya aaL and status-raising—
though they have slightly different meanings by region and class.

2.2. Style
2.2.1 Introduction
Among youth, the question ‘what is style?’ (style NNaa enna?) elicits two types of
answers. One is the enumeration of the kinds of objects and actions which count as doing
5

Note that these distinctions aren’t absolute but overlapping and relative; they sketch particular tendencies
between these two notions of status. Pace Gal (2002), we can see this as the logic of fractally re-embedding
the shifters youth–adult. Moreover, this isn’t supposed to count as a description of how adult ‘society’
works, but how it’s taken to work by youth so as to make their own actions intelligible.
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style. The second invokes personae that emblematize style; most commonly, film heroes,
and in particular, Super Star Rajinikanth. In this chapter I look at the first answer. In
chapters 4 and 5 I look at the second answer.
When I got to Tamil Nadu for my fieldwork I was struck by youth’s flashy clothing,
their branded apparel, their tee-shirts in bright colors with English words written on them,
and other tokens of fashion. I often inquired why they wore such clothing and
accessories, to which I almost always got a single word answer: “style.” 6
Why are your jeans ripped? Style.
Why are you wearing a (fake) Nike wristband? Style.
Why are you wearing sneakers today, it’s over 40 centigrade?! Style.
Why do your shirts have wild colors and English writing on them? Style.
What is with your giant 50 Cent belt buckle spins around? Style.
Why the new cell phone with a million different functions? Style.
I also found that style could also be used for body grooming:
Why the long hair? Why no hair? Style.
Why the hair coloring? Style.
Why the goatee beard? Why no facial hair? Style.
It could also be used to typify behavioral repertoires, leisure activities, and linguistic code
choices:
Why did you start smoking? Why did you start drinking? Style.
Why is he riding the bus on the footboard/roof? Style.
Why do you knock knuckles as a greeting instead of just shaking hands? Style.
Why did you use that English word in your Tamil? Style.
6

Cf. Lukose’s (2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71) discussion of the concept of chethu. She glosses this as
“commodified masculinity” (p. 66). While I cannot speak for her materials, style can’t be reduced to just a
commodity register. While it is the case that style includes commoditized signs (like brands, English, etc.),
it also includes other things like whistling at the theater, loving girls, wearing the same shirt as your friends,
or riding on the roof of the bus. These are all style because, as I show, they are exterior, they individuate
and foreground the user, they are transgressive, etc. And while commodities can perform this function, they
aren’t the only way that such interactional work can be done.
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Why did he stop talking to us and go over to talk to those girls? Style.
What is the logic that makes all such semiotic displays typifiable as style?

2.2.2 Style and visuality
Style is showing oneself to be different and unique, an individual foregrounded from
the background of the peer group: “style NNaa thaniyaa theriyaNum” ‘to be/do style you
have to be individuated/visible.’ Style is about getting attention from others. It is about
‘attracting’ others (kavarkkiRathu). Anything style is an ego-focal index, ‘Look here!’ As
youth explained, ‘when you walk by, people should turn their heads and look at you.’
Note that being visible and individuated is a kind of status in Tamil Nadu more
generally (M. Mines 1994; Dean n.d., 2009; Dickey 2009a), partially because to be
visible is to subject oneself to the dangers of other’s envy and the power of vision. Only
one who is strong enough to withstand the deleterious effects of kaN thrishdi (‘the evil
eye’) would want to willingly attract such kinds of attention. To this extent, then, making
oneself visible is understood as status-raising, as Melanie Dean (n.d., 2009) has shown in
her work. As such, youth’s visibility practices implicitly transgress norms of avoiding
envious attention and ostentation.
‘Whistling and yelling’ (alappare pooduRathu, also a term for status-ful activity),
group chants, dancing and singing, ‘teasing’ others (kalaaykkiRathu), sight adi-ing
(‘ogling’) girls, graffiti, getting in fights, and doing fashion all appropriate space literally,
aurally, and especially visually. 7 Getting attention by its very definition attempts to
control space, and to set the terms under which interaction unfolds. To be visible is to be
7

Indeed, common slang terms for status-raising are explicitly visual (and filmic): scene
pooduRathu/kaadduRathu (‘showing/putting on a scene’), film/padam kaamikkiRathu (‘showing a
film/image’).
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status-ful, and to be invisible, to be unseen and unnoticed by others is to be without status
(Dickey 2009a). As one Madurai student noted regarding English as a style-ish form, ‘if
you don’t know it, even a dog won’t turn to look at you’ (cf. Rogers 2008; Lukose 2009:
ch. 5).

2.2.3 Style and exterior space
Forms which are style derive their value from alternative (i.e., non-“traditional”) and
exterior frameworks of status and value: from the upper-class elites (figured by the
working and middle classes as so rich that they are outside of ‘society’), from foreign and
Tamil media (music television VJs, Hollywood films, Rajinikanth), and from the
underground or marginalized (the criminal world, the rowdy). Fashions from north India,
from America, from Singapore are style. English (spoken or written on clothing) is style.
Western brands (real or duplicate) are style. Acting like a cinema hero (or a villain) is
style.
Youth status is also about projecting class and spatial mobility (also see Lukose 2009:
ch. 5). Among lower- and middle-class youth, to do style through English and Western
brands is to index social spaces outside the neighborhood, hometown, state, and thus
figuratively invoke higher social strata and utopic exterior lands. This is revealed by the
fact that one salient concept of non-status is the term local. 8 The term local has multiple
indexical values, contrasting both with decent—a middle-class notion (Dickey 2009a)—
and style—a youth notion. A shoddily made product, a product of no value is local.
Language that is crass, ugly, and marked by colloquialisms is local. Behavior which is

8

Cf. Tarlo (1996: ch. 7) on the similar indexical valence and use of the term deshi in rural Gujurat.
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without any status is local. The local as non-status projects space in several ways.
Objectively, it refers to the slums. Relatively, it refers to the peripheries of value. Thus
things from Madurai are local with respect to things from Chennai; things from south
India are local with respect to things from north India; and things from India are local
with respect to things from abroad.
In contrast to the local, style tropically figures exterior space. Thus, to not do style, to
always stay within the ‘society’ and ‘culture’ of the region, is to be stuck without
possibility of betterment. Youth sometimes understood this quite literally, particularly
with regard to English and Tamil (cf. Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lukose 2009: 189). While one
could easily elicit Tamil pride out of students, their spontaneous discourse about their
mother tongue was often one of regret. As one student put it: “ippa yaarum thamizh like
paNNamaaddaangka” ‘today no one likes Tamil.’ He continued to explain that with
Tamil you can’t go anywhere; you can’t leave the state; you can’t get ahead. 9 There was
a kind of claustrophobia among youth: without transgressing ‘society’ and embracing
forms that index exteriority one can never escape.
In this sense, style, even if a playful non-serious realm of youth fun, is linked with
serious anxieties surrounding mobility and escape. As I noted in chapter 2, youth culture
in urban Tamil Nadu, like the British subcultures of the 1960s (Willis 1981[1977]; P.
Cohen 1993[1972]; Clarke et al. 1997[1975]; Hebdige 1979), projects the contradictory
experience of youth and diagrams it in its expressive culture. While for post–World War
9

One of Rogers’ (2008: 85) informants puts it thusly: “But if you know only Tamil, you can go nowhere. If
you go out of Tamil Nadu, then you are empty; you are like a newly born baby. If I went to Andhra
[Pradesh], I would be expected to speak in English; or at least in another Indian language like Hindi. Even
here, if you go to a company, they will expect you to speak English. At RPG Cellular or SKYCELL [Indian
mobile phone network providers] they will not speak Tamil. If you struggle to speak English, they will say:
shut up and go away. They will not respect you.”
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II British youth, status expressions and their aesthetics diagrammed age and class
contradictions (among other things), for post-liberalization Tamil youth, style diagrams
age relations (YOUTH : CHILDREN :: YOUTH: ADULT) and spatial (inside–outside) relations
(VILLAGE : CITY :: CITY :: NATION :: NATION : GLOBAL). For many young men, the West
was imagined to be a youth utopia: self-centered without kinship, abounding with money
and job potential, egalitarian and equalitarian, everything style, everything modern, 10
sexualized but without marriage or children (cf. Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 regarding Soviet
Russia).
In addition to the figurative notion of space implicit in the concept of style is a literal
one: style is something that is done in exterior (youth) spaces, but not something that can
be done at home. When one goes out on the town (e.g., to the cinema, to the beach, to
college) and when one goes out of town (e.g., on college tour) one performs style.

2.2.4 Style and transgression
In addition to being beyond the pale of ‘society’ and ‘culture,’ style is often seen as
explicitly transgressing norms of ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ As one of my Madurai
roommates Sebastian stated, he does not do style because he follows the ‘culture of
adults’ (“periyavangkaLooda kalaachchaaram”). Moreover, he does not do style because
10

As my Chennai roommate put it: ‘modern doesn’t mean style but this how “we use it.”’ The lexical item
modern as used by Tamil youth means something akin to ‘newness’ (puthumuRai). In short, style is that
which makes the user seem different and unique. Things that are modern, by contrast, are used by many
people and don’t necessarily individuate the user. While things from the West are often considered style
and modern, they aren’t synonymous. There can also be non-Western style and non-Western modern.
Compare this with fashion as a Tamil lexical item. Something that is fashion is a fad, or a trend, while style
is a status-raising behavior. Something can be a style without being a fashion, and vice versa. However,
insofar as fashion is often valorized the two are linked. Similarly, there are examples of style which may
draw on something old or timeless in order to differentiate the user: for example, talking loudly as a way to
attract attention. That said, the emblematic kinds of style tend to be modern precisely because that which is
modern often embodies exteriority, uniqueness, attention-getting, and transgression, themselves iconic with
the construction of ‘youth’ qua status.
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he is from a village and thus is “traditional.” Style, by implication, then, is neither of
these. It is exterior to and deviant from “Tamil culture.” As such, style is seen as an
explicit challenge by youth to established authority structures. Thus, style is harder to do
in front of people of (traditional) status as it elicits disapproval and censure.
More than simple transgression, style attempts to create new norms and authoritative
anchorings. Thus, for example, ‘bad’ habits like whistling, smoking, drinking, fighting,
ogling, teasing and loving girls are style because they transgress the norms of ‘society’
and because they attempt to stake out—for one’s peers at least—a space of authority in
distinction to that of adults and other youth.
Sartorially, style’s aesthetics are shocking and disturbing to the sensibility of others
(especially adults). Gaudy colors, ripped fabric, and extra pockets are all style. In short,
style-ish clothes are non-functional (except in their attention-getting quality) (cf. Blumer
1969: 288). As one student explained to me using the example of pants:
‘Pants usually have four pockets. Typically pants are tailored. That is “normal,”
“ordinary.” So pants which have more pockets, pockets which are visible (even
though, perhaps because, they are functionless) are “style.” Pants which are
“ready-made” are “style.” At first there was the “six packet” [sic]—pants with six
pockets. When that got ordinary, the fashion increased into twelve pockets, twelve
pockets being more than six pockets, even more unnecessary. That was “style.”
Then we came to know them as “cargoes.” The more pockets, the more “style.”’
In fact, anything that cannot be understood through functionality or “tradition” is
potentially style. I learned this on my first visit to India. I was wearing a tee-shirt inside
out. A number of young men who were talking to me noticed and pointed out that my
shirt was inside out. ‘Why?’ they inquired. When I shrugged and hesitated to come up
with some sort of face-saving answer, one of them answered for me: ‘Oh, it’s style!’ The
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anomaly explained, the conversation moved on (cf. Tarlo’s [1996: ch. 5] experience of
her dress’s [un]intelligibility among her Gujarati informants).
As a Madurai college professor bemoaned after scolding a student for entering his
office with ripped jeans, long hair, and an earring, ‘everything and anything today is
style: there is no rhyme or reason to it.’ Style verges on the absurd, on the comic. It is
playful. 11 Under the concept of style, deviation from norm is contained and made
sensible. As function does not and cannot ground style, youth status and authority must.
Style is about stretching norms as far as possible, going to the edge of reason, verging on
madness (kiRukku), to attempt to make the non- and the extra-normative one’s own. To
own transgression, to create one’s own authority, or co-opt the authority of something
else, where only nonsense and unintelligibility existed before is style. As such style
presents itself as all form, no substance; all surface, no meaning. Hence the irrelevance of
the meanings of the English wordings on students’ clothing; on knowing who or what
Eminem, 50 Cent, Diesel, Tommy Hilfiger actually are (‘are they rock bands or brands?’
my Madurai roommate Stephen asked me) (see chapter 6 for more discussion).

2.2.5 Style for love, love as style
But why do style? Besides its self-evidence as status-ful, students often justified style
thusly: style was not just to impress one’s peers, but more importantly to impress the
opposite sex. Suresh, a second-year college student in Madurai, explained to me that he
likes brands like Nike because girls like Nike because it is style.

11

Thanks to Susan Seizer for pushing me to emphasize style as a kind of play.
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And indeed, young men do style in contexts when they are visible to women: for
example, at the bus stop; when going outside for a stroll to sight adi (‘ogle’) girls; at the
park, beach, or temple; at the movies or a college function; or when going to a girls
college. When a girl would walk by, guys would adjust their clothing, push their hair
back, lean against a motorcycle, put on sunglasses, etc. When a young man falls in (onesided) love, guys explained, he naturally starts to do style to “impress” her. One common
question that peers ask to a youth performing new kinds of style is “enna daa, lav
paNReyaa? ‘what’s the deal man, are you in love?’
However, young men don’t only do style for girls. Indeed, young men’s interactions
with women are rare, and most of their status negotiation is same-sex. Even when the
goal is attracting women through style, youth’s strategic displays of style are mediated by
same-sex status negotiation: ‘among ten guys, I should be the one the girls notice,’
Suresh explained. In effect, over and above the question of impressing girls (or rather,
precisely because of the inability to interact with girls except through the visual displays
of style) style was part of the negotiation of young men’s relationships with each other
(cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 193).
At the same time, while style is for love, ‘doing love’ (lav paNRathu) is itself a kind
of style to impress one’s same-sex peers (cf. Liechty 2003: 29 on ‘fashion’ and ‘doing
love’ among Nepali youth). As my Chennai roommate pointed out (somewhat
nostalgically for a time he never experienced), echoing a common discourse about the
state of contemporary “Tamil culture” and love: ‘Today love is just a fashion, just for
time-pass. Today, a college guy will have a bike, cool clothes, and a girlfriend <all
emblems of style>. They will love for three years <the duration of college>, finish up
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everything <i.e., have sexual relations> and then breakup and marry whom their parents
tell them to.’ In short, being in a romantic relationship with a girl makes you stand out
(visually through transgressive public displays of affection like sitting next to each other,
speaking to each other, or holding hands; or virtually as a topic of gossip) and it hints at
transgression of caste patriarchy’s and the kin group’s demand for arranged marriage (as
an index of obedience to their authority) (cf. Osella and Osella 1998, 2000b: ch. 7).
Ultimately, however, this is temporary, only for show, my roommate lamented. In short,
the desire to love was a desire for style, for exteriority, for status. This is reflected in
films that narrate the style-ish, darker-skinned, working-class youth hero loving the rich,
north Indian college girl (e.g., the films of Dhanush or an early Rajinikanth; cf.
Dhareshwar and Niranjana [1996] on Kaathalan [1994]). To love such a woman is to
desire the exterior, to conquer it, hybridize it with the self, and to extend oneself as
status-ful. It is to be ‘youth,’ to co-opt alternative cultural forms, to own them in efforts
to create alternative models of status to the hierarchical kin-, caste-, and age-based
‘society’ of adults.

2.2.6 Style and individuality
We might be tempted to think of style as a kind of self-expression, a proclamation of
the unique individual against a society-oriented culture (cf. Williams 2001). And yet, it
isn’t. Style is about being visible, getting attention, accruing status. It isn’t about
interiority or the perduring authentic self, but about projecting a “public face” (M. Mines
1994). It is a kind of garment. 12 Youth make no bones about the fact that they do style not

12

Thanks to Asif Agha for suggesting this trope.
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because of their own personal tastes, but because they think that such forms can accrue
them appreciation and status from their peers and the opposite sex. 13 ‘It’s only about
what others think,’ one youth noted. Thus, doing style isn’t linked to any discourse of
authenticity (e.g., of the subculture, of the brand, of understanding the English words
printed on one’s clothing). 14 In addition, style is something which need not be an
individual quality; it can also be a property of the group. Hence, for example, youth
would often all wear the same outfit when going out. They explained that when you see a
bunch of people all wearing the same thing you’ll notice them, and thus this is style.

2.3. Geth(thu), thooraNai, and other concepts of the figurative periya aaL
Youth use a number of other words similar to style to typify that which is status-ful.
In Madurai youth use the word thooraNai (lit. 1. ‘posture,’ ‘pose’; 2. ‘a kind of wedding
decoration’). In Chennai (and Madurai to some extent), they use the word geththu (lit.
‘prestige,’ ‘haughtiness,’ ‘influence/intimidation’). In other parts of Tamil Nadu (e.g.,
Paramagudi), one would hear simply (yaaru) periya aaL ‘(who is) the big man.’
13

This isn’t to say that students don’t develop their own individual expressive forms over time. In talking
to a third-year student at the elite Chennai college I did research in, he explained that there aren’t discrete
identities for students vis-à-vis dress except that some dress more style-ishly and others more “ordinary”
(which itself contains a number of other categories by proxy: rich/poor, urban/rural, local/formal, etc.).
However, over the three years some students in his class had developed distinctive looks, though unnamed.
For example, when they were out shopping on tour he suggested that his friend buy a particular kind of
jewelry because it would “suit” his look. But even here this isn’t because it was seen as an expression of
some inner self, but rather that it was consistent with a particular outer image. Such “looks” aren’t
institutionalized, certainly not to the extent that they are in the West (vis-à-vis a rock style, a punk style, a
metal style, a hip-hop style, a frat style, etc.), and thus can’t be invoked through particular emblematic
sartorial forms. Rather, in this case they are only possible in the context of having gone to college with
someone everyday for the past three years.
14
What is interesting is that the pragmatic function of style as status-raising doesn’t exist at the level of
explicit awareness when it’s internalized as an individual, authentic expression, as it is in the United States
or among Indian elites. Indeed, the concept of personal style in U.S. disavows that one would ever imitate
or copy someone else. This would invalidate such style. In the Western notion of style, then, individuals are
atomic units that aren’t comparable per se and thus dressing in one way or the other doesn’t have status
implication, but expresses the true self (at least that is the ideology). Yet this was certainly not how Tamil
youth thought of style.
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Like style, questions such as, ‘Why did he buy those new branded sneakers?,’ ‘Why
did he get new, embroidered jeans with Suzuki written on the side?,’ ‘Why is he speaking
in English?’ receive answers like “geththu maintain paNRathukku” ‘to maintain (his)
geththu,’ “thooraNai kaamikkiRathukku” ‘to show (his) thooraNai,’ “periya aaL
kaamikkirathukku” ‘to show that he is the periya aaL.’ However, such terms are slightly
different in meaning/use and in the figures of personhood they invoke. While similar to
style in that they refer to youth status, they invoke different modes of masculinity and
project the periya aaL–chinna paiyan dynamic differently, depending on who is using
them and in what contexts.
As opposed to style which is mainly about getting attention through doing something
different and thus figuratively projecting the periya aaL, geththu invokes a rougher kind
of masculinity, something closer to ‘badass’ than ‘cool’ (cf. Rogers’ 2008 discussion of
masculinity in the Chennai college he worked in). It is used more often to typify literal
transgression (like smoking, drinking, fighting, rowdyism). Objects or behaviors which
presuppose such a tough and status-ful persona, like rolled-up sleeves, a pulled back shirt
collar, and flashy jewelry emblematize geththu. 15

15

Unlike style which is hardly ever used by youth to describe adults (it struck youth as un-felicitous),
geththu and thooraNai can be used to describe status-ful adults and the signs which index them as such. For
example, one close unmarried friend in Madurai explained to me that he didn’t like wearing veeshdis,
because “veeshdi periya aaLooda thooraNai” ‘the veeshdi is the thooraNai of the big man.’ It’s the sign of
his prestige/status as a man of age and repute (a status which he was excluded from). In usages to describe
adults, however, both geththu and thooraNai generally describe status with respect to the individual and not
with respect to his societal responsibilities (to the kin or caste group), as is the case with mariyaathai
‘respect’ or gauravam ‘honor.’ One’s geththu or thooraNai can’t be impugned, though one’s mariyaathai
or gauravam can be. Indeed, unlike mariyaathai or gauravam which are institutionally perduring, like style,
thooraNai and geththu reflect the relative status relations between a group of peers in interaction. Between
thooraNai and geththu, one difference is that thooraNai is explicitly linked to the notion of putting on a
face, and in derisive contexts, as pretending. While geththu is a characteristic of a person (the outward
expression of his being a periya aaL, literally or figuratively), thooraNai is a kind of pretence, it is
something on the surface, an (over) action. It is exaggerated masculinity.
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While thooraNai and style figuratively invoke the relative periya aaL through egofocal status-ful signs, geththu is, in addition to this usage, also used to more literally
describe the dominance relationships between individuals. As youth explained to me,
geththu is at core a description of the relative power relationship between two individuals
(or groups). If you are ‘below’ me (kiizhee), if you have to do or listen to what I say, then
when I exercise my power I am ‘showing geththu’ (geththu kaadduRathu). This resonates
with the idea that a status-ful youth in a time of need should have his peers ‘standing
behind’ him (pinnadi nikRathu), just as followers stand behind their leader. But this is
recursive: those below the relative periya aaL have people below them, and so on. As one
young man explained to me, the regress is that any man will have younger relatives with
respect to which he has geththu. When he exercises his relative status over them, that is
his geththu. Geththu, then, is a term of relative status, capturing the periya aaL–chinna
paiyan dynamic in a literalistic and recursively embedded idiom. Indeed, this more
closely approximates the “traditional” notion of status implicit in the concept of the
periyar ‘big man’ of eminence as discussed by M. Mines (1994: ch. 2; M. Mines and
Gourishankar 1990). It’s “naan thaan” (‘just me’), “top” (‘he who is at the top’), the
notion that ‘there is no one above/beyond me’ (“enne minchi yaarum kedeyaathu”).
In colleges, especially in Chennai, geththu (with this particular interpretation) is the
reason that young men form cliques. As one student from the elite college in Chennai that
I worked in explained, ‘college isn’t like in school where everyone is together, where
everyone has studied since they were little kids. In college, you have to be part of a
group. In college, you have to maintain some geththu, right?’ (“oru geththu maintain
paNNaNum, le?”) He meant this both in terms of having a group of friends and in the
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sense of having a gang of guys to support you in status-raising activities, including fights
with rival groups. Indeed, while geththu was used to describe objects, behaviors, and
individuals, it was also commonly used to describe groups of students.

2.3.1 Geththu and the bus route
This usage is most clearly seen in the organization of students in the government
college in Chennai in which I did research. As a whole, this college is renowned in
Chennai as a “geththaana college” ‘a badass, tough college.’ Students from this college
often boast about this: their college is the toughest college, the “top” college, and thus
they are the “Kings of Chennai.”
This college’s peer groups are based around the bus route (see chapter 2, section
4.2.3). I first came across these bus routes through their graffiti, written all over the
insides of the buses they rode and the college walls. Such routes boasted with epithets
invoking the most ‘biggest’ of the ‘big men,’ the king: “Route ##: Kings of the City,”
“Route ##: Kings of the [College name],” “City King ## Route: King of the King
Maker’s [sic]” (photo 3.1).
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Photo 3.1 Bus route graffiti: “King of the King Maker’s [sic]”

These routes imagine themselves as gangs involved in bloody warfare with other gangs
to establish dominance relations. Being the top route means having the most geththu,
winning the most number of fights. Thus other routes are their adimaikaL ‘slaves.’ Next
to one of the epithets on the college wall (“## ROUTE SINGKANGKAL” ‘## route lions’) was
a picture of a bloody machete and the caption “raththa buumi engkaL [name of the
college], ‘Bloody earth, our [name of the college]’ (photo 3.2). Students would boast
about their scars, their police cases, the battles of the route with other routes, and the fact
that instead of security guards the college had a permanent detail of police on campus.
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Photo 3.2 Bus route graffiti: “raththa buumi engkaL [college name]”

Such fights were, though real, mainly symbolic. The aims were not to annihilate the
other routes, but were about “ego,” establishing dominance relationships: who was the
periya aaL, which route had the most geththu in the college and in the city (they had
rivalries with routes of other colleges). Indeed, when routes were not jockeying for
dominance, they were friendly. Students openly admitted that such rowdyism was just for
jolly, viLaiyaaddu, ‘play/a game.’ While violent, showing geththu in this idiom is like
doing style. It is a form of status negotiation within the peer group, variously extended in
social and spatial scale, in order to project the relative periya aaL.
The route is also organized internally by the concept of geththu. The route has as its
leader the head or thala (short for thalaivar, ‘chief’; lit. ‘headman’). The thala of the
route is the student who is the fiercest (the terror of the route), who is able to dominate
all. One becomes head through beating all others who would vie for leadership, through
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either fighting or through support from one’s peers. The head, like the top route, is
looked up to and inspires fear. The thala is the figurative periya aaL of the route.
The tropes surrounding the route and the thala explicitly draw from traditional
conceptions of status. In particular, they are drawn from tropes of royalty. (Students were
even able to give me lineages of their routes, quasi-origin myths tracing the emergence of
the route into positions of dominance in the college through political intrigue, alliances,
and battles.) The head should be silent in the sense of not singing, dancing, teasing,
whistling, yelling, standing on top of the bus (all things that characterize the activity of
route pooduRathu, ‘riding the bus route’; see chapter 2, section 4.2.3) (cf. Irvine 1974).
Unlike other students who must be visible in order to accrue status, like the ‘headman’ or
king, the route leader need not, as presumably everyone knows who he is. To do so
would be beneath his status. Such is his geththu. Indeed, it took me a while to actually
meet the route heads. They were always present in our group conversations, but didn’t
speak or make themselves visible to me.
This is the only instance within peer groups where I found status being
institutionalized in a relatively hierarchical and static manner akin to adult ‘society’ while
still outside of its authority structures (cf. student government, hostel government,
department organization). 16 This is partly because the route is an inter-year peer group
and thus age hierarchy is relatively less neutralized than in the department–year based
peer groups of other colleges where everyone is the same age. 17
16

The film fan club might be another possible exception (Dickey 2001; Rogers 2009).
Indeed, there is a category difference between the route and the peer group as such. The route is a superpeer group akin to the department. Within the route youth do organize themselves into age-equal peer
groups, though this sub-division is less pronounced than in colleges where the department (with its year
cohort division) is the main criterion of peer group formation, as is the senior–junior divide. Departments,
however, don’t usually have student heads per se.
17
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The route is highly organized. It perdures over years (though the route head usually
changes every year); it has its own songs (modified gaanaappaaddu [Chennai
fisherman’s folk songs] which are passed on and modified year by year), epithets, and its
own rituals. For example, every year each route picks a day to celebrate the route in what
is called “bus day.”
Bus day is organized by the heads each year. The route head collects dues from route
members, route alumni, sympathetic citizens, and local politicians (photo 3.3).

Photo 3.3 Bus day donations receipt

With the money the route head buys alcohol (for route members), decorations for the bus
(minimally a garland), posters (to advertise the day), and rental charges/bribes for
transportation officials and bus drivers to get government buses. With these buses the
route members and their friends and only them (which may easily total into the hundreds)
slowly ride from the beginning of the route to the college. En route the students engage in
extreme route pooduRathu: singing the route’s song to the rhythms played by route
members by hitting the bus with their hands; dancing to frenetic kuuththu beats provided
by a rented band or by students’ songs; riding on the side of the bus (hanging on by the
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side windows) or on the top of the bus (photos 3.4, 3.5); whistling; yelling insults at
students from other colleges; teasing (kalaaykkiRathu) onlookers (especially girls);
getting dressed up in style-ish clothes; and drinking alcohol. Like the college tour
(chapter 2, section 3.3.5), bus day is a particular ritual of youth exteriority where ‘youth’
is performed to its maximum.

Photo 3.4 Bus day celebrations 1
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Photo 3.5 Bus day celebrations 2

Having a big bus day with lots of people, making the most amount of noise and being
the most visible all express the route’s geththu, as does having the first bus day of the
season. Bus day is a celebration of, and demonstration of, a route’s geththu; hence the
exaggerated displays of youth status, youth transgression, and youth exteriority. It also
traces out the route’s territory via the buses’ traversal of space, co-opting such space as
the space of the route, if only temporarily.
Geththu in the route means more than fighting and domination, as the discussion
above shows. It’s about status-raising more generally. Geththu is also about
entertainment (jolly), but through creating temporary islands of alternative authority.
Expressions of geththu, by either the route or an individual youth, attempt to bend the
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rules of existing authority and get away with it. The amount of someone’s or some
route’s geththu is reflected by the degree that existing rules can be bent and alternative
authority can be established by their extra-normative acts.
In sum, geththu is linked to a particular kind of rough, rowdy masculinity that projects
the periya aaL–chinna paiyan dynamic quite literally, often operationalizing status as
physical dominance or tropes of it. Below I compare geththu and style, looking in
particular at the issue of social class and status.

2.4 Status and social class: Geththu versus style
While both geththu and style are about getting attention, raising status, projecting
exteriority, and transgressing, they tend to do so differently. Relative to geththu, style
expresses status through figuratively indexing elite social class—for example, via English
and (duplicate) branded clothes—while geththu does so through hyper-masculine
displays—for example, fighting, riding the footboard of the bus, teasing (kalaaykkiRathu)
and intimidating other. 18
In addition to the forms involved, the meta-pragmatic stereotypes invoked by such
forms differ. For example, when I asked students in the elite Chennai college about
geththu, the name of the government college that I worked at came up. If I asked students
at the government college about style, the name of the elite college would come up.
Students at the government college would explain, ‘if you really want to see style go over
to that royal (‘rich’) college. There the students are really style-ish. They can afford to do

18

For similar concepts of youth masculinity, see Lukose (2005a: 925–926, 2009: 66–71) on chethu among
Malayali youth; Schoss (1996) on “shine” among male Kenyan youth involved in tourism (especially the
contrast between the “smart” professionalized tour guides and the flamboyant “beachboys”); and Bastian
(1996) on young Nigerian men.

105

a lot of style through clothing, jewelry, cell phones, bikes. They have access to modern
fashions. Here, we are all relatively poor guys, and hence it isn’t so much style as geththu
that concerns us.’ Students, of course, do do style at the government college. However,
their identity-linked typifications diverge as per their reflexive awareness of their class
position. Like youth’s relationship to adult status they can’t access, students at the
government college figure themselves as more-or-less exterior to style, which for them is
a class-linked register that they are partially excluded from. 19
Besides the forms and the class-linked persona invoked through them, different
groups use these terms slightly differently. Students from the elite college (who tend to
be more affluent) use geththu and style with more overlap (thus eliding class from their
conceptions of status) than the government college students (who tend to be from
working-class backgrounds), who differentiate style and geththu to a greater extent. As
one government college student put it, middle- and upper-class youth don’t worry that
much about geththu because of their kudumba gauravam (‘family honor/prestige’).
Because of such gauravam their families exert more control over them. Thus, they (are
made to) exert more self-control because there is more objective status at risk. That is,
because they are closer to ‘society’ (they have more invested in the status economy of
adult society) they are less transgressive (they are more controlled), and thus they have
less geththu and are like chinna pasangka. Naturally they value it less, he reasoned.
Inversely, the discourse from the elite college’s students about the government
college’s students’ mode of masculinity is that it is not decent, it is local. They typify the
19

The difference between these two colleges isn’t only social class, but also the stereotyped identities of the
two colleges. The elite college has long been linked with producing civil servants and white-collar
professionals, while the government college has historically been linked to political agitations, student
politics (which is hyper-masculinized in Tamil Nadu), and producing police men and politicians.
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hyper-masculinity embodied in this government college as ‘childishness’ (chinna
puLLeththanam): they fight too much, they fight for silly reasons, they drink too much,
and they aren’t serious enough. As such, the elite college students projected the students
of the government college as chinna pasangka (i.e., deficient youth) to their more
“mature” status.
As for (super-)elite youth, those who speak fluent English at home, wear authentic
brands, who travel and study abroad, forms which perform style for the lower- and
middle-classes are so presupposed as part of their peer groups that style is erased from
their discourse altogether. Such students are above the status concerns of the more
economically challenged. As such, style is replaced with a notion of “taste” or innerexpression similar to concepts of self-expression qua individual “style” in the U.S.
(Bourdieu 1984). To such youth, the lower- and middle-class notions of doing style and
geththu are crude; they betray an inability to think independently and thus show the
childishness of the lower- and middle-classes with their herd mentality. For them, the
word “style” is used to describe a way of expressing one’s inner self through unique
affectations. For them the issue is individuality, not individuation.
Moreover, even when the core meaning of style is the same, its extensions and its
source registers differ by social class. For example, for the upper-middle classes style is
embodied in authentic branded items but not duplicates; for working- and middle- class
youth the distinction is irrelevant. They don’t have enough money for authentic brands
(see chapter 6). For the upper-middle classes, words like “dude” and “brother” were
style-ish speech, while working-class students may not even be familiar with such terms.
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One important difference to note is that forms typified and used as style by uppermiddle class youth, like authentic brands and English, are themselves a mode of
socialization to individual mobility within the global economy. Indeed, most of the jobs
available to the students of elite colleges (where style is presumably done maximally) are
call center positions and multi-national jobs in metropolitan cities, or jobs abroad. On the
other hand, geththu in the government college I worked in typifies forms and activities
which have no cultural capital in the white-collar job market, and thus provide no
foothold from which to enter the globalizing economy.
In my discussion I have exaggerated the differences between the uses of the terms
geththu and style so as to highlight two different kinds of transgression and exteriority
from ‘society’ that are differentially associated to social class: an aesthetic of exteriority
via tropes of wealth and mobility and an aesthetic of exteriority via tropes of rough
masculinity. Both are exterior, but only one facilitates economic mobility.

2.5 Youth status as life stage
Doing style, maintaining geththu, showing thooraNai are considered, by both youth
and parents, as part of the youth life stage. As one gets older one ‘naturally’ does less
style and transgresses less. The responsibilities of life begin to weigh heavier, one’s
attention and energies are steadied, and one’s duties multiply. Youth eventually ‘have to
slow down’ (veekam kuRaikkaNum), become less self-centered, and start thinking about
the family, its gauravam (‘honor’), and one’s mariyaathai (‘respect’): one has to ‘move
inside society/caste’ (“samuugaththukkuLLee poogaNum”) and grow up (cf. Osella and
Osella 1998: 201, 2000b: 245).
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An exchange with a UG student Shankar from the Chennai government college that I
worked in illustrates this. He sent me a forward SMS that had the name of his college
with a machete dripping with blood from it. I jokingly asked him, what’s with all the
“muradduththanam” (‘rowdy-ness,’ ‘intimidation,’ ‘aggression’)?

S: Chumma! Rody colg la tats y

S: Just cause! (Ours is a) rowdy college,
right? That’s why.

C: enna, ithellaam college-ukku

C: What, so all this is just for college?

maddumthaanaa?
S : S. Costes silent ta job ku poganum!

S: Yes Costas, (after this) I have to go to
work silently!

C: Haha. Appa rowdy thanam

C: Haha. After that your rowdyness will

mudnchirukkum!

be finished!

S: YeS. Mams Silentu irukanum

S: Yes maams <variant on maamaa, cf.

college. pogura varaikum than Rowdy

‘bro’>, (then) I have to be silent. All this

thanam ellam.

rowdyness is just while I am going to
college.

As we can see, college offers a particular zone for youth to transgress, to indulge their
exterior liminality; in this case as a college rowdy (cf. Rogers 2008). And this is figured
not as a perduring generational difference, but as a transient phase, as an age set.
As one recently married friend explained: ‘Before marriage you spend most of your
free time with your friends. There is a freedom there. At that age, one doesn’t care as
much about listening to family. After marriage, the only people you spend your time with
are family. Life becomes family. One moves into family.’ He continued by explaining
that when he was younger he would only see his kin relations at special occasions once a
year. But now that is all he sees. And with family, you can’t be however you want. There
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is no freedom. You have to be like this or that, how they want or expect you to be. There
is a pressure to be a certain way, to start thinking about your future and your kin/caste
responsibilities.
For the girls with whom I spoke with in Madurai and Chennai, the experience was
similar. All the egalitarian relations, all the modern, style-ish clothes, all the
independence afforded by college (or the workplace) are a phase. They last as long as
they are in college (or working). After that comes marriage, and all the adult
responsibilities that entails, from changes in dress, speech, leisure activities, to the
company they kept. 20

3. Status-raising and -leveling in the peer group
In this section I look at how concepts of youth status play out in peer groups through
status-raising and -leveling activities and rituals which act to reconstitute the peer group
as an egalitarian and exterior youth space.

3.1 Over style
20

This, of course, begs the question, what is generation and what is age set? Of course, the two are
dialectically related to each other. And this is one of the problems with work on youth culture (e.g., Liechty
2003: 37): there is a projection from age set to generational change, which itself is simply the naturalization
of our own belief in the history of society as successive waves of generations. Yet it’s precisely through age
set that generational changes become possible. To take a simple example, more and more students were
wearing track pants instead of lungis. While the reason given was style and style itself is a transient life
stage, through the socialization to a particular middle-class, urban habitus (itself motivated by concepts of
decency in the college) such changes in dress were likely to perdure beyond the age set if only because such
changes were unrelated to (i.e., had no implications regarding) adult concepts of mariyaathai. Similarly
while the avoidance of high Tamil among youth speakers and the valorization of English isn’t leading to
language shift in Tamil Nadu per se, it does seem to be leading to register shift. Many students were not
particularly well socialized to higher registers of Tamil, though they were perfectly fluent in spoken Tamil
(though perhaps not literate) and (less than) proficient in English. While they expected that when they
would become periya aaLungka they would acquire and perhaps have occasion to use higher registers of
Tamil (cf. Meek 2008), it’s unknown to whether they will be able to speak such registers when they get
older. Ultimately, of course, to tease apart generation and age set requires multi-generational study. It’s
enough to note, however, that Tamil youth understand their predicament as both age set and generation, and
that the importance of age set with respect to status behavior must be noted.
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If style is status-raising, it is constantly haunted by its own excess. As I argued earlier,
this is inherent in the construction of the peer group, youth’s own understandings of their
place in ‘society,’ and their concepts of status.
What are the boundaries of style? If style and the peer group are about transgression,
does such transgression itself have limits? One of my first fieldwork experiences went
straight to this question. I asked Ajith, a third-year student in Madurai, ‘what is style?’ ‘It
depends,’ he explained, because style is relative. ‘What is style for one person will be
“over” (‘excessive’) for another.’ That is, the boundary is negotiable. And indeed, much
of students’ casual conversation, gossip, and teasing is about whose style is acceptable
and whose is excessive or kiRukku (‘crazy’); who is status-ful and who is showing off or
trying too hard.
Style is defined as much by its deviation from norms of propriety as it is by its own
tendencies toward excessiveness and (unwarranted) deviation from the norms of the peer
group. Style is always troubled by the possibility of it being too much, and thus is
constantly being negotiated in the peer group through status-leveling. This is reflected in
the elaboration of the concept of style in terms of its excess, as reflected in terms like:
over style, over acting/action, banthaa (‘excessive showing off,’ ‘prestige’), scene
pooduRathu (lit. ‘putting on a scene [from a film]’), film kaadduRathu (lit., ‘showing a
film’), padam pooduRathu (lit., ‘putting on a film/picture’), build up paNRathu (‘building
[oneself] up’; a reference to the ‘build up’ sequences preceding the hero’s appearance in a
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film), bigu paNRathu (‘to condescend,’ ‘act better than [s.o. else]), thalai ganam (lit.,
‘head weight’), head weight (‘arrogance’). 21
Ajith illuminated over style with the following example. Leaning over, he said, ‘look
at my watch. It’s nice, right? It’s shiny, it’s steel, it has the name of a brand on it. But
look closer: it isn’t running! It’s broken. It’s a fake. The watch is style, but it is “over”
because it’s broken.’ This disjunct reveals that he in fact does not have the status (in this
case, access to authentic, working branded commodities) to back up his status-raising
move in wearing the watch. While the watch implies a kind of middle-class commodity
consumption, this status-ful presupposition is infelicitous because the watch is broken:
his wearing it is “over action” and is vulnerable to the claim that he is trying too hard to
impress. (Hence his quick move toward self-status-leveling by laughingly revealing his
watch as broken.) And indeed, as I observed many times over, attempts at excessive
status-raising always elicit status-leveling from one’s peers. As one female Madurai
student told me using a youth proverb: “over banthaa udambukku aagathu” (‘too much
showing off/status-raising is bad for the body’); that is, excessive style results in
“fetching some nice slaps,” as she glossed it, from one’s peers.
Because status expressions are always relative to the uptake of the peer group, over
style is always defined relative to the style of one’s peers. If everyone is wearing ‘normal’
clothes and one comes with ripped jeans and a branded tee-shirt, one will inevitably be
labeled as showing off. Such status expressions, however, won’t be considered excessive

21

Note how the figuration of excessive style is linked to the notion of re-animating filmic images and thus
to tropes of visuality. This is because filmic representations of style are inevitably exaggerated as film
heroes are figured as higher status individuals than fans. They are also linked because the imitation of film
is often associated with the madness of film fanaticism and the childishness of the fan (see chapter 5 for
more discussion).
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within a group of peers who dress similarly. Over style is also relative to the
activity/location at hand. While an outing to the girls’ college, a college function, or the
cinema may call for one level of style, the same level of style for going to the hostel mess
or one’s home village will invite teasing and scolding. In short, style and over style are
context dependent. They are also dependent on particular ideologies about personhood
and appropriateness.

3.2 Ideologies of personhood and style
Particular ideologies of personhood are often invoked to legitimate who can do style
and who can’t. When I asked a group of students why they were teasing one particular
student for doing style but not others who were engaging in similar status practices they
would note that the style-ish displays in question ‘suited’ (suit-aa, match-aa) the one guy,
but not the other. That is, some people are more equipped to do style than others. This
might be justified aesthetically: for example, a student with a rough looking face might
be able to pull off certain kinds of style (e.g., an earring), while on someone with a baby
face it might seem inappropriate (e.g., ‘he looks too much like a chinna paiyan to have an
earring’). At the same time, too much style for a tough looking guy (e.g., long hair, a
beard) might make him look too much like a periya aaL or a rowdy and thus be
excessive.
Similarly, youth often assume that particular people can(not) do style based where
they come from, their “culture” or ‘native place’ (cf. Daniel 1984: ch. 2); that is, based on
some notion of appropriateness (Tarlo 1996: 246; Dean 2009; Dickey 2009a). My
roommate Stephen in Madurai came from Kodaikkanal, a place associated with Christian
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missionaries, colonial vacationers, and a famous American private school. Students often
explained Stephen’s forays into sartorial style, which they appreciated and ratified, as due
to the fact that he is from Kodaikkanal. Similarly, students from north India were seen as
more likely to do style. Style was okay for such youth, it didn’t “disturb” others because it
was part of their “culture.” Similarly, my deviations from the norms of Tamil society
(sartorial or other) were always rendered intelligible by the idea that in my “culture” we
did style naturally. Most confusing for youth, in fact, was why I didn’t do more style:
why didn’t I have more style-ish clothes, why was my cell phone so ordinary, why didn’t
I always wear sneakers, why was my bag so ‘normal’? Their assumption was that I could
do whatever style to whatever level of absurdity I wanted to. So why didn’t I (cf. Lukose
2009: 77)?
Note, of course, that what grounds style is, again, a trope of exteriority. Places which
are exterior, and thus status-ful, license style: WESTERN > OTHER-FOREIGN (e.g., African,
Southeast Asian) > NORTH INDIAN > MALAYALEE (and other Southern states) > TAMIL
URBAN

> TAMIL RURAL. Those who come from interior places most closely aligned to

‘society’ and ‘culture’ (i.e., caste and “tradition,” the ‘real’ Tamil “culture”) are least
likely to be given the benefit of the doubt vis-à-vis style (cf. Tarlo 1996).
Similarly, students from certain departments are assumed to be more style-ish and
thus are not questioned as much if they performed style. This too has a hierarchy (see
chapter 1, section 2): VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS, COMMERCE > COMPUTER SCIENCE,
ENGLISH, PHYSICS > CHEMISTRY, BOTANY, MATHEMATICS > HISTORY, ECONOMICS, TAMIL.

114

The style departments are, of course, those where the rich study with more frequency. 22
The person from Kodaikkanal, from America, from Commerce, from Visual
Communications is used to dressing with style because that is their norm, their culture. It
is the (mis-)match between projected status and status-licensing background which makes
one person style and another over style.
While ideologies of personhood certainly set particular defaults for the evaluation of
performances of style, such ideologies are more often than not after-the-fact
rationalizations. Such ideologies can be defeased, and poor guys from the village can just
as well be ratified as style pasangka (‘stylish guys’) and rich urban students as un-styleish. Such work takes place in the centrifugal and centripetal forces of the peer group,
pushing youth toward difference and pulling them toward sameness, as I discuss below.
What is interesting is that for those whose status is secured—that is, they are accepted by
their peers as status-ful—style is a property of their person and thus their status-raising
moves are performative of style. For those who are not necessarily seen as status-ful, who
occupied the grey area, style is a tenuous performance, an external surface or show. For
such individuals such semiotic displays aren’t seen as a property of the person, but a
function of the form: he got that haircut for style, he used that English word for style, etc.
Such performances of style are only sometimes entailing of status, depending on the
attending co-text and uptake by one’s peers.

3.3. Strategies of status-leveling

22

This is due to how, on the one hand, fees and corruption involved in buying seats makes placement in
such departments function as an index of economic status, and, on the other, the association of schooling
and money. (The rich can study at better English-medium schools, etc., and thus get into better departments
on merit.)
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Below I discuss a more general set of interactional practices and genres that function
to status-level and maintain the egalitarian space of the peer group qua intimate space of
peer pressure and coercion: gossip, teasing and status-linked humor, rituals of statusinversion, the treat, and fighting (cf. Osella and Osella 1998: 195ff.; Nisbett 2007; see
Kyratzis 2004: 631–635 for a review). Such practices speak to the ambivalence of youth
status and the appreciation and envy it potentially engenders. As we see, it is also a
principle of the hybridization and negotiation of status-ful youth cultural forms.

3.3.1 Gossip
Gossip is a common mechanism for social control in many societies (Briggs 1998;
Besnier 2009; on youth peer groups see Kyratzis 2004: 632). Among youth, talking about
others whose behavior transgresses the bounds of reasonable status-raising; or whose
status-raising can’t be licensed by their status is one way that: a) those who gossip reset
the status level of the peer group, and b) those who are seen as showoffs are encouraged
to tone down their status-raising. As a Chennai student put it while describing his
departmental peers, guys who scene pooduRathu (‘put on a scene,’ i.e., act like they are
on screen, like film heroes), who show off too much with their branded clothes, who are
always trying to show what a periya aaL they are, inevitably get torn down by their peers
behind their backs and interactionally kept at a distance. A female student who moved
from Chennai to Madurai told me that when she got to college, her overly style-ish
clothing (jeans, sleeveless kurtas) and English speech kept the rumor mill about her
going. Only when she started speaking in Tamil and dressing more modestly would other
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girls even interact with her. In her case, gossip about her made her socially peripheral
until she changed her behavior to be more in line with the group.
The fear of gossip and the fear of being seen as showing off are potent forces among
youth. Strong enough, for example, to cause students to hide status-ful aspects about
themselves that others might not ratify: for example, covering up a romantic relationship;
or lying about their high marks.

3.3.2 Teasing and English
Much of the face-to-face status regulation in the peer group is done through teasing.
Students often experience teasing as entertainment. It’s taken lightly most of the time and
everyone is usually a good sport (see section 3.3.3 below). You have to be a good sport,
in fact, because teasing is highly ritualized and institutionalized in forms like ragging
(chapter 2, section 4.1.2) and culturals. But teasing is also serious business and functions
as a force demanding conformity to the peer group. In general, youth only get teased
about things that are considered status-ful. 23
The most common kind of teasing among college students regards English use.
English use is considered style, indexing the speaker as one who has command over a
language that affords job opportunity, global mobility, and the impression of education
and upper-class background. English use also projects exteriority and contrasts with high
register Tamil—which commands mariyaathai (‘respect’) among ‘big men’ (periya
aaLungka), emblematized in the Dravidian politician speaking about protecting “Tamil

23

Rarely in peer groups did I find examples where youth teased someone about their low status. Such
teasing quickly turns into insults and results in fights or breaking off of social relations. The kinds of
teasing I am interested in here are forms of status-leveling (not status-lowering/ranking) which function to
maintain social relations in the peer group and not sever them.
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culture”—and colloquial local (or regional) Tamil—which is seen as ‘normal’ or crude
(cf. Smith-Hefner 2007). Students’ use of high Tamil is almost nil, only invoked as
parodic humor, and colloquial Tamil is unmarked for status.
But using English to index exteriority and ego’s status is precarious. Youth often
deride individuals who use a “foreign” accent (American or British) when speaking in
English or in Tamil (cf. Lo and Kim 2009). Such individuals act like they were ‘born in
London,’ or had ‘just gotten off the plane from America.’ Such a student is a “peter.”
Here the Christian name Peter is a metonym for the absurd English persona invoked
through such speech. Such a youth “peter (v)uduraan,” meaning that they ‘show off’
(banthaa kaamikkiRathu) through English. In fact, English usage is such a pervasive
mode of status-raising that youth often used peter (v)udurathu to simply mean ‘showing
off’ in any semiotic register.
In addition to accent, using English words in one’s speech is grounds for teasing.
Thus, in a peer group where no one speaks English fluently, code-switching or codemixing is immediately greeted with teasing; and if such English usage is seen as
excessive (that is, more than the others in the group can [under]stand) it is met with
explicit meta-pragmatic discourse. For example, at functions where a (youth) speaker is
speaking in ‘too much’ English audience members will invariably yell out “thamizhle
peesu!” (‘Speak in Tamil!’) (cf. Lukose 2009: 187).
My English-fluent roommate in Madurai, Stephen almost never spoke English in the
hostel except to me. This was precisely for the reason that speaking in English, even
when comprehensible to his peers, would lead to him getting teased (and certainly to their
annoyance), and eventually to exclusion from the group. One common rejoinder to a
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student who uses too much English is: “A, B, C, D, E, F, G…engkaLukkum theriyum”
‘We also know our A, B, Cs (so no need to show off).’ Inversely, in a group where
everyone speaks English at a particular level, someone who speaks English but at a lower
competency will also be teased, not only as ignorant, but also as trying to project a level
of status that he can’t sustain.
What one finds, then, is a desire, in fact an obsession, with speaking English
accompanied by a paralyzing insecurity, a shyness/fear that one’s English will either be
too good or not good enough (also see Rogers 2008: 85; Lukose 2009: ch. 5). To not
know any English is a sign of ignorance. But even more than this, to be exposed as
ignorant or deficient in English in moments of status-raising through English (of which
every token utterance of English is a possibility) is humiliating for students and thus
studiously avoided.
This dialectic has a number of effects on how English is used. First, because everyone
wants to speak in English but can’t, within peer group interaction there is a motivating
force to use English words when speaking Tamil (code-mixing) and the avoidance of
clause and sentence level constructions (code-switching). 24 Students pepper their Tamil
with English words, and much of youth slang is derived from English. As one student
explained after trying to initiate in English with me in vain as everyone else told him to
stop:
‘There isn’t anything wrong with the sentence “Scissors-e kodu. Paper cut
paNNaNum.” It conveys some knowledge of English and is thus status-raising.

24

Moreover, full English speech is associated, for most students, with their encounters with adults in the
college: classroom lectures, the speeches of college officials, job interviews in the placement cell, etc. (cf.
Lukose 2009: 186). Thus, while English is usable as status-ful behavior at the word/phrase level, its fullblown use is indexical of formal contexts associated with adult authority.
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Further, its use won’t exclude one’s peers. But saying “Give the scissors, I want
to cut paper” will elicit teasing because it’s banthaa, because it’s trying to show
that you are the periya aaL.’
Second, as using English words that are unknown by most of the populace runs the
risk of teasing, there is a push is toward using English words that have a social domain
that is neither nil nor all of the peer group. Words known by all cease to have statusraising potential while words known by none will invite censure.
Third, there is an incessant glossing activity or cross-code semantic redundancy in
youth’s Tamil whereby English words will be accompanied by their Tamil glosses. This
is a longstanding pattern in Tamil Nadu and one can find a large number of such crosscode reduplications where a Tamil word and English word of same denotation are
combined into a single lexical item that has the same denotation as its components (e.g.,
but-anaal, so-athanaale, varisai-queue, gate-vaasal). Such cross-code reduplication and
glossing diagram the dialectic between status-raising and -leveling in a manner that
parallels the pragmatics of use–mention (Fleming n.d.). In effect, one ‘mentions’ the
English word, hesitantly status-raising, while at the same time ‘using’ the Tamil gloss of
the English, thus preemptively countering any possibility of teasing. By doing this one
can status-raise without leaving anyone out.
Fourth, words that contribute minimally to the denotational text and maximally to the
interactional text are favored: greetings and departures (“Hi,” “What’s up?,” “Good
morning,” “Bye,” “We’ll meet tomorrow”); ritualized interactional moves and phatic
communications (“How are you?,” “Did you eat?,” “Ok[-vaa?],” “Isn’t it?,” “Yeah, I
know”); and discourse linkage words (“but,” “suppose,” “so”). Such words are statusraising (i.e., are ego-focal) but don’t exclude anyone from the conversation (i.e., aren’t
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addressee-focal). This is because their denotational content is minimal but their
interactional content is maximal and easily recoverable from context without knowledge
of English. Such usage manages the double bind to status-raise by speaking English but
not status-raise too much by not speaking too much English.

3.3.3 Teasing as humor
Above we saw how excessive status-raising—where attributed status differs from
perceived/desired status—can produce jealousy, gossip, and teasing. In addition to being
a form of control, teasing is also a genre of humor and entertainment (cf. Lukose 2009:
82–84 on chammal in Kerala; Nisbett 2007 among Bangalore Tamil youth).
Among youth teasing as humor takes a number of recurrent formulae, all of which
inversely diagram youth status. In such genres of teasing a person is attributed a level of
status (explicitly, or implicitly via presupposition) that is incommensurate with the
perceived status of that person. Such teasing figures the status-raising behavior as
something to be questioned because it can’t be backed up by the status of that person.
Thus, for example, in my Madurai hostel two roommates Vignesh and Danavel sparred
back and forth, trading teases. Vignesh initiated saying that Danavel was loving a girl,
causing everyone in the room to laugh. Danavel shot back that Vignesh looked like the
popular and handsome film star Ajith. Here the tease that Danavel is loving a girl—
something which is good and which guys want to be doing—is met with another
otherwise status-raising statement that Vignesh looks like the light-skinned film hero
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Ajith. Of course, he doesn’t, nor was Danavel loving, thus creating a tropic dissonance
whose construal is status-leveling qua teasing. 25
I often encountered this kind of humor when a new person was introduced to me. The
form of the joke is the following: ‘This is my friend X. He is Y’ where X is the person’s
name and Y is filled by some status-raising or status-presupposing predicate: for
example, ‘loving a girl,’ ‘the top of the class,’ the “college hero,” ‘the best chess player in
the college,’ ‘the biggest rowdy in the college,’ the “college terror,” the “#1 accused,”
etc.
Such explicit linguistic boasts for another, negatively valorized through irony, are
largely embarrassing for the person being introduced and always get good laughs from all
around. Ventriloquating attributed status playfully pokes fun through ironically creating a
status mismatch: the target of the teasing is attributed some kind of status which is either
perceived to be excessive or impossible/untrue. Through third-person attributions, such
humor navigates sarcastic insult (2nd pers.) and boasting (1st pers.). 26
As age is a salient axis of status-differentiation in Tamil society, much status-humor
revolves around age. For example, a common joke among youth is to say that someone is
older than he really is; for example, ‘Vivek is 31 years old!’ 27 Relatedly, mismatch of

25

Young men almost always denied being in love except as a kind of confession, saying that such
information if mismanaged would eventually lead to gossip about both the guy and the girl, and thus spoil
their reputations (especially the girl’s). Indeed, one of the common sources of envy among college guys is
that another guy has a girlfriend while they don’t. Such a situation causes the girlfriend-less person’s
‘stomach to burn’ (vayiRu eriyuthu).
26
Similarly, during culturals performances clapping, while usually a form of praise, is often used by youth
to ironically tease someone on stage who they want to take down a peg. They do this by excessive and
premature clapping. Here the ordinary form is troped upon in order to attribute a level of status-raising to
another that all recognize as excessive.
27
Cf. the term chiththappu (see chapter 2, section 4.1.3).
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cross-generational fictive consanguineal kinship was often perceived as humorous. 28 For
example, male students would often playfully joke with their female classmates by
calling them akkaa ‘older sister.’ 29 For example, in a light ragging session in the elite
Chennai college that I worked in, a group of style-ish third-year students were
questioning a first-year girl, asking her name, where she is from, and what classes she is
taking. The girl was, appropriate to the genre, part embarrassed, part demure, part
submissive as expressed in her body language, tone of voice, eye gaze, and terse answers.
When the girl, presumably by accident due to being so nervous, answered one of the
third-year’s questions “Yes, uncle” everyone broke out laughing. This was compounded
when the other third years seized on this status-mismatch and reversed it, saying that no,
actually his birthday is in 1992, making him younger than the girls. They shouldn’t call
him “uncle,” he should be calling them akkaa! This got a wide round of laughs from all
the students (and a blush from the target of the teasing).
Similarly, parodic uses of status-raising behaviors often functioned as humor in the
peer group. For example, trying to speak English but failing at it was always good for a
laugh (cf. the famous Rajnikanth comedy dialogue in the film Veelaikkaaran [1987]
discussed in chapter 4). Youth often speak in humorous, exaggerated broken English as a
joke, demonstrating familiarity with English and thus status-raising, even while
distancing themselves from the enregistered figure of status-ful personhood associated
with it, and thus self-status-leveling.

28

Kin terms from the patrline tend to be humorously used precisely because (age-)status and hierarchy is
more salient for one’s consanguineal kin than for one’s affinal kin.
29
Note that the participial noun for a woman who shows off with English (peter vudravaL) is peter akkaa,
thus compounding the tease by ironic attribution of foreign background and older age.
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3.3.4 The treat
Another youth cultural ritual that reflects and redistributes status is the treat. When
something good happens to an individual (s)he is expected, and often times forced, to
give a “treat” to the peer group; for example, take them out to the movies, buy them
dinner (or sweets), or for men, buy them alcoholic drinks (also see Nisbett 2007). Here
“something good” means something which raises one’s status in the peer group. Having a
birthday (in Tamil Nadu, on your birthday you have to bring the cake), getting a job,
winning a game, securing someone’s love, getting married, or passing an exam, for
instance, all require giving a treat to one’s peers. Not giving a treat is seen as selfish, as
arrogant, and is grounds for breaking social relations.
While youth will often state that one treats because one wants to share the happiness
due to the status-raising event, this isn’t its only function. 30 Indeed, as with the other
youth cultural forms describe above, the treat is a mechanism of advertising statusraising (one treats because one has had his status raised) coupled with status-leveling
through redistribution of status, thus recreating egalitarian relations out of statusdifferentiation. This tropically replicates the model of patronage that one finds in adult
society (M. Mines 1994; M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990) through youth rituals of
transgression (smoking, drinking, cinema). Through the circulating treat (Mauss 1954)
the peer group is reconstituted as status-level.

3.3.5 Fighting

30

This necessity to treat is so strong that one of my close friends upon getting engaged studiously avoided
walking in his neighborhood, instead taking auto-rickshaws or bikes in circuitous routes. He was afraid of
being stopped and asked for a treat (in this case, sixty rupees for a quarter of spirits) from any and
everyone. I myself was unknowingly stuck with the rather large bill at my own going away party.
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Most of the time peer group activity works smoothly and status-leveling of the kinds I
described above regulate youth affairs. However, physical fighting is always a resort that
exists among youth to negotiate status.
One night in the first Madurai hostel that I lived in, during an interview with two
second-year students we heard a commotion in an adjacent room. Going over there we
learned that a fight had broken out between two first years. The first years had been told
by the third years to put away the cricket equipment, a legitimate expression of
hierarchical difference. One upper-middle class, urban first-year, Bradley, told
Venkatesh, a working-class rural first-year, to put it away. Venkatesh, in turn, told
Bradley he could do it if he wanted to, but he wouldn’t. Both turns were un-ratified
expressions of hierarchical difference. Because there was no principle to determine who
had the right to tell the other what to do, a verbal fight broke out. The moment, however,
when it escalated into physical confrontation involving a mirror used as a weapon is
when Bradley, proficient in English, code-switched into English. Venkatesh, insecurely
ignorant of English took this as a direct insult that he was an ignorant bumpkin, unable to
speak in or understand English, and thus attacked Bradley. As this example shows, once
status negotiation through ego-focal tropic displays of style breaks down, the negotiation
of status takes on a more literal semiotic mode of status-leveling: physical blows.
In general, if status-raising becomes too much for the peer group to handle, if it
implicates one’s peers as lower status, thereby hierarchically ranking them and
impugning their self-image, a physical fight to literally establish dominance is always a
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possibility; as is the dissolution of the peer group and the severing of social relations (see
Nisbett 2007 for a nice description of this). 31

Status-raising objects/behaviors are dangerous cultural forms: while they have the
power to elevate the user, they risk making the user the object of derision. Hence the
multiform hybrid and partial strategies at play in the peer group. As we saw, youth’s
activities in the youth peer group are highly ambivalent about status, and thus almost
always offer a kind of deniability prefigured in their use. This is itself a reaction to the
anxieties and insecurities of being a youth, of being in the double bind to obey (the peer
group) and transgress (through status-raising). With respect to English use we saw how
youth’s own practices hybridize status-ful signs so as to negotiate the problematics of the
peer group (also see chapter 6, section 3.3 on how the consumption of brands works
through a similar dialectic). I take this up in the conclusion of the chapter.
Status-raising also enables particular kinds of pleasure. We saw how genres of humor
status-level through ironical status-raising, lowering status through attributing status.
While such practices are otherwise aggressive gestures (teasing outside of the peer group
can lead to fighting) in the peer group they are converted into signs of intimacy/solidarity
through their double-voicedness. Thus, at the same time that youth status invokes the
specter of its excess, it also makes particular forms of humor and play possible through
status-mismatch, status-inversion, and performance of other’s styles (e.g., film stars) by

31

While I didn’t observed incidents of the kind described by Rogers (2008), we might also add “eve
teasing” (‘sexually harassing’) women of an adversarial group as a way to status-lower other men. I did
observe cases of this on an individual level, though the groups in the colleges I worked at didn’t explicit
organize around caste and thus such events didn’t become caste-mobilizing conflicts as Rogers describes.
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parodic distance (see chapter 4 on the film comedian) that ultimately reconstitute the peer
group as a space of intimacy and egalitarian reciprocity.

3.4 Status licenses transgression, transgression begets status, status begets status
As we have seen, there is a thin and shifting line between acceptable and excessive
status-raising. There is no clear and fixed line precisely because youth status is largely
defined by its exteriority from perduring modes of institutionalized status. Rather than
being anchored in unambiguous and perduring forms of status, youth status is a shifter
(Silverstein 1995[1976]), interactionally grounded, ephemeral, and in constant need of
renewal. And as I have argued, this is inherent in the tension of the peer group as a space
of status-raising/transgression and -leveling/peer pressure.
Youth status exists in the circular logic of transgression and grounding of
transgression. Status presupposes and entails the ability to deviate from norms of
authority (‘society’). And yet to have such transgression ratified by your peers, one must
have established an alternative authority which grounds such transgression. The irony
here, then, is that those with status can have their style be easily ratified by the group,
while those who don’t can’t. And this is a bootstrapping project. One can’t out of the blue
start doing style. It will certainly draw teasing from one’s peers. One has to piecemeal
engage in status-raising negotiation in the peer group.
Not only can youth who are viewed as status-ful pull off status-ful displays, but they
can also set norms of status-ful transgression. To this extent, mature youth become the
islands of the authority they desire. While a youth considered as a chinna paiyan with a
mohawk hairstyle might come off as absurd, a status-ful youth with the same haircut
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would be style. And having gotten such an outlandish haircut (and having it ratified by
the peer group), such a status-ful youth becomes the baptismal event from which other
less status-ful youth can replicate such style with less chance of being made fun of. I
return to this issue in chapter 5 in considering how film can function as source register for
youth’s status work.

4. Women and status: Why doing style is so difficult for women
4.1 Introduction
So far we have been looking at youth status from the perspective of men. I justified
this because the construction of ‘youth’ as exteriority makes being a female youth
problematic insofar as women are: (a) figured as interior to home, family, kin, caste, and
culture, because (b) their behaviors, clothing, and status work are taken as indexes of the
status of the groups to which they belong. The emblem of this is the woman’s kaRpu
‘chastity.’ The woman’s chastity is the honor of her kin group, her caste group, “Tamil
culture,” the Indian nation (Chatterji 1993; Mankekar 1999), and even divinity itself
(Ramaswamy 1997). Because of this, after puberty young women’s behaviors are much
more regulated than during their childhood (Vatuk 1972, 1982b; Kakar 1978; Daniels
1980; David 1980; Reynolds 1980; Bennett 1983; Das 1988; Dube 1988; Tarlo 1996;
Ram 2000; A. Kumar 2002). Whereas young boys are given more freedoms as ‘youth,’
women are given less. They are expected and made to be more mature, more controlled
(kadduppaadu), more like adults.
Nevertheless, there are, as we have had occasion to point out, zones where such
expectations and controls are partially lifted for young women. College is one such place,
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and women’s colleges are exceptional social spaces for the social processes I have been
discussing in this chapter (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 6). While geththu and thooraNai are hardly
ever used to describe women, their behaviors, or their possessions (except perhaps in
teasing them through tropes of masculinization), they can and do do style. Style is,
however, highly problematic for women. But what exactly is so unladylike about ‘youth’
and style?

4.2 Visibility
First, as we noted, style is about being seen, about being visible. Even more than this,
it is about wanting to be seen, as desiring attention. In Tamil Nadu, however, the woman
as agent of her own desire is in most contexts stigmatized (Nakassis and Dean 2007). To
have desire is to invoke the awful power of the sexually voracious woman, the out-ofcontrol female sakthi (‘power’) that can destroy social relations and even physical matter
(cf. the Kannagi myth 32 ) (Wadley 1980a, b; Daniel 1984). Female style is often described
simultaneously as showing off, as seductive, and as (demonically) threatening (cf. Lukose
2005a: 925 on gema in Kerala; Tarlo’s [1996: ch. 6] discussion of the cardigan). One
college girl in Madurai whose chudithar hem revealed the top half of her back was
described by onlooking young men as ‘doing style,’ as “scene pooduRathu” (‘showing
off’), and as “puuchchaaNdi kaamikkiRathu” (‘showing puuchchaaNdi,’ the demonic
boogeyman). To take another example, going out in public with free hair (i.e., not in a
braid, the emblem of the control of female power) is thought to make a woman look like
32

The Kannagi myth is the story of Kannagi, the wife of a wealthy merchant. Having lost their fortune,
they travelled to Madurai where her husband pawned her jewelry so as to raise money and start afresh.
Unfortunately the jewelry is mistaken for the Queen’s recently stolen jewelry and her husband is falsely
accused, convicted, and executed. Kannagi’s anger at the injustice was enough to set all of Madurai on fire.
Her anger had this power because of her purity of character and chastity.
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a demon or ghost, but also makes people think that the woman has an abaasamaana
guNam, ‘a bad (i.e., loose) character.’
Second, to have desire is to (potentially) compromise one’s kaRpu, and thus to
threaten the honor of the patriarchal kin and caste group. Recalling the proverb from
chapter 2, section 2.2.1, while letting a man out of the house makes him a man, letting a
woman out of the house spoils her. The quite real fear here is that to be seen in public
will lead to the assumption by others of agentive desire, and this to the assumption of
immodesty, and thus to the destruction of reputation and the possibility of (upward
mobility in) marriage.
Style threatens a woman’s reputation precisely because style inevitably invokes over
style and thus teasing. Teasing by boys, or by the reified agent ‘society,’ is the first step
to gossip, and gossip to a spoilt identity (Goffman 1963). Young women, indeed, fear
teasing and gossip, and this largely shapes how they act and dress in public (Lukose
2009; Tarlo 1996). For a man, however, there is no such threat. In fact, not doing style is
likely to ruin one’s reputation. (It certainly won’t aid it.) Style for a man is status, it
attracts; for a woman it attracts too much, it is glamour. For a man, over style is at most
absurd; for a woman it is immoral. By this logic, knowing all this, what kind of girl
would do style but a bad one?
This was made clear to me in discussions with male youth about why jeans and teeshirts are considered so transgressive for women while track pants and short sleeve
jerseys of the same cut and fit worn by female athletes are not. But why? Young men
explained that it is because sports dress is a uniform. It is required. Thus, the
interpretation that the girl is trying to get attention is neutralized. On the other hand, one
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wears jeans/top to get noticed. Thus, as one student reasoned, one can infer that the girl
who wears jeans is easier to talk to, and by implication, easier to sleep with. And while
young men enjoyed looking at women dressed as such, it was highly disturbing for them
as well, as too attractive, too seductive. But wearing track pants/jersey is for sports, not
for looks. It is obligatory, not a choice. Hence it is not style, not agentive, not sexualized,
not problematic.
While transgression from adult gender norms for men are expected, for women they
are dangerous. For all these reasons, to do style, to be visible, to try to get attention is a
sexualizing act and thus to be avoided. 33

4.3 Status-raising
Style is about status-raising. It’s a kind of boast. While for men this is fine, for most
women boasting is highly problematic. This is because the general assumption in Tamil
Nadu is that between a man and a woman of the same age or younger the man should
always be higher status. 34 And yet a status-raising woman puts this into question, and
thus presents a challenge to men. 35

33

Incidentally, this is a major reason why many Tamil women aren’t allowed to act in television or film. To
be on screen is to be visible, and this is in and of itself enough to question a woman’s modesty and the
honor of her kin group (caste, culture, nation). While in rural Theeni on the set of Goa (2010), getting the
husbands of interested local woman to be extras was difficult for precisely this reason.
34
This is the explicit logic why in a relationship between a man and a woman the man should be older and
taller. Otherwise, the woman will see him as a chinna paiyan, and thus will never respect him. The man
will lose control (cf. Lukose 2009: 193–194).
35
We might cite examples of powerful women in Tamil politics. I would argue, however, that such women
are the exceptions that prove the rule. Moreover, in such cases the relationship between the dominant
woman and subordinate men are often reframed within socially sanctioned kin relationships of mother to
children.

131

The woman who does style makes men uncomfortable because she questions the
masculinity of those around her by participating in their economy of status work. 36 While
men have geththu, women are ‘caught’ by ‘arrogance,’ “thimiru pidichcha poNNu.” 37 In
the college a girl who talks ‘too much’ (i.e., jokes around with the guys and isn’t shy and
reserved), who projects status, who does style, or who speaks in English is arrogant, is a
rowdy poNNu (‘rowdy girl’) who has head weight (chapter 2, section 4.1.2). 38 Such a
young woman is derided, isolated, teased.
Among young men there is a palpable anxiety about today’s “modern” women. The
common refrain from young men about such women is that they “scene pooduRathu”
(‘show off’), they act like they are better than men, and this is why young men avoid
socializing with them. Male insecurity often gets played out in avoidance behavior which
only exacerbates the problem because channels of communication and understanding are
severed (cf. Osella and Osella 2004: 243; Nisbett 2006: 139; Weiss 2002: 110–113 on
masculinity as predicated on female exclusion). 39

4.4 Patriarchy

36

Similarly, being teased by a woman is doubly status-lowering, and guys often noted that when girls were
around they were extra careful not to try to show off and fail (e.g., make a mistake while speaking English).
College professors explained that this was one of the drawbacks of coed education: boys are more hesitant
to answer questions in class for fear of being wrong in front of their female classmates, and thus teased by
them (or their male peers).
37
We can note the obvious parallels with the double standards in the U.S. vis-à-vis derogatory terms like
“bitch” applied to women whose actions would receive laudation if done by men.
38
For example, the idea that women would use men’s language (e.g., terms like machchaan) in their own
peer groups is seen as a kind of arrogance (thimiru), as strange and incongruous, as gutsy (thuNichchal),
and unfeminine.
39
Such insecurity also abounds in youth film (thanks to Dr. Uma Vangal, personal communication 9.30.08,
for pointing this out regarding Dhanush’s oeuvre). See, for example, the film Manmathan (2004) which
centers on the condoning of the hero killing English-speaking, rich, style-ish women who sleep around.

132

A woman doing style is a challenge not just to the concept of masculinity but to
patriarchy itself. 40 Style is about the transgression of ‘society’ (i.e., patriarchy); about
being bold and challenging authority. While for young men transgressing patriarchy isn’t
itself a challenge to patriarchy as such (it’s a challenge to specific authorities, or an
attempt to figuratively insert oneself into the larger political organization of ‘society’),
for a woman to transgress through style is to undermine the patriarchal order in general. If
to do style is to be exterior to the authority of patriarchy, and if patriarchy is predicated
on the control of its women as chaste, a woman doing style threatens ‘society’ itself. For
a woman, then, style is doubly transgressive. It puts the honor of the patriarchal group
(the caste, patriline) at risk, and questions the ability of ‘society’ to carry any authority at
all.
Style is also about status work which is ego-focal, about being self-centered. Young
men can do fashion because they don’t have to care what others think (chapter 2, section
2.2.2). As we saw, this isn’t true for women. Thus, while self-centeredness is
neutral/good for men, it’s a dangerous quality in a woman (M. Mines 1994). This is
because a woman’s actions are never simply ego-focal but radiate in all directions from
her. Self-centered-ness for a woman is unacceptable because to be self-centered is to
forsake the home, the family, ‘society,’ ‘culture,’ the nation. Women who do style, youth
explained, are “very bold,” “independent,” and most importantly ‘don’t care about
others.’ And under the belief that women are the baakkiyam (‘auspicious gift’) of the
patriarchal group to which they belong, and thus literally cause the success or ruin of the
40

See Tarlo’s (1996: ch. 6) discussion of the modern, stylish cardigan as a medium of resistance to
patriarchy in the Gujarati village in which she did her fieldwork. Also compare with Bastian’s (1996: 100–
111) discussion of the kinds of tropes of masculinity in Nigerian women’s fashion circa the 1980s and
men’s reactions to it.
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family, a woman who does style can literally cause the ruin of the family and the
patriarchal social order more generally.
To be a young woman, then, is to be caught between ego-focal youth status and
concern for others. This mediates young women’s relationship to youth culture more
generally, making style highly problematic. This is precisely why women’s fashion often
provokes violent reaction: women’s behavior and dress are never simply ego-focal but
always alter-focal, indexical of the kin group, the ‘society,’ the ‘culture.’ When they
transgress, then, they transgress for everyone, all onlookers, all addressees. (See Lukose
[2009: intro., ch. 2] on the complexities of women’s fashion among Indian youth; also
Tarlo 1996.) As some young women of a Madurai college explained, ‘young women [i.e.,
we] may like jeans, but insofar as they offend the sentiments of others, they are taboo.
When the principal burned a pair of jeans on the campus as part of the symbolic banning
of jeans on the campus, few protested. We came in chudithars’ (cf. Lukose 2009: 86).

4.5 Women do style
Yet, as I noted earlier, women do do style, though often in a more muted fashion than
men. Women’s style in fashion tends to be less conspicuous. In general, women’s fashion
eschews the marks of exteriority. For example, while the male body is covered in brands,
women’s clothing remains largely unbranded. Women’s clothing also downplays
exteriority through negotiated forms: for example, the north Indian chudithar instead of
Western jeans; or hair clipped but not braided (see Lukose 2009: ch. 2 on what she calls
the “demure modern”; Tarlo 1996). Instead, status in clothing is expressed through
materials, fabric quality, color matching, and embellishments (metal work, embroidery,
134

etc.). In fact, it is often not even called style, but fashion, meaning a current trend, thereby
negating the problematic associations of style. 41
While style in women’s fashion is more controlled, its full expression in speech is
possible. Indeed, the stereotype among youth is that it is young middle-class women who
peter (v)uduRathu (‘show off with English’) the most. Young men stated that such girls
speak as if they are from a foreign land, often code-switching just at the moment when
their speech becomes audible to others. As such style is relatively unrelated to women’s
sexuality per se, it is less controlled and easier for women to engage with.
Finally, for many young women style is something one appreciates from a distance,
but not something that one does. While they may not be able to re-animate those who do
style—TV VJs, film actresses, rich-urban women—they can enjoy the fashion from a
distance: unrequited style.

4.6 Who, where, and when female youth do style
As it is for boys, women’s engagement with style in fashion is licensed in
circumstances where the chance of such actions getting back to anyone who knows the
girl is minimized. Thus, for example, in all-girls colleges, girls might come to the college
in one outfit, but then change into another more style-ish outfit once inside (cf. Tarlo
1996: 201). And as discussed in chapter 2, the tour (especially outside of Tamil Nadu) is
always a good time to break out style-ish forms.
For women the concept of style is even more class-linked than it is for men precisely
for the reasons stated above. Because style is linked to public space and visuality, young

41

Thanks to Melanie Dean for pointing this out to me.
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working- and middle-class women almost always link style to the rich, as something that
only rich girls did. This is because only rich girls can afford access to the kinds of
exterior spaces where it is possible to do style and avoid teasing and harassment from
men. Rich girls go to college and hang out in spaces of wealth (malls, restaurants, foreign
countries) where they won’t get bothered for doing style. Further, they get to such
exterior spaces by taking their motorbikes or cars, and not by walking or riding on the
bus.
Given the luxury of exteriority, the rich are seen to literally inhabit a different world.
In this sense young rich/elite women are doubly outside of ‘society,’ and thus are able to
do style without threat to their reputation. Hence the stereotype about rich women is that
they don’t care what others think, of what ‘society’ says about their behavior. They live
in a different ‘society’ and thus they are free. Their status is so high, as it were, that it’s
un-impugnable. They can afford, literally and figuratively, to do style. And while this is
clearly a lower-/middle-class linked perspective, unlike boys’ fashion where forms and
designs are continuous across a class spectrum, women fashions and style are
discontinuous across social classes. In general, rich urban women dress qualitatively
differently than middle-class and poor women: they wear pants, jeans, tee-shirts, and
blouses, rather than thavanis, chudithars, and sarees (cf. Tarlo 1996: ch. 5–8).

5. Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In this chapter and the last I have laid out a particular logic that organizes youth
cultural activity in Tamil Nadu. In chapter 2 I showed how the construction of ‘youth’ as
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an age set in an otherwise age hierarchical ‘society’ motivates youth’s experience of their
own positionality in that ‘society’ as exterior. I examined how this exteriority is taken up
in youth’s own activities and forms the central trope that organizes the peer group and its
social spaces and the activities and semiotic registers that unfold in them. In particular, I
showed how much of the activity in the peer group is about status, and that metapragmatic typifications like style and geththu are themselves diagrammatic of ‘youth’ (as
exteriority to hierarchy) while at the same time reinscribing the categories of ‘society’
that youth attempt to distance themselves from. One entailment of the peer group
constructed as exterior space is its highly intimate and coercive nature, creating a
contradiction between the peer group as a space for status-raising and transgression and
the peer group as space of constant status-leveling and peer pressure. In this chapter I
explored how the forces of status-raising and -leveling inherent in the youth peer group
shape the negotiation of status-ful signs via their hybridization and double-voiced
structure (e.g., in humor, jokes, English use).
While I mainly looked at young men’s experience, I noted how gender and class
crucially mediate these dynamics. Indeed, we can think of style and geththu as two
concepts of class- and gender- linked genres of meta-pragmatic typification that are
enregistered with respect to different models of ‘youth.’ In the coming chapters I explore
the mediation of these genres of status vis-à-vis film (chapters 4–5) and branded forms
(chapters 6–8).

5.2 Globalization, “tradition,” age, and style
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Ritty Lukose (2009: 62; cf. Brown and Larson 2003: 12–13) writes in her
ethnography of college-going youth in post-liberalization Kerala that political discourses
about youth
“have a theory of globalization and youth embedded within them: youth is a
consuming social group, the first to bend to what is understood to be the
homogenizing pressures of globalization, a globalization fundamentally tied to
Americanization. Youth consumption practices index the presence and reach of
globalization.”
I have said little explicitly about globalization or the presence of American cultural forms
among Tamil youth, though we have had occasion to note them. This is perhaps because
of the implicit and seemingly unresolvable tension that Lukose identifies in debates about
globalization, a tension between globalization/homogenization and resistance to
it/heterogenization (Robertson 1995, 2001; Appadurai 1990; Tomlinson 1997; Bauman
1998).
This tension, what Mazzarella (2004: 348ff.) has dubbed “the Formula,” is
presumably resolved through the notion of “negotiation,” following British Cultural
Studies’ attempt to understand hegemony and move beyond the staid dualism of
power/ideology and agency/resistance (cf. Mosse 2003). Hybridized cultural forms are
the supposed evidence for such negotiation of globalization. For example, Jeffrey et al.
(2008: 16) note that young men’s masculinities in many societies are played out through
the hybridization, or partial engagement and appropriation, of signs that indexically
invoke “tradition,” “modernity,” and “globalization.” Thus, such youth practices can be
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read as either negotiated acceptance or resistance to hegemonic masculinities/
ideologies. 42
What I would like to suggest is that the issue shouldn’t be formulated in terms of
alignment of youth toward preexisting ideologies or not (i.e., as a model of “reception” of
discourses handed down to local “targets” from global “sources”). Rather, we should ask
how do youth use particular signs, taken from a variety of source registers, to do their
interactional work? As we have seen, Tamil youth’s concerns with status in the peer
group recruit semiotic forms from various source registers: from Western branded forms
and English, the accoutrement of the rowdy, and tropes on the objective periya aaL.
While we might see this as a mix of the “traditional” and “modern” and thus the
negotiation of “globalization” what I pointed out in this chapter is that all such semiotic
forms, irrespective of their traditional-ness or modernity, are functionally the same vis-àvis the logic of ‘youth.’ Youth use such forms not because they are “modern,” “global,”
or “traditional” per se but because such forms can be made to do interactional work in the
peer group (i.e., status-raising and -leveling). 43 From this point of view, youth are not
negotiating “globalization,” “modernity,” or “tradition” but are negotiating the

42

Tarlo (1996: ch. 2) gives a similar argument in her discussion of male fashion in colonial Indian. For her,
the problem of what to wear, and the kinds of hybrid compromises it created, was caught in the double bind
of desires for civilization/status (“modernity”) and cultural loyalty (“tradition”). Interestingly, even in the
examples she discusses (e.g., on pp. 53, 57) we see precisely the status dynamics discussed in this chapter.
Further, her argument regarding how Gujarati villagers engage such national debates (pp. 332–335)
resonates with the argument that I present in this section. Bastian (1996) provides a rich set of examples
showing a similar dynamic in young Nigerian men and women’s fashion practices. Here we see how
concerns about local status negotiations within and across generations motivates into use both “traditional”
and “modern” sartorial signs, thereby creating hybrid fashion forms. Similarly Schoss (1996) provides a
number of examples of how young Kenyan men involved in the tourism trade draw on exterior source
registers of value in their dress in order to negotiate their places in larger kin networks, even if she
ultimately argues that what is being done through such dress is consuming “cosmopolitanism” itself (pp.
184).
43
Cf. Tobin (1992: 4) and Stanlaw (1992) on a similar argument regarding the “domestication of the West”
through Japanese consumption activities and English use, respectively.
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contradictions of the youth peer group: the injunction toward exteriority and statusraising and the peer pressure and anxieties of conformity inherent to the peer group.
Because of the contradictions of the peer group, itself a result of youth’s own reanalysis
of their position in the life cycle, youth cultural forms are hybridized so as to
simultaneously status-raise and -level at the same time, to raise one’s esteem but avoid
censure from the peer group.
To read such youth peer group activity as a negotiation of “tradition,” “modernity,” or
“globalization” is to, I would argue, read youth culture allegorically against anxieties that
analysts often feel acutely (for various reasons). I do not deny that in some instances
youth themselves may reanalyze their own experience in this way. Certainly some do
some of the time. But this is an empirical question and must be posed as such rather than
as a pregiven from which analysis follows (cf. Mosse 2003). In my observations, most of
the time most male youth were unconcerned with globalization, tradition, or modernity as
such. When they were, it was in moments of reflection (or secondary rationalization) on
what they were already doing (which abides by a different logic than the question of
negotiating globalization per se, as I argued above). 44

44

The approaches to globalization that I have discussed, then, observe that: (a) youth use “modern” forms,
“traditional” forms, and “global” forms; (b) youth are involved in “negotiation” projects via (a); and (c)
youth cultural forms hybridize (a) while doing (b). I showed how this view mistakenly attributes this as the
“negotiation” of “globalization” because it doesn’t take into account the on-the-ground logic of the youth
peer group. What is interesting is that there is a systematic motivation of (a), (b), and (c) from the logic of
the construction of the age category ‘youth’ and how it plays out vis-à-vis tropes of exteriority. As I have
discussed in this chapter and the last the middling of ‘youth’ in the life cycle is reanalyzed by youth via
trope of exteriority; this trope constructs youth spaces, concepts of status, and the peer group as a space of
status-raising and -leveling and thus produces the observables (a), (b), and (c). I would argue, then, that this
process of reanalysis and status negotiation systematically motivates the globalization story as an
ideological misunderstanding. It is a classic Whorfian projection/Boasian secondary
rationalization/Marxian fetish where the logic of some social process motivates a partial awareness of that
process, and thus through reanalysis, a distorted ideological formulation of it. It would seem to do this for
both globalization theorists and for Tamil youth who, on occasion (re)analyze the experience of Tamil
youth as the negotiation of “globalization.”
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Seen from this light, the question of “negotiation” is a false solution to the problem
posed by ambivalences of youth culture; false not because it is necessarily untrue, but
because it doesn’t allow us to pose certain kinds of questions given its assumptions.
Given its assumption—there exist discourses or ideologies, what are the possible ways of
engaging with them?—the conclusion—one can either accept, reject, or negotiate them—
seems self-evident. But rather than framing the issue in terms of how individuals
“receive” or engage with preexisting and static entities (denoted by abstract nouns like
“ideology,” “culture,” “power,” “globalization”) I have asked how youth variously use
and re-animate signs which have various indexical values (like “modernity,” “the West,”
“tradition”) to do some (often mundane) interactional work (e.g., status-raising in the
peer group, impressing a girl). Just as a carpenter doesn’t negotiate with a hammer
(except under the most strained readings) but uses it to do his work, youth use signs of
modernity, tradition, and globalization to do their own work.
This is not to say that globalization, modernity, and tradition are irrelevant to youth’s
social reality, for clearly they are, as source registers for youth’s status work. Indeed, one
of the ironies of Tamil youth culture is the motivation and recruitment of particular youth
cultural forms from the global exterior in order to play out particular understandings of
status which are distinctly Tamil (e.g., the status differential of periya aaL–chinna
paiyan) while bracketing the larger institutional meta-pragmatic discourses (caste, kin
group) which attempt to locate ‘youth’ with respect to those discourses (as hierarchically
ranked below adults). The issue, then, isn’t just the mutual constitution of the
modern/traditional or global/local, but that this mutuality is asymmetrical precisely
because of its multi-tiered semiotic structure of sign–metasign: [‘youth’ is a trope [on
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“traditional” concepts of status via [modern forms and traditional forms]]]. 45 That is, it
isn’t only a question of the kinds of cultural signs recruited by youth in their activity (i.e.,
are they “traditional,” are they “modern”?) but also an issue of their diagrammaticity, or
higher order logic (and tropic possibilities) (cf. Gal 2002 on fractal recursivity). In short,
then, rather than seeing youth engagement with “tradition” and “modernity” as
semiotically flat, or one dimensional (that is, taking place only at the level of cultural
forms with such-and-such indexical values), we must also be able to understand how such
youth engagements are always already figured within a more complex semiotic
configuration of a two-tiered structure (minimally of the sign–metasign order),
imbricated in particular on-the-ground interactional work (cf. Mosse 2003).

45

Cf. Mazzarella (2003: 263ff.) on a similar but inverted situation among India advertising elites:
[‘consumerism’ is a trope [on globalization via [“Indian-ness” and signs of elite status]]] whereby the
simulacrum of indigeneity is reproduced through a globally-aware sensibility, thereby producing a
consumerist structure and (reified) “tradition” in an asymmetric relation of tradition mobilized for
consumerism.
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Part II. Style and Film
Chapter 4 – Film as Style, Style in Film: Hero, Villain, Comedian

1. Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3 I showed how the construction of the age category ‘youth’ and
concepts of youth status diagram youth’s relationship to their reified notions of ‘society.’
The focus was on status at the level of face-to-face interaction in the peer group. As was
clear, however, youth status is informed by and re-animates mass-mediated images of
youth masculinity and status; in particular, film (Rogers 2009, forthcoming; see Osella
and Osella 2004; Derne 2000; Lukose 2009). In this chapter I look at style in herooriented, Tamil commercial action films, with particular attention given to the style of
Rajinikanth. In chapters 2 and 3 I bracketed the importance of film precisely because, as I
argue in chapter 5, while film is an important source register for youth status (a) it is
more general notions of status and age (as discussed in chapters 2 and 3) that inform both
youth peer group activity and film representations of masculinity; and (b) it is the
dynamics of the peer group that directly inform how youth engage with and re-animate
filmic representations.

2. Filmic representations of status: Style, geththu, and status inversion
In this chapter I argue that the best way to understand commercial cinema is as the
negotiation of status in the peer group put in narrated form. I discuss this with respect to
the hero (as positive representation of status), the villain or rowdy (as excessive
representation of status), and the comedian (as inverted representation of status). I make
this strategic move for two reasons: first, to recenter the analysis of such film from being
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text to audience focal (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009); second, to move from
the notion of reception to the notion of re-animation or use, and thus from a focus on
media to mediation, or how meaningful social activity is enabled and coordinated with
respect to mass-mediated representations (see Agha 2007b; Mazzarella 2004).
Reading commercial film through the lens of youth status is justifiable, I argue, for
the following reasons: (1) the main audience of Tamil films, especially of the herooriented films discussed in this chapter, is (male) youth (Nakassis and Dean 2007;
Rajanayakam 2002); (2) such films are about youth in terms of their protagonists, social
worlds, and concerns; and (3) cinema as an institution is figured as exterior and
transgressive to ‘society’ and ‘culture’ and thus is, by degrees, iconic with the
construction of ‘youth’ and its forms of status (chapter 2, section 3.1).
While Indian film has been read through the lens of religion and mythology (as a
projection from, or as drawing on) (Mishra et. al 1989; Dwyer and Patel 2002; Osella and
Osella 2004: 224; Lutgendorff 2006); political image and (quasi-)propaganda (Hardgrave
1971, 1973, 1979; Hardgrave and Neidhart 1975; Sivathambi 1981; Pandian 1992;
Dickey 1993b; Rajanayakam 2002); political economy and ideology (Prasad 1998;
Lukose 2009: 49–51); caste politics (Dhareshwar and Niranjana 1996); fan devotion
(Srinivas 1996; Dickey 2001; Osella and Osella 2004; Rogers 2009, forthcoming); or the
moral frameworks, fantasies, and desires of the makers or audience (Thomas 1985, 1995;
Mishra et al. 1989; Kakar 1990: ch. 3; Dickey 1993b, 1995; Derne 2000; Osella and
Osella 2004: 224–225; Dickey 2009b), it has not been read from the perspective of
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concepts of youth status, and certainly not of style. 1 And yet, as we will see, Tamil film is
rife with representations of status, both in and out of the film text.
Why has film not been so investigated with respect to status? I argue that this is
because most work on Indian cinema operates with a highly partial view of film as
communicative process. In such work, the audience is passive (as the semantics of term
reception implies; Asif Agha personal communication, February 9, 2010). They are the
communicative end point, the telos of the text. The film is consumed by the act of
viewing, used up, completed (cf. the notion of commodity “consumption,” Marx 1976:
ch. 1).
In this chapter and the next I take another line of inquiry: how can we see film as
imbricated in the pragmatic goings-on of everyday life, as a resource for pragmatic
interactional work by viewers (versus simply iconic with the viewer, producer, myth,
“culture,” ideology, or psyche, etc.). I argue that this iconic indexicality—the reanimation of film by youth (iconism) to achieve pragmatic ends in peer groups
(indexicality)—explains (a) what aspects of film youth engage with; (b) the
reproducibility and hence recirculatability of hero-centered films outside of film (peer
groups, TV, other films, political campaigns, etc.); (c) how youth talk about film stars
and their selective deployment of filmic images of status (chapter 5); and (d) why the
hero-centered film can produce what I call “hero-stars” 2 through their inter-discursivity
(chapter 5).
1

Rajanayakam’s (2002: 97, 231) dissertation, while it deals extensively with the image of Rajinikanth,
relegates style as a mere “gimmick” which youth like but which is of ultimately no real consequence
besides endearing Rajinikanth to his fans.
2
What I mean by “hero-star,” as discussion will make clear, is a popular and status-ful actor whose onscreen and off-screen personae overlap to such a degree that there is a trans-textual coherence to his heroic
characters such it that transfers to his extra-textual persona qua “star.” Examples from Tamil cinema
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3. Style: Super Star Rajinikanth and the hero
3.1 Rajinikanth as style
As noted in chapter 3, if you ask youth in Tamil Nadu ‘What is style?’ you will often
get a one word answer: Rajinikanth. Indeed, style as a lexical item is something
historically particular to Rajinikanth (b. 1950). While M. G. Ramachandran (MGR)
(1917–1987)—the most popular Tamil actor-politician of all time, active from the 1950s
to the 1970s—certainly did something akin to style (e.g., his fashionable clothes; his
oratorical dialogues; his signature crossing of his index and middle finger, placing them
on the tip of his nose and then untwisting them in a motion that left his index finger
pointing up in the air), this was not called style, but paddaiya kiLappaRathu (lit. ‘strip off
wood/bark/skin’; roughly, ‘doing something in an impressive manner’; cf. English ‘rip it
up’). The word style, as far as I know (and my informants knew), was first used to talk
about Rajinikanth (who rose to prominence as MGR was retiring to full-time politics) and
is fused with him. Rajini is style. Style is Rajini. This isn’t to say that style isn’t used or
usable with reference to other individuals (new stars, older stars in retrospect, non-filmrelated individuals), but that to invoke style is to invoke, at some level, Rajinikanth.
Rajinikanth is, and has been since the seventies, the biggest hero-star in the Tamil
industry. 3 He began as a character actor in 1970s, often playing the villain or negative

include MGR, Rajinikanth, Vijay, and Ajith. The hero-star is associated with a particular type of film, the
commercial hero-oriented action film.
3
He is certainly the best paid. Apparently in all of Asia Rajinikanth, even in his late fifties, is the second
highest-paid actor today only after Jackie Chan (Eapan 2009). This is telling as the Tamil-speaking
audience is at least seven times smaller than the size of the Hindi-understanding audience, not to mention
the pan-Asian audience of Jackie Chan’s films. Further, the economics of the Tamil film industry, unlike
the Hindi film industry, relies mainly on the theatergoing audience, instead of on ancillary markets and
diaspora audiences, as the Hindi cinema does, making his per film salary all the more impressive.
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hero in K. Balachandar’s family-oriented melodramas. Even in his early films—for
example, Bharathiraja’s realist film Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) where he plays the
village villain—his speedy delivery and oft-repeated dialogues (“ithu eppadi irukku?”
‘how is it?’) made him popular among viewers. This villainy paid off and he made the
transition into being a(n anti)hero in his own right in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
through the craft of director S. P. Muthuraman. From the 1980s on he played the “angry
young man” (often remaking Amitabh Bachchan films from Hindi) (Kazmi 1998), an
antihero who works on the peripheries of society as a vigilante meting out his own
justice. It is in this period that (a) his image as the “Super Star” of Tamil cinema
congealed and that he became the biggest action hero in Tamil Nadu; and (b) style
became his signature trademark.
His image reached its apotheosis in the 1990s with super-blockbusters like Thalapathi
(1991), Annamalai (1992), Muthu (1995), Baadshaa (1995), Arunaachalam (1997), and
Padaiyappa (1999). The new century has seen as a slowdown in Rajini’s films both in
number of films and box-office revenue; indeed Baba (2002) and the more recent
Kuseelan (2008) were flops. Nevertheless, Chandiramukhi (2005) and Sivaji: The Boss
(2007) were big successes. Currently in production, his Enthiran (dir. Shankar) promises
to be even bigger (if its budget is any indication).

3.2 Why Rajinikanth?
If the supposition of this chapter is that youth’s concepts of status are central to film,
why take the hero of yesteryear when there are contenders for the throne from today’s
generation: Vijay, Ajith, Dhanush, or Simbu?
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First, youth in Madurai and Chennai cite Rajinikanth as what style means. Second,
many are still Rajinikanth fans, either informally or in fan clubs. Third, all are well
versed with, and enjoy, his films. Fourth, they see other film stars like Vijay as simply
newer versions of Rajinikanth. One Madurai student put it thusly: ‘If you want to
understand style there is no one better than Rajini. No one does style like Rajini.’ When I
then asked, ‘If you like Vijay for his style but Rajini’s is better, why do you say you are a
Vijay fan?,’ he answered ‘because Vijay is for today’s youth only, while everyone loves
Rajini, from a little child to an old man. Vijay is the new generation.’ Fifth,
Chandrimukhi (2005) and Sivaji (2007) were hits and were re-animated by many youth
while I was in the field. Their dialogues, styles, and comedy sequences were taken up in
youth’s own peer groups. Finally, from my own viewings of Vijay, Ajith, Dhanush, and
Simbu films, the conclusions from my analysis of Rajini’s films are applicable (certainly
enough for the purposes of my argument) to these heroes.

3.3 Note on heroism and style
There is a slight difference in what Tamil youth mean by style when they are talking
about the style of Rajinikanth versus the performance of style in the peer group, though
ultimately the two are the same. When one asks what is style vis-à-vis Rajinikanth, youth
will inevitably point out a set of stereotyped mannerisms or actions performed by Rajini
in the course of the film: for example, the way he twirls his finger; the way he throws a
cigarette into his mouth from a distance; his gait; or his so-called “punch dialogues” (akin
to the one-liner in Western action films). These are the most localizable, most detachable,
and most framed as style by the film text itself (through slow motion shots, double takes,
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sound effects explicitly typified as style), and the most repeated elements of style (both
within the film and across films).
These elements are considered different from, though are obviously related to, the
more general notion of heroism (‘the quality of being a hero’). Stereotypically, heroism
includes things like fighting off bad guys, jumping across buildings, and saving the
damsel in distress.
By contrast, style is used by youth in their peer groups more often than not as the
explanation for some behavior, mannerism, or status-ful object (e.g., apparel,
motorcycle). It explains the function of some form, its reason for use: it singles out the
user and his attempts to raise his status. As such, style gets applied to much more
mundane forms (e.g., a tee-shirt) and for more diffuse phenomenon (one’s total image
can be queried: ‘what’s the deal with all the style daa’?). Indeed, even acting like a film
hero, heroism, is reanalyzed as style in the peer group.
In my analysis of Rajini’s style I treat both notions of style as part of the same
phenomenon. The first (Rajini’s formulaic repertoire) is a subset of the second (the logic
of differential status-raising that ‘builds up’ the persona of the status-ful individual).
Ultimately it’s the second more general category which youth end up drawing upon more
heavily. This is because it’s broader in scope and thus affords more opportunity for reanimation in the peer group.

Below I analyze style in one emblematic Rajini film, Baadshaa (1995), which I
watched with a group of Madurai students in the second college hostel that I stayed in.
After the film I did several group interviews with them about the film which I use to
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ground my analysis and discussion. This method allowed me to highlight which moments
resonated with students (by their comments, their talking back to the screen, their
whistles, claps, boos, laughs, and dancing), as well as which moments they considered to
be emblematic of Rajini’s style.

3.4. Baadshaa as a story of youth status
Baadshaa (lit. [Urdu/Hindu] ‘king,’ ‘leader’) (1995; dir. Suresh Krishnan) is the
Rajinikanth action film par excellence. The Tamil youth with whom I spent my time
cited this film as their favorite Rajinikanth film (and one of their favorite films in
general), as the film which encapsulates Rajini’s style and performs it to maximum effect
and pleasure. As I show below, Baadshaa is a story about style.

3.4.1 Individuating the hero-star
Like his other films (e.g., Annamalai [1992], Padaiyappa [1999], Sivaji [2007]),
Baadshaa (1995) begins by announcing itself to be a Rajinikanth film. The first images
are tiny lights appearing one by one, accompanied by what we could perhaps call Rajini’s
“theme music” (it’s the same in many films). Cumulatively the lights spell “Super Star.”
Then, in succession the letters R-A-J-N-I fly toward the audience. Having spelt “RAJNI”
[sic], his name comes to rest in between between the words “Super” and “Star,” first in
English, then in Tamil (photo 4.1). This tells us what we already know: this film is, first
and foremost, a Rajinikanth film.
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Photo 4.1 “Super Star Rajni” [sic] intro

3.4.2 Deferring darshan
The diegesis opens with a number of scenes where the hero’s (comic) sidekick is
giving money to the needy (someone who needs dowry, someone who needs hospital
bills paid) on behalf of Manikkam (an auto-rickshaw driver played by Rajinikanth). 4
Manikkam is praised by others—as a great man, a good guy, as our aNNan (‘older
brother’)—but our experience of seeing him on-screen is deferred. We only hear about
him from others. 5 Note that in commercial Tamil cinema the hero’s entrance is one of the
major events of the film-viewing experience. It’s the moment when the fans throw the
confetti into the air; the whistling and dancing begins; when the film is officially on its
way. All this deferral, then, functions to increase the anticipation of the audience.
We learn that today is ayutha puuja (the worship ritual for the tools/machines through
which one earns), so Manikkam is at the auto-stand ‘tearing it up’ (“paddaiya
kiLambikkiddiruppaaru”). This is an inter-discursive allusion to MGR. (His auto-stand is
also called “MGR auto-stand.”)

4

Note that the auto-rickshaw driver is a stereotypical working-class profession in urban areas. A populist
image, but also a figure of low status.
5
See Rajanayakam (2002: 88–92) on the trope of speaking for the hero more generally.
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Cut to the first song. A large crowd of auto-drivers and neighborhood people have
gathered at the auto-stand for the puuja. The camera focuses on a pumpkin thrown into
the air to commence the ritual. Cut to the pumpkin flying in the air, then cut to white
sneakers running toward the camera. Cut to Manikkam jumping in the air and smashing
the pumpkin with his head. (It’s crucial in the ritual that the pumpkin be smashed [Dean
2009] so as to release the negative energy, or thrishdi, that is absorbed by the pumpkin.
That Manikkam breaks it with his head is, presumably, an index that he is so powerful
that nothing will happen to him. Indeed, touching such a pumpkin after it’s broken is
believed to cause bodily harm [Melanie Dean, personal communication, February 1,
2010], which it certainly doesn’t do to Manikkam.) The next shot is of Manikkam landing
on the ground and smiling at the camera in a fully frontal bust shot. He is looking directly
at the camera and in slow motion he gives the vaNakkam gesture (the traditional greeting
of folding the hands in front of the chest) to the audience/camera.
Cut back to his fellow auto-drivers dancing in front of a cinema hall (showing
Jurassic Park [1993], a huge hit in Tamil Nadu). In the dance sequence he is
differentiated, made visible, and centered: while all the other auto-drivers have colored
shirts and shoes (in addition to the auto-driver’s olive-brown jacket/pant uniform),
Manikkam wears a bright white shirt and sneakers; he is always in the middle of the shot;
he is in the front (foreground) of the group (background); he is the only man dancing with
the women; and he is the only one singing the song.
Lyrically, he is portrayed as a man of status—for example, he sings that he will come
to name your child (a role reserved for the high status)—but decidedly part of the (peer)
group. As the lyrics state, everyone trusts him. This status-raising is ratified by the
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onlookers. For example, his female family members come to see him dance, expressing
approval and appreciation in their faces. The final shot is a trick shot where two
Manikkams face the camera with an open hand extended. This trope of status is akin to
the linguistic trope of honorification through pluralization, while also invoking the image
of the Hindu deity whose iconic representation is as that of multiple body parts (heads,
arms, legs) (Havell 1980[1928]: 44–45; Stutley 1985: x; Dehejia 1997: 140, 242).

3.4.3 Introducing the egalitarian, progressive, down-to-earth hero
As the song finishes, the diegesis begins with sketches of Manikkam as an older
brother, not a success in career or studies (in this he like most people), but as the enabler
of his siblings’ successes: in education (his sister has the marks to get into a medical
college, a very difficult and prestigious achievement) and in work (his brother has
become a police officer). As it turns out, Manikkam is fulfilling the dying wish of his
father to give his siblings a better life. He is a consummate progressive, pushing for his
sister to study, and thus eschews “bad” tradition (as indexed by their mother’s desire for
her daughter to stay with traditional gender roles and not study). With his younger
brother he refuses to allow him to get the traditional blessings from him (a status diagram
where the receiver of blessings falls to the feet of the giver). Instead he hugs him, a sign
of equality. In short, he isn’t only against the old habits of ‘society’ and “tradition,” he
also values egalitarianism over hierarchy.

3.4.4 Maximizing status by status-lowering
A common trope in many Rajinikanth films is to show him as someone who is
uninterested in status-raising. In general, at first his characters are simple people that
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embody a submissive and hyper-polite demeanor. They avoid fights, symbolic displays of
domination, and showing off.
The opening scenes of Baadshaa show just this through a series of episodes where
Manikkam actively avoids conflicts. For example, a fellow auto-driver warns him about
an area where there is unrest: ‘I thought I would tell you,’ he says, ‘since I know you
don’t like fights.’ Manikkam agrees, ‘I definitely don’t.’ This has a comic feel, for the
audience knows that he—that is, all of Rajini’s characters, past, present, and future—is a
consummate fighter.
This is a rhetorical strategy to maximize Manikkam’s status-raising, however,
because ultimately through the instigation of others (most often the villains who
challenge him or hurt his women) he rises to the occasion to show his true self/potential,
that of the indestructible hero, the man of power, action, and style. Such a strategy also
functions to create anticipation (When will he reveal his true self?) and light comedy. To
take another example, in a later scene while driving the heroine in his auto-rickshaw they
come across a fight. He immediately turns around and drives off. She asks if he is afraid.
‘Yes, very much so,’ he says. 6 She then asks him if he has ever loved anyone and been
loved by them, to which he replies in hyper-polite speech that there are no girls who have
pursued him. He even goes so far as to say a boy shouldn’t even pursue girls. Note that
this diagrams an image of anti-status which is, given that we know Rajinikanth to be the
Super Star and desired by many women, a status-inversion/mismatch. To this extent it
functions as comedy or irony. (This scene evinced laughs from the students that I

6

Note that the participant framework—poor youth–beautiful young rich girl—would typically evince
hyper-masculine displays of style. Knowing this, Manikkam admitting his fear is unexpected, and thus is
humorous. Additionally, it projects Manikkam as an innocent and good person.

154

watched the film with.) Even more than diagramming anti-status, it diagrams anti-youth:
he disavows romance, he avoids fights, his speech is hyper-polite, and he is considerate
and respectful of others. He acts the chinna paiyan, recognizing the authority of others, as
well as ‘society’ and ‘culture.’
Even as the plot develops this artifice of Manikkam the ordinary auto-driver, the
chinna paiyan, starts to unravel. When his younger brother goes for his police interview,
the police inspector notices his older brother’s name is Manikkam, son of Rangasaami,
born in Bombay. Suspecting that perhaps he is Manik Baadshaa—the infamous Robin
Hood smuggler and gangster from Bombay who supposedly died four years ago in a
fire—he calls Manikkam to the office.
In this scene, Manikkam walks into the room, full frontal bust shot. Mutual
recognition seems to pass over the faces of the police inspector and Manikkam. The
police inspector rises, a sign of respect and surprise. Close up pan of Manikkam’s face.
He walks into the room with a scowl, his upper lip cocked to one side, his head slightly
down, eyes looking up (photo 4.2, left). As we will have occasion to see, this is his
preferred posture (and that of the next in line for Super Star status Vijay as well) when
revealing himself as a status-ful individual. There is a flash cut to (Manikkam as)
Baadshaa, the gangster in Bombay walking with sunglasses and a beard. This is indexed
as a flashback film through a film-negative effect (photo 4.2, right). There are then a
series of cuts of Baadshaa’s henchmen shooting off guns with the film-negative effect;
Baadshaa doing his style walk (also with film-negative effect); and newspaper articles
about how Baadshaa, the famed smuggler, died in a bomb blast. Here we have the first
instance of style bleeding into the diegesis.
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Photo 4.2 Manikkam–Baadshaa, positive–negative, ‘small boy’–‘big man’

We come back to the present (presumably this flashback is the mental interpretant of
the police officer who thinks he recognizes Baadshaa in Manikkam) and are returned to
the ordinary Manikkam. In contrast to this literally inverse image of style (Baadshaa),
Manikkam is humbleness incarnate. He refuses to sit; he greets the police officer first
with the vaNakkam gesture; his arms are folded and his body is comported as a man of
lower status. He strives to convince the police officer that he is just a simple auto-driver,
Manikkam. As he leaves and walks out, the music kicks in, a hint that perhaps the police
officer’s hallucinatory, in-the-present flashback is the truth after all.
When the police officer asks his subordinates for Baadshaa’s file, they get scared just
hearing the name, “Bombay Baadshaa.” Again, speaking for the hero begins the process
of the hero’s status-raising, while allowing him to maintain his humble demeanor,
thereby negotiating the dictates of status-raising and -lowering in the peer group, as
discussed in chapter 3.

3.4.5 Style as attracting women
A major part of the construction of the status-ful hero is his ratification as status-ful
by others. One of the primary functions of the heroine in Rajinikanth’s films is, I argue,
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to ratify the status of the hero. This is either through providing a reason for the hero to
fight and struggle against patriarchy (as in the love story) or villainy (in the action film);
or, more directly, through her approving gaze and dialogue about him.
As in his other films, it is the heroine’s romantic attraction to the hero which first
ratifies his style in the film. In Baadshaa, the song sequences for “Azhagu” (‘Beauty’)
and “Style Style” function to this effect. In “Azhagu,” a love song for Manikkam from the
perspective of the heroine, Baadshaa’s style begins to be revealed. As the students with
whom I watched the film noted, ‘in this song everything Rajini does is style, plus
comedy.’
The song is a daydream of the heroine Priya who sees Manikkam wherever she goes,
in every man she sees. She sees (who she thinks is) Manikkam doing style, but it’s then
revealed not be Manikkam, but some non-status-ful individual (usually whom she has
ended up in an amorous position with). The style inversion/mismatch creates the comic
effect. In this song Manikkam comes in a number of avatars: as a man in a tuxedo serving
her a drink; as a man in a track suit exercising next to her in a state-of-the-art gym; as a
business man in a suit surrounded by beautiful women working for him; as the doorman
for a five-star hotel in regal clothing; as a Nagaswaram player; as a traffic cop; as a
Vaishnavite Brahmin on a motorcycle; as a driver of a car (a sign of status); as a
deboinaire man in a purple blazer and pink cumberbun; as a gangster in all white with a
big mustache; as a bus conductor in a bus that passes her by; 7 as a man in a luxurious
bathrobe who watches her bathe; and finally as the ordinary Manikkam sitting on her
porch in his auto-driver outfit.
7

In Rajini’s ‘real life’ parallel text he is extolled as coming from the modest background of a bus
conductor. This, then, is an extra-textual reference to his past career.
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Each avatar performs some style. As the man with the car, he puts on his sunglasses
by twirling them and rotating them around his hands first. As the bus conductor he styleishly descends and ascends from the bus while it’s moving. As the Brahmin, he sits on
top of his motorbike decked out in Puma brand sneakers and round fashionable
sunglasses. Lyrically the song revolves around his beauty and his style; as it’s put in the
lyrics: ‘his beautiful smile, his physical beauty, his beautiful speech.’ (These three are
recurrent features of praise in many Rajini films.) The lyrics voice her desire for him, and
the cause of this desire is his style.
The style portrayed in this fantastical song sequence eventually begins to bleed into
the diegetic reality. In a later romance scene, Manikkam drops Priya off at her house.
Getting out of the auto, he pushes back his jacket and puts his hands on his hips in a
single deft motion, leaving him standing with his body maximally enlarged. (His arms
and chest are extended by the posture of having the hands on the hips, and his legs
slightly spread. This is a common style in many Rajini films.) She clicks seductively with
her mouth, looking up at him, rocking back and forth on her heels, “nee seyRathule
ellaam style-aa irukkiyaa?” ‘Are you style-ish in whatever you do?’ Embarrassed, he
switches his posture. The implication here is that he can’t help but be style; he does it
without knowing it. Not knowing where to put his hands, he points in her face (another
diagram of status-difference) and mildly scolds her saying that he isn’t in love with her.
She smiles, “oh ho, nee peesuRa thamizh kuuda style-aa irukkiyaa?! ‘Oh ho, you’re styleish even in the Tamil you speak (it seems)?!’ When he tries to leave, she grabs him, turns
him, and kisses him on the mouth: ‘whatever you say, “I love you. I love you.” See you
later dear.’
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After this scene comes the song “Style Style” where the love proposition is
transformed into a platform for Rajini to perform his style and to be praised by the
heroine. He enters as James Bond, twirling a pistol around his finger in silhouette against
a black and white target. He jumps through the target to a female chorus yelling “Super
Star!” In this song his sartorial style is emphasized. In his first getup he wears a bright,
shiny silver blazer with matching cowboy boots, leather black pants, a huge belt, and
sunglasses. The sleeves of his blazer are pushed back, with the cuffs of his shirt revealed.
(This is a common style across many of his Rajini’s films.) He puts on his sunglasses in
his signature style while smiling at the camera and singing. In this song he is surrounded
by cars and airplanes (signs of status and mobility). His costume changes: now he is the
captain of the airplane and she the head stewardess. It changes again: he is in all leather
with metal studs across his pants and vest (an outfit reminiscent of Mad Max); pieces of
leather hang off in strips from his clothes; he has on a large metal belt, a bright red
bunyan, and lots of jewelry.
Lyrically, the song constructs the character Manikkam as Rajini the actor that interdiscursively blends the hero with the star. It opens by appelating him by his epithet “Hey!
Super Star! Style style super style, ithu style style thaan super style-thaan” ‘Hey Super
Star! Style, this is your style, this is (your) super style!’ The heroine sings, “karuppum oru
azhaku enRu kaNdukoNdeen unnaalee” ‘Because of you I have found that black is also
beautiful’ in reference to Rajini’s dark complexion. 8 In the final verse she praises his
‘beautiful, milky smile’ and ‘the beautiful hair that falls on his forehead.’ (Another
characteristic style of Rajini’s is longish hair where the bangs fall on his forehead, thus
8

Rajini’s dark complexion is one of his distinctive traits, especially given that he took over the mantle of
hero-star from the famously light-skinned MGR (Rajanayakam 2002).
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requiring him to flip his head back to move the bangs, or to run his hands through his hair
to push back the bangs.) She finishes by saying “unnai paarkkum pozhuthil pootha
peNgaLil naan oru thinusu” ‘I am one of the girls who admired you when they saw
you.’ 9

3.4.6 Revealing style
So far in the film, Manikkam’s true identity as Baadshaa, a man of status and style,
has only been hinted at in flashbacks, non-diegetically grounded song sequences, and
obliquely in his interactions with the heroine. It fully erupts into the diegesis when the
chastity of his sister is questioned by a corrupt medical college principal attempting to
force her into sexual favors. He approaches the principal as Manikkam, attempting to be
polite and deferential. The principal says, ‘Have you come to threaten me? Because I am
a big rowdy. Only after being a criminal did I come to be a principal!’ Manikkam then
asks his sister to leave the room. From a posture of submission he then puts his hands on
the principal’s desk (invading his private space), leaning in with a big smile and says, ‘I
have another name.’ Cut to the negative flashback shot of Baadshaa walking. Cue
Baadshaa’s theme music with a crowd chanting “Baadshaa! Baadshaa!” Cut to a shot
from outside the room (the point of view of his sister). We see the principal scared, acting
submissively, and then standing up in deference. We see Manikkam/Baadshaa talking
animatedly (versus his submissive comportment earlier), touching his uniform (as if

9

We can find similar scenes in films like Padaiyappa (1999) where the villain-cum-heroine praises his
boldness (thairiyam), his anger (koobam), his valour (viiram), his speech (peechchu), and ‘more than
anything else his style’ (“ellaatheyum vida, un style-u”). Similarly, in Sivaji (2007) the heroine says to him,
‘What I like about you is your style and your thunderous action.’ See Rajanayakam (2002: ch. 4) for
discussion of this in other films.
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saying that all this is just a disguise). Cut to inside the room, Baadshaa saying ‘Don’t say
anything to anyone outside.’
Next comes what viewers take as the introduction of the emblematic style of the film:
smiling, Manikkam/Baadshaa flips his hand in the air and twirls it with the index finger
pointing up. This is accompanied by a swoosh sound effect. His smile fades, his eyes
intense as he intones: “naan oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri” ‘If I say
it one time, it’s as if I said it one hundred times.’ (Again note the trope of plurality as
status.) The smile returns and he claps his hands twice. The principal raises his hands in a
vaNakkam gesture. When leaving, his sister asks what he said to the principal to change
his mind. He laughs and says, ‘the truth’! That is, that he is a status-ful individual; that all
his humbleness is a veneer of this real style-ish self, Baadshaa.
So far Rajini’s status as super-hero has been revealed slowly and sporadically, as has
his style as index of that status. It’s explicitly revealed by way of the final status-lowering
event of the film: his ruthless beating and the subsequent abduction of his sister. In an
encounter with a local rowdy, Manikkam tries to defuse a showdown between his brother
and the rowdy. Rather than let his brother suffer at the hands of the rowdy, Manikkam
allows himself to be taken for punishment. His fellow auto-drivers try to stop him. He
style-ishly points his finger in the air with a swoosh sound to silence them. In this scene,
tied to a lamp post, he takes a vicious beating. 10 The mood is dramatic, intense. With
every blow he takes, there is a cut to lightning striking and shots of his smiling face. A
mini-song praises his patience and tolerance, comparing him to Jesus, but indicating at
core he is the super-hero we know him to be: ‘Look at his innocent face, his calm face,
10

The students with whom I watched said that when they saw this scene as children they would cry on
seeing Rajini receive such a thrashing.
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his infant smile while bleeding, his patience like Lord Jesus as he is beat. He is a candle
giving light while his body burns. What sinner switched his horoscope, who put a wet
cloth on this volcano?’ (my emphasis) As they take him down from the lamppost,
Manikkam simply walks away. His brother angered, he reports the rowdy to the police. In
retaliation the rowdy abducts their sister and brings her back bloodied (and possibly raped
as well). On seeing this challenge to his status, Manikkam becomes Baadshaa, the superhero.
The next scene is a fight scene. There are close ups of Manikkam/Baadshaa’s eyes
staring in anger. Cut to a shot of his hand closing into a fist. A henchman of the rowdy
charges him. He unleashes a single punch which sends the henchman flying all the way
across the road, hitting a lamp post. Cut to shots of the shocked onlookers. Slow motion
shot of Manikkam/Baadshaa looking up with a scowl, his head tilted down, eyes looking
forward. He pushes back the unbuttoned shirt that is on top of his tee-shirt, putting his
hands on his hips (accompanied by a swoosh sound). Edited together by jump cuts, there
are increasingly closer shots of his face in anger, looking up and scowling. His theme
music/chant “Baadshaa! Baadshaa!” kicks in, along with the flute motif from the Western
film The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. He single handedly beats all the henchman. In the
middle of the fight, he tells his brother to go inside. His brother, shocked, doesn’t move.
In an uncharacteristic (as far as his brother is concerned) display of authority and power,
he turns around and repeats it yelling with intensity and deliberation: uLLe poo! ‘Go
inside! (-hon.).’ He then rips out a water pump out of the ground with his bare hands.
Turning in slow motion, his hair flying back and the water behind him spouting up in the
air, in a single spectacular blow he knocks down all the henchmen who are surrounding
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him. He then throws the pump across the battlefield to knock the main rowdy’s gun out of
his hand.
Finally, he ties the head rowdy to the lamppost. The light of the post is flickering on
and off as he beats the rowdy with the same wood log that he was beaten with. All you
can hear are the blows and the wind howling. As more reinforcements of the rowdy
come, it’s revealed that Manikkam/Baadshaa’s neighborhood friends and fellow autodrivers are members of Baadshaa’s old Mumbai gang. They intercept and beat the
reinforcements. The fight is over. Manikkam/Baadshaa is victorious. Cut to a shot of
Baadshaa with his hair flowing behind him, blown by the wind. Baadshaa’s men come up
to him one by one, kneel, kiss his hand in obeisance, and walk behind him. He is the don
(‘head gangster’) and they are his henchmen.
The scene finishes with the film’s signature punch dialogue. His voice has a heavy
reverb effect, the pitch of his voice is low. He warns the rowdy: “innoru thadave intha
pakkam naan unne paaththaa, paaththa idathileyee kuzhi thoNdi puthaichchuduveen” ‘If
I see you around here another time, I’ll bury you right there and then.’ He throws the log
into the air and it knocks out the light. All goes to black. Cut and fade in to Baadshaa
standing before the camera, lit from behind, glowing. His hand style-ishly twirls and flips
around until his index finger is pointing up. His voice reverberates with a heavy echo
effect: “oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri” ‘If I say it once, it’s as if I
said it a hundred times.’ We hear the lightning crack, and in slow motion he puts his
hands on his hips flinging back his unbuttoned shirt along with a swoosh sound effect.
Baadshaa is fully revealed: style has gone public.
His brother confronts him: ‘Who are you? What happened in Bombay?’ Interval.
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3.4.7 From style to periya aaL
In the first half of the film Rajini’s style/status has been covered, revealed, confirmed,
and proven. The second half of the film goes into his backstory to explain how the
ordinary youth Manik became the terrifying gangster Baadshaa, and then how Baadshaa
became Manikkam the auto-driver. In doing so we are introduced to the principal villain,
the (almost) equally style-ish Marc Anthony. 11 The rest of the story revolves around their
conflict, and how Baadshaa becomes the periya aaL to the subordinated villain. Here
style becomes the symbolic battlefield for the status negotiation between the hero and the
villain.
The flashback begins with Baadshaa’s chant accompanied by his walking down a
hallway, then down the stairs of a huge mansion (in multiple shots). He is in a style-ish
suit (no tie); his blazer is a colorful blend of fabrics with the sleeves rolled up; he is
wearing sunglasses that have no arms; and he is sporting a beard. 12 Walking behind him
are his men. For the students this moment, his revelation as Baadshaa, is the
consummation of his style. This scene provoked the loudest reaction among the students.
They yelled, stood up, clapped, and turned the volume of the TV to the maximum, the
praising music blaring distortedly through the speakers:
eey! Baadshaa paaru Baadshaa paaru!

Eey! Look at Baadshaa! Look at Baadshaa!

paddaaLathu nadaiya paaru!

Look at the gait of the army man!

pagai nadungkum padayai paaru!

Look at the army that makes the enemy

11

Marc Anthony is played by Raghuvaran, one of the recurrent villain’s in Rajini’s films.
Here the beard has multiple indexicalities: one, as a diacritic of difference with respect to Manikkam;
two, as an index of him being a rowdy; three, as an index of style; four, as am ambiguous marker of
community affiliation. (This is because the beard is associated with Islam, and as we see below, it is the
murder of his Muslim friend Anwar which transforms the simple Manik to Baadshaa.)
12
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tremble!
coat-u suit-u reNdum eduththu pooddu

Look at the tiger walking who has put on

nadakkum puliya paaru!

both coat and suit!

paRReriyum neruppu poola sudderikkum

Look at the eyes that scorch like a fire that

vizhiya paaru!

burns with heavy flames!

raththam veervai reNdum koNda

He’s the emperor among kings, made up of

raajaangkaLin mannan thaanadaa!

sweat and blood!

ivan peerukuLLe kaantham uNdu uNmai

It’s true, there is a magent in his name! 13

thaanadaa!
The backstory of Baadshaa revolves around a tale of revenge and lost innocence in
Bombay. As young men, Manik and his childhood friend Anwar are the only ones who
stand up to the villain Marc Anthony when he attempts to illegally evacuate their slum.
The death of these young men is called for, but because Manik’s father works for
Anthony, Manik’s life is spared. Anwar, however, isn’t. Anwar’s death radicalizes
Manik, and he becomes a rowdy (Manik Baadshaa) to destroy rowdyism (Anthony).
A montage of explosions and news articles inform us that Baadshaa has become a big
rowdy criminal, only rivaled by Marc Anthony, the target of his revenge and a rival
emblem of style and status. The rest of the flashback centers on the rivalry between
Baadshaa and Anthony which culminates in Anthony’s imprisonment, Baadshaa’s
father’s death, and Baadshaa’s promise to give up the life of crime and become
Manikkam. This takes place through a series of confrontations where the relative status of
the two rowdies, Baadshaa and Anthony, are negotiated. The negotiation proceeds
through two intertwined idioms: one is style, or the symbolic diagramming of relative
status; the other is through physical fights and the literal determination of status.
13

One of the common refrain’s about Rajinikanth among his fans is that he is a ‘magnet’ (kaantham), a
(super)natural attractive force. This is also a trope on the ending of his name -kanth.
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3.4.8 Building up the periya aaL: Speaking and style
Anthony receives news that Baadshaa was able to foil his plan to bomb a religious
function. After shooting the messenger of the “bad news,” as Anthony puts it in his styleish low drawl, he gets a phone call. He answers, slowly, deliberately, with style:
“Anthony, Marc Anthony. <pause> solReen. Hmmm. Good news” (‘Antony, Marc
Anthony. <pause> I’ll let you know. Hmmm. Good news’). Baadshaa has called to set up
a meet. The next scene’s showdown gives a first approximation of the battle of status
between these two powerhouses (photo 4.3):

Photo 4.3 Baadshaa and Marc Anthony showdown

Anthony: enna Manik? nalla irukkeyaa?

Anthony: What Manik? Are you (-hon.
throughout) doing well?

Baadshaa: Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.

Baadshaa: Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.

A: Ah, yes, Manik Baadshaa. enna

A: Ah, yes. Manik Baadshaa. What is the

vishayam thambi? enkidde ethoo peesaNum problem little brother? They said you
NNu sonneyaame. ethoo uthavi theevaiyaa? wanted to speak to me about something.
sollu. enna veeNaalum seyveen. nee engka

Do you need some help? Tell me.
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Raangkasaami puLLe, ache. sollu.

Whatever you want I’ll do. You are our
Raangasaami’s son (after all). Tell me.

B: Che, eh, eh, eh. ithu paaru. enakkum

B: Che, eh, eh, eh. Look here (-hon.

unakkum thaan saNdai. intha

throughout). The fight is between you and

Baadshavukkum Anthonykkum saNdai. nee

me. A fight between this Baadshaa and

saagaNum. ille naan saagaNum. unooda

Anthony. You have to die or I have to die.

aLungka saagaNum. ille enooda aLungka

Your men have die or my my men have to

saagaNum. pothu makkaL ille. appaavi

die. But not common people. Not innocent

makkaL ille. ippa therinjchu poochchu. nee

people. Now I finally know. You are a

oru koozhe. oru koozhe saNdai

coward, fighting a coward’s battle. I don’t

pooduRathu. ithe pudikkaathu. intha

like this. This Baadhsa, this Manik

Baadshaa, intha Manik Baadshaa

Baadshaa doesn’t like it. I’ll finish you.

pudikkaathu. mudichchiduReen.

Finish you.

mudichchiduReen.
<B. snaps.>
ini, ini eezhu naaLukkuLLe un kathai

I’ll finish you in seven days from now.

muduchchidureen.
Raangasaami: Hey! yaarkidde peesuRe

Raangasaami: Hey! Do you know who

NNu unakku theriyumaa?

you’re talking to?

B: theriyum paa. oru ayoogiyakkidde

B: I know, father. I’m talking to a fraud.

peesuReen.
R: Eey!

R: Eey!
<A. gestures for R. to cool down.>

A: Ah, ah ah ah. chinna puLLe. aamaa

A: Ah, ah ah ah. Small boy. That’s right

Manik Baadshaa, nee thozhilukku puthusu.

Manik Baadshaa, you’re new to the field

kuzhanthe. enna sonne? eezhu naaLle enne

(of crime). A child. What do you say? In

mudikkiReyaa? unne eezhu secondkkuLLe

seven days you’ll finish me? In seven

naan mudikkiReen.

seconds I’ll finish you.
<takes off his sunglasses>

illaiya? konjcham paaru.

No? Take a look.
167

<Glances to his right at some sharpshooters
with Baadshaa in their sites. Baadshaa
removes his sunglasses. He looks to his
right.>
B: angkee konjcham paaru kaNNaa.

B: Look over there dear.
<laughs>

Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.

Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.
<Begins to leave. Turns back around
suddenly.>

Eh hey hey. onnu solReen. nalla

Eh hey hey. I’ll tell you one thing. Learn it

therinjchukoo. nallavan aaNdavan

well. God tests good people. But he won’t

soothippaan. kai udamaaddaan.

abandon them. He gives a lot to bad

keddavanukku niraiya koduppaan. aanaa

people. But he’ll abandon them. Ah!

kai vidduduvaan. Ah!

<Puts on his sunglasses and walks off;
music kicks in. Cut to scenes of him in his
luxurious car alone, sitting with his legs
crossed. 14 >

This last dialogue is given by Baadshaa with Rajini’s characteristic rhetorical flourish,
the rhyme scheme (underlined in the Tamil above) embellished through his delivery and
punctuated by his behavioral style, putting on his sunglasses, pointing his finger, and
getting the last word and walking off to music.
In this dialogue both Baadshaa and Anthony vie to determine who is the periya aaL
through their use of address and reference terms: Anthony diminutizes Baadshaa and
treats him as a chinna paiyan; Baadshaa instead status-raises through third-person
reference—DEMONSTRATIVE + PROPER NAME (this is a common strategy in Rajini

14

Note that sitting with one’s legs crossed in repose in a trope of status in Tamil Nadu.
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films 15 )—and aggressive tropes of intimacy (e.g., “kaNNaa” ‘dear’). They also vie in
their oratory (mostly cool, though Baadshaa flares at the right times to reveal his superior
status) through tropes of intimidation and philosophical position statements. In these,
Baadshaa is more coherent and, ultimately, successful.
Their fashion also diagrams this as a battle of style. Both come with their fashionable
haircuts (Baadshaa with his slight shag; Anthony with his rowdy-ish funk [‘mullet’]),
their sunglasses (both use the sunglasses to punctuate their status moves by taking them
off and putting them on at key moments), and their clothes (Anthony is in a swank
business suit, Baadshaa in a blue velour track suit).
After a similar second encounter the film then moves through a series of montages
(accompanied by Baadshaa’s theme song) of Baadshaa as the periya aaL of the Bombay
underworld. All other gangsters come to kneel at his feet and kiss his hand while he sits
in his throne with a huge dog at his side. (This image is one of the more memorable and
circulated images from the film.) He is shown beating people, surrounded by money,
screaming orders on the phone, and handing out money to married couples (i.e.,
redistributive wealth cum social service cum patronage).
The next episode that demonstrates Baadshaa’s dominance and style is the trap set by
Kesavan (the father of Priya, the heroine, and a minion of Anthony) at Baadshaa’s
birthday party. Again, Baadshaa is style embodied. At the party he enters at the top of the
staircase with the crowd below him. He is in a white suit with a red cumberbum,
matching scarf, and his armless sunglasses. He pushes back his jacket and puts his hands

15

Cf. Pandian (1992) where Rajini’s punch dialogue is as follows: "intha paaNdiyan, eppoovum,
engkeeyum, ethilum right” ‘This Pandian is always right everywhere in all things’ (with hand pointing
toward his chest/the check on his shirt).
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in his pockets. He walks down the stairs as flowers are thrown on him, greeted by a giant
group of singers and dancers. He takes over the drum beat and starts into a faster song
(“Raa Raa Ramayah”), playing various instruments and dancing. The song is an outline
of what youth life is about and, of course, about praising Baadshaa as status-ful: ‘just as
there is only one moon for the night, and one sun for the day, there is only one Baadshaa
for the world.’ His henchmen are shown stopping someone from taking his photo (as a
diagram of his importance: he is an object of visual desire, and thus he has to police his
own image).
At the end of the song Baadshaa goes back up the stairs to sit in his throne above all.
At that point Kesavan springs his trap and gunfire opens on Baadshaa. It seems that
Baadshaa is shot, but no sooner than we fear his death does the chair spin around 180
degrees, revealing that it was not Baadshaa sitting in the chair at all but a dummy (how
did he make the switch?!). He is alive and well sitting in an identical chair on the
opposite side. He then deliberately crosses his legs, a repeated gesture of status in Tamil
films. This shot is repeated three times in rapid succession, a trope of status and itself a
cinematic style. Baadshaa opens fire and kills all the bad guys with the exception of
Kesavan. To the begging Kesavan who has fallen at his feet, he points his finger (with a
swoosh sound effect):
Baadshaa: eppa nee enakku jalra adikka

Baadshaa: When you (-hon. throughout)

arambichcheyoo, appavee

started to kiss my ass (lit. hitting the

purinjchupoochchu daa nee muthale kuththa “jalra” drum) I first realized that you were
pooRe NNu. intha Baadshaa adi paadi

going to backstab me. Have you ever seen

eppoovaavathu paaththirikkeyaa daa?

this Baadshaa playing and singing? You

appavee purinjchukka veeNdaam un

didn’t need to know that I knew your plan
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thiddam therinjchupoochchu NNu.

then.
<B.’s left hand flashes up and rotates.>

poo. Anthonykidde ethaavathu neermaiye

Get out of here. At least be true to

iru.

Anthony.
<Keesavan with folded hands>

Keesavan: Sir, enne, enne onnum

Keesavan: Sir, so you won’t do anything

senjchirukkamaaddiingka, le?

to me, will you (+ hon.)?

B: poo!

B: Get out!

K: saththiyaamaa . . .

K: I promise . . .
<B.’s right hand flips up with a swoosh,
index finger pointing up, interrupting K.>

B: intha Baadshaa oru thadave sonnaa

B: If this Baadshaa says it once, it’s as if

nuuRu thadave sonna maathiri.

he says it a hundred times.

K: theriyum sir. theriyum. sariingka sir.

K: I know sir. I know. Okay (+hon.) sir.

Sariingka.

Ok (+ hon.).

Rajini’s style is performed not only through high-status fancy clothing, his punch
dialogue with its related body language (the pointing index finger, crossing legs, sitting
in his throne above all others), and his differentiation from other characters (dress wise,
placement in the screen, editing tropes of status), but also through his reality-defying
acts: how can he switch bodies without anyone seeing, only to spin around when all the
villains’ bullets are spent, not mention his amazing accuracy with a gun? His style is also
indexed in his access to speech. In contrast to the dialogues with Anthony which are
relatively equal in turn-taking (though Baadshaa ultimately gets the last word), here we
see Kesavan, a man of little status, silenced into simply begging for his life.

3.4.9 Besting the villain, part I
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The final push by Anthony takes place. He bombs everything Baadshaa owns.
Baadshaa takes it all very coolly, playing the piano as his empire seems to be crumbling.
Cut to Baadhsaa calling Anthony. Anthony answers with his characteristic style:
“Anthony” <in low drawl>. Baadshaa simply says, with equal style, “Baadshaa.”
Baadshaa reveals that he gathered evidence against Anthony for the bombings. Anthony
breaks from his cool register of style and screams “Baadshaa!” Baadshaa begins to laugh
and says in his characteristic quickfire delivery “Yeah, yeah, yeah.” (Note here how
linguistic style and Anthony’s loss of cool, as a kind of register break, diagrams
Baadshaa’s superior status and victory.) He then flips his jacket backwards with a
flourish, puts his hands on his hips, first on the left, then the right in a slow motion frontal
shot accompanied by a swoosh sound effect: “Baadshaa. Manik Baadshaa.” His name
rings with a heavy echo effect. He continues:
enna sonne? kuuddam seeththu ellam

What did you (-hon. throughout) say? You

jeeykkamudiyaathu NNu sonne, le? uNmai

said that I couldn’t gather a group and win

thaan.

everything, right? It’s true.
<He walks forward, his steps echoing. He
takes off his sunglasses; full frontal view>

aanaa enkidda irukkiRa kuuddam naan

But the group that surrounds me isn’t a

seeththa kuuddam ille. anbaale seeththa

group I gathered. It’s a group that joined

kuuddam. entha thani saamraajiyam.

together (on their own) because of love. A

anbaa saamraajiyam. yaaraalee

unique/separate empire. An empire of love.

azhikkamudiyaathu.

No one can destroy it.
<He puts his sunglasses back on and
laughs.>
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Cut to the police deciding to arrest Anthony. Cut to a later conversation between
Baadshaa and Anthony. Baadshaa is talking into a clear-plastic futurist looking speaker
phone (something unique at the time). Anthony, on the other hand, has his own style-ish
cordless phone. ‘This is the greatest day in Manik Baadshaa’s life,’ Baadshaa declares.
Anthony laughs, conceding that he indeed is a periya aaL, but also revealing that he still
has a trick up his sleeve: ‘You made a mistake in leaving your father with me.’ When
Baadshaa rushes to the house to save his father, his father gets between him and the bullet
meant for Baadshaa. His father dies to save him. Cut to a shot of Baadshaa. His glasses
fly off as he turns his head in slow motion, his hair flying across his face. He literally
dodges the bullets fired at him, climbs the wall in an impossibly fast movement and beats
Anthony. Anthony is saved at Baadshaa’s father’s request, but arrested by the police. The
flashback ends.

3.4.10 Besting the villain, part II
Flashing forward to the original timeline, Kesavan learns that Baadshaa is still alive
when Baadshaa comes to save Priya from her arranged marriage. Baadshaa takes Priya
away as his own. The next song has Rajini in getups from all kinds of status-ful
masculinities including a sheik, a king, and a rowdy. He co-opts every form of masculine
status, putting his stamp of style on it, recombining it in a bizarre pastiche celebrating his
attainment of the heroine.
Learning that Baadshaa is still alive, Anthony escapes to exact his revenge on
Baadshaa. He kidnaps the female members of his family. Baadshaa infiltrates Anthony’s
camp and starts killing his henchmen one by one, each in an amazing display of valor and
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power. When Baadshaa finally makes it to Anthony’s room, Anthony claps in mock
applause. He circles around Baadshaa and greets him: “asalam alakkam.” Anthony tries
to blow the bombs that he has rigged, but none go off. Baadshaa’s men have disabled
them. Baadshaa leans in and says ‘I got rid of all the bombs’ <smiling>, “valaikkum
salam!” Unfortunately, Anthony has a backup: he has the family tied up with bombs
ready to go off. With the remote control (and the upper hand) Anthony begins to beat
Baadshaa. They exchange blows. Unable to set of the bomb, Anthony lights the floor on
fire to burn Baadshaa’s family and makes an escape. Baadshaa rolls over the flames with
his body to put them out. Freeing his family he chases after Anthony by jumping down
two stories. He then hits Anthony’s moving car with a log which causes it to wreck and
explode! Anthony is cornered by the auto-drivers on one side, the community on the
other, and Baadshaa emerging from the flames of the car. He begins to walk toward the
camera in a frontal shot, his head tilted slightly down with his eyes looking up/straight
ahead (i.e., his style walk). As he walks through the flames the camera cuts between
Manikkam the auto-driver and Baadshaa the don (i.e., as Anthony remembers him).
Anthony does a double take and wipes his eyes. Baadshaa/Manikkam’s
demonstration of physical dominance and style have literally superimposed the images
and sutured the two identities. Both time and perception have been reversed through the
status-ful actions of Baadshaa/Manikkam. The theme music with its “Baadshaa
Baadshaa” chant begins as he walks toward Anthony. When he gets there The Good, Bad,
and the Ugly flute motif punctuates his arrival. Cut to a close up shot of Baadshaa’s face,
looking up with one lip cocked, head slight turned down. Flashback to Anwar getting
stabbed (past), cut to Baadshaa punching Anthony (present). Cut to Anthony shooting his
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father (past), cut to Baadshaa hitting Anthony (present). This second hit is doubled: one
hit as auto-driver Manikkam, one as the don of Bombay Baadshaa, a tropic fusing of
identity and statuses. Repeat. Finally Baadshaa picks Anthony up over his shoulder and
walks while the crowd cheers him on to dump him into the flames of the car, his own
funeral pyre. The inspector comes on the scene (too late of course to actually enforce the
law) and tries to stop Baadshaa from exacting his own alternative justice based on his
own norms of authority. He appeals to him as Manikkam, the auto-driver, the man of
compassion and ‘society.’ Manikkam lets Anthony fall onto the ground and walks away.
However, Anthony has grabbed the gun from the cop and pulls it out. Before Anthony
can shoot he gets shot in the head by Manikkam’s younger police officer brother. Family,
Priya, and Manikkam are reunited and the song that begins the film (“Autokkaaran”)
finishes it. Baadshaa has again become the ordinary style-less Manikkam.

3.5. Summary of analysis of style
Above I have told the story of Baadshaa (1995) as the story of status. In particular, as
the narrativization of how style as iconic index of status is acquired, hidden, negated,
inverted, deployed, revealed, and (of particular interest to fans) developed and changed in
comparison to other films. I have shown that style, in addition to punctuating all moments
of the hero-oriented film, is the agent moving it forward: who has style, who is licensed
to use it, and whose style wins out (hero’s or villain’s)? In the following sections, I
synthesize and abstract the elements of style that characterize the hero-star.

3.5.1 Individuation of the hero-star: Style and visuality
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The emblematization of style in the image of Rajinikanth is all about visuality and
standing out. The hero-centric text is thusly constructed. Rajini is always differentiated
and foregrounded from his surroundings. In the opening song of Annamalai (1992), while
Rajini plays a simple milkman, he is always presented as different from his peers. While
all other milkmen are in clothes colored by powder from the celebration of maaddu
pongaL (a harvest holiday celebrating cows), he is sparkling white. He is the only one
with brand new, white Diadora branded sneakers (itself totally anomalous with his image
as a milkman). 16 In Padaiyappa (1999), during a festival the village youth are dressed in
red pants and yellow shirts and the elders in white shirts and veeshdis. Only Rajini is
dressed in modern costume (pants, button-down shirt unbuttoned, tee-shirt underneath,
shoes). In general, throughout Rajinikanth’s films, the hero-star’s clothing tends to be
shiny, colorful, and fashionable (see more below), foregrounding him against the
background of other more drab and less status-ful characters.
The hero takes up most of the objective time on the screen. He is in the most number
of scenes. The hero also takes up most of the objective space of the screen. The shot
structure of such films continually individuates and foregrounds the hero: hence the
ubiquity of fully frontal shots; closeups of the face and the eyes; and well lit shots where
the hero is centrally positioned in sharp focus.
More than this the camera is itself used style-ishly to meta-communicate the hero’s
style. Hence the visual tropes that status-raise the hero: for example, shooting the same
image multiple times and using jump cuts to move between them; the trick shot of
multiplying the image of the hero-star on the screen; rewinding an action and playing it

16

To query this inconsistency with viewers is to elicit the self-evident response: ‘it’s his style.’
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again (e.g., in Vijay’s Pookkiri [2006]). Such tropes of multiplicity function like
linguistic tropes of plurality for honorification through a visual medium. It’s as if Rajini
is more than a single man, it’s as if his style-ish actions exceed their own diegetic status
as singular events. If he does it once, their impact is as if, as Rajini puts it in Baadshaa
(1995), “nuuRu thadave maathiri” ‘he has done it a hundred times.’ 17

3.5.2 Style as set of idiosyncratic mannerisms
Rajini’s style is most usually emblematized for viewers in the aspects of the film text
which are most visually salient, most localizable, most repeated, most differentiated from
their surrounding co-text, and most recontextualizable (across and outside of films).
These are also the aspects that are most transparently presented to viewers’ awareness as
style. Most notable are Rajini’s unique mannerisms and punch dialogues. The two
reinforce each other, as well, because they are often part of the same performance. In
general, his punch dialogues and his signature mannerisms function in the narrative to
punctuate his attempts and successes at status-raising. And since this happens repeatedly
throughout the narrative (as the narrative is about such status-raising), this kind of style is
the most transparent qua style.
As we saw in Baadshaa (1995) he twirls and contorts his fingers in elaborate pointing
gestures before delivering punch dialogues (‘If this Baadshaa says it once, it’s as if he
said it a hundred times!’). Similarly, in Baadshaa (1995), Annamalai (1992), Padaiyappa
(1999), and Sivaji (2007) he flips back his shirt while putting his hands on his hips during
moments of status-assertion. The signature move of Padaiyappa (1999) is the physically
17

We can also note the use of echo and reverb effects to similarly tropically augment the status-ful-ness of
his voice and words.
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impossible twirling of a cigar around his finger and then throwing it into his mouth from
his hip. This goes along with his low voiced, reverbed out punch dialogue ‘my way is a
unique way’ (“en vazhi thani vazhi”). With the last line of the dialogue he snaps his
fingers to produce a flame for his cigar, one of his signature styles. (He does a similar
style in Annamalai [1992].)
As of late, as cigarette smoking in films has come under fire from the government,
Rajini’s style in more recent films like Sivaji (2007) has replaced cigar(rette)s with
chewing gum. Thus, instead of flipping a cigar(rette) into his mouth and smoking, in
Sivaji he throws a piece of gum from one hand, bounces it off of his palm (and later in the
film off of the villain’s forehead) into his mouth. He punctuates this with his style-ish
dialogues: “cool” or “summa athirthu, le?” (‘it makes you tremble, doesn’t it?’). 18
Another signature style is how Rajini puts on his sunglasses. While in older films he
did so by rotating and flipping the glasses around his hands while putting them on, in
Sivaji, in his incarnation as MGR the glasses are flipped around to the back of his head
without the use of his hands!
As we have had occasion to note, such various styles are also accompanied by other
repeated moves: the head tilt (head tilted down, eyes looking slightly up with a smirk on
his face, photo 4.2), the brushing of his hair, and the crossing of his legs. All such styleish mannerisms inevitably are accompanied with other meta-signs of difference:

18

In other (comedy) scenes, this style is troped upon by using notionally hot things instead of gum: in one
scene he throws chilies into his mouth, in another he flips a firecracker in his mouth and lights it,
punctuating it with one of his older style-ish dialogue—“ithu eppadi irukku?” (‘How is it?’)—from the
1977 breakout film PathinaaRu Vayathilee. Other styles from Sivaji (2007) include: flipping a coin (and
later car keys) from one hand to another (his hands are stretched at full length across his body), then back to
the original hand, and then flicking it up into the air, catching it in his pocket; later as M. G. Ravichandiran
his style is to tap his bald head with all his fingers (as if playing a miridangam drum).
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fashionable clothes, shots of onlooker’s amazement, the swoosh sound effect (connoting
the rapidity of his motion), as well as punch dialogues (see below).
In all such cases, such actions are style because: (a) they draw attention to themselves
as actions that exceed their functionality (one can simply put one’s sunglasses on, or put
gum in one’s mouth); and (b) they are presumably difficult to do, if not impossible
without the aid of camera tricks. In this sense through the performance of some skill they
both draw attention to themselves and the user as “different” and thus status-raising.

3.5.3 Style and dialogue
Rajini’s dialogues, as we have seen, are delivered in a way that marks them off from
everyday speech. They are poetic (rhyme, alliteration, meter); they are monologic; they
are delivered with either blazing speed or very deliberately; they are often heavily
affected with echo or reverb; they are delivered in a lower pitch than his normal speaking
voice (especially when the delivery is deliberate); they are framed by style-ish
mannerisms (as discussed above).
Take, for example, the following example from Padaiyappa (1999). On the left-hand
column I have put the dialogue (with gloss below it) and in the right-hand column the use
of kinesics and sound effects. Note the syllabic parallelism and its iconicity with the
paralinguistic use of his fingers.
“en vazhi

<swoosh sound effect as he moves his left hand

(‘My way . . . )

across his body from right hip to left; thumb
and middle finger touching, his index finger
pointing up>

thani vazhi

<With the words “thani–vazhi” his index
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(. . . is a unique way. . . . )

finger/hand moves up–down.>

thadukkaathee/ kuRukkidaathee/

<While saying the last phrase his index

siiNdaathee / Better don’t come in my

finger/hand moves from left to right.>

way.”
(. . . ‘don’t try to interfere/cross it.’)
In terms of their denotational content, such dialogues status-raise Rajini by projecting
him as more than a normal man. They also often encapsulate his philosophy, figuring him
as a kind of leader, politically and spiritually. Take, for example, another variant of the
punch dialogue from Padaiyappa (1999):
arasan anRu kolluvaan. theevam inRu

The king kills on that day (then), while God

kollum. athu antha kaalam. arasan inRu

kills on this day (today). That was at that

kolluvaan. theevam anRee kollum. athu

time. The king kills on this day (today) while

intha kaalam. intha jenmaththil senjcha

God kills on that day (then). That is this time.

paavam intha jenmaththile

(Today) we experience the sins of this

anupavikkaNum.

lifetime in our lifetime.
<Up to now his hands are only punctuating
the deictics (‘that/this day’). He is looking at
the villain, head tilted, eyes looking straight
ahead/up. After the last word of the line his
index finger pops up to point at the face of the
villain with a swoosh sound.>

niingka anupavippiingka. naan

You will experience (your sins). I don’t cross

yaareyum kuRukkidamaaddeen. en vazhi

anyone. If anyone crosses my path . . .

yaaravathu kuRukkiddaa . . .
<He then raises his hand and spinning on his
finger is a cigarette, accompanied by a fast,
twirling sound effect. He then throws the
cigarette into his mouth, lighting a match off
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of the villain’s shoulder.>
purinjchathu, le?

You understand, right?
<He starts to walk away, and then turns back
accompanied by a swoosh sound effect. Cut
to a low angle shot looking up at him>

en vazhi thani vazhi.

My way is a unique way. Don’t forget it!

maRakkaathiingka !

<His voice is low, reverb and chorus effected.
Wide shot of him walking away twirling a
chain, accompanied by the swooshing sound
of the chain. As he gets near the camera he
wraps the chain around his waist and walks
off camera.>

Through his cosmological philosophy of sin he here locates the wrongdoers and by
implication figures himself as just. He then threatens anyone who gets in his ‘way’
(vazhi). Vazhi (‘path,’ ‘way’) here stands in as his statement of difference: he walks a
unique path; he is outside of convention, normalcy, the ordinary, and authority as he is, in
fact, his own authority.
Consider another example from the film Annamalai (1992). In this scene Rajini
(whose character’s name is Annamalai) has goaded the villain—a rich man corrupted by
greed—into spending an exorbitant amount of money at an auction. Annamalai has done
this in order to bankrupt him, to turn his own avarice against him.
<with a normal, conversational pace>
muuNu koodi mathippu soththu panneNdu

Have you ever seen a smart person spend

koodi koduththu vaangkina buththisaali

twelve crores 19 for property only worth

paaththirukkeyaa nee? naan innikki thaan

three crores? Today I saw just that. They

19

The Indian counting system proceeds from thousands to lakhs (100,000) to crores (10,000,000).
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paaththeen. ethoo peesa kaNakku kaNakku

[the villain and his son] are always talking

NNu peesuraangka. intha Annamalai

about some calculation or another. Let’s

kaNakku konjcham keedkaddum:

hear the accounting/calculations of this
Annamalai:
<with a brisk metered delivery>

ambillai pooduthu inRu kaNakku,

Men put the calculations of today,

pomble pooduthu naaLaiya kaNakku.

Women put the calculations of tomorrow.

paiyanunga pooduthu mana kaNakku,

Boys put the calculations of the heart,

poNNunga pooduthu thirumaNa kaNakku.

Girls put the calculations of marriage.

ezhai pooduthu naaLai kaNakku,

The poor put the calculations of tomorrow,

paNakkaaran pooduthu paNa kaNakku.

The rich put the calculations of money.

arasiyalvaathi pooduthu ooddu kaNakku,

The politicians put the calculation of votes,

janangka pooduthu nambikkai kaNakku.

The people put calculations of trust.

manushan poodda thappu kaNakku,

Man puts the calculation of mistakes,

aaNdavan pooduthu paava kaNakku.

God puts the calculations of sins.

intha Annamalai pooduthu eppoomee

This Annamalai always puts the calculation

niyaayamaana kaNakku.

of justice.
<From here on his speech is super fast>

kuudi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum.

Add it, subtract it, the calculation will come

enkidde kaNakku peesuRaangka?!

correctly. What are they talking to me about
calculations?!

In this dialogue Annamalai co-opts the villain’s own oft-repeated style-ish dialogue
(“kuudi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum”). He elaborates and improves it, making it
more poetic than the villain ever did (note the phonological, semantic, and grammatic
parallelisms). But Annamalai also makes fun of the dialogue and by extension the villain
as he demonstrates his mastery over the villain’s style by bending it to his own ideology
of justice, framing it in a his reported speech construction ‘what are they talking to me
about calculations?!’
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Just like his mannerisms, then, Rajini’s dialogues both individuate and status-raise
him. Moreover, they articulate Rajini’s extra-societal justice philosophy. Such dialogues
articulate a discourse of exteriority—from the rich in Annamalai (1992), the political
system in Padaiyappa (1999), and India itself in Sivaji (2007)—and figure Rajini as a
man who is extra-ordinary, who stands apart from the crowd. He says in Sivaji (2007) to
a group of rowdies who laugh at him for coming alone without any help: “kaNNaa, panni
thaan kuuddamaa varum” ‘Dear, only pigs come in groups.’ Knocking them back with a
single blow, the sound of a lion growling in the background reverberates as the theme
music starts up. He style-ishly flips his collar back and finishes the dialogue with his
index finger pointing up: “singkam single-aa varum!” (‘The lion comes alone!).

3.5.4 Style and fights
Such style in dialogues and mannerisms are often the prelude to fights where the
symbolic diagramming of status as style is literalized in actual physical domination. Here
style becomes geththu as the hero beats the rowdies to a pulp. In the filmic idiom,
however, geththu and style are fused in heavily style-ized fight sequences, often in a kung
fu idiom (and more recently, e.g. in Sivaji [2007], in the idiom of Hollwyood action films
like the Matrix [1999] and video games like Mortal Kombat [1992]). Common tropes
include the slowing down or speeding up of a blow and the use of fans to blow back the
hair of the hero, the dust on the ground (the step of the hero makes the ground itself
tremble), or ripple the skin of a foe who has been struck (a trope of strength).
For example, in Padaiyappa (1999), after beating a number of rowdies, Rajini
literally knocks one rowdy down by simply blowing in his face. In Sivaji (2007) he plays
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the piano facing away from the keys as he beats off the rowdies with his legs. In a song
qua sex qua fight scene in Sivaji he enters riding a motorcycle lying down with his feet
on the handlebars and a hat over his face. The bike flies forward propelling him into the
air. He hovers in the air in slow motion. Electricity buzzes and a lion’s roar echoes as he
flies through the air demolishing legions of enemies. At one point in the fight he dodges a
bullet, and then throws his gun so that it flies around a fountain (like a boomerang),
shoots a villain in the face, and then returns to him. Later he literally stares down a bullet
until it stops and drops into his drink.

3.5.5 Style as the impossible, as the ridiculous
One of the aspects of style is that it tends towardness excess. As we have seen, this is
both true in its diagramming of social relations—to do style is to transgress ‘society’—
and in its diagramming of the hero’s relationship to physical laws of the universe—his
style can bend the laws of reality as we know it. As such, style borders on the implausible
and impossible. For example, in Sivaji (2007), Rajini’s first character Sivaji Arumugam
actually cheats fate by being reincarnated as M. G. Ravichandiran, thus defying his
astrology that if he marries the heroine he will die. This fulfills his own prophesizing, as
he tells the heroine: ‘The love that I have for you is more powerful than any horoscope.’
And while ostensibly it’s the cliché of love that defies death, in fact it’s style, for he
comes back not to love her (the love story is a mere tangent) but to vanquish the statusful villain through his reincarnation in an even more style-ish avatar. He is too status-ful
to die. Note only would his fans not allow it, but neither would his own image (cf.
Pandian 1992).
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This aspect of style as defying of reality itself takes two tones in the hero-centered
film, as it also does in youth peer groups: (1) as ridiculous, and thus as a form of ironic
comedy; and (2) as serious: the hero really is that powerful. The two often blend: style is
taken seriously and yet it’s also absurd. Indeed, Rajini’s whole image, as Rajanayakam
(2002) has pointed out, is based on both style and comedy. I would alter this by saying
style as appropriate status-raising and style as excessive/absurd status-raising (see section
3.5.5 below).
For example, in Sivaji (2007) there is a scene where Rajini’s character is rapidly
signing two documents with two different hands at the same time, style-ishly flipping and
twirling the pens backwards and forwards each time he finishes a set of documents. The
scenes are both serious and comic, because such acts do perform style, but do so in a
playful self-reflexively parodic way. 20

3.5.6 Style as fashion
In addition to the signature styles of Rajinikanth, style also inheres in his
appropriation of signs from alternative frameworks of value; in particular, those
associated with social class (versus caste) and exteriority (versus the autochthonous).
Below I discuss his use of status-ful commodities of exterior origin: fashion and English
(section 3.5.7).
Rajini’s dress ranges the gamut: from (simulacra of the) “traditional” to hypermodern. However, in all his hero-centric films, in moments where his status is in
20

We can also mention more mundane discrepancies in Rajini’s films which abide by the same logic. For
example, why is Annamalai, a simple milkman always wearing expensive branded sneakers with his
otherwise rustic, traditional outfits? Because Rajini’s status is so high and established that such style qua
deviation from norm is licensed: he can bend social convention to his own will, just as he can bend the laws
of the universe. (See chapter 5 for more discussion.)
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question, his dress is always style-ishly modern. Thus, in Baadshaa (1995), while as
Manikkam he is dressed relatively ordinarily, as Baadshaa his fashion is hyper-style. In
Annamalai (1992) he starts off as a relatively normal milkman, but ends up a successful
business man who embodies a formal style (e.g., suits, tuxedoes). In Sivaji (2007), as
MGR, the reincarnation of Sivaji, he is even more stylish with his large diamond earrings
and leather jacket. In short, Rajini’s dress in his films diagrams the narrative as a tale of
status: from the hiding of status to its revealing to its deployment in the aims of
domination.
The most stereotypical elements of Rajini’s style in fashion are: his sunglasses, his
pierced ears, his wearing of a button-down shirt over a tee-shirt, his jeans or cargo pants,
his sneakers, his long-ish hair feathered and hanging over his face, and his use of branded
apparel in his dress (e.g., Diadora, Nike, Diesel, Puma). In addition to dress, in such
status-elevated states Rajini is always surrounded by fashionable status symbols: cars,
motorcycles, huge mansions. Here style is an appropriation of wealth by the sub-altern
youth. He takes that which is reserved for the rich, for men of traditional status, and
makes it his own via tropes of youth status.
Rajinikanth’s own relationship to fashion and body modification qua style is
diagrammed most clearly in the song “Style” from the recent film Sivaji (2007). Before
the song, the heroine tells Sivaji (Rajini’s first incarnation) that she can’t marry him
because of he is too dark for her. (It’s a false reason: she doesn’t want to marry him
because the astrology predicts his death if they marry.) In response, Sivaji declares that
he will become white for her. After a number of comical therapies to become white, he
returns to her successfully. The first shot shows him pulling up in his Mercedes Benz. In
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a deferment of the moment of visual pleasure, we only see his white leg (revealed
because of his style-ish three-fourth length cargo pants). He walks into her store and
throws her a rose. We get our first look at this new, white Rajini. The song begins.
Hero and heroine are dancing in front of Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim museum in
Bilbao, Spain. In this song, Rajini comes, one by one, in eight different “getups” which
span a range of hip fashion including a variety of wigs (blond, light brown, dark brown,
but notably not black, the stereotyped hair color of Tamils), jeans, blazers and jackets,
button-down shirts in bold colors, scarves, sunglasses, and leather shoes (photo 4.4). 21
The dancers and the heroine (played by Shreya) are in hip-hop inspired clothing.

Photo 4.4 Seven of the eight Rajinikanths in “Style” (Sivaji: The Boss [2007])
21

Below is a description of the various Rajini getups in this song sequence (though note that some of the
items are swapped in and out across shots). In his first getup Rajini is in jeans, a black button-down shirt
with white trim, a pink leather blazer, aviator sunglasses, and a blond wig with straight hair. The second
getup has Rajini in black shoes, dark blue jeans, black tee-shirt with print design, a black blazer with red
scarf, black sunglasses, and a brown straight-haired wig with blond streaks. The next getup has Rajini in
black shoes, an all white suit, black sunglasses, and straight-haired blond wig (with brown roots). The
fourth costume is brown shoes, brown cargo pants with wallet chain, light pink shirt and matching scarf,
brown camoflage jacket with patches, and dark brown, curly wig. Next comes light brown shoes, turquoise
pants, white button-down shirt with orange sweater on top, sky blue leather jacket, light purple scarf, silver
sunglasses, and a blond wig. Sixth is blue jeans, pink belt, green tee-shirt with print design, navy blue
jacket with patches on it, pink scarf, and wavy brown wig and strip of facial hair running from his lower lip
to his chin. Seventh, we have Rajini in light brown shoes, khaki pants, red shirt, orange cowboy style
jacket, red-pinkish scarf, sunglasses, and a brown hair wig. The eight Rajini is in black shoes, dark
bluejeans, white synthetic tee-shirt with star print, Formula 1 style racing jacket, blond wig, and sunglasses.
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The hero and heroine dance in front of two groups of dancers: Caucasian dancers and
dancers of African descent. Notably there are no Indians in either dance troupe. While the
symbolism of black to white transition represented through black and white dancers is
clearly, if not crudely, represented there is a more important point: the iconism of the
transition operates outside of India. Both black and white represent exteriorities that
Rajini dually has the status to appropriate. Indeed, it isn’t a dark south Indian that
represents blackness (a ripe reservoir for cultural meaning in Tamil cinema), but an
African. And it isn’t a light-skinned Indian (remember, the light-skinned heroine cited a
lack of matching of skin color as the problem) but hyper–light skinned blond dancers that
symbolizes the white. It isn’t that he has moved from being darker to lighter, but that in
the process he has appropriated the exterior, he has become an object of desire through
co-opting that which is beyond India.
Indeed, the whole song’s visuality operates on this principle. All the outfits are
Western, modern style outfits (which also index the West through the brands displayed on
the clothing: e.g., brand logos on the Formula 1 racecar style jacket) that have no
indexical trace of India. The hyper-modern, almost surreal, architecture of the
background is downright alien. It is a stark, empty, cold landscape of inorganic geometry,
devoid of any signs of sociality: no people, no nature, only technology. (This
technoaesthetic is itself reflected in one pair of sunglasses Rajini wears which have
windshield wipers on them moving back and forth!)
This is compounded musically and lyrically. The song is a sluggish hip-hop beat of
the down-South U.S. variety popular in the U.S. at the time of the film’s release. Its
angular samples of horn stabs, synthesized bass, programmed drums, and a call and
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response introduction echoes contemporary rap music. The lyrics construct Rajini as the
embodiment of style, and thus as an object of attraction: ‘your gait’s style, your smile is
style, your speech is style’; ‘your style stirs it up, it attracts, it’s victorious’; ‘your style is
hot to the touch, it’s thunderous action, it’s (your) often disheveled hair’; ‘everything you
do is style’; ‘your style is for the children, for the youth, for the old.’
The song ends with an English rap: “Am I black or white? Does it really matter if I
am black or white? This is me. This is you. This is what I’m telling you.” As the rap
begins—questioning whether it matters if he is black or white (indeed, it doesn’t, it only
matters if he is style and if this can justify his changing skin colors)—the different getups
assemble together in the same frame in a frontal shot. Seven of his eight getups (minus
the racing jacket Rajini) are lined up left to right facing the camera. The heroine is on the
far right of the screen (photo 4.5). All of a sudden, all seven collapse from left to ride and
implode into the Rajini closest to the heroine. This trope of multiplicity-in-singularity
diagrams not only status (as ‘more than’) but also Rajini’s ability to tie together so many
diverse styles together coherently.

Photo 4.5 Seven Rajinikanths becoming one (“Style,” Sivaji: The Boss [2007])
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At the end of the song, a ninth avatar approaches the hero and heroine. It is
Rajinikanth in blackface, in all black clothing with long dreadlocks and sunglasses. It is a
style-ized image of anti-status, of ugliness (photo 4.6).

Photo 4.6 Rajinikanth as style-ish anti-style (“Style,” Sivaji: The Boss [2007])

He has come to (comically) ogle the heroine and challenges Rajini, this white Tamilian in
English, “Who do you think you are (doing such status-ful style)?” He is summarily sent
off by the white Rajini in a style-ishly delivered and non-honorificating “poo daa” (‘get
lost’). The white Rajini has successfully embodied the image of style. He has
appropriated the image of the status-ful Other, he has sent off the image of the status-less
Other, and has secured the attraction/love of the heroine. Note that this is appropriation
and not an attempt to pass (hence his use of Tamil to send off the English-using
impostor). It isn’t that he is a white person; but rather, as the lyrics state, that he is a
‘white Tamilian’ (veLLai thamizhan). No matter what his color is, he is ‘always
completely Tamil’ (eppoothum pachchai thamizhan). 22

22

He sings: “appa thaan vechcha karuppee. ippoo thaan sekka sevappee. eppoothum pachchai thamizhan.
ippoo naan veLLai thamizhan” ‘I was black then. Now I am bright white. I am always completely Tamil.
Now I am (just) a white Tamilian.’
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Rajini is style insofar as he is the agent who co-opts and instantiates this alternative
scheme of value through fashion. This formulation is precisely how Rajini’s Madurai
fans interpreted the song: ‘Rajinikanth can do all such styles because of his status and
popularity (remember, the young and old alike love his style). Everything he does is
style,’ no matter its source, its extravagance, its absurdity, its authenticity. As his fans
explained, ‘he can do foreign style even better than foreigners. He is conversant in
English, Tamil, Spanish, any language. Rajini can perform any kind of style because
Rajini is (performatively) style. If he does it, it’s style.’ And yet he is still authentically a
Tamil. He exists in both worlds. And again, this is possible because his style is
underwritten by a more fundamental status such that any particular style can be done and
then discarded after use without threatening his true being, his true identity as a Tamil, as
a modest man of the people/peer group. 23

3.5.7 Style as English
Rajini’s co-optation of the exterior and the status-ful extends beyond the body into his
speech as well. Taking again the song “Style” from Sivaji (2007), we can easily see how
the lyrics diagram Rajini’s appropriation of exteriority through code-mixing between
English and Tamil, and code-switching between Tamil and English. For example,
consider the introduction to the song: 24
Give me one time style yeah . . .

Give me one time style yeah . . .

Give me two time style yeah . . .

Give me two time style yeah . . .

23

Of course, that Rajinikanth is neither ethnically Tamil nor from Tamil Nadu isn’t a problem for
audiences who have come to accept him as a Tamil (see Rajanayakam 2002: 241 for discussion).
24
I have italicized the Tamil words in the quotation and left the English words unitalicized; in the gloss I
have underlined the Tamil words that are glossed and the glosses of those words.
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Give me three time somethin’ . . .

Give me three time somethin’ . . .
<Music kicks in.>

oru koodai sunlight

A pot of sunlight

oru koodai moonlight

A pot of moonlight

onRaaga seeththa color thaanee en white.

My white is the color of them combined.

Here we see code-switching—from English to Tamil—followed by code-mixing English
noun phrases into Tamil sentence structures.
Rajini’s relationship to English, however, is ambivalent. As far as English is
concerned, he plays both sides: style for status-ful effect and over style for comic effect.
Indeed, broken English is sometimes termed “Rajini English” by youth due to Rajini’s
successful comedic use of English disfluency in depicting (failed) status-raising. Such
comedy is perhaps best captured by the following scene from Veelaikkaaran (1987). In
this famous scene Rajini is a recent arrival from the countryside to the big city. At a job
interview he is asked if he can managed in English. His comic sidekick jumps in (in
Tamil): ‘how can you expect him to speak in English when he just arrived from the
village?’ At this point Rajini begins his memorable dialogue (the first line was often
quoted to me by students, or deployed by students to tease each other):
<to the sidekick:> “Shut up! I can talk English, I can walk English, I can laugh
English you bloody fellow! <to the interviewer:> Waya puri in Tamil becomes
vaay puri in English and bhel puri in Hindi. Sir, English is a very funny
<pronounced “punny”> language sir. But fine and the Tamil language as well,
you know how? English is the passion of the nation. It’s a consideration, a
conjunction become injunction and injunction become irritations. Frustration and
temptations come up for all nations. Because conditions become corporations
become premonitions. That’s why fiction deserves in collusion, diffusion,
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destruction, demonstration, declaration, desolation, depression, deliberation, and
decoction.”
What is interesting about this clip is that while it pokes fun at the (rural) upwardly
mobile and parodies Rajini as a status impostor through his schizophrenic word salad, it
still demonstrates him as a successful candidate as he gets the job. English here is a kind
of mystic tongue (the audience would understand only a fraction of what he is saying;
indeed, it took me many attempts to understand his super fast delivery). But it is wielded
successfully by Rajini nonetheless.
Rajini’s style dialogues also deploy English as a serious marker of status. Such usages
tend to be, just as they are with young men’s use of English as style in their peer groups,
at the beginning or ends of his dialogues, in greetings or departures, as glosses of
something said immediately before or after in Tamil, or in single lexical items deployed
without any denotational content (e.g., “cool” from Sivaji [2007]).
For example, in Baadshaa (1995) Baadshaa confronts the police for their inability
and unwillingness, due to their fear, to confront Anthony. When he arrives the police ask
him to sit. He replies in English, “No no no, thank you very much . . . .” He then switches
into Tamil to explain how bad Anthony is, how the police have done nothing, and how
he, Baadshaa, has only tried to do good. He switches gears into a punch dialogue in
Tamil. Before leaving he again switches to English: <with an echo effect to the English>
“Okay? Bye <waves>. Bye!” Here we see the use of English for the interactional moves
at the beginning and the end of the dialogue.
In Padaiyappa (1999) Rajini goes into a long lecture in Tamil, scolding the female
villain for her arrogance and quick temper. Having given his philosophy on gender
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relations, he tilts head and menancingly smiles with raised eyebrows. He then switches
into a rapidfire delivery English, demonstrating his mastery over the language of status
and exteriority: “You know one thing? Anger is the cause of all miseries. One should
know how to control it. Otherwise, life will become miserable. Try to understand that.”
He starts to walk off, but then comes back and roughly glosses his philosophy in Tamil:
“Last but not least: athika aasai paNRa ambilleyum athika koobappadRa pombleyum
nalla vaazhnthathaa sariththanam kedeyaathu.” (‘There is no instance of a man who
desires too much and a woman who gets too angry living happily’). Having glossed his
philosophy, he raises his hand and gives a style salute along with the swoosh sound
effect. He says “Bye” and walks off to horn fanfare, in slow motion walking toward the
camera, head down in his style gait.

3.5.8 Status-raising and -leveling
In this section, I show how the construction of Rajini’s style also iconically reflects
the peer group dynamics of status-raising and -leveling. We noted in the discussion of
Baadshaa (1995) that Rajini’s films often increase the tension and excitement in seeing
him initially perform his style through prior moments of status-lowering. His characters
are often constructed at first as humble, respectful, even afraid. It’s only through others
that his inherent status is made to come out. This, of course, is an indication of his
modesty: he takes no pleasure in status-raising, but it must be done. It isn’t under his own
agency, and thus he can’t be accused of boasting.
This is compounded in that before Rajini’s characters begin their performances of
style (in particular, self-status-raising punch dialogues) they have already been
194

constructed as men of status and style by those around them. To take an example from
Sivaji (2007), the heroine’s neighbor extols him as a humble man: ‘Look at his eyes,
man!’ (“avanooda kaNNu paaru ayyaa”). Cut to Sivaji looking at the camera smiling.
The neighbor says: ‘Look at his skin color, man’ (“avanooda color-a paaru ayya”). Cut
to Sivaji flipping a piece of gum into his mouth, cut to onlookers looking amazed. The
neighbor says: ‘Look at his style, man! . . . Who in Tamil Nadu would say that they don’t
like him having seen him?’ (“avanooda style-e paaru ayyaa. . . . avane paaththu thamizh
naaddile pidikkale NNu evanoo soluvaar ayya?”). At this moment Sivaji protests that he
is lauding him too much. The neighbor replies: ‘Look at that, man, he’s a person who
doesn’t even like being praised!’ (“paaru ayya, pukazhchchi pudikkaathavan ayya!”)
There are at least three functions at play here: the first is to maximize Rajini’s statusraising through leveling it. The trope of humble origins, as well as comedy segments
which poke fun at Rajini’s status, act to lower his status, only to raise it later with greater
effect. Second, such a construction—in particular, the exteriorization of his own statusraising through testimonials and the reactions of others to him—acts to preemptively
ratify his style as authentic, as legitimate, as acceptable and not to be derided as over or
absurd. 25 It paves the way, as it were, for accepting Rajini as someone who has enough
status to perform such style and (pre-)ratifies such performance once it’s done. Through
these mechanisms Rajini’s status becomes an undisputed fact within the diegesis. Third,
this construction reaches outside of the text to construct Rajini himself as a humble
person, as a man of the people, as an ordinary person. Indeed, Rajini’s popularity
partially hinges on the fact that in terms of ascribed status markers he is deficient: he isn’t
25

Rajanayakam’s (2002: ch. 4) discussion of this provides many more examples of this more general point:
Rajini’s status is raised before he even raises it himself.
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white skinned, proportionally built, or conventionally beautiful (like MGR) (see
Rajanayakam 2002 for a thorough discussion of this). Moreover, he comes from the
modest background of being a former bus conductor. (I return to this point later in
chapter 5.)
In short, Rajini’s characters are always presented as both ordinary and extra-ordinary,
as part of the community of peers, but somehow apart from it (see Rajanayakam 2002:
144–173). However, his being superior to his peers is never presented in a way that is
excessive to his status, never more than necessary, never showing off, never arrogant.
One interesting phenomenon that Rajanayakam (2002) points out in his notion of “liminal
spurts” is that Rajini’s status-raising (what he calls “elitising” 26 ) is often coterminous
with his status-leveling (what he calls “sub-alternising”). For example, Rajini often does
his style with a beedi (a cheaper cigarette smoked by the working class) or a cigar
(associated with rural areas) rather than the relatively more costly cigarette; or, while
dressed as an ordinary milkman in Annamalai (1992), he wears a pair of sneakers (a sign
of status). That is, there is a compulsive performance of difference through sameness
(and vice versa) through co-occuring signs of status-raising and -leveling. This is, as we
saw in our discussion of peer groups, precisely the double motion of the peer group
toward individuation and inclusion, of status-raising and status-leveling.

26

One issue with Rajanayakam’s (2002) account is that he wants to exclusively associate style with the
elites. Thus, doing style isn’t only status-raising, but “elitising.” There are a number of limitations to this.
First, Rajanayakam has no clear account of style precisely because he explains it away as “gimmicks”
which somehow attract viewers (presumably due to its inherent attractiveness). Second, it isn’t clear that
style is necessarily something only linked to elites, though it certainly often is. This exposes a more general
telescoping in Rajanayakam’s discussion: he is only interested in MGR and Rajini’s image construction as
emblems of class-relations as they play out in the political realm, and takes no consideration of age as a
relevant factor (cf. the critique of Prasad 1998 in Nakassis and Dean 2007, fn. 21).
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3.5.9 Style as a life stage, as temporary
In Rajini’s films, while reality has itself been altered by his style (the villains
vanquished, dharma restored), at the end of the film he either returns to his previous state
of non-style or becomes a literal periya aaL (e.g., he finishes Padaiyappa [1999] and
Annamalai [1992] as an old man; in the latter he returns to his lowly milkman status at
the end of the film; he gets married at the end of Baadshaa [1995] as the ordinary
Manikkam; he finishes Muththu [1995], where he plays a double role, just as he started:
as a lowly servant and an elderly renouncer). While the hero-star is exterior and
transgressive, he ultimately moves beyond, renounces, or suspends his youth status.
That is, Rajini’s characters’ construction as antihero vis-à-vis his bad habits (e.g., he
smokes, he drinks, he filanders, he loves), vigilantism (i.e., he works against and above
the law), occupation (e.g., as a rowdy), and his social background (e.g., as poor, as an
immigrant; Rajanayakam 2002: 241) places him outside of ‘society.’ However, Rajini
doesn’t only inhabit the periphery. His characters move back into ‘society’ at the ends of
his films. What is important to note, however, is that such moves back into ‘society’ are
from a position of exteriority where Rajini’s return is to a ‘society’ changed because of
his intervention. In effect, ‘society’ and its authority have been reappropriated as his
island of authority. Further, whenever he moves back into ‘society’ his expressions of
style are diminished and muted.
One reason for the suspension of style at the end of Rajini’s films—especially his
older films—is that the Rajini audience is mixed and includes adults. A second reason is
that it constructs Rajini as humble, modest, and one of the people. Style is inside him
always, but need not be expressed unless there is a foe to be vanquished. Otherwise he is
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a man of the people, a commoner just like you and me. The third issue evoked by this
renouncement of style is the idea that style is a kind of disguise, something ephemeral, a
temporary artifice to raise status for someone who is liminal. The hero-star is a vehicle to
change the world through efficacious status-raising. At the end of this, however, style is
used up and made unnecessary. It can be stored away until the next film. Thus, for
example, at the end of Annamalai (1992) Rajini sings the first song from the film about
being a milkman and tells everyone that being a millionaire (which he only became to get
revenge on the rich villains) was a ‘disguise.’ At the core he was always the same guy, a
milkman: “ithu thaan permanent. maththellaam temporary” ‘This [being a milkman] is
what is permanent. Everything else is temporary.’ Similarly, recall the song “Style” from
Sivaji (2007) where Rajini becomes a white man as the ultimate expression of his style.
When he finds out, however, that the heroine doesn’t want him to be white at all, he
immediately washes off his “veesham” (‘disguise’).
Note, then, that the filmic concept of style is just like youth’s own understandings of
their age as temporally transitional and in between. For both Rajini and youth more
generally, style is a surface to be played with, a tool of temporary appropriation, and itself
must be negated at the correct time. With age one moves on from relative youth status to
objective adult status: going ‘into’ ‘society’ and becoming a periya aaL with adult
responsibilities, duties, and signs of status. And indeed, in Rajini’s films the characters
never really overthrow the social system. Rather, they co-opt authority, move up the
social ladder, and displace evil (Rajanayakam 2002: 180). This parallels, in fact, youth’s
own experience of youth not as rebellion but as transgression; not as overthrowing social
relations, but as creating spaces exterior to them.
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3.5.10 Summary
I have argued that Rajinikanth’s filmic image qua hero-star and the narratives that
construct that image are, at core, stories about youth status negotiation, and need not be
read as only political vehicles (pace Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993a, b; Rajanayakam 2002).
In particular, they are about style as the outward expression of status. I showed that while,
on the one hand, style is something particular to Rajinikanth (as a set of mannerisms,
dialogues, stereotyped signs associated with him alone), style is also iconic with the more
general notion of status among youth which is itself an icon of ‘youth’ itself, and thus not
particular to Rajinikanth at all. I argued this by showing how Rajini’s style is constructed
as: (a) visual and individuating; (b) exterior to ‘society’ and ‘culture’; (c) transgressive of
established norms in content (Rajini’s characters break the rules), in form (the
conventions of the Rajini film themselves are a deviation from those established by MGR
[see Rajanayakam 2002: 124–125]), and in ‘real’ life (Rajini’s early “parallel text” was of
a deviant youth); (d) co-opting signs of wealth and status; (e) diagramming the relative
relationship of periya aaL–chinna paiyan figuratively through style and literally through
fights (geththu); (f) caught up in the youth peer group dialectic of status-raising and leveling; and (g) replicating the transitory status of ‘youth’ in the narrative’s construction.
In short, Rajini’s style presents us with a hyperbolic image of ‘youth’ and its concepts of
status. As we see below, this status construction contrasts with both the villain (as
excessive status) and the comedian (as inappropriate status).

4. The villain and the comedian: Excessive and deficient status
4.1 Introduction
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As I have argued, the hero-centered film moves through representations of status and
its negotiation. But while the hero is the main emblem of status, he isn’t the only one.
The status negotiation and the build up of the hero’s status require that other characters
engage in status work as well. As I show in this section and the next, other main
characters in the film—villains and comedians—are also emblems of status, though of a
deformed sort.
In the case of the villain, this is because he is defined by and defines the hero through
conflict. The narratological function of such conflict is to determine who is the periya
aaL among them. For the comedian, there are two reasons why status and style are central
to his character: (a) the comedian is often the sidekick, and thus his status work (statusmismatching or -lowering) serves to highlight and foreground the hero’s status-raising;
and (b) status-inversion and -mismatch in Tamil Nadu is itself a form of comedy
entertainment (chapter 3, section 3.3.3).

4.2. The villain
4.2.1 The villain as (not) status-ful (enough)
In the hero-centric film the villain is a mirror image, if distorted, of the hero. Indeed,
the construction of the villain is the same as that of the hero in all the films discussed so
far, though not as elaborated. The villain dresses fashionably style-ish, grooms himself
style-ishly, and is surrounded by style-ish objects.
For example, Marc Anthony in Baadshaa (1995) wears sunglasses, an earring,
dresses in chic business suits, and has a hip mullet hair cut (funk). The female villain of
Padaiyappa (1999), Neelambari, is often shown in modern dress: jeans, miniskirts,
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leather boots, and sunglasses. One of the villains from Annamalai (1992) has a sculpted
beard, bejeweled jacket (with matching pants), sunglasses, and cut-off leather gloves.
More recently, the villain of Vijay’s hit film Pookkiri (2006), Ali Bhai, is shown in fancy,
shiny black suits, sunglasses, and leather jackets. Similarly, the remake of Rajini’s Billa
(2007) is all about the style of the villains (think the Sivaji [2007] song “Style” taken as a
whole film): gangsters dressed in expensive, shimmering suits and reflective sunglasses
living in the hyper-modern Kuala Lumpur with its sleek steel and glass aesthetics, shot in
a cool blue color scheme. 27
The villain is also transgressive of established norms and authority structures. He
commits crimes and does evil malicious things as we saw with the scheming Marc
Anthony of Baadshaa (1995). He also partakes in youth status-raising rituals: he smokes,
he drinks, and he loves (although illicitly, kaLLaa kaathal). The introduction of the
villain of Pookkiri (2006) Ali Bhai shows him smoking a cigar and taking shots of tequila
in a discothèque surrounded by beautiful and scantily clad women. The villain occupies
exterior spaces: industrial hideouts, huge modern mansions, bars, and clubs.
In general, then, the villain’s style rivals that of the hero in its exteriority, its
transgressiveness, its visuality, its attractiveness to women, and its diagramming of
difference. Indeed, his style verges on the extreme and excessive: over style. Remember
that the most common reaction to youths who do too much style, especially by adults, is
that they look like, or act like, rowdies (i.e., villains).

27

This was an intentional move by the filmmakers in order to create a hyper-modern style-ish backdrop that
Tamil viewers never had seen before (Shah 2009). The filmmakers wanted the film itself to be style (it was
a Rajini remake afterall), but in a contemporary idiom.
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The villains in hero-oriented Tamil cinema also have their own style-ish dialogues
accompanied by individuating status-raising mannerisms (finger pointing,
removing/putting on sunglasses, crossing the legs). Above we saw some of the dialogues
of Marc Anthony from Baadshaa (1995) and his characteristic styles: his low voice, his
third-person introductions (“Anthony, Marc Anthony”), and his taunts. Similarly as we
saw above, the villain of Annamalai (1992) has his own punch dialogue that he deploys:
“kuuddi kalichchu kaNakku sariyaa irukkum/varum” ‘If you add and subtract (it), the
calculations will be right/correct.’ Pragmatically, the villain’s dialogues are used in the
same ways and places as the hero’s: before some status-raising activity (e.g., fighting or
embarking on some status-raising project) or after it succeeds.
Similar tropes of status-raising are also deployed. Swearing revenge, the female
villain of Padaiyappa (1992) status-raises through the same DEMONSTRATIVE + PROPER
NAME

construction as the hero: “intha Neelambari nenechchaa, nichchiyamaa mudiyum”

(‘If this Neelambari thinks it, it’s definitely possible’). She snaps her fingers, swearing
not to take off her anklets until she gets her revenge. She says ‘This is definite, man’
(“ithu saththiyam daa”), and then slams her hand into a glass table and breaks it. Her
hand bleeding, she repeats: “ithu saththiyam,” closing her fist on the glass. Villains also
speak English in their dialogues. For example, in Annamalai (1992), one of sub-villain’s
only dialogues is the English sentence “I am a bad man.”
Like the hero’s style, the villain’s style moves between the serious and the ridiculous.
Marc Anthony’s character straddles this line. His unique mannerisms evinced laughs
from students, but also were part of the serious construction of him as a foe to be
reckoned with. Fighting is also central to the villain’s style, and the villain’s fighting skill
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rivals the hero’s. He can vanquish his foes with a single blow, causing them to fly off into
the distance, at times even the gaining the upper hand on the hero. He is a strong,
dangerous, masculine man, ruthless and fierce in his fighting abilities.
In terms of the camera treatment of the villain and sound effects, it is the same as the
hero: swoosh sound effects emphasize the villain’s style; multiple camera shots of the
same action act as tropes of status; slow motion and sped up shots act as tropes of
strength and speed; and frontal bust shots and closeups of the eyes and face individuate
and make the villain visible. Like the hero, the villain is style.

4.2.2 Excessive status: Villain is never humble, only humbled
As we have seen, the hero and the villain’s status is similarly constructed and
represented. So what is the difference, then, between the hero and the villain?
First, in an earlier filmic idiom which still carries weight today (though less and less;
see section 4.4 for more discussion), the hero occupies a higher moral ground than the
villain. The villain is ruthless and sadistic, while the hero is righteous and just.
Second, the villain is never humble until humbled. He is arrogant. He engages in none
of the status-leveling which the hero does. While status-ful, he inspires no hope in those
around him, he isn’t liked or admired because he is arrogant. For example, while
speaking-for-the villain is a common trope of status-raising, such speech never valorizes
the villain except to highlight his power and strength. Indeed, it often casts the villain as
unjust or arrogant. For example, in Padaiyappa (1999), the hero’s friends comment on
the female villain. Saying that she studied abroad, they categorize her thusly: “enna
thimiru, enna banthaa, enna style-u” ‘what arrogance, what showing off, what style.’
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They continue to say, ‘Didn’t you see her come in car? She came from studying abroad in
a plane, and the car came in a boat.’ Here speaking-for-the-villain status-raises, but
figures such status not as appropriate but excessive and arrogant. She has style (and its
commodity trappings), but it’s too much. She is arrogant, her style is over.
Third, the villain is an obstacle to the hero. By definition, then, the villain’s status and
style must be made subservient to the hero’s. While the villain is the hero’s double, (s)he
must be outdone in style, his/her status must be appropriated, and finally (s)he must be
vanquished physically (or made to reform and repent). Ultimately the issue of the villain
and the hero comes down the question of style and geththu: who is the periya aaL,
symbolically and literally? It’s the play between dominance through style and dominance
through fighting that characterizes the narrativization of status in such films. Indeed, it’s
the bombastic villain which gives the hero an occasion to rise to, and thus brings out his
status. It’s only the status-ful villain that can reveal the true strength and style of the hero.
Moreover, without such provocation, the hero’s displays of status would smack of
arrogance. It is, in fact, the figurement of the hero as modest and reluctant to status-raise
coupled with the excessively status-raising villain who elicits the hero’s extreme statusful acts that makes the hero an appropriate emblem for youth status.

4.2.3 Example: Symbolic status negotiation in Padaiyappa (1999)
Take the hero–villain encounters in the film Padaiyappa (1999). In Padaiyappa, the
main villain, Neelambari, is an arrogant, Western educated woman who initially wants
Padaiyappa (played by Rajinikanth) romantically. (She is also his cross-cousin and thus a
potential/preferred marriage candidate.) When she can’t have him and he marries her
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servant (a doubly humiliating situation for her), she swears revenge. This quest is
expressed in the film through negotiations of status between Padaiyappa and Neelambari,
through a back and forth to determine who the periya aaL is.
In one famous scene Padaiyappa goes to her wealthy home. She has taken out all of
the furniture from the house. Padaiyappa enters. Cut to a low shot of her coming down
the stairs (a common trope of status difference, as we saw in Baadshaa [1995]). She
snaps her finger and a servant brings her a chair. She sits in front of Rajini, another
diagram of status difference, forcing him to stand in front of her. She crosses her legs
slowly, the sole of her foot passing right in front of the camera, taking up most of the
screen. 28 She then gives him a style salute with a flourish of the hand (accompanied by a
swoosh sound effect). Her head is cocked to one side, slightly pointed down, her eye gaze
slightly looking up in a similar posture of style assumed by Rajini in many films. Her first
moves of style have diagrammed her symbolic domination of Padaiyappa through coopting his style.
Padaiyappa replies by pulling off his scarf and flipping it up into the air with a
swoosh sound effect (throwing the scarf onto the shoulder is a recurrent style of the film),
then grabbing a swing as if out of nowhere (it’s out of the frame, presumably tied up to
the ceiling) and pulls it down in a slow motion shot. The scarf lands on his shoulder and
he takes a seat across from her. His theme music kicks in. He crosses his legs slowly,
deliberately. He puts his hand on his knee, assuming the most circulated image from this
film, sitting majestically like a king. He then gives his style salute. She ratifies his style,

28

Note that not only is sitting down while others stand indicative of higher status, but the foot, and the sole
of the foot in particular, is extremely status-lowering to others: thus, for example, one throws one’s shoe to
humiliate another and one worships God by falling at his feet.
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saying ‘my electric dear, you know why everyone likes you? Even though you have aged,
your style and beauty haven’t left you’ (“minsara kaNNaa. ellaarukkum een pidichchu
irukku NNu unakku theriyumaa? vayasu aanaalum un styleyum azhakum innum unne
viddu poogale”). He replies: ‘“Thank you, thank you.” It was with me when I was born. It
will never leave me’ (“Thank you, thank you. kuudavee poRanthathu. ennikkum
poogathee”). Padaiyappa 1, Neelambari 0.
And yet, it does leave him, as well see in a later encounter. The villain has pulled off
her first victory: she reveals that she has gotten his daughter to fall in love with her
nephew, only to force her nephew to stand her up at the alter, breaking her heart. She rubs
it in Padaiyappa’s face through the co-opting of his punch dialogue and his style. She
says to him: ‘You often say, my way is a unique way (“en vazhi thani vazhi”).
Neelambari’s way is also unique. From now on your activities won’t cross me.’ While
repeating his words back to him, Neelambari holds out her hand in a fist, with the thumb
pointing up moving from left to right in Rajini’s characteristic style. When Padaiyappa
tries to style-ishly throw his scarf onto his shoulder he misses. She says, ‘this is the first
time in your life it’s slipped off, huh’? Here the failure of style diagrams her victory, her
superior status, her (temporarily) being the periya aaL. He is unable to do style in front of
her. Padaiyappa 1, Neelambari 1.
In the final showdown, however, Padaiyappa’s style comes out on top. Padaiyappa
has determined that her nephew was only pretending not to love his daughter. He didn’t
say anything out of fear of his aunt and politician father. Padaiyappa shows up at the
nephew’s wedding day (the aunt has arranged for him to marry someone else) with
literally thousands of people as support. Padaiyappa and his army and Neelambari and the
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wedding party stand opposite each other. The nephew reveals that he does love
Padaiyappa’s daughter. Padaiyappa walks across the divide to take him to marry his
daughter and starts to leave. Then, he dramatically turns around (with swoosh sound
effect). Standing next to the villain, Rajini looks at her with head tilted down and eyes up,
while she stares forward. He has won, and his eye gaze is direct, while hers is defeated, in
avoidance. He gives a dialogue: ‘I think that now you are remembering the drama that
you conducted when you cheated my daughter right at the moment that that the thaali 29
was supposed to be tied. You won once. It’s a good thing it happened. I woke up. Now I
think you understand’ (“thaali kaddi veeNdiya neeraththile en magaLe eemaaththi nee
nadaththina naadagam ippoo unakku njaabagam varum NNu nenekkiReen. oru thadave
nee jeeychchidde. nalla thaan poochchu. naan muzhichchiddeen. ippaavathu unakku
purinjchi irukkum NNu nenekkiReen”). That is, she understands that he is superior to her,
he is the periya aaL. She understands this not only because he was able to conduct the
marriage as he had planned, but because his style is back. Grave sounding strings enter.
The camera cuts to a low shot of just the villain and Padaiyappa. Her arms are crossed,
her eyes finally looking at him, ratifying what she knows will now happen, he will
symbolically diagram his return to dominance through his style. His hand flashes up,
cocked and ready to deliver his punch dialogue: ‘My way is a unique way’ <his index
finger moves up and down>. Better don’t come in my way’ <his finger moves from left
and right> (“en vazhi, thani vazhi. Better don’t come in my way”). He gives a style salute,
smiles at the applauding crowd behind him and walks off toward the camera. Padaiyappa
is back, and so is his style.

29

Tamil marriage ceremonies center on the tying of the thali (a string) around the bride’s neck.
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4.2.4 Summary
The filmic image of the villain, and the rowdy more generally, is as that of excessive
style plus geththu (itself expressed in acts of style). The villain’s style, however, is not
commensurate with his/her status, and this is revealed when the hero puts the villain in
his/her place. This reflects, again, the status-economy of the youth peer group: those who
transgress too much, who boast too much, who attempt to dominate too much, must be
taken down a peg. There is a pleasure, then, in seeing the hero (who, remember, always
partakes as a member of the peer group as well as apart from it) put the villain (the
individual who pays no heed to the peer group and purely attempts to status-raise) in
his/her place. 30
In short, style is the raison d’être of the villain insofar as the hero is defined by the
economy of style. A villain who does no style gives no pleasure to the audience. (S)he
isn’t a villain at all. As it became clear from talking with youth about film, they expect
that the villain will project his/her status via style to the maximum, because only then can
the expression of pure style sans society’s norms of morality be relished as an object of
pleasure in its own right. Moreover, only then can it provoke the hero into even more
over-the-top expressions of style. The villain’s excessive style makes it necessary for the
hero to engage in even more extreme expressions of style while allowing the hero to
maintain his status as justified and not arrogant.

30

This is also why the other alternate fate of the villain is to reform and recognize the authority of the hero
(i.e., self-figure him/herself as a chinna paiyan). It is not enough for the hero to achieve his goal and
resolve the film’s conflict. The villain must be explicitly ranked as subservient to the hero and his norms of
authority.
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While the hero diagrams the experience of youth status as a push and pull of statusraising and -leveling, the villain diagrams the individual who only attempts to statusraise. This is why the villain is simultaneously an object of pleasure for audiences and an
object of derision.

4.3. The comedian
4.3.1 The comedian as mismatched status
If the hero is the emblem of reasonable style (style backed up by status and acceptable
to others) and the villain is the emblem of excessive style (too much style for his/her
status and unacceptable to others), then the comedian in hero-centered films presents us
with an emblem of inverted or mismatched status. Like the villain, when the comedian
does style it’s too much for his status. But unlike the villain whose status inevitably does
not quite get to the level of the hero (in fact, it is post hoc, in contrast to the hero that the
villain’s status is ratified as excessive), the comedian’s status-raising attempts don’t even
pass muster as status-ful in the first instance. Thus, often the comedian’s status-raising
attempts reflexively meta-communicate their deficiency in the acts themselves. As such,
the comedian’s performances of status do not entail status. Rather, they diagram antistatus, often by merely ‘reporting’ or tropically re-presenting emblems of status.
The comedian—more precisely, the buffoon (cf. Seizer 2005)—has little to no style,
he has no masculinity, he has no geththu. In this he differs from the villain who does have
status and geththu, just not as much as the hero. Thus, when the comedian performs style,
when he projects masculinity and status, it is ridiculous and absurd. For example, the
popular comedian Vadiveelu’s ridiculous mustache in films like Maruthamalai (2007)
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and Imsai Aran 23-am Pulikeesi (2006) are a clear diagram of this absurd masculinity as
comedy (photo 4.7). In the photo from Maruthamalai (2007, right) compare the
mustaches of the hero, which is appropriately masculine, to Vadiveelu’s hyperbolic and
comic mustache (not to mention fake looking, thereby meta-communicating that this is
comedy).

Photo 4.7 Vadiveelu’s humorous mustaches: Pulikeesi (2006, left) and Maruthamalai (2007, right)

The comedian’s status-raising is comic because it is a status-mismatch. We know that
the comedian doesn’t have the status to back up his status-raising moves. And when he
gets put in his place, often by those of low status (women, children, average workingclass people on the street), the comic effect is produced. The comedian, then, offers us an
image of deficient status. This isn’t to say that the comedian has no other comic appeal.
Physical comedy, double entendre and word play, satire, and situational comedy are all
aspects of comedy in Tamil films. What is most interesting from the point of view of this
chapter, however, is that comedy in hero-centered Tamil films largely does its work
through status-mismatches in failed performances of style.
As we see below, the comedian is largely defined through his relationship with the
hero. This happens in two ways: through situations where the comedian acts like a hero, a
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man of style but is revealed not to be; or through parodying the image of the hero. In the
latter case there is a double voicing: there is the mismatch of status—we know that the
comedian is no hero and to see him act like one is ridiculous—and layered on top of that
the voice of parody—his status-mismatch is a reflexive and inter-discursive performance
(and thus there is a knowing wink involved). In such comedy it is the image of the hero,
and status itself, that is being made fun of as ridiculous even as such comedy more often
than not acts to build up the status of the hero. 31

4.3.2 Revealing the buffoon
In Annamalai (1992) much of the comedy is created through the character Panju’s use
of English. We know it to be anomalous given his status within the narrative—he isn’t
the hero Annamalai and he is the owner of the local tea shop (a low-status job)—and
outside the narrative—Janagaraj is a well-known comedian in many films. Panju’s
recurrent comedy is his insistence on using English even though he isn’t fluent and even
though it is interactionally unnecessary. In an early scene in the film Panju is sitting at the
tea stall reading the English newspaper and explaining it, wrongly, to the guys hanging
out. He sits in the middle of the group, and his manner (e.g., his pedantic hand gestures
and his use of rhetorical questions ‘do you know what X means?’) indexes him as a kind
of vaaththiyaar ‘teacher,’ a position of high status in rural Tamil Nadu. His tone of voice
is patronizing and exaggerated and slow in delivery, ambiguous between his inability to
read and his perception of his interlocutors’ inability to parse English.
31

It is, of course, debatable whether these two categories are different in kind. Indeed, the first case only
works through the implicit image of the hero as status-ful and the construction of the comedian as not (cf.
the villain). The second case, then, is the case where the image of the hero is more explicitly interdiscursive and thus viewers have more grounds to impute a level of reflexive awareness to the comedian as
part of their interpretation.
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<reading the headline:>
Panju: Today’s News. Minister files

Panju: Today’s News. Minister files

complain(t).

complain(t).
<He doesn’t pronounce the final “t” sound.>
<to the overhearers:>

Minister files complain(t) NNaa enna

Do you know what “minister files

arththam theriyumaa? Minister-ukku

complain(t)” means? It means the minister has

muule viyaathi NNu arththam. muule

piles. What I’m asking is, why should these

viyaathiye vechchukkiddu ivanungka

guys go to work if they have got piles? I’ll

veelaikki een poogaNum NNu keekReen.

read the next one.

aduthathu padikkiReen.
<reading the headline:>
Following of the railway concession.

Following of the railway concession.
<to the overhearers:>

Concessions NNaa, church-le father

Concessions means in the church there is the

irukkaan. udkaarnthu mannippu

father. You sit down and they give

koduppaangkoo.

forgiveness.
<Annamalai comes and sits. To Annamalai:>

vaa Annamalai! Good morning Brother

Come Annamalai! Good morning Brother

Mountain!

Mountain!
<Annamalai stands up.>

Annamalai: vaNakkam.

Annamalai: Greetings.
<Hands folded at chest in vaNakkam
gesture.>

P: It’s okay.

P: It’s okay. <laughs>
<Annamalai sits back down.>

Cricket news padikkiReen. keeLu.

I’m gonna read the cricket news. Listen.

Gavaskar clean bowl. Clean bowled

Gavaskar clean bowl. Clean bowled means,

NNaa vanthu appadiyee panthu paaru.

he comes and catches the ball just like that.

gup NNu pudikkiRaan. athu thaan

That is why it’s called clean bowled.
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cleaned bowled NNu peeru.
While the comedian is ostensibly status-raising through his style-ish language use, which
also figures him as the teacher to his listeners (thus figured as students and chinna
pasangka), there are clear signs that he doesn’t know English well. His reading is slow
and verging on stuttering. Second, his translations and pronunciation are wrong. He
confuses “files” with “piles” (Tamil doesn’t distinguish /f/ and /p/.) He confuses
“confessions” with “concessions.” And he gets “bowled clean” backwards (it has to do
with pitching the ball, not catching it.) Moreover, his translation of the proper name
Annamalai into its literal gloss ‘Brother Mountain’ is ridiculous.
There are other ways that he is (comically) status-raised. When Annamalai first
comes he sits down. When Panju greets him, Annamalai rises from his seated position
and comports his body to deferentially greet Panju. Panju ratifies this diagram of status
with his “It’s okay,” that is, ‘you do not have to stand for me,’ exercising his right as the
presumed higher status person to dispense with the formalities. This diagramming of
unequal status is comic because it’s a status-mismatch; the audience recognizes
Annamalai (and Rajini) as a higher status character (and person in real life) than Panju.
The comedy continues when a white tourist (as indexed by the camera around his
neck) comes and sits.
Panju: Hiii!

Panju: Hiii! <in singsong prosody; waves>

Tea worker: veLLaikkaara saami, enna

Tea worker: White ‘guy’ (saami, lit. ‘god’;

saapiduReyee?

address term for priest), what are you (hon.) eating?

P.: Eey! unakku avankidde peesuRathukku

P: <to the tea worker:>Hey! You don’t
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thaguthiyee kedeyaathu.

have the status/qualifications to even speak

naayee! nee poo uLLoo!

to him. You (-hon.) dog! Go inside!
<to the customer sitting next to the white
guy:>

Eey! nee enna udkaarnthukkiRe?

eey! And what are you (-hon.) doing sitting

naaLaikki sappida vaa. pooyyaa!

here? Come back tomorrow to eat. Get lost!

Disgruntled customer: aamaa uurleyee tea

Disgruntled customer: <muttering> Right,

vechchirukkaan.

only he has tea in the whole town.

P: Hi. Hello. My name is Mr. Panj.

P: Hi. Hello. My name is Mr. Panj.

White guy: Nice to meet you. I’m Mr. Pim.

White guy: Nice to meet you. I’m Mr. Pim.

P: Hi Mr. Pim. And now I am going to

Panju: Hi Mr. Pim. And now I am going to

explain you what are all the foods we are

explain you what are all the foods we are

having. Rice cake. And spicy vada.

having. Rice cake. And spicy vada.
<cut to Annamalai looking dubious>

And big sauce. In these what you like to

And big sauce. In these what you like to

have?

have?

White guy: oru masaala vada, oru chaiya,

White guy: <in Tamil to the tea worker:>

suudaana chaiya.

One masala vada, one tea, a hot tea.
<Comedy sound effect. Cut to Panju
looking annoyed/angry. Annamalai comes
over and sits next to him.>

Annamalai: uh, uh, Good morning.

Annamalai: uh, uh, Good morning.

P: uh, vaNakkam.

P: uh, vaNakkam. <P.’s deportment is
smaller. Rajini grabs him by the neck and
shakes him.>

Panju, as the (supposed) periya aaL of the group, attempts to monopolize
conversation with this high-status individual (indexed by his race and his dress [a full
suit]). When his midget tea worker asks the white tourist in non-honorificating, colloquial
Tamil what he wants, Panju insults the worker. He doesn’t have enough status to speak
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with him. Moreover, the customer sitting next to the white tourist doesn’t have enough
status to sit next to him. This status differential is diagrammed by the code-switching
from English (with the white man) to informal Tamil (with the worker and the customer).
Panju begins to show off his English, only to be shocked that Mr. Pim speaks in fluid,
colloquial Tamil. Moreover, Mr. Pim bypasses address to Panju and directly addresses
the tea worker. That this is the punchline is indexed by the sound effect (a detuned
harmonica) alongside a shot of Panju’s annoyed/angry/shamed face. Here the comic
effect is dual: first our expectations are broken, a white person speaking Tamil! (This
mismatch provides no end of comic effect or wonderment to Tamils, as I found in my
fieldwork.) Second, as someone who knows English and Tamil well, his Tamil shames
Panju for his excessive use of English: it was unnecessary, exposing his vain attempts to
status-raise. That his attempts to status-raise were never taken seriously by anyone is
already indicated by the grumblings of the disgruntled customer and Annamalai’s
dubious looks. This is confirmed when Annamalai comes to sit next to Panju. Making fun
of him, he says “Good morning” in English, reversing the earlier status differential with
Rajini paying deference to Panju in Tamil, thereby lampooning his use of English. Panju
ratifies being put in his place by his response in Tamil “vaNakkam,” preceded by a
tentative “uh” spoken with a shrunken body comportment indicating low status.
Annamalai grabs him around the neck in a playful show of teasing dominance.

4.3.3 Parodying geththu
Much of the comedy of Vadiveelu—one of the most popular comedians today—
hinges on acting the buffoon through unwarranted status-raising (plus physical comedy).
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In the film Pookkiri (2006) Vadiveelu has the ridiculous costume of a martial arts fight
master, complete with hair knot on the top of his head. In his introductory scene
Vadiveelu is conducting a martial arts class for the neighborhood children. From the getgo we know that Vadiveelu will project some style or geththu which he can’t back up, as
he does so in almost all his films. This is ratified by one of the kids who comments
regarding Vadiveelu preparing to break a set of flaming wood blocks with his hands,
‘He’s been giving us a build up for the past three years’ (“muuNu varushamaa build up
kodukkiRaaru”) ‘but he still hasn’t done anything.’ Indeed, instead of breaking the
blocks, he changes his mind and calls the heroine Shruthi to come, so that he may flirt
with her and impress her with his status-raising masculinity. Shruthi’s doesn’t want to go,
but also doesn’t want him to come to her. This tells us that, indeed, he is somewhat of a
pest, not the cool guy he thinks he is. ‘I’ll teach you martial arts,’ he proclaims to the
class. He calls for his assistant to bring him logs of wood, and gives one to Shruthi and
one each to two young students. Cut to the mother of the family complaining about how
annoying he is. (Note speaking-for-another as status-lowering the comedian.) He says to
Shruthi and the students: ‘immediately after I say “ready” attack me in any direction you
want. Watch how I block the blows’ (“naan ready NNu sonna udanee entha direction
veeNaalum attack paNNungka. athu eppadi thadukkiReen NNu watch paNNungka”). He
says “ready?” (i.e., are you ready for me to say “ready”?) and they all hit him in the head
at the same time. He blocks nothing. Comic music kicks in as the camera cuts to a head
shot of him in pain alongside bird and cuckoo sound effects. He says, ‘This is what
happens when you do something without a plan. You have to plan. OK <sounds like
“Hookay”> (“entha oru vishayaththeyum plan paNNaame paNNinaa ippadi thaan. plan
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paNNi paNNaNum. OK”). As if it was not bad enough, upon his exit a bucket falls on his
head. Here his attempts to show his geththu fail. His status-raising is ridiculed, and this
no less by low-status women and children.

4.3.4 Building up the hero through mismatched status
What is interesting is how the comedian’s failed attempts to act the periya aaL
diagram a form of anti-status, or anti-style. And the more ridiculous and absurd the
mismatch between actual and projected status the more the comic effect is. While this
kind of comedy provides its own pleasure, more often than not it functions to build up the
hero (or the villain).
Take a comedy sequence out of Padaiyappa (1999) for example. In this sequence the
fat, dark-skinned comedian is going along with his friends to meet his future wife. For
this important day, he is supposed to be the center of attention, and thus he makes
everyone walk behind him (including the hero Padaiyappa). The other guys say that it’s
embarrassing to have to walk behind him, thus status-leveling him as he attempts to
project his status-differential. Padaiyappa defends him (thus status-leveling himself in
ratifying the comedian’s status-raising): ‘today he is going to see his fiancée (for the
marriage fixing). It’s his day to be the “hero,” so leave him be.’ Dressed in all-white
traditional clothing, the comic says, ‘If Padaiyappa is the man of power, then Azhegesan
[the comic] is the man of beauty’ (“Padaiyappa man of the power NNaa, Azhegesan man
of the beauty”). 32 Using the same third-person trope of status, as well as English (the only

32

The name Padaiyappa has as its root padai ‘army,’ and Azhagesan azhagu ‘beauty.’
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Tamil lexical item, besides the proper names is the conditional marker NNaa), the comic
again status-raises.
Immediately after this status-raising, the comic trips and falls into the mud, statusleveling him. His clothes sullied, everyone starts laughing at him. Though Padaiyappa
doesn’t want to, he is guilted into switching dress with the comic. Now the friend is
dressed in very style-ish clothes and Padaiyappa in traditionally status-ful clothing. The
punchline of the comedy is how villagers repeatedly come up to them and treat
Padaiyappa as if he is the groom (remember, now he is wearing the traditional garb). In
each instance, Padaiyappa retorts, ‘No, he is the groom, but he is wearing my clothes.’
Each villager in turn says, ‘oh, that’s why he looks good.’ The comedy revolves around:
(a) the fact that the comedian’s attempts to status-raise are thwarted; and (b) the fact that
everyone—even old, uneducated country women—find the style-ish dress more
appropriate for Padaiyappa but anomalous for the comedian. In both interpretations
Padaiyappa is figured as a high-status individual (as the groom, as a person befitting
style). In the end it’s the hero’s style which is ratified as authentic and appropriate and the
comedian’s attempts to status-raise through style which are repeatedly questioned and
then explained away. Here the comedy functions to ratify the hero’s status and to provide
entertainment.

4.3.5 Parodying the hero
Another comic usage of style by the comedian is the self-conscious parody of the
hero. This is done through inter-discursive re-animation of the hero. This usage can be
found in an increasing number of youth-oriented films (e.g., Chennai-600028 [2007];
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Saroja [2008]; Padikkaathavan [2009]; Goa [2010], Thamizh Padam [2010]). Here the
comedy stems from: (a) the performance of hero-esque style by someone who isn’t a
hero; and more importantly (b) through the parody of particular heroes (by replicating
their distinctive styles) and thus by making light of hero-oriented cinema more generally.
In the non-hero oriented cinema of director Venkat Prabhu we can find such spoofing
in its most sophisticated (and popular) form. 33 In his films, his younger brother, the
comedian Premji’s comedy is based almost entirely on the re-animation of the hero
through parody. Such parody works in two ways. First, through the reappropriation of
dialogues from Rajini and Vijay films; for example, the popular “enna kodumai
Saravannan sir?!” (‘What cruelty is this, Saravannan sir?!’) from Rajini’s
Chandiramukhi (2005), used in Chennai-600028 (2007), Saroja (2008), and Goa (2010);
the repetition of the address term “sir” between the characters in Saroja (2008) as a
lampoon of such such usage in Sivaji (2007) (and in the film industry more generally;
Venkat Prabhu 2008); the dialogue “evvaLavoo paNRoom, ithe paNNamaaddoomaa?”
(‘we’ve done this much, we won’t do that as well?’) from Vijay’s Azhakiya Thamizh
Magan (2007) used in Saroja (2008) and Goa (2010); or “oru vaaththi mudivu eduththaa
naanee en peechchu keedkamaaddeen” (‘If I make a decision once, even I won’t listen to
what I say’) from Pookkiri (2006) in Goa (2010). Second, through the reappropriation of
mannerisms and tropes of heroism/style; for example, Rajini’s hand gesture in
Padaiyappa (1999) with the hand held to the face, palm facing inwards, bottom fingers
slightly curled inwards, the index finger pointing up is used by Premji in Chennai-600028
33

While all of Venkat Prabhu’s films “take the piss” (as he puts it) out of the Tamil hero-stars (Venkat
Prabhu 2008), his latest film Goa’s (2010) first half is totally based on the premise of making fun of Tamil
films from the 1980s and 1990s.
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(2007), Saroja (2008), and Goa (2010); or the extended fight scene in the second half of
Goa (2010) parodying Rajini’s fight scenes in general (and in particular, of Baadshaa
[1995] and Sivaji [2007]). Interestingly, Premji’s form of comedy parallels how young
men—as well as Premji and his brother, director Venkat Prabhu, interact with each other
and in their peer group—also re-animate film dialogues in order to create comic effects in
the peer group, a kind of playful acting as if one were the hero. Indeed, the phrase “enna
kodumai Saravannan sir?!” was a common phrase used by youth in their own peer
groups during my time in the field.
This parodying also happens within hero-oriented cinema itself. Rajini’s Sivaji (2007)
moves deftly between projecting actual style and comic style. In the prelude to a comic
fight scene from Sivaji (2007), after a minor rowdy finishes a status-raising dialogue
Sivaji’s index finger flips up along with a swoosh sound effect. But before he can begin
his punch dialogue, his comic sidekick (played by Vivek) stops him, saying that ‘these
days all sorts of unimportant guys are giving punch dialogues and twirling their fingers.
It’s not worth it.’ (Here he is simultaneously making fun of the rowdy, other hero-stars
who are vying for Rajini’s position as “style king,” and also presumably Rajini himself.)
Sivaji concedes: ‘So you give the dialogue then.’ Vivek says:
Eey! Chittor thaaNdinnaa Katpadi.

Eey! After you cross Chittor comes Katpadi.

Sivaji siiNdinaa dead body.

If you mess with Sivaji (you’re a) dead
body.
<finger points up to punctuate each line>

Chinna pasangka paakkiRathu PoGo.

Little kids watch PoGo [a children’s TV
station].
<slides over to the other side of the rowdy
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and points at him>
Sivajikidde veendam, go go.

(If) Sivaji doesn’t want it, go go.
<slides back toward Sivaji>

Six-ukku appuram, seven.

After six comes seven.

Sivajikku appuram, evan?

After Sivaji, who (comes)? <with ‘who’ his
finger is pointing up toward the heavens>

ithu eppadi irukku?

How is it? <looking at the camera>

Here Vivek re-animates Rajini in two ways. First he speaks for Rajini in a hyberbolic,
exaggeratedly comic style, performing a Rajini-esque dialogue (note the rhyme scheme).
Second, he uses one of Rajini’s first one-liners from Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) “ithu
eppadi irukku?” ‘how is it?,’ gently poking fun at Rajini’s own image. In a later faux
punch dialogue, Vivek both parodies the punch dialogue genre and his deficient status to
give one by providing his own echo effect at the end of the dialogue by repeating the last
syllable. 34

4.4 Blurry moral lines, hybrid characterization
If one looks at the changes in Tamil cinema post-liberalization—with the entrance of
cheap electronics to duplicate and view VCDs and DVDs (and thus piracy) and with the
arrival of satellite television and the internet (Pendakur 1991; Pendakur and Kapur 1997;
Shields 1998; Agrawal 1998; Page and Crawley 2001)—one sees that the audience for
Tamil film has largely shifted from the family as unit of film watching to the youth peer

34

The whole film Sivaji (2007) can be, in fact, seen as one hypertrophy of style to the point of comic
absurdity. Later in the film, when trying to break the audio-password that Rajini has set up for his laptop,
the police bring in a series of mimicry experts. Tellingly, the comedy here revolves around each mimicry
artist attempting to break into Sivaji’s computer by delivering lines from past Rajini films: “oru thadave
sonna, nuuRu thadave maathiri” from Baadhsaa (1995), “Lakalakalakalakalaka” from Chandiramukhi
(2005), “cool” from Sivaji (2007). As in all of these cases, style in the wrong hands evinces comedy. Also
not the inter-discursivity and auto-referentially as part of the pleasure of the scene (chapter 5).
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group (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995; Kathir 2005; Ratnam 2005; Nakassis and
Dean 2007). Concerns of morality, sentiment, and kin relations as they have been
traditionally treated in Tamil cinema have increasingly been bracketed in contemporary
films and relegated to specific genres (in partirular, the ‘family film’ kudumba padam).
Since liberalization, in hero-oriented cinema, the heroes are more like villains, there are
fewer scenes of family-oriented sentiment (but more scenes of related to youth love and
‘love failure’), and kin relations are often unremarked upon or themselves deficient. 35
Yet what has filled the vacuum? I would argue that status, violence (fights), comedy,
and love have filled the vacuum. Action films are less and less about establishing a
particular moral order (Thomas 1995) and are more centered on the relative statusrelationships between the characters: of the hero to the villain, of the hero to the
comedian, of the villain to the comedian. It’s in this light that we can begin to understand
the displacement of the hero as a morally-centered character, and the blurring of the lines
between the hero, the villain, and the comedian (as noted by Rajanayakam [2002: 370]
without explanation). 36
This isn’t to say that current hero-centered films don’t retain a fixed moral compass,
or that older films didn’t at times blur the hero, the villain, and the comedian. Rather, it’s
that such blurring is more possible (and thus more common) given the changing structure

35

This is the case unless the film is explicitly about the youth’s engagement with family as in, for example,
Kaathal (2005) and 7G Rainbow Colony (2004). Such films are, notably, not hero-centric films (see
Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009).
36
The flipside to this is the emergence of more specific genres post-liberalization carved out of elements of
the older commercial-action film: sentiment hypertrophied in the ‘family film’ (kudumba padam), comedy
track hypertrophied in the parody/comedy film, and plot-coherence and romance hypertrophied in realist
youth-oriented (love) films (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). Note that the last three types of
films mentioned are explicitly oriented to youth (and young men in particular).
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of the audience and the economics of film from the producer’s point of view (Ratnam
2005; Nakassis and Dean 2007).
This trend, in fact, begins with Rajinikanth’s “angry young man” where the dogooder image of MGR was denaturalized by the grittier antihero, a hero who can be
ruthless and who feels no guilt (Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 4). If in the earlier films of MGR,
the villain stands in for pure evil to the hero’s pure goodness (Rajanayakam 2002: ch. 4–
5), since Rajinikanth’s inauguration of the rowdy antihero the villain has increasingly
stood apart from the hero not by ‘morality,’ or at least not primarily by occupying a
separate moral space, but because he is simply an obstacle to be overcome through style
and geththu. This trend has continued with heroes such as Vijay in films like Pookkiri
(2006). 37 We may also cite films like Puthuppeeddai (2006), Paruthiveeran (2007),
Subramaniyapuram (2008), and Naan KadavuL (2009) which, while not hero-centered
films, figure the protagonists as attractive precisely because of their violent, anti-social
nature. We can also note films where the hero is the villain. In Manmathan (2004), Simbu
plays two twins, one who is cheated by love and the other who kills women who cheat
men (cf. Bharathiraja’s Sivappu RoojakkaL [1978]). The film’s ambiguous moral
compass ends with the villain-hero admitting, ‘I don’t know if what I do is right or
wrong, but I won’t stop doing it. Only God can judge me.’ Here the hero is so far exterior
37

Take for example, how in Pookkiri (2006) the hero’s ruthlessness and cruelty equals, and even exceeds,
that of the villain. While there is ultimately an attempt to put the hero back into the moral order through a
late-in-the-game flashback/twist, the construction of the hero as a pookkiri (‘rogue’) makes him no different
from the villains he fights. Indeed, he works with them to kill politicians and other rowdies! It’s only when
their egos clash (ostensibly it’s because the hero doesn’t believe in killing children and women), that the
villain becomes an obstacle. This prompts the hero to rise to the challenge. What is interesting is that one
gets the impression that this display of humanity from the hero functions simply to provide a ground for
opposition, rather than the articulation of a particular moral position. Vijay doesn’t show moral outrage. He
explains it coolly, as a matter of fact. Indeed, the whole film revolves around the fact that he has no
conscience, no mercy, that he is a pookkiri. In any case, it’s on this point that the hero–villain ego clash
begins, which then blossoms into all-out war where the status-differential negotiated through style is
resolved in style-ized fighting independent of the moral order.
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to ‘society’ that morality becomes a moot subject until the afterlife. Similarly, comedy
blurs with the villain in the Vijay film Ghilli (2004) where the villain enacts both an
image of excessively arrogant status and a comic image of the insane rowdy. And with
Rajini, as we have already noted, comedy blends with heroism and style.
In short, status in general, and style in particular, forms the core of hero-centered
action film. In contrast to older films where style was, at least narratively, subordinate to
the reestablishment of the moral universe through the abolishment of evil, in newer films
morality takes a less important role and, as a result, the villain–hero dynamic revolves
increasingly around their relative ranking: who is the periya aaL? In such status
negotiation the lines between hero and villain blur and become unimportant. Increasingly,
the hero becomes defined as he who is left standing, the villain as he who is vanquished.
Note here that discourses which link increased violence in film as the degredation of
morality in general miss that what has changed in Tamil film and society is not morality
per se, but the economics of film and its related foregrounding and elaborating of already
existing filmic motifs and features (i.e., the narrativization of status).

5. Conclusions
In this chapter I have: (1) argued that commercial hero-oriented film can be usefully
seen through the lens of youth status, both in terms of characterization and narration; (2)
further, that representations of masculinity and status in the film abide by the same logic
of status of the youth peer group, albeit hypertrophied; and finally (3) that such
representations of status are distributed variously among characters, creating a set of
figures of (non-)status-ful personhood: the ratified status-ful hero, the excessively status224

ful villain or rowdy, and the deficiently status-ful comedian. Film presents, in this sense,
mediatized versions of youth concepts of status and masculinity, themselves an inflection
of common cultural discourses on status.
Implicit in my discussion is that Tamil film can’t be understood outside of ‘youth’
and youth notions of status. As I show in the next chapter this is because youth engage
film based on the same logic of status negotation in the peer group that in this chapter I
argued makes Tamil film intelligible in the first place.
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Chapter 5 – Using Filmic Style to Status-Raise:
The Parallel Cases of Youth and Hero-Stars

1. Introduction
In chapter 4 I looked at how hero-oriented Tamil commercial film can be read via the
lens of concepts of youth status and status negotiation, as outlined in chapters 2 and 3. In
this chapter I extend this analysis, arguing that the felicity of this interpretation is a result
of (a) how youth audiences engage with Tamil film and their hero-stars and (b) how herostars contruct their own images. I argue that audiences evaluate heroes/actors based upon
the same logic of youth status in the peer group and thus heroes’ image construction
abides by the same principles.
First I look at how film serves as a source register for young men’s status work. I then
ask why this should be the case. In doing so I argue against the idea that young men
imitate their favorite film stars. Instead I argue that young men’s engagement with filmic
images is tied up in their non-filmic concerns with status negotiation in the peer group
and not about liking or identifying with a hero per se. I show how such status dynamics
also apply to aspiring and established stars. I look at how the image construction of herostars abides by the logic of the youth peer group, analyzing the various ways that herostars status-raise and -level. I then conclude with a more general discussion of the
concept of reception and its problematic assumptions about communicative practice.

2. Film as source register for style
2.1 Introduction
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Mass media like film, television, the internet, radio, and print are all source registers
for youth’s status work. 1 I focus on film, however, because film is the most salient
medium for youth, both in terms of their engagement with it (they consume more film
than other media) and their re-animation of it (their status work draws more heavily on
film than other media).

2.2 The two protagonists of youth film: Hero and non-hero
For the purposes of this chapter it is useful to schematize the protagonists of Tamil
youth cinema into two kinds: what I call the hero and non-hero protagonist (or simply,
1

In Tamil-language television youth slang terms are circulated and standardized through youth-oriented
serials like KaNaa KaNum KaalangkaL—for example, the group address term makkaa, gaaNdu aaku ‘to
get angry’—as well as through popular dance shows. In the English-language, but Tamil-oriented television
station SS MUSIC and to an extent Tamil channels like SUN MUSIC, English slang terms are circulated to
(middle-class) youth through their VJs (cf. Smith-Hefner 2007). Youth characterized such speech as style
because of its English fluency—which they found attractive—and over style because of its (perceived)
performance of Tamil disfluency. English slang like “What’s up?,” “No probs,” “dude,” “brother,” and
“okies” were taken up by youth through such stations. “Tanglish” constructions such as kalaaychi-fy
(‘making fun of’), adich-ify (‘beating’)—[VrbAVP + -ify], a verb when used in English, a noun when used in
Tamil—are circulated through VJ speech (cf. Lukose 2009: 88 on “chethu-fying”). In addition, new
fashions were circulated through TV, especially through VJs’ style-ish dress. More important, however, is
how television, especially English-language television is able to make youth familiar with, and thus
popularize to an extent, certain musical genres whose distinctive dress youth sometimes borrow from in
performing style. Hip-hop style, for example, both in terms of fashion (low-rise baggy pants, 50 Cent and
Eminem tee-shirts), language (“what’s up,” “bro”), and dance steps are made available to many students
through channels like SS MUSIC, VH1, and MTV. Tamil-English rap and its related style also have been
popularized through such stations (and the recent cross-over efforts in Tamil film) via artists such as
Malaysian rapper Yogi B. and the group Natchatirangkal. Such channels, however, are more important for
upper-class, urban audiences’ engagement with fashion, though not exclusively. Another interesting source
of style, particularly in the form of body management is American wrestling programs which are very
popular among youth. The styles of wrestlers, the dialogues, the fights, the grand entrances, the
melodrama—all reminiscent of the hero-oriented action film—are thoroughly enjoyed by youth and form
another image of embodied style. The internet and its extension into cell phones are increasingly a source
register for youth’s performances of style, in terms of the display of knowledge (e.g., knowing about the
most recent films, pop artists, world news, general knowledge, slang terms); as a place to learn about and
reenact certain styles; and as an activity unto itself that is style (e.g., using social networking sites like
Orkut, going “browsing,” having a computer with an internet connection as style). Indeed, the internet is a
ripe space for youth enactments of style insofar as it emblematizes ‘youth’ virtually: it is an exterior space,
a foreign space, a space outside of ‘society’ and the norms of the everyday (via its anonymity), a space
where image can be manipulated and changed according to one’s own desires. American pop and hip-hop
styles and music are made available to many youth through their internet browsing and downloads, and file
sharing through cell phones. Youth’s cell phones abound with pictures of what they consider style: brand
logos, the weed symbol, photos of Che Guevara, pictures of actors, pop stars, and popular Western and
Tamil songs.
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non-hero). 2 This isn’t only an analytical distinction but one that youth viewers also make
in distinguishing films that are for ‘pure entertainment’ and time-pass and those which
attempt to do something different, and by implication ‘serious,’ in their cinema (see
Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). The non-hero is a protagonist who is supposed
to be a character out of ‘real life,’ either as the ‘typical young man’ (e.g., in films like
Oru Thalai Raagam [1980], Kaathal Theesam [1996], Kaathalar Thinam [1999],
ThuLLavathoo Ilamai [2002], Boys [2003], Kaathal Kondeen [2003], 4 Students [2004],
7G Rainbow Colony [2004], Autograph [2004], Kaathal [2004], Chennai-600028 [2007],
Kalloori [2007], Vennila Kabadi Kuzhu [2009]) or as some ‘real’ type of person from a
different walk of life (Seethu [1999], Pithamagan [2003], Puthuppeedddai [2006],
KaRRathu Thamizh [2007], Ooram Poo [2007], Paruthiveeran [2007],
Subramaniyapuram [2008], Naan KadavuL [2009]). He is made in the image of actual
individuals. He is of this world or of some possible world.
The hero, on the other hand, can be seen as a kind of ideal type. In many ways he
isn’t of this world, or perhaps of any possible real world. He is larger than life. Akin to
the epic hero, he projects and embodies particular qualities present in the world, but in an
exaggerated and hyperbolic way, bleached of the gritty specificity of the non-hero. The
hero is the protagonist of the commercial films discussed in chapter 4. Such films are
often typified by both audiences and academic critics as unrealistic, fantastical, and

2

This division of hero/non-hero is roughly related to the star division of labor in Tamil cinema, from actors
who play the hero—Thyagaraja Bhagavathar, M. G. Ramachandiran, Rajinikanth, Vijay—to those who
play characters—P. U. Chinnappa, Sivaji Ganesan, Kamal Hassan, Ajith. My distinction is slightly
different however. For even for those actors who play characters, they do so because this is part of their
perduring image, their style if you will. Such actors are seen as different and talented because they do not
always play the same type of character (the “hero”) in the same type of movie (the “commercial film”).
They are character-stars, but not hero-stars. The distinction of hero/non-hero, then, is broader and includes
actors who may never become stars through the characters they play.
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escapist (Dickey 1993b; Prasad 1998; Thomas 1985; Nandy 1987–1988; Kakar 1990: ch.
3; Derne 2000; Osella and Osella 2004; Srinivas 2010; see Dickey 2009b for a review),
though we will have occasion to problematize this later in the chapter. The hero is a super
man: he can fight a hundred men and win; time and space are no limitation for him, and
thus are of no import to the plot (hence, presumably, the suspension of criteria of
coherence and rationality in such films). The hero doesn’t just speak dialogues qua
conversations, but also delivers punch dialogues qua oratory. As many have pointed out,
while the non-hero lives to serve the film and its story, in commercial action cinema the
film and its story live to serve the hero (Pandian 1992; Rajanayakam 2002); more
precisely, the hero-star. Much of the literature on Tamil film has focused on such films as
vehicles for the creation of fan worship, and thus of political mobilization, as in the cases
of MGR and Vijaykanth in Tamil Nadu (Hardgrave 1971, 1973, 1979; Hardgrave and
Neidhart 1975; Sivathambi 1981; Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993b; Rajanayakam 2002; cf.
Rogers 2009).
What is interesting is that such hero-stars in Tamil cinema are never what are referred
to in Tamil Nadu as “new faces.” They are always established names in the industry who
have been around for a long time. When such current hero-stars entered the field,
however, they entered like all other actors: playing the non-hero character. And vice
versa, the non-hero protagonist is often played by the new face. If successful in such
films, such young actors get the chance to accrue status over time in the eyes of
audiences and film industry insiders through being cast in hero-driven commercial films.
With a string of such successes in such hero-oriented films, they may become hero-stars.
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2.3 The (non-)hero and style
There are two points to note. First, the non-hero isn’t a status-ful actor. The hero-star
is. Second, the non-hero is rarely a source register for youth status work and style. While
non-hero films may be source registers for slang or comedy dialogues, they aren’t
generally for style qua fashion or behavioral repertoires. Hero-oriented films, however,
are. Indeed, as we will see, the whole spectatorship of hero-star driven commercial film is
organized around the replication of fractions of the hero-star through repeat viewing,
other media (TV, radio, print), fashion trends, re-animated film dialogue, and fan activity
more generally (e.g., putting putting up sign boards, social service in the name of the
hero-star). In contrast, so-called realist, “experimental” commercial film’s spectatorship
grounds itself in a different ontology: that of the ‘real’ world, of the coherent and
plausible story (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009). Such films attempt to reflect
‘reality’ and in this fetish there is little in the way of performable status to be mined by
viewers. One identifies or empathizes with the non-hero protagonist as an equal (or even
someone of lower status) from a (fractionally) common social world. By contrast, the
hero-centered film exists to be re-animated, in the theater (through whistling, dancing,
and singing to the songs; by speaking the dialogues; and conversing with the hero onscreen) and outside of it. As such, the hero presents, by degrees, a usable figure of statusful personhood. To watch the hero on-screen is to watch status, to watch style; to ratify
that status and style is to make such style doable in everyday life. Through such
spectatorship, the style of the hero-star becomes usable for viewers.
This is revealed by how youth use the terms hero and heroism in their peer groups.
Such terms are used by youth to describe both the hero and his heroic actions on the
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screen and to describe the youth who does style; in particular, who status-raises in an
idiom resonant with that of the hero-star. 3 To successfully perform such style in the
college peer group is to be the college hero. The over style of heroism (and style in
general) is captured in phrases like scene pooduRathu (‘to put on a scene’ [from a film]),
film kaadduRathu (‘to show a film’), padam pooduRathu (‘to put on a film’), over acting
(‘excessive acting’), and build up paNRathu (‘to build up excessively’ [cf. the building
up of the hero’s character on-screen]). These phrases are used to describe (s)he who
shows off too much, who acts absurdly like a film hero(ine). As we saw in chapter 3,
teasing often invokes actors’ names, ‘who does he think he is, Vijay?’ or ‘look at her
acting like some kind of Jyothika/Simran!’

2.4. Using film for style
Youth’s re-animation of film ranged from the direct and literal to the more vague and
impressionistic (i.e., as noted above, acting ‘like’ the hero). An exhaustive list of
borrowings and inter-discursive moments between film and peer group activity would be
near impossible both because of the sheer numbers of borrowings and
recontextualizations, and because with each new movie new borrowings emerge. The
cycling of fashion among youth is incredibly fast and the styles, teases, and jokes
discussed herein will likely be out of circulation before long (cf. Eble 1996 on American
college slang). Below I give an idea of how film is used by youth through discussion of
some examples.

3

While heroism is inclusive of style, the reverse isn’t necessarily the case. Heroism includes things not
narrowly understood as style (but can be reanalyzed as ‘doing style’): for example, fighting or being a good
Samaritan. (See chapter 4, section 3.3 for discussion.)
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2.4.1 Speech
Youth speech, both male and female, borrows heavily from film. Film circulates
particular lexical items: for example, “jilfonse” ‘illicit romance’ from the film Ithayam
(1991); “pedde rowdy” ‘local rowdy’ from the film Kaathalan (1996); “omlete poodu”
‘to vomit’ from the film Boys (2003); “meedi” ‘playboy’ from Manmathan (2004); “freeudu” ‘let it go’ from the film AaRu (2005); the English word “cool” in Sivaji: The Boss
(2007).
Film also circulates phrases and larger swatches of dialogue. For example, the phrase
“Thirunelveeli halwa daa!” comes from the chorus of a popular song from the film Saami
(2003) and is used to index speaker’s knowledge of some task (contrary to interlocutor's
expectations). 4 The Vadiveel dialogue, “appadi shock aayiddeen” (‘I got shocked like
that’) is used humorously to feign surprise or shock. Similarly “oh poodu!” (‘put an
“oh!”’) is a phrase from the eponymous song in Vikram’s hit film ThuuL (2003). By
commanding one’s friends to shout “oh!,” this phrase is used draw attention to a youth
who is engaged in something he doesn’t want attention for, thereby teasing him.
Even whole speech registers are circulated through film: for example, Chennai slum
speech is familiar to, and used by, Madurai youth from films as early on as Maharaasan
(1993), a Kamal Hassan film where he plays a slum youth; while I was in the field, rural
Madurai speech styles were made more familiar to and deployed by Chennai youth
through films like Paruthiveeran (2007) and Subramaniyappuram (2008).

4

The logic is that just as the dessert halwa is a metonym for Tirunelveli, the speaker is an exemplar of the
activity at hand. For example, person B is on the computer opening a program. Person A says, ‘You have to
do it like this.’ B responds with Thirunelveeli halwa daa! ‘I know that quite well man!’
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Such linguistic forms, especially film dialogues, are often used by youth as inside
jokes or like proverbs. Rajinikanth’s punch dialogues (see chapter 4) are often
recontextualized by students to punctuate some point they might be making, often with a
touch of humor. For example, dialogues like “oru thadave sonnaa nuuRu thadave
maathiri” (‘if I say it once it’s like I said it a hundred times’) from Baadshaa (1995) are
used to jokingly drive home the speaker’s point. Or just as commonly, phrases like
“summa athirthuvu, le?” (‘it makes you tremble, doesn’t it?’ from Sivaji [2007]) are used
to jokingly justify one’s excursions into style by invoking Rajini’s image as a style-ish
actor.
In addition to heroes, the comedian is a common source register for youth speech; for
example, Vivek’s neologism, “S.I.” short for “summa irukkeen” (‘just hanging out,’ or
euphemistically, ‘I’m unemployed’); the address term goyyaale, the exclamation gokka
makkaa from Vadiveel; 5 or puNam thiNi from the film Paruthiveeran’s (2007) comedian
Kanja Karuppu. Comedy dialogues form a core set of inside jokes common among youth
all over Tamil Nadu. Vivek’s comedy, “pick up, drop, escape!” is used by youth to
humorously describe their entries and exits from romantic interactions. Shouting out
“thoppi!” (lit., ‘hat’) from Rajinikanth’s Chandiramukhi (2005)—a reference to the
character Senthilnathan (played by Prabhu) which youth found so funny—at someone
who had failed at something, or had gotten caught doing something wrong, is enough to
tease that person. Similarly, “enna kodumai, (Saravanan) sir!” from the same film (and
5

Some of Vadiveel’s comic phrases that were often used by youth include: “vanthuddayyaa
vanthuddayyaaaaaa” (‘they’ve come man, [I cannot believe that] they’ve come maaaaaaan’); “entha oru
vishayaththe plan paNNaame paNNinaa ippadi thaan. plan paNNi paNNaNum. Hookay" (from Pookkiri
[2006]), "enne vechchu comedy kimidy ethuvum paNNaleye?” ‘You’re aren’t doing any comedy
schmomedy at my expense, are you?’; this is used when one feels that people are ironically praising them;
biffa bipa biplack, an allusion to the earlier onomatopoeic slang jing jing jack to refer to the three grades of
women: beautiful, average, ugly.
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replicated in Rajinikanth’s’s next film Sivaji [2007], and by the comedian Premji in
Venkat Prabhu’s films Chennai-600028 [2007], Saroja [2008], and Goa [2010]) is used
by youth to humorously exclaim about something they found unjust or absurd. Such
dialogues are often used to punctuate teasing sessions. In teasing peers for using too
much English, youth might invoke the classic Rajinikanth comedy dialogue from
Veelaikkaaran (1987): “I can talk English, I can walk English, I can laugh English . . . .”
(see chapter 4, section 3.5.7, cf. chapter 4, section 4.3.2)
Youth also use names of characters from films, often the comic characters, to tease
their peers; for example Taaklas from Paruthiveeran (2007), a name used to refer to
someone who has a childish face but cheats others (as per the character in the film); or
SorNakkaa from ThuuL (2003) for a bold woman (based on the female rowdy character
in the film). Such names most often referred to characters of anti-status (a childish
looking cheat) or status-mismatches (a female rowdy) precisely because they humorously
diagram failed status-raising attempts.
Such reenactments have multiple uses. First, they provide a pleasure in simply
repeating the form. Second, as inside jokes such reenactments provide solidarity among
peers. Third, such forms take on their own lives in their reenactments, becoming objects
of pleasure unto themselves through acquiring new meanings and indexical values.
Fourth, such dialogues can be used rhetorically to bring home a point, to (ironically)
point to oneself as status-ful through status provided by the actor, or to status-lower
another through teasing.

2.4.2 Behavioral repertoires, the body, and style
234

Youth also derived behavioral repertoires for style from films. For example, pushing
the hair back, smoking cigarettes, throwing the cigarette into the mouth, spinning around
one’s sunglasses before putting them on, punctuating speech with a twirling of the index
finger and then pointing it into the air, are all forms of style introduced by Rajinikanth
and which youth explicitly point to as the source register. Similarly, greeting a peer by
bumping the knuckles of the fist was introduced in the S. J. Surya film New (2004).
Enacting the hero or style are the common typifications of such behaviors. Such
behavior, unsurprisingly, is exaggerated when visibility itself is salient: for example, in
performance settings (e.g., culturals competitions), in highly public places (classrooms,
buses, parks), and when cameras are present. Indeed, when a camera comes out,
especially when students are on their college tour (see chapter 2, section 3.3.5), male
students inevitably end up posing like various hero-stars: expanding their bodies to look
bigger by making muscles, putting on cool sunglasses, and crossing their arms in hip-hop
inspired, but film circulated poses. Such reenactment was jolly, a fun expression of youth
subjectivity as well as part of youth’s own aesthetics of style.
We can also briefly note changing norms of beauty regarding men’s body type. The
spectacularization of the male physique has increased as of late, from the fetish of the big
bicep to, most recently, the six-pack. Shortly after Dhanush’s six-pack in Pollaathavan
(2007), Vishal’s in Satyam (2008), Suriya’s in Vaarinam Aaiyram (2008) (see chapter 6,
photo 6.5), and most recently Aravind Akash’s in Goa (2010), many students (like other
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film stars [Buzz18.com 2008] 6 ) became keen on having a six-pack. To have such a body
was style or geththu.

2.4.3 Film as source register for college rituals
Like performances of self in the peer group, when students have to do any kind of
stage performance they utilize film as a source register. Students sing film songs, perform
film songs in their live bands, dance to film songs, do mimicry of actors, and perform
skits which utilize the characters and dialogues of films. Film is also often the common
touchstone from which ragging happens at various college functions. Students might
have to act like a film character, sing or dance to a film song, or propose to an imagined
film actress. During one function, for example, the emcee ragged the students performing
by playing film comedy dialogues that he had saved on his cell phone into the
microphone. For example, to punctuate the onstage teasing one student, he played
Vadiveelu’s “enne vechchu comedy kimidy ethuvum paNNaleye?” (‘You’re aren’t doing
any comedy schmomedy at my expense, are you?’). Here some swatch of the film is
reproduced in a larger text segment as a typifying meta-commentary on the performance.
The voice of the comedian is made to stand in for that of the emcee in a complex
ventriloquation, thereby recontextualizing both the film text-segment and the current
event (ragging the student, getting some laughs).
The bus route songs of the government college in Chennai that I discussed in chapters
2 and 3 also borrow heavily from film. The melodies of such songs are often film

6

Indeed, while in pre-production for Goa (2010) Aravind Akash was on a special regimen to prepare his
six-pack. It provided endless conversation among the assistant directors and other crew about who had a
six-pack, how cool it looked, and how to get one.
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melodies with the lyrics of the song playfully reappropriated and changed to exhort the
geththu of the bus route and the college.

2.4.4 Fashion
Fashion is the most visible and important arena where youth utilize film as a mine for
new styles. Paralleling our discussion in chapters 2 and 3, many examples of style in
fashion find their way to youth via film representations.
For example, from slum barbershops to high-end fashion salons, customers use film
star haircuts as their frame of reference, either through film name or photos. ‘Cut my hair
like Suriya in Veel (2007)’ or ‘perm and color my hair like Vikram in Anniyan (2005)’
could be heard in barbershops and salons in the late 2000s, as would have cuts from films
of yesteryear be heard in their heyday (e.g., the attack hair style from the film Thil
[2001]). ‘Shave your mustache like Ajith’ or ‘grow a beard like Suriya’ were common
advice given among students. “Virumandhi” (the name of a 2004 Kamal Hassan film)
was a common teasing epithet for me when I had a mustache. This usage is interesting
because such a mustache has many more salient resonances: associations with rural
masculinity, martial caste groups, protection deities, police offers, (low-level) politicians,
or just simply the periya aaL. Students bypassed those and went directly for the film as
reference point, even though my mustache looked very different from Kamal’s actual
Virumandi mustache (photo 5.1). 7 This was because making such connections was itself
a pleasurable activity, re-remembering the film to mildly tease me for my
age/status/culturally-inappropriate mustache.
7

Note that this comparison was based on the mustache alone, for I never received any comparisons to
looking like Kamal Hassan except when I sported such a mustache.
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Photo 5.1 The real Virumandhi (Kamal Hassan) and the tropic Virumandhi (Constantine Nakassis)

Similarly, clothing fashions are often first introduced by a particular film hero, and
then taken up among youth until their cache are used up. The history of fashionable pant
styles reads as the history of popular actors—from the bell bottoms (1970s) and then later
the tapered pants of Rajinikanth and Kamal Hassan (1980s); the MC Hammer inspired
pants of Prabhu Deva (1990s); the “6 pocket” pants of Rajini to its new avatar “cargoes”
and jeans (2000s) as popularized by Vijay.
When I arrived in Madurai in 2007 Vijay’s film Sachin (2007) had introduced the teeshirt sewed onto the button-down shirt as a fashion. The handkerchief wrapped around
the hand across the palm and in front of the thumb, a popular style among youth, had
come from Vijay’s Pookkiri (2006) (photo 5.2). Vikram’s Bheema (2008) made popular
the short-sleeve button-down shirt with sleeves which could be folded up and buttoned. 8

8

Fashion styles are not only about the hero-star of Tamil cinema. Fashions just as easily came from
Hollywood cinema. For example, more than a few youth in 2007 still sported hair styles like the hero of the
1997 super hit Titanic, Jack.
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Photo 5.2 Vijay-style handkerchief wrap

Interestingly, while dressing like the hero is acceptable to most all students, shirts
with the hero’s face or most recent film on it (see, e.g., chapter 6, photo 6.16), are
considered local, or low class, as something associated with slum dwellers, villagers, and
the uneducated. Such shirts, as one college student explained, are “chillaRai thanam”
‘childish.’ One looks like a “chinna paiyan.” He meant this literally, because school
children tend to be the most enthusiastic film fans; and figuratively, as one of low status.
In his (lower-)middle-class social circle, wearing such shirts will make your friends laugh
at you and tease you. Here a class-linked discourse is deployed to rank status by
alignment to film, redeploying common discourses (from adult ‘society’) about the
childishness of cinema and the childishness of cinema fans as pathologically devoted to
the hero-stars. To look like a film star is style (qua tropic periya aaL) while to signal fan
devotion is childish insofar as it marks one explicitly as subordinate.
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Western brands, too, circulate through Tamil cinema (though this was not the only
way, see chapters 6–8). Below I discuss one particularly interesting example of a brand in
cinema qua style: the Nike “swoosh.” (I return to this example again in chapter 6, section
3.2 as well.)
The Nike swoosh can be seen all over Tamil Nadu. On tee-shirts, earrings, shoes,
shorts, wristbands, hats, jackets, cell phone wallpapers, and the sides and backs of cars,
motorcycles, buses, and auto-rickshaws (cf. Bick and Chiper 2007). What is interesting is
that when I asked youth why they liked and used this brand symbol I got a range of
answers. For the most informed, youngest and affluent, the swoosh is a symbol of a
brand, Nike, which they had some idea about. As such it was style, it was aesthetically
pleasing. However, many other youth provided a different answer: the swoosh means that
‘I am always right,’ ‘Whatever I do is correct,’ ‘I know what I am doing.’ I was
perplexed. What I learned was that this meaning comes directly from the Rajinikanth film
Pandiyan (1992) where the Rajinikanth style of the film is to punctuate his punch
dialogues (wherein he says that everything he does is “right”) by ripping open his shirt
and exposing a tee-shirt with a checkmark or tick on it. Hence in the film he is “Mr.
Right” (photo 5.3).
Mediated by the filmic style there is an iconism between Rajini’s tick and the brand
logo of Nike, an indexically hybrid sign which indexes fashion through a Western
branded form because of its presence in the film as style.
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Photo 5.3 One of Rajini’s style getups (with tick) in Pandiyan (1992)

More recently, in the 2004 hit film Manmathan, the hero-cum-villain’s ability to bed
loose women (who he later kills) is punctuated with a stamp on the screen. The stamp is a
circle where around the circumference is written “corrected machchi” (correct paNRathu
is the slang term ‘to pick up,’ or ‘initiate a love relationship with someone of the opposite
sex’; machchi is a slang variant of the ingroup fictive afinal kin term machchaan) with a
Nike swoosh and the Playboy bunny in the middle of it. Photo 5.4 is taken from one such
episode where we can see the hero’s face kissing a girl who he then goes on to kill. There
is a triple allusion: (1) to Rajinikanth in Pandiyan and thus as a tick or checkmark (‘to be
right, to being correct’); (2) to the Nike brand and thus as the swoosh; and (3) to Playboy
(‘playboy’ is roughly a gloss of Manmathan, the Hindu god of love) and thus to the
sexual prowess of the hero to correct girls. These allusions point to the status-ful hero,
first by co-opting the status of Rajinikanth; second, through co-opting the status of the
Western brand; and third, through co-opting female virtue.
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Photo 5.4 “Corrected machchi” stamp from the film Manmathan (2004)

In 2007 I came across this symbol re-animated by a group of students from an
engineering college near Madurai. They had printed a status-raising tee-shirt which
utilized the Manmathan stamp with their own caption: “Beware of the B3 - Back Bench
Boys.” 9 In this example we see how older film (Pandiyan) serves as source register for
the status work of newer films (and younger stars) 10 which in turn serves as a source
register for youth’s own status work. 11

9

“Back Bench” is a reference to students who sit in the back of the classroom and make mischief (chapter
2, section 4.2.4). The shirt is status-raising both in its denotational and allusional content, but also because
such shirts were all matching and meant to be worn at the same time by the students, thus creating a visual
effect, foregrounding them from the background of other students (see chapter 3, section 2.2.6).
10
Venkat Prabhu’s 2010 film Goa has re-animated this scenario from Manmathan in a parody scene
starring the Manmathan hero Simbu using the same stamp. Here the reference is simply to Manmathan and
the references to Pandiyan and Nike are subsumed to the playful re-animation of Simbu’s role in this youth
comedy film.
11
Film is also a source register for brand marketing. For example, a 2007 television advertisement for a
candy company appellates youth customers by showing a child reenacting a famous Rajnikanth style where
he throws a candy in the air, bounces it off his body, catches it in his mouth, and says “namma style” (‘[it’s]
our style’). The ad then cuts to Rajinikanth in a soccer and volleyball game doing even more excessive and
impressive style with the candy (cf. the styles in Sivaji [2007]). Here film becomes the source register to
market a particular product in other media through representations of style aimed at youth.
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2.5 Women and film as a source register for status work
The use of film as a source register is more common among young men than women,
though young women do borrow from cinema heroines. Moreover, even if they don’t
practice such aesthetics in their everyday lives, their aesthetic tastes (i.e., what they like
and think is beautiful) are articulated through film. When they can, though, they often do
(e.g., on tour, when on the college campus). Many hair styles, accessories (e.g., Trisha’s
hair clips), color schemes, prints (e.g., Jyothika’s saree in Chandiramukhi [2005]), and
ways of wearing clothing (e.g., Sonia Agrawal’s wearing of the dupatta in 7G Rainbow
Colony [2004]), were re-animated from film.
Women, however, borrow less comprehensively and with less frequently than men.
This is due to the problematics of style for young women in general (see chapter 3,
section 4). It is also due, however, to the fact that youth film favors the hero, constructing
him as emulatable, while the heroine of the film is often relegated to a very minor role; as
we saw in chapter 4, to the ratifier and appreciator of the hero’s style, or as eye candy,
and not an emblem of style itself (except perhaps as a negative image of style, as in
Neelambari, the villain of Padaiyappa [1999]).
I asked many young women what they thought of the fact that the female characters
in Tamil films are minimal and their dress is totally impractical to everyday life. They
noted that while indeed this was the case, it didn’t impede their viewing experience
because they themselves watch like boys. They also watch for the hero, who is the focus
of their experience of the film. They are used to it, they explained. Reflecting this fact,
women’s slang speech as far as film as source register was concerned, used many of the
same kinds of constructions and borrowings as men’s (except, to my knowledge at least,
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the use of sexual double entendres). And note that most of the speech that makes its way
into youth usage comes from male characters, the heroines’ speech being much less
replicated. (They have, after all, much less dialogue.) Again we see how ‘youth culture’
in Tamil Nadu is highly gender skewed, in this case with respect to mass-mediated
representations and their re-animation.

3. Received wisdom: Engaging representations of style
3.1 Imitating favorite film heroes?
In chapters 2 and 3 I showed how youth talk about, engage with, and negotiate style
and status in their peer groups. In chapter 4 I analyzed the image of style in film and
demonstrated how this image of style is iconic with that of ‘youth,’ both in the forms
used and in the dynamics of representation/negotiation. In this chapter I have discussed
how film provides a source register for youth performances of style, providing usable
signs for youth in their own status and identity work.
Why are filmic representations of style and youth modes of status and identity work
through style iconic? What is the relationship between these two representational orders;
between these two modes of youth activity (film viewing and film re-animation)? A
common answer in lay and academic discourses (e.g., Rajanayakam 2002; Verma and
Saraswathi 2003: 115; Osella and Osella 2004) is that youth imitate their favorite film
stars, and thus youth style and film style are iconic to some significant degree. This is
often attributed to youth’s obsession with film. Hence “fan worship” or “devotion”
become dominant paradigms in understanding the relationship between film and its
viewers (e.g., Rajanayakam 2002; Dickey 1993b, 2001; Srinivas 1996; Osella and Osella
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2004; Rogers 2009, forthcoming). Through these paradigms engagement with film is
reduced to (unreflected upon) mimesis (implicitly, then, a kind of influence or
brainwashing), a result of film satisfying viewers’ fantasies and desires (see Dickey
2009b for a discussion). 12 While cases of youth imitating their favorite film stars can be
demonstrated, thusly formulating youth’s relationship to film in general misses out on
what I argue is a major part of what is going on in youth’s engagement with film. As I
show, both the notion of imitation as well as the notion that imitation is conditioned by
liking a film star are problematic.
First, it isn’t clear how representative the film fan club member is of youth in general.
Indeed, most of the youth who use film as a source register aren’t fans per se. Many are
simply casual viewers. Second, what they use from film may not be from their favorite
film actor, or even a film actor whom they like. For example, many Vijay styles were
replicated (knowing they were Vijay styles) by youth who actively disliked Vijay. This
isn’t to say that some of the time some fans do not imitate because they like the star, but
that this isn’t sufficient to explain the relationship of youth to film in general. Third,
viewers don’t imitate everything that their favorite film stars do. Indeed, they are highly
selective and they react strongly when their favorite film stars do things on-screen that
they don’t like. They will boo, boycott films, or tear up the screen or the theater seats
with razorblades. Moreover, a fan of a star like Kamal Hassan may not imitate him
precisely because Kamal Hassan’s image itself eschews style. Fourth, the imitation view

12

For example, “The individual’s emotional and blind identification with the hero and the total loss of selfidentity make him/her effectively dysfunctional and lost in the world of simulations” (Rajanayakam 2002:
224). “The phenomenon of hero worship is most prevalent among the youth, who are by and large
unemployed or underemployed with a vast majority of them coming from poorer socio-economic
backgrounds” (ibid.).
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assumes that popularity of film is somehow linked to the amount of imitation by viewers.
Yet even a cursory analysis shows that film popularity is no guarantee of acceptance of,
for example, style in fashion. A flop like Vijay’s Sachin (2005) may generate a trend like
the tee-shirt stitched on top of a button-down shirt, while a very popular film like Ghilli
(2004) may not generate much in the way of fashion. Fifth, this view implicitly imputes a
top-down view of film-mediated communication: fashions come from film and go to
youth viewers.
In short, the notions “imitation” and “favorite film star” aren’t relevant for most of
the youth population. And even for fans such notions are insufficient to explain their
engagement with film.

3.2 Why youth use film for style
We are presented with two questions. Why are youth interested in style in film? What
is the relationship between style on-screen and off-screen? At a first pass we need to
bracket the question “what about style and the hero-centered film gives pleasure to youth
viewers?” if only because of the assumed link between pleasure as self-evident reason for
why film is a source register for youth’s status work (cf. Thomas 1985; see Dickey
2009b: 10).
I argue that the link between film and youth activity is about how film can be made to
speak to youth’s own status and identity work in their peer groups. Rather than film
influencing youth, rather than youth imitating film, youth use film, youth re-animate film
(cf. Pandian’s 2008 discussion of realist “nativity” films in rural Tamil Nadu). From this
point of view, the use of film in peer groups doesn’t necessarily have anything at all to do
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with film qua film at all. One very important reason why youth are interested in film is
that it offers neat solutions for how to solve the problem of status-raising via style in
contexts where status-raising is likely to breed jealousy and prompt teasing and other
modes of status-leveling. This is so for at least two reasons.
First, to do style requires its ratification by peers. Because youth’s status negotiation
is fluid and ephemeral, finding a solid ground from which to project oneself as status-ful
through style without falling prey to teasing or accusations of being boastful or arrogant
is fraught with problems. Ratification, then, either requires the user of style to be already
seen as status-ful (i.e., he is able to pull it off) or that the particular style-ish form in
question is usable by all. In the latter case, it is easier to do a style which has already been
done by someone else of higher status. Thus, using (prefigured) style from film is always
easier, always safer, and yet still status-raises. This is precisely because it tenuously
maintains the distance between the act as re-animation and the act qua act—that is, the
act as performance versus as performative (Fleming n.d.)—and thus always maintains the
possibility of citing the status of the source of the borrowing (the film star) as
justification; or in the case of ambiguous irony, the possibility of deniability, i.e., as
mention instead of use. The fact that style in the film conforms to style among youth is an
indicator that film is a treasure trove of possible status-raising devices. Things which do
style in film are easily recontextualizable within the peer group.
And this is by design. Films present imminently reusable models of personhood to
youth in such an idiom because they are intentionally designed by filmmakers to be
replicable, recontextualizable, and recirculatable in media other than film. As the actor
Sriman (the sidekick to Vijay in Pookkiri [2006]) (Sriman 2008) explains, ‘a youth film
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needs dialogues and fashions that youth themselves can use. For example, in Pookkiri
(2006) Vijay’s dialogue “oru vaaththi mudivu eduththaa naanee en peechchu
keedkamaaddeen” (‘If I make a decision once, even I won’t listen to what I say’) is one
such usable part of the film hero. From the perspective of fashion, film stylist Vasuki
Baskar explains that the hero-star’s outfits, from the clothes to the accessories to the hair
styles, must always be a bit “different,” but still fit within the paradigm of style and the
overall image of the hero-star (Baskar 2008). It should be a bit out of the ordinary and
“dramatic,” but not bizarre. The ultimate reason is that the hero’s fashion should be style
that fans can use in their own self-presentation. Dance choreographer, film hero, and
director Laurence Raghavendra makes the same point regarding dance steps
(Raghavendra 2009). Dance steps are choreographed with the idea of fan replicability in
mind.
In short, the style of the hero (dialogues, fashion, dance, etc.) should always be
changing, have its own unique permutation in each film so that: (a) such differences in
style (which youth viewers look forward to seeing on the screen) act as a draw to get
youth in the theaters; and (b) such styles recirculate fractions of the film and its hero-star.
Such recirculation creates a kind of advertisement for the film. Such style fractions make
the film visible, hype it, and thus contribute to the popularity of the film and thereby
profits. They also contribute to status-raising the hero-star himself—insofar as being reanimated by others for status-raising itself constitutes status-raising for the person being
re-animated—and thus making him capable of further status-raising in future films.
Second, film as a social institution, heroes’ characterization in film, ‘youth’ as an age
set, and style as a type of status and repertoire of semiotic forms are all iconic with each
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other. They all diagram exteriority from ‘society’ and ‘culture.’ They are all transgressive
of norms of authority (chapter 2, section 2.2). They are all characterizable as visible,
different (ab-normal, extra-ordinary), modern, and linked to the foreign. And because
they share a fractionally similar diagrammaticity, diacritics from one realm are easily
transportable to another. Just like youth, then, actors and the characters they play are seen
as exterior to ‘society.’ They are defined by their visibility. Their status is non-traditional,
transgressive, and modern. 13 As such, film is made for youth; film is about youth; style is
done by youth and ‘youth’ (status) is style; film style is re-animated by youth as status-ful
among one’s peers (but not in the adult world where cinephilia is childish) and youth
style is the grist for filmic representations of style. For all these reasons, then, youth style
lives on and off the screen.

3.3 Principles of using film for style
If youth are selective in how they engage with filmic images, what are the principles
upon which they select? I have already in part answered this question. Youth use images
from film which can be status-raising in the peer group. But which images are potentially
status-raising? I argue that the forms which are used by youth to status-raise in the peer
group are precisely those that, on the one hand, are status-raising in the film diagesis,
and, on the other, are performed by actors who themselves are seen as status-ful offscreen. Thus, for example, comedians rarely provide a source register from which youth

13

This is perhaps one reason why Tamil audiences, while particularly Tamil-oriented in their politics and
protective of their “culture,” have no problem accepting non-Tamil cinema actors. MGR, Jayalalitha, and
Rajinikanth aren’t Tamil as typically reckoned by Tamils. Moreover, rhetorical attempts to sideline such
politically-minded actors from Tamil politics based on their non-Tamil-ness have had little traction with the
Tamil population. This is because the whole ontology of status for such individuals is always already
different, alternative, and exterior.
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borrow style insofar as comedians emblematize anti-status through failed style. Youth
will, however, re-animate comedians in their status-leveling, as we saw. Or, they will
self-status-level by re-animating the comedian(’s dialogues) as a kind of self-deprecating
humor (itself potentially a tropic form of status-raising, though not style per se).
So from whom, then, does style get borrowed? Who are seen as status-ful enough to
license their own and others’ status work? Heroes and to some extent villains are the
most commonly re-animated figures in youth’s status work. Earlier I argued against the
proposition that the link between youth peer group activity and film was constituted on
the basis of simply “liking” a film star. So what is the principle? Do youth borrow
randomly from any hero? No. Rather, hero-stars who are seen as status-ful by a critical
mass of one’s peer group, who are seen as being able to pull off some style by virtue of
their status serve as source registers for style re-animation by youth. Note that this is
different from the issue of “liking” a star. Even if a Vijay fan dislikes Ajith, he will
recognize that Ajith is status-ful (or at least that many people recognize Ajith as statusful) and thus to borrow from Ajith is to do style. In this sense, then, “liking” a film star is
related to youth engagement with film, but not at an individual level. Ultimately the reanimation of style is contingent on the perception of popularity, as manifested (or
reanalyzed from) bodies in the theater seats, peers’ appreciation of the hero-star’s
performed style, and widely circulating evaluations that some hero-star has the status
necessary to pull off style. In short, the issue isn’t individual mental states (“liking”) but
reflexive calculi of sociological facts (“popularity” qua status).
Note how the issue of popularity, then, is as much an issue of how re-animatible and
how re-animated certain forms linked to the hero-star are. And, of course, such forms are
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constantly being cycled, both because of the constant arrival of new films in theaters and
because forms which are too replicated, too re-animated begin to lose their cache as
status-ful. The dialectic, then, is between forms whose status can’t be backed up (one will
get teased otherwise), borrowed forms (which raise status through association with statusful individuals), and overused forms (which no longer raise status because of their
ubiquity).
If the perceived status of the hero-actor determines the probability that what he does
on-screen can be used by others, then what counts as status for film actors? How does a
film actor become status-ful enough to license his own style, not to mention license the
style of others?

3.4 Films stars negotiate status like youth negotiate status
Youth apply the same logic of status negotiation in the peer group to their
engagement with film stars. They watch a hero on-screen doing style as they might watch
and evaluate a peer doing style. Further, youth judge the hero of hero-oriented cinema
against his status both as a hero-character (intra-textually) and, more importantly, as an
actor (extra-textually). They judge representations of him status-raising on-screen against
their perceptions of his achieved status (across films and off-screen) and not just based on
the story’s construction of the hero alone. This is because for such viewers, doing style
on-screen is a move of status-raising of the actor. Is he an established star or a new face?
This was explained thusly by my Madurai informants: ‘if Rajini or Vijay lights a cigarette
by shooting it with a gun, or if they come back to life (by pure force of will) people will
clap and appreciate it. They will take it as a serious act (of status-raising). However, if a
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new face does the same thing, they won’t accept it. They will boo at the screen. They will
laugh at it as ridiculous, absurd, and unrealistic. Who are such young actors to try and
project such a status through such extreme style? They are just “chinna pasangka” (as
compared to the periya aaLungka that established hero-stars are).’ This is also related to
popularity. For example, as another youth explained, if the very popular Rajinikanth
catches a bullet with his teeth and spits it back at the villain to kill him viewers will clap
in appreciation. If Vijaykanth—a film hero who is unpopular with urban youth and who
is seen as a kind of a joke, an emblem of the absurdity of an older kind of cinema—does
something similar—for example, stares a bullet down so that the bullet turns around in
fear—they will laugh. 14
Note that this is why young actors and filmmakers, as they pointed out to me, opt for
‘realistic’ roles and films (Chantanu 2009; Kumarappa 2008). They can’t pull off such
heroism and style in their films. Viewers will reject it, and their films will be flops
(Selvaraghavan 2005, interview in Nakassis and Dean 2007: 89–90). As the actor Sriman
(2008) put it regarding the extreme heroism of Tamil hero-stars like Rajinikanth and
Vijay: “Only Superman can fly.”
The ability to perform style is also related to the overall image that the actor has.
Take, for example, Kamal Hassan (or Sivaji Ganeshan from his generation). He is a
highly regarded an actor (versus Rajinikanth or MGR who are not regarded as
particularly good actors, but as consumate heroes). Seen as the genius of Tamil cinema,
in each film Kamal plays a different type of character from all walks of life. Each

14

Obviously, this is highly perspectival. Vijaykanth fans would give different answers of course (see
Rogers 2009).
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character looks and sounds different. 15 His films attempt to work outside of heroism
often through notions of realism and coherency of narrative that the hero-centered cinema
often brackets. And as youth explained, if Kamal tries to do Rajini-esque style, even
though Kamal is a highly regarded and established actor whom many viewers like, they
won’t accept it. It will seem odd, absurd, and stilted.
What is interesting, then, is that for both hero-stars and youth when one’s status isn’t
established as a perduring social fact, acts of status-raising are fraught with the possibility
of going wrong, of being excessive, and thus being rejected by the peer group/audience.
In such contexts, style is seen as a kind of performance and is evaluated functionally.
Individual A did action B or used form B because it is style: individual A is trying to
status-raise through B; (s)he is trying to show that (s)he can do that. For individuals
whose status is sedimented—either by virtue of the history of his films (e.g., for a
Rajinikanth, Vijay) or by some ideology of style (e.g., my roommate Stephen from
Kodaikkanal, see chapter 3, section 3.2)—style is performative. A did B because that is
his style, because A is style. Here style is seen as an externalization of an inner quality, a
perduring aspect of that person (his status).
In short, there is a double articulation of status that is held in tension through the
screen: style on the screen can only be licensed through the ratification of status off (or
across) the screen. Further, off-screen status isn’t reckoned independently of film. Rather,
it is reckoned by the image of the hero projected in and across his films. This seems to be
a paradox. How can one get status off-screen if status is only able to be built up on15

His recent Dasaavathaaram (2009) was his attempt, in fact, to establish his status as the premiere actor
of Tamil cinema, past and present. In this film he plays ten roles (das ‘ten’ + aavathaaram ‘avatars’), thus
breaking Sivaji Ganeshan’s previous record of nine roles in Navarathiri (1964) (lit., ‘nine nights’)
(Rangaranjan 2007).
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screen? And how can one do status on-screen if it can only be done if backed up by offscreen status? How can a hero bootstrap his way into style and heroism?
It is important to note that: (a) no actor starts off doing heroism. Rajinikanth started as
a villainous character actor in (relatively) realist films (Abuurva RaagangkaL [1976],
Pathinaaru Vayathile [1977]). Vijay started off as a “soft hero” in romantic films (Love
Today [1997], Kaathalukku Mariyaathai [1997]), as did Ajith (Kaathal Kooddai [1996],
Kaathal Mannan [1998]). Dhanush’s early films are all within a realist idiom
(ThuLLavathoo Ilamai [2002], Kaathal KoNdeen [2003], Dreams [2004], Puthuppeeddai
[2006]). For all these actors, it is only after a number of their depictions as non-hero
protagonists clicked with audiences that they could even be taken seriously as hero-stars
who can do style. Thus (b): building up such an image is never a single-film affair.
Rather, building up a status-ful image as hero-star who can perform style in his films and
have it ratified by audiences is something that happens over many films. And as the case
of Kamal Hassan shows, it isn’t just being acceptable as a star that counts. One’s films
must consistently construct an image as status-ful which is greater than any one of the
roles one plays. That is, one’s oeuvre of films must construct a status-ful hero-star, a kind
of “parallel text” (Mishra et. al 1989) or trans-textual image: a fusion of the actor with all
the roles that he plays. Note that this notion of status-building over a set of films is
precisely the same issue that confronts youth in the peer group: one has to consistently
status-raise so as to create a perduring image or reputation as status-ful. It isn’t one single
act of status-raising that can entail such an image. It is a cumulative effect that depends
on image management and negotiation with those who, ultimately, must ratify such
status-ful acts.
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As I show below, just as the youth peer group works through the centripetal and
centrifugal forces of status-raising and -leveling, the sedimentation of the hero-star’s
status also works through the same dynamic. Those who are successful at building up an
image of status, like Rajinikanth, Vijay, and Ajith, are precisely those actors who are able
to status-raise—project style—while also status-leveling. They are enmeshed within the
same economy of status negotiation that their viewers are. It is the multi-voiced-ness of
actors’ status-acts—they articulate to inter-discursive histories of status-raising within an
economy of status negotiation; they simultaneously engage in both status-raising and leveling (implicitly or otherwise)—that make them so useful to youth, whose own status
negotiation also crucially depends on such multi-voicedness, as we saw in chapter 3.

3.5. How film stars accrue status within, across, and outside the film text
In this section I discuss the ways that film actors attempt to bootstrap their status
through their image management. I differentiate three different textualities which,
through the process of becoming a status-ful hero-star, get articulated in different ways,
and in their apotheosis blurred completely: (1) the intra-textual image of the film hero (on
a roll of film); (2) the trans-textual image of the hero-star (on many rolls of films and in
non-filmic meta-discourses about that image); and (3) the extra-textual image of the actor
qua ‘real’ life human being (not on film). 16
16

The trans-text is what Rogers (forthcoming, p. 22 of the manuscript) calls the “idiolect” of the hero’s
stardom. Compare my tripartite distinction with Rajanayakam’s (2002: 253) distinction of the explicitly
“public realm,” the publicly known side of the “private” realm, and the self-reflexive “screen realm”: “The
public realm includes any reference that is directly political, such as icons . . . , critical comments,
ideological statements and culturally rooted motifs and archetypes. The frequently recurring ‘politicisable’
references to the private life invariably consist of the past experience. . . . The self-reflexive references
within the screen realm but laden with the potential to be politicised include repeated usage of honorifics . .
. , certain motifs . . . , and mere titles of films by the same star” (ibid.). This set of distinctions is designed
to deal with the particular problem of how particular texts can come to influence politics, be seen as
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In chapter 4 we saw how Rajinikanth’s films project his intra-textual image as both
above and part of the peer group (i.e., the community of film viewers). However, how
does an actor like Rajinikanth connect this intra-textual image as legitimately status-ful
individual to his extra-textual image as a status-ful actor who can play such roles? As
noted above, it is through the construction of a trans-textual image of the hero-star. How
is this done? Below I answer this question by focusing on the films of Rajinikanth and
Vijay.

3.5.1 Inter-discursivity
The intra-textual image of the film hero in any particular film is made to be similar to
all other images of him, either in other films or outside of film. 17 That is, the
sedimentation of status of the hero-star is only possible through a kind of interdiscursivity where each film builds off of the last. 18 This inter-discursivity is both
implicit in the iconism between the roles of the characters—Vijay’s and Rajini’s heroes
are more or less of the same type (see Rajanayakam 2002 for an indepth description of
this iconism across all roles)—and explicit in alluding to previous characters, the

political statements themselves, and translate the hero-star into a political figure. As such, it conflates
various indexical targets which may be relevant in differing ways to the images of the hero. Do filmic signs
index the actor, the image of the trans-textual hero-star, or another organization [e.g., a political party]? Or
“culturally rooted motifs and archetypes”? Thus, even from the beginning (since Rajanayakam is interested
in already fully status-ful hero-stars like MGR and Rajinikanth) Rajanayakam collapses the various kinds
of images of the hero-star and the materiality in which they adhere (a single film, many films, the
construction of the hero-star’s “parallel text”) into the singular image of the politicized hero-star.
Rajanayakam also doesn’t differentiate between the internal textuality of a particular film and the
cumulative image over many films, instead carving out the category of the “public realm” which is a
heterogeneous set of semiotic forms which index the extra-textual political realm.
17
Note that this tendency also applies to villains to some extent. For example, Raghuvaran was a popular
villain who played across from Rajinikanth in many films. Similarly, Prakash Raj’s villain in Ghilli (2004)
is rehashed in Pookkiri (2006) (e.g., through the explicit inter-discursive use of “chellam” ‘dear’ in both
films). Hence we can also talk about the villain-star.
18
This is what Rajanayakam (2002) calls “snow-balling.”
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cumulative trans-textual image of the hero-star, and the extra-textual image of the actor
himself.
For example, the signature styles of older films are repeated in later films, thus
creating a trans-text of style. Rajini does the same style-ish salute accompanied by the
same sound effect, the same twirling around his sunglasses, the same pushing back his
shirt to put his hands on his hips, the same throwing of a cigar(ette) or gum into his
mouth, and the same style-ish gait in all his films. This goes along with the repetition of
songs (e.g., the theme song of Annamalai [1992] redeployed in Baadshaa [1995]) and
particular shots across films (e.g., explicitly referencing Baadshaa [1995] in Sivaji [2007]
through a similar shot of Rajini walking toward the camera with flames behind him).
In general, in Rajini’s films his characters are similarly praised for having so much
“style,” thus explicitly foregrounding his trans-textual image as the king of style. Take,
for example, the songs “Style Style” in Baadshaa (1995) and “Style” in Sivaji (2007).
Similarly, the constant praising of his “style” by other characters serves to connect “Super
Star” Rajinikanth to the lexical item style. As we saw in chapter 4, the heroines in
Annamalai (1992), Baadshaa (1995), and Padaiyappa (1999) all voice their attraction to
Rajinikanth through their attraction to his “style.” Similarly, the father in Padaiyappa
(1999), played by Sivaji Ganeshan, makes Rajini perform his signature style-ish salute for
him, referred to explicitly as “style,” and then praises him for it.
Rajini’s older dialogues are also re-animated in his later films. This is most
transparent in Sivaji (2007), a retrospective inter-discursive smorgasbord of style. This is
done both by Rajini—for example, when he says “ithu eppadi irukku?,” the dialogue
from Pathinaaru Vayathilee (1977) after flipping a firecracker into his mouth; or when he
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(parodically) reenacts his role from Chandiramukhi (2005) as the king clapping the
thalam (“lakalakalakalaka”) for Jyothika (in Sivaji played by a male police inspector)—
or by other characters, as when Vivek references Rajini’s “thani vazhi” and “ithu eppadi
irukku?” dialogues when giving punch dialogues on Rajini’s behalf, or when the police
use mimicry artists to try and crack the password of Rajini’s computer (each artist does a
different dialogue from a Rajini film).
In general, hero-centered films reflexively position the hero as a hero in the film text.
For example, in Vijay’s Pookkiri (2006), a female villain addresses him as “Hey hero.”
Often this takes the form of referencing the hero with the name of another character
played by the actor from an older film. For example, in the song “Athirathee” in Sivaji
(2007) Rajini is referenced as Thalapathi (‘general,’ the name of his 1991 film), Billa
(the name and character of his 1980 film), and Baadshaa (‘king,’ the name of his 1995
film). 19
More explicitly, Rajini is constantly referred to in his films by his epithet “Super
Star.” In chapter 4 we noted this with respect to the display of the epithet of the hero-star
at the beginning of every Rajini film (photo 4.1). This acts to suture together all his roles
as “Super Star” (or, in Vijay’s case, as “Ilaiya Thalapathi Vijay” ‘Vijay, general of the
youth’). In Sijvai (2007), the song “Style” begins “Hero Hero, You are the Hero. Staro
Staro, nee Super Staro” ‘You are the hero! You are the Super Star!’ Later in the film the
bad guys have assembled to bemoan Sivaji’s rise. A minister says, ‘All he wanted was to
open a college, but [through your challenging of him] you made him into “Super Star.”’

19

Similarly, as Rajanayakam (2002: 253) points out, the song “Kaalai Kaalai” from the film Manithan
(1987) variously refers to Rajini’s previous films Murattu Kaalai (1980), Pookkiri Raajaa (1982), Paayum
Puli (1983), and Nallavanukku Nallavan (1984).
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Alternatively, Rajini is often indirectly referred to by his name; for example, in Baadshaa
(1995) Rajini’s character is referred to as the one who has a kaantham (‘magnet’) in his
name, referring to the ‘-kanth’ in Rajinikanth and to Rajini’s magnetic attractiveness to
audiences (see Rajanayakam 2002: 295).
Besides simply referring, older roles are actually reenacted in many films. For
example, in Pookkiri (2006), the hero from Vijay’s previous blockbuster Ghilli (2004)
makes an appearance (in the same exact outfit) singing the song “Appadi Poodu” from
Ghilli. Most amazing is Annamalai (1992) where during a song sequence we are shown a
montage of scenes from different Rajinikanth films. This is diegetically framed by the
hero and heroine looking into a moving image-finder with eye holes on either side (one
for Rajini, the other for the heroine played by Khusbhoo). They look into it and what do
they see but various shots of Rajini doing style in as many as twelve getups from other
films! The film characters are bizarrely watching themselves in other roles. The song
goes even further in its lyrics when it references Rajinikanth explicitly as “Rajini” and the
heroine as “Khushboo.” Here the division between extra-, trans-, and intra-textual is
blurred. Of course it causes no dissonance because, as I have been arguing, the immanent
film text is always already part of the larger trans-textual construction of the hero-star. At
any moment, Rajini or Vijay is a particular film hero, all of his film heroes, and himself.
Every character is a token of the type.

3.5.2 Borrowing status
The hero-star is also constructed based on the same relationship that youth have to
film stars. That is, the status of the hero-star is constructed by re-animating status-ful
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forms from other high-status individuals, notably other film stars. Thus, for example, in
the film Baadshaa (1995), the name of the hero’s autostand is “MGR Auto-stand.” 20 We
can also note the co-opting of MGR by Vijaykanth in his epithet “Karuppu MGR,” ‘The
Black MGR.’
Sivaji (2007) revolves precisely around Rajini’s co-optation of the two great actors of
the previous generation: Sivaji Ganeshan and M. G. Ramachandiran (Sivaji and MGR for
short, respectively). 21 The first incarnation of the hero is as Sivaji Arumugam, but in the
film called “Sivaji” for short. Later he comes as M. G. Ravichandiran, but called in the
film “MGR” for short. Here the naming co-opts Sivaji Ganeshan’s and M. G.
Ramichandiran’s status-ful images but marks Rajinikanth (as the animator of these
characters) as different: he is Sivaji Arumugam, M. G. Ravichandiran. In addition to
positioning Rajinikanth within the dual lineages of Sivaji Ganeshan and MGR, the film is
rife with other references, where Rajini re-animates the 1948 S. S. Vasan super-hit
Chandralekha; his contemporary Kamal Hassan; younger generation actors like Prakash
Raj in Ghilli (2004) and Vadiveel in Imsai Aran 23am Pulikeesi (2006); Hollywood films
and video games: Roger Moore and James Bond, Eddie Murphy, Robert Rodriguez’s
Desperado, The Matrix, Moral Kombat (and the Sega video game system), Superman,
Spiderman, and even Fidel Castro.
On the first night of marriage with his wife Rajini asks her how they should celebrate
(i.e., have sexual intercourse). Should they celebrate “soft-aa, vegetarian-aa” (‘softly,
20

See Rajanayakam (2002: 259ff.) for descriptions of how Rajini used MGR’s image increasingly after his
death; and how other actors use MGR’s image (ibid.: 307–308).
21
Similarly, Rajini’s earlier film Raajaa Chinna Rooja (1989) explicitly connects Rajini with past greats of
the Tamil film world. He states “I can sing like Bagavathar. I can wield sword like MGR. I can act like
Sivaji. I can speak Thamizh like Kalaignar” (quoted in Rajanayakam 2002: 290). We can compare this with
Simbu’s recent co-optation of Ajith and Vijay at the end of his recent film Silampaaddam (2008).
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vegetarian-like,’ i.e., gently)—cut to a parody of the song sequence of the first night in
Sivaji Ganeshan’s 1972 film Vasantha Maligai—or dreamy and “suRu suRu NNu”
(‘vigorously’)—cut to a psychedelic song sequence of the first night from the 1971 MGR
film Rickshawkaaran—or “romantically” (i.e., sexily, lustily)—cut to a song sequence
from Kamal Hassan’s 1982 super-hit Sakalakkalavallavan. She then praises his style and
says, ‘how would it be like that [according to your style]’? Cut to the actual song
sequence from the film where a style-ized representation of the first night qua phallic
fight scene is presented to the audience. Here Rajini borrows status from other greats, coopts them, and then transcends them. 22
And just as actors of Rajinikanth’s and Vijaykanth’s generation calque their status off
of already established artists of yesteryear like MGR, current aspirants use Rajinikanth’s
style-ish trans-text to try to ground their own status work. A survey of recent film titles
shows this. Dhanush’s Pollaathavan (2007) and Padikkaathavan (2009), Laurence’s
Raajaathi Raaja (2009), Ajith’s Billa (2007), and Sundar C.’s Thee (2009) all take their
names from past Rajinikanth hits. 23 In the film Pookkiri (2006) Vijay does a style,
twirling the gun around his finger over and over, pops the trigger, and loads it back up.
When a female character asks him in amazement how he is able to do that, he replies:
‘How many Rajini films I must have seen . . .’ (“naan eththane Rajini padam
paaththirukkeen . . .”). Here, lesser status actors are able to use Rajini’s status to

22

The extreme auto-referentiality of Rajini’s films (especially in Sivaji [2007]) represents the regress of
this logic of status borrowing. Indeed, there are few who have more status than Rajinikanth, and certainly
no one whose status is such that it can license style to the extent that it does for Rajini. As one’s status
increases, then, the citationality of status-grounding moves turns inwards to one’s own trans-text rather
than externally to others’.
23
Similarly with MGR films: Marmayogi (Kamal’s recently shelved project), Aayirathil Oruvan (director
Selvaraghavan’s 2010 film), and Raama Thediya Siithai (Cheran’s 2008 film).
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(ironically and seriously) justify their own style, in the process constituting and ratifying
Rajini’s trans-text as status-ful hero capable of doing style to the extreme. 24
Here, then, the hero-star is placed within a lineage of other status-ful individuals
where, through a semiotic chain, status from one’s status-superiors licenses one’s own
status work. And note that status works up the chain as well. Being so used itself indexes
the status of the person being used. Hence the recirculatability of fractions of the herostar (e.g., of Rajini’s style in youth peer groups, of Rajini’s style by other film stars) itself
constitutes status-raising of the hero-star (cf. voicing by another, as discussed in chapter
4), and grounds his further status-raising in other domains (e.g., his future films).
Note that of all the strategies discussed, borrowing as status-raising is one of the
safest, and hence one of the most common strategies for younger, aspiring heroes and
youth, precisely because it can equivocate between being an act of reporting (and thus
simply a performance) and an act of performativity (as an actual raising of status). It is
this ironical, but serious distancing which can be utilized to status-raise but maintain an
escape hatch of deniability while still constituting an act of status-raising. This is what
differentiates the comedian’s use of status-ful images from the hero’s. The comedian’s
use simply attempts to perform an image of status (it is reportative, ironic, parodic) while
the hero attempts to performatively diagram status (it constitutes status). Given humor as
the comedian’s functional end, it is the self-reflexive distance of the performance from its
performativity that differentiates the comedian from the villain. The villain’s style act is
infelicitous, while the comedian brackets the illocutionary force of style within a larger
reportative frame. The hero’s use of style attempts to minimize the gap between
24

Also see Rajanayakam (2002: 302) who notes the reference to Vijay as “chinna Rajini” ‘small Rajini,’ in
the song “Priyamudan,” as well as the actor Sarath Kumar’s use of Rajini’s image.
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performance and performativity so that the former constitutes the latter, while the
comedian attempts to maximize the gap so as to create a status-mismatch or -inversion,
and thus humor.

3.5.3 Summary of the hero-star’s trans-textual status work
The total effect of such trans-textual status work is that all instances of the actor as a
film hero are equated with each other, constantly referring to each other, collapsing one
hero-character into the next, creating a coherent and formulaic trans-textual image, a
crystallization of the textualized hero-star, a blurring and implosion of the intra- and
trans-textual that is grounded not only in the intra- and trans-textual construction of the
hero, but also in his alignment with other status-ful hero-stars (i.e., in a trans-hero transtext: the Tamil archetype “hero”). What is important here is that the similarity or
equation of roles is crosscut by the sedimentation of status. With each successful film the
hero’s style can increase, can become more magnificent, more capable of transgressing.
There is an accumulation of status which felicitously licenses more and more style. With
such a pattern established, viewers expect this kind of hyperbolic style from the hero-star,
and fans are disappointed when he doesn’t deliver on it. As with youth peer group
dynamics, status begets status.
Further, because style is tightly regulated by the formulaic image necessary to
generate the status essential to perform such style successfully in the first place, extremity
of style (its intensity, the degree of its transgression) becomes another dimension of
differentiating previous and future status-raising style. That is, the fetish of difference
produced by the regularity of sameness increases the quantity of style as difference within
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the same qualitative category. Indeed, in every film that a veritable hero-star like
Rajinikanth does, his style grows in intensity while maintaining the same basic formula.
It becomes more and more extreme, more and more developed, more and more powerful
to the point where the hero-star is able to bend the laws of reality and society to his own
wishes without it seeming silly or absurd to the audience. In fact, quite the opposite: it
becomes natural and necessary.
Such status work in films is only possible, as I have argued, because the relevant text
being constructed and engaged with isn’t a particular film but a set of films that are seen
as contributing to a larger trans-text. That is, the build up, to use a Tamil youth phrase, of
an authenticated trans-textual hero-star conserves the status work done in any particular
film, allowing it to be used as the ground zero of style for the next film. And because
every intra-textual representation (token) is an icon of the trans-text (an emergent type
level phenomenon), every next film doesn’t lose the momentum gained in the previous
film. Here the history of Rajini’s films are organized around the construction of the
Rajini trans-text: Super Star, the king of style and all their associated meanings. This kind
of bootstrapping project of building up an image of style isn’t engaged with by actors like
Kamal Hassan, whose characters are different in every film. His trans-textual image,
rather, is of the consummate actor, capable of putting on any disguise and making you
believe it isn’t him or any of his previous characters. Through non-iconism, or disidentification, of his roles he is seen as a great artist, but not a performer of style.

3.5.4 Trans-text to extra-text
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As I have been arguing, the hero-centered text constructs the hero as status-ful, and
thus licensable to do style. And such texts situate themselves within lineages of
texts/heroes to construct larger trans-textual images of status. The successes of particular
actors to create coherent images that presuppose and entail status license the performance
of style in later films. At the same time, such (trans-)textual images of status are
explicitly connected to the extra-textual image of the actor, his ‘real’ life person.
For instance, Rajini’s films often refer to his ‘real life.’25 In the fictional film
AnbuLLa Rajinikanth (1984) he plays himself. In the more recent Kuseelan (2008) he
plays a famous hero-star that is, in everything but name, Rajinikanth. In Sri Raghavendra
(1985) and Muthu (1995) he plays spiritually oriented characters, which are taken by
audiences to reflect how he is spiritual in real life. More interesting, and common in his
films, are the references to his lowly origins; in particular, to his having been a bus
conductor before coming to film. In Baadshaa (1995) he is pictured as a bus conductor in
the song sequence Azhaku, accompanied by a self-reflexive moment where he stares into
the camera and smiles a knowing smile to the audience. In Sivaji (2007), after having
suffered a setback at the hands of the villain, his comedian sidekick Vivek asks him,
‘What will you do? Will you become an auto-driver (his role in Baadshaa [1995]), a
milkman (his role in Annamalai [1992]), a bus conductor (his role before coming to
film)?’ Later in the film when he gets off a bus, Vivek says ‘You get down style-ishly
like a conductor’ (“conductor maathiri style-aa iRangkuRe!”) doubly referencing his
real-life past and his filmic image. Similarly, in Nallavanukku Nallavan (1984), Rajini’s

25

The issue of course isn’t whether or not Rajinikanth’s life is really like this, but that the allusion in such
films isn’t to his trans-textual or intra-textual images but to his extra-textual image, whether this be true or
not.
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employer asks him: “Have you heard of the one who was initially a bus conductor, but
later turned out, because of sheer hard work, to be ‘Super Star?’” (quoted in
Rajanayakam 2002: 288)
In short, the trans-textual image of the hero-star is explicitly connected to, or
anchored in, his extra-textual image. 26 But why? For what purpose? As I argue below,
this is because the ability of the trans-textual image of the status-ful hero-star only holds
traction to the extent that the extra-textual image functions as a status-leveling alibi of the
hero-star’s status-raising. In effect, the extra- and trans-/intra- textual images engage in a
status division of labor that attempts to guarantee the audience’s acceptance of the herostar’s status-raising and allows such status-raising to become hypertrophied in successive
films.

3.5.5 Extra-text as alibi: Status-leveling

26

In addition to being a feature of hero-centered films, this tacking between the inter-, trans-, and extratextual is itself part of spectatorship practices in Tamil Nadu. There is an assumption among many Tamil
viewers that the role an actor plays reflects who he is as a person. This peculiar kind of realist spectatorship
among Tamil viewers (perhaps more relevant at an earlier period of time) has been misunderstood by many
as the ignorance of an audience that is so charmed by film that it cannot tell the difference between the
screen and real life (see Rogers 2009; Dickey 2009b for discussion). This misapprehends the issue
however. Many Tamil viewers assume that an actor wouldn’t agree to play a role that didn’t reflect who he
was in real life. That is, the assumption is that one picks roles that project who one really is. For example,
with MGR the logic was that he only played ‘good’ characters because he was a ‘good’ man. Conversely,
on this logic women only act in films as heroines because they are actually morally corrupt in real life. For
Rajini’s early image, there is also a confluence of his extra-textual image—as a man of vices—and his
antihero image as deviant youth. From the get-go, then, the Tamil culture of film viewing is wont to
connect the images of film characters with film actors through the notion of similarly constructed roles (i.e.,
that the extra-, intra-, and trans-textual images will or should align). Secondly, there is a long history of
films diagramming extra-textual political situations. MGR’s films, and Rajini’s films to an extent, as
Pandian (1992) and Rajanayakam (2002) have clearly shown, are supposed to be read against non-filmic
scenarios, often quite literally. We can compare this kind of realist spectatorship with American
assumptions about the truthfulness of documentary or news images. We accept that the news may lie to us,
but we assume that what the news says should be evaluated by its truthfulness, or the commitment of its
authors/animators to such truth. While we know that news images are simply images that can and often are
false, nonetheless, the default assumption is that, by convention/genre, they are, or should be, true.
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So far we have noted that youth viewers judge the expression of style in hero-centric
films based on their evaluation of the hero-star as status-ful or not, following the logic of
the peer group. One who is status-ful can express style successfully, while one who isn’t
is ridiculed. We have linked the ability to ground status by film actors as part of the interdiscursive construction of trans-textual images which, if ratified by audiences, license
more and more status-ful expression in the form of style. What is interesting is that the
grounding of such status is ultimately based on the extra-textual image of the hero-star,
evaluated by the same logic of the peer group: the more he status-raises on-screen the
more he must status-level in ‘real life.’ Just as someone who status-raises too much
threatens to alienate the group, film stars who do not status-level themselves are viewed
as immodest and arrogant. Indeed, when I talked to youth about film stars, it is this fact
which they mention as much as the on-screen image of the hero-star. They like film stars
such as Vijay, Ajith, and Rajinikanth because they are good people, they do social
service, and they are humble and modest. (See Rogers forthcoming on Vijay’s extratextual construction as modest and ordinary).
The common stereotype about Rajinikanth is that while on-screen his style is extreme,
in real life he is (now) very simple and humble (also see Rajanayakam 2002: 249ff., 299).
As it was often explained to me, ‘in contrast to other film actors and politicians who act
in real life and on-screen, Rajini doesn’t act in real life. He is so simple. He doesn’t wear
makeup when you see him in real life, or in television appearances. He comes as he is:
balding, dark-skinned, unshaven, with white hair (photo 5.5). If there is a function he
doesn’t come late and make everyone wait (a demonstration of higher status); rather he’ll
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be the first one to come (a demonstration of equal status). He never acts like he is better
than anyone else. He acts on-screen, but not in real life.’

Photo 5.5 Rajinikanth: On-screen and off-screen

Indeed, this is part of Rajini’s self-presentation. For example, consider an interview on
the Indian news channel NDTV (NDTV 2007) about the release of the film Sivaji (2007):
“Interviewer: <to the camera> It’s not everyday that you get to meet and
interview the God of Indian cinema. With me is the one and only Rajinikanth
<turns to Rajini>. Sir, thank you very much for talking to us. We know that you
do not give interviews normally. There’s a lot of expectation and hype around
Sivaji. And people have been talking about the Rajinikanth style, the Rajinikanth
style. Let’s hear it from you. What is the Rajini style?
Rajini: <laughs embarrassedly; rubbing his neck; looking down> See, actually,
it’s only the media who have made it so big to be frank with you. Now they are
comparing Rajinikanth with Amitabh Bachchan. 27 To be frank with you, in the

27

Ambitabh Bachchan was the biggest actor in Hindi cinema from the 1970s to the late 1980s, and is still a
popular actor today. Many of Rajini’s hits were remakes of Amitabh Bachchan’s films.
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cinema world Rajinikanth is only a king, probably a king. But Amitabh Bachchan
is an emperor.
I: Don’t be very modest.
R: No, it’s a fact. So don’t compare emperor to a king, right? Ami-ji is my
inspiration, he is my role model. Okay? And this hype, see whatever, this is
Shanker’s [the director’s] picture, AVM’s [the producers’] (picture). Whole credit
goes to Shankar. He’s the master, master director. Hats off to him for everything.
We should congratulate, we should appreciate everything to Shankar. I am only
an actor, just like a puppet.
I: That is typical Rajini modesty. People say Rajinikanth doesn’t do stylish stuff,
what Rajini does becomes style.
R: Maybe, I don’t know about that <laughs embarrassedly>. I don’t know about
that, maybe. It’s a God’s grace [sic].”
Rajini’s comportment in this interview ranges from the submissive to the embarrassed:
his nervous laughter, his swaying back and forth, his compacting posture, his nervous
rubbing of his neck, his downward avoiding eye gaze, and his soft voice. At every move
he status-lowers himself and praises others: saying that “Ami-ji” (+hon.) is his superior
and role model; saying that the director Shankar is his master; attributing his success to
“God’s grace” or the media hype. He even makes the unbelievable assertion that he is
“only an actor, just like a puppet.” He lets the interviewer praise him, and explicitly statslevels himself to the point where the interviewer interrupts him by saying “That is typical
Rajini modesty,” a dismissal of his status-avoiding manner (yet ironically itself ratifying
Rajini’s self-status-lowering moves through interruption). Even when he self-attributes
status he hedges: “probably a king,” “Maybe, I don’t know about that.”
This necessity to perform modesty in proportion to one’s own on-screen style is de
rigeur for film stars. Hence the necessity of sponsoring social functions like giving to
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charity and celebrating one’s birthday by performing social service for the poor (e.g.,
Vijay’s 2007 celebration of his birthday with poor, sick children at the Egmore hospital
in Chennai [Indiaglitz 2007]; cf. Rogers forthcoming). It is also de rigeur for fan clubs of
film stars to engage primarily in acts of social service (Dickey 2001; Osella and Osella
2004: 242)—for example, giving away food, pens, notebooks, or clothing to the poor
during celebrations of the hero-star’s birthday or recent film releases. And this is
encouraged directly by film stars. The idea here, as Rajini fan club members in Madurai
explained to me, is to spread the good name, the humbleness, the “of the people”-ness
qua patronage (i.e., status-raising through lowering, cf. the treat) of the hero-star (Osella
and Osella 2004: 242; cf. M. Mines and Gourishankar 1990; M. Mines 1994 on the
periya aaL).
To not status-lower is to risk peril at the hands of audiences. Indeed, while youth
accept stars as status-ful who project sameness with the community of viewers qua peer
group, they explicitly dislike other stars, and often reject their status-raising moves in
films, because of their perceived arrogance in real life. This is common discourse
regarding actors like Simbu and, to an extent, Kamal Hassan. While everyone agrees they
are talented, their head weight (thalai gaNam, ‘arrogance’), their banthaa, their over
speech praising themselves as talented individuals outside of film is a turnoff, and thus a
reason to dismiss them/their films and their attempts at status-raising. 28
What we see, then, is that while the intra-textual film hero performs unimaginable
acts of style, projecting unmeasurable amounts of status, the extra-textual image of the

28

Note that for comedians and villains the necessity to be authenticated outside of film as users of style
doesn’t exist. Their filmic style is always already deficient in some way, and thus the necessity for their
grounding and status-leveling in the extra-textual is moot.
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film actor acts as a kind of alibi, grounding film style through extra-textual statusleveling. 29 Just as with youth peer groups, status negotiation is always twofold: one can
perform status to the extent that one has status; one’s performances of status should never
exceed the peer group. The most popular hero-stars are consummate humble men of the
people, constantly status-lowering off-screen while constantly status-raising on-screen.
Interestingly, as a hero-star like Rajinikanth’s status is ratified by audiences, he
increasingly disavows style off-screen. This itself is an act of status-raising through
inversion for only the man who has something to downplay can downplay it. Fans
assume, then, that just as Rajini’s characters become normal men after the villain is
vanquished and the film plot finishes (see chapter 4, section 3.5.9), when Rajini steps off
of the set he is a humble, normal person, but with a caveat: just like Rajini on-screen, the
lion within him is always there waiting to be unleashed, contained within himself as an
act of solidarity with and deference to the ‘people.’
Note that for any one hero-star the figures of status in play are multiple; that is, there
are multiple embodied surrogates of the actor circulating at any one time: his actual
physical body; images of him in particular films; and commentaries on him (as a hero or
person) in conversation and in other media. Further, each of these images are engaging in
status-raising or -leveling to various degrees. Precisely because of this simultaneous
multiplicity, the hero-star’s status work can tack between these various images so as to

29

When understood outside of the context of the dynamics of status negotiation in youth peer groups, this
feature of hero-star presents itself as a contradiction or ambiguity. For example, Rogers (forthcoming: 24–
25 in manuscript) notes this ambiguity/contradiction regarding Vijay. However, because he doesn’t take
into account the larger underpinning of the hero-star’s construction (as regulated by the logic of the peer
group), he can only make sense of this contradiction by appealing to the essentialized Cartesian and
Darshanic modes of seeing that are presumably at play, thereby reintroducing the mind–body dualism he
strives to avoid in the first place. Once we realize, however, that film star images are constructed out of the
same logic of the peer group the contradiction becomes a non-problem.
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both project equality and difference from the peer group at the same time. Thus he can
both voice status and deny/defer it, and each act can play off of the other, thereby
hypertrophying the intensity of status-raising. It is precisely this representational
disjuncture that makes it possible for the hero-star to make incredible status expressions
in his films and have it ratified by audiences.
And note, recalling Rajini films like Annamalai (1992) and Padaiyappa (1999), how
the hero-star’s tacking between multiple surrogate images of himself (the extra-, the
trans-, the intra-textual) parallels the structure of the hero-oriented text: style and statusraising only come after a ‘building up’ of the hero (through the voices of others) coupled
with status-leveling images of the hero both before (he is just a normal guy who avoids
status negotiation) and after the main status work of the film (he returns to his ordinary
status-less self). Style is liminally situated between two moments of non-status (or rather,
hidden or deferred status). Similarly, the extra-textual image of the hero-star functions to
buffer moments of status-raising in films, deferring the articulation of his status to others
(e.g., his fans), by being situated outside of the film text.
Note how this parallels youth’s ‘solving for’ the inherent tension of the peer group
through the hybridization or negotiation of their status-raising performances (chapter 3,
section 3). Of course, the problem is slightly more difficult for youth because: (a) in
general they do not have such surrogates to status-raise (though images circulated in
graffiti, on sign boards [for friends’ weddings, fan clubs, political parties], gossip, or in
other media function in this way to this end); and relatedly (b) the feedback of statusleveling from peers is often coterminous with their acts of status-raising, making the kind
of tacking back and forth done by hero-stars difficult for youth. This explains why
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youth’s status tends toward hybridity while the hero-star’s on-screen status tends toward
hyperbolic extremity. The main task, however, of creating a perduring image of statusful-ness that can thus license style qua status-raising is the same. We can see, then, why
youth status and film representations of status are so iconic: the logic of hero-stars’
performances of status (on- and off-screen) and that of youth’s performances of status
and the evaluation of both kinds of performances are based on the same logic. And
moreover, each interpenetrates the other: film images require their extra-filmic
recirculation for popularity and profits; youth utilize filmic images to successfully
navigate the youth peer group.

4. Conclusions: From reception to re-animation
In this chapter I have shown that film is a central source register for youth’s status
work. Further, I argued that the engagement of youth with filmic images of style is the
same as their engagement with images of style in their peer groups. To this extent, film
hero-stars abide by the same logic of status negotiation that applies to the youth peer
group. I argued that the iconism between youth peer groups and filmic representations
holds because films are re-animated by youth to do their own status work and thus the
same forms circulate in both representational orders. Second, they are re-animated
because film offers a solution to the problematics of status negotiation in the peer group.
Further, this ease of re-animation and recontextualization is part of the design of such
films.
In this section, based on the above discussion, I problematize the notion of reception
in media studies. Within Indian film studies the typical framing of the commercial hero273

oriented film has attempted to locate it within a larger dichotomy of realism versus its
others: melodrama, escapism, and fantasy (Thomas 1985; Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993b;
Rajadhyaksha 1993; Vasudevan 1995; Dickey 1993a; Rajanayakam 2002; Srinivas 2010;
see Dickey 2009b for a discussion). Implicitly, then, most approaches to the herooriented commercial film have attempted to read it against the question of how it relates
to the extra-textual as representational or not (where representation is understood in the
classical sense of mirroring, or true reference). The theoretical and methodological fallout
of this is that the study of such film is largely textual (e.g., Prasad 1998; Niranjana and
Dhareshwar 1996; cf. Srinivas 2010 who even while attempting to locate her analysis of
the social life of film outside of the text inevitably falls back into this trap by “reading”
film posters).
More anthropologically oriented approaches to film have attempted to move from the
text to the audience’s reception. 30 However, the representational assumptions of such
work still remain, except now, instead of the question being how do film texts relate to
the (un-)reality of (ideological) representations, the question becomes how do film texts
map onto the audiences that apprehend them? That is, how do viewers interpret film
images and make meaning out of them (cf. Bordwell 1989 in the film theory literature)?
How do viewers process filmic images, how/what do they think about particular films (cf.
cognitive approaches in the film theory literature: Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Carroll
1996; Currie 1996; Holland 1992; Hochenberg and Brooks 1996; Prince 1996)? What do

30

For this discipline shift in anthropology see Davis 1989; Hirsh 1992; Dickey 1993a, b, 1995, 2001;
Spitulnik 1993; Armsbrust 1996; Crawford and Hafsteinsson 1996; Barber 1997; Larkin 1997; Derne 2000;
Liechty 2003. On the turn to reception in cultural studies (with respect to television and other media) see
Morley 1980, 1992[1980]; Hobson 1982, 1992[1980]; Ang 1985[1982]; Radway 1984; see Ross and
Nightingale 2003 and Straiger 2005 for discussion.
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they learn from film images (Rajanayakam 2002: 227)? Do they reject, do they accept, or
do they “negotiate” film images qua instances of ideology (Hall 1993[1974])? In short,
ultimately for this approach to media the question still is, how do audiences engage with
filmic texts as representational objects?
In all such questions the viewer is taken as a kind of end point of communication, of
meaning, of consumption, of ideology. The film is extinguished at the moment of being
seen and processed by the viewer; it influences or not, just as a mirror can reflect back
only what stands across from it. Film is always already about watching, processing,
comprehending, thinking, and feeling at the moment of sensing the filmic image. 31 This
is the moment of its (mental/sensual) contact (cf. Benjamin 1935 and Kracauer’s 1960
notion of film’s tactility).
But why only view film from the perspective of the mental interpretants that it
immediately produces (what Peirce 1992 referred to as the dynamical interpretant)?
Certainly this is part of the social life of film. But is it only that? In this chapter I have
framed film as a particular kind of semiosis that can be interrogated—and is interrogated
on a daily basis by Tamil youth—according to its pragmatic utility. Further, I argued that
film meta-pragmatically (pre)figures itself as re-animatable based on precisely such
pragmatic utility (Agha 2007b). It isn’t only the case, then, that film representations of
status abide by the norms of the youth peer group, but that this is so because film design
explicitly links re-animatability to popularity and profits (often under the rhetoric of

31

Hence the high degree of cognitivism in film theory, from Kracauer (1960) and Bazin’s (2004)
psychologistic, Screen theory’s psychoanalytic (Baudry 1986[1970], 1986[1975]; Fargier 1980; Comolli
1986[1971]; MacCabe 1985; see Carroll 1998a, Allen 1995 for discussion), to current cognitive
psychological (Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Carroll 1996; Currie 1996; Holland 1992; Prince 1996)
approaches to film.
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giving the fans ‘what they want’). Films are designed to live on beyond being “received”
through presupposing youth’s active modes of spectatorship and post-filmic engagement
with and use of film (Nakassis and Dean 2007; Nakassis 2009).
In short, then, to understand the hero-oriented film—and to understand any film, I
would argue—it is necessary to look at the re-animatability of filmic representations as
pragmatically efficacious and meta-pragmatically prefigured for such efficacy (cf. Agha
2009). To do this requires us to attend to contexts and activities often far removed from
events of film reception (cf. Ram 2008: 56 on religious film). I demonstrated this for
Tamil commercial cinema by situating film with respect to youth notions of status and the
dynamics of status negotiation, and linking these realms to film production.
The problem with the reception approach to film can be demonstrated with analogy to
another semiotic phenomenon (see Agha n.d.: 9 on a similar line of critique regarding
classical political economy). It is as if we reduced fashion and its consumption to the
showroom and the moment of purchase, and ignored the fact that people actually wear
the clothes they buy to do interactional work outside the showroom. And further that this
is central to fashion and its social life. I think analogies of this kind aren’t often drawn
with regards to film because of the particular biases introduced by the denotational
transparency of film. Film has a seemingly self-contained “meaning” and can be analyzed
solely from this point of view without any seeming residue (see Nakassis 2009 for a
critique). Because of this robust semanticity the pragmatic and meta-pragmatic conditions
of possibility for such meaningfulness are easily ignored in favor of textual analogies or
analyses of audiences’ textual analyses. But ignoring such conditions is neither justified
nor advisable, as I have argued in this chapter.
276

The ground for status work, for the work that youth make film do, is the peer group.
And as I have argued in this dissertation, this extends far beyond the theater. From this
perspective we can start to think about film engagement not as reception (and thus the
question, does film influence or not?) but as re-animation (how is film used and to what
ends?). To recall the metaphor from chapter 3, just as the carpenter isn’t influenced by his
hammer but uses it, youth use film; they re-animate it for other purposes: to status-raise,
to status-level others, to entertain, to time-pass. Film theory misses this to the extent that
it thinks that films are objects whose sole or most important aim is to represent (and thus
that its sole value is its representational and denotationally self-contained content, or
apperception thereof), to create a world for us to be able to think and feel. It is this
attempt to reduce film as surrogate mental object—that film is a projection of, or iconic
with, thought or the senses—that reduces engagement with film to a mental act and that
then projects this back on films and classifies them based on whether they abide by the
ontological and epistemological categories presupposed by this mental act, viz. “reality”
or “fantasy.”
An approach to Tamil cinema which takes the story and not the hero-star, which takes
the logic of coherence/realism and not the logic of status in the peer group, is unable to
understand such film except as escapist, fantastical, ridiculous, unreal (cf. Ram 2008 on a
similar take on religious films). And yet, as I have argued, such a view misapprehends
that such films are primarily about status and not about reality or fantasy per se. They
must be read as such. This is precisely because this is how film viewers engage with
hero-stars. We might offer a different, albeit culturally specific, classification of films
than the real–fantasy dualism: films which are designed to be re-animated for status
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negotiation in peer groups and those which aren’t (cf. the hero versus the non-hero,
discussed in section 2.3).
This mode of reckoning film also allows us to theorize engagement with film without
having to fall back on the psychologism inherent in the notion of identification. In
analyses which do not place the youth peer group as the relevant model for understanding
Tamil hero-centric cinema, the notion is that youth imitate film heroes because they
identify with them in the fantasy created by the film (Rajanayakam 2002; cf. Osella and
Osella 2004: 257; in Western film theory: Allen 1995; Smith 1995). While perhaps not
untrue in some cases, this formulation mischaracterizes the issue by reductively
psychologizing it. As I have shown, the issue of film engagement is independent of
psychological identification by viewers insofar as it rests, in the first instance, on the
pragmatic usability of particular forms. It doesn’t matter whether viewers identify with
Rajinikanth or Vijay, or that they feel that they are like him, but that the images presented
on-screen are iconic with the kinds of images that they themselves can perform for egofocal indexical effect. Indeed, feeling closer to the character is no guarantee that viewers
will use such images more in their lives, as a comparison of the frequency and fidelity of
youth’s re-animation of Rajinikanth with a new faces like Dhanush—with whom youth
may identify with but not re-animate—shows.
There are other issues which are still unexplained by approaches to Tamil film which
relegate it (knowingly or unknowingly) as the opposite of realist cinema: why do viewers
accept the ridiculous unreality of such cinema, its illogicity, its schizophrenia (as seen by
such theorists)? The only fall back is to say that either: (a) viewers are brainwashed,
confused, or ignorant, as per a common lay discourse; (b) that they just want some easy
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entertainment, nothing too heavy (Dickey 1993b); or (c) that the film conforms to a larger
moral/ideological vision of the social world (Thomas 1995; Prasad 1998). Such views,
however, are unable to explain why some films are rejected, derided, and made fun of for
their illogicity, their in(s)anity, and their stupidity but others aren’t. Such views also fail
to explain why such distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable illogicity do not
map onto fans versus non-fans (i.e., the idea that fans accept anything and non-fans can
see through the veil). Non-fans may accept the illusion in films of an actor as status-ful,
while fans may reject that illusion (e.g., if it contradicts their expectations). Further, they
are unable to explain the most salient fact about Indian commercial cinema: its ubiquitous
recirculation and re-animation by highly discriminating viewers in all domains of social
life for multiform purposes often unrelated to pure entertainment or moral cosmologies
(cf. Srinivas 2010).
What I have shown in this chapter is that if we view film from the perspective of
status negotiation in youth peer groups these issues become non-problems. For example,
the logic of status is clear and rational in the film and thus the issue of representation and
reality (and the masses’ illogicity) becomes irrelevant because the pragmatics of status
negotiation work not on concepts of truth or reference but on performance and
performative felicity.
This interpretation of the hero-centered film also explains a number of otherwise
curiosities about hero-oriented Tamil cinema. For example, (a) how to reconcile that the
hero-star has unbelievable fighting ability despite not that great a physique; (b) his
uncontrollable charisma despite average looks; (c) films whose plot lines are incoherent
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but that aren’t evaluated negatively because of it; (d) the ability (indeed, necessity) of
hero-stars acting as young characters well into old-age.
A hero-star like Rajinikanth or Vijay commands so much status that he can literally
bend screen reality to his will. Viewers accept this with relish because the hero-stars’
status is built up and ratified across a filmic history of status-raising and -leveling. 32
Thus, after seeing MGR or Rajini hundreds of times playing the same youth character,
fighting off hundreds of rowdies, loving and being lusted after by young beautiful girls,
we expect—no, we demand!—that the hero-star still play a character that age because,
more than his actual age (which everyone knows), the age of the hero-star is fixed.
Similarly for his physique and looks. It causes no dissonance that the hero-star is average
looking or flabby in real life or on-screen, because the main issue is the hero’s status and
the extent to which that can license what would otherwise be anomalies in this
characterization.
Yet note that no new face can do this. Indeed, the new face in Tamil cinema
inevitably plays the role inscribed in his actuality. Thus, Dhanush’s, Bharat’s, Vijay’s,
and Arya’s first films were as average, young men. It is also no surprise, then, why it is
smaller aspiring stars like Vishal, Dhanush, and Suriya (rather than Ajith, Vijay, and
Rajinikanth) whose actual physique first began to match the figurative and filmically
constructed hyper-masculine displays that have always been part of Tamil cinema but
never displayed on the actor’s body as they are today in toned biceps and six-pack abs.
For new faces and less-established stars there is no other principle to ground their
characters or their status except for their “reality” (and the coherence and realism of the

32

This is what Rajanayakam (2002: 140) refers to as the hero’s “transcendental narrative status.”
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story); for to break with reality presupposes status that they do not have enough of. It is
this status—built up over a history of texts—that licenses such breaks from reality: from
the reality of looks, of physique, of age, and of logic.
In short, we have to be able to break the assumption that film should be judged from
its representational content and audiences’ reception of such content. This is an
understandable assumption given that the form of film motivates such a reading. Indeed,
film is denotationally and referentially rich. Moreover, much film is made to be engaged
with in precisely that way. And yet not all film is so constructed, and not all film is so
used. If we hope to fully understand how film works in many different places and in
many different ways, the concept of reception itself has to be displaced, just as the notion
of the film image as only having (true/false) referential content.
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Part III. Style and the Brand
Chapter 6 – Consuming Branded Forms

1. Introduction
In this chapter I look at the consumption of branded forms by Tamil youth. 1 In
particular, I am interested in apparel and accessories that index Western brands like Nike,
Reebok, Diesel, Armani, etc., either explicitly or implicitly. As I will argue, the
consumption and display of such garments is understood by youth as style. This is
because the branded form itself is understood as style. Moreover, such garments are
understood as style at the expense of the “brand images” and “meanings” typically
associated (in the West) with branded forms—that is, as regimented by brand metadiscourses. As I show, youth are largely ignorant of brands qua specific brands.
Moreover, they are willfully ignorant. I conclude with discussion about why youth are
willfully ignorant of brands as such but invested in branded forms; how this changes how
we theorize the brand (which I take up in chapter 8 in more detail); and what the
implications are for how we think about globalization and doing ethnographic research.

2. Consuming the branded form
2.1 Introduction
When I came to Tamil Nadu for the first time, of all the things that grabbed my
attention, one which always gave me pause and brought a perplexed smile to my lips was
the ubiquity of foreign branded forms in public space. On sign boards, the backs of cars
1

I use the term “branded form” to refer to objects which have the form of branded goods, whether or not
they are legitimate or counterfeit. This includes brands, counterfeits, and quasi- and non-brands. “Branded
form” refers to that which has the qualia of brand tokens qua tokens of the brand type.
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and auto-rickshaws, the sides of buses, the fronts of motorcycles, and especially on the
clothes and accessories of young men, public space in Tamil Nadu was teeming with
brands. I became increasingly interested in how and why such branded forms were so
present, so visible in youth male fashion. Why and how were brands consumed by young
men? 2

2.2 Brands in India
While foreign brands have been present in India for a long time, their ubiquity has
grown since the mid-1980s when the Indian economy began to be liberalized
(Rajagopalan 1999; Mazzarella 2003: 256; Tarlo 1996: 337–341; cf. Lukose 2009). The
liberalization of the Indian economy has contributed to the presence of brands in at least
three ways. First, it contributed to the rise of brands in public life through making
branded commodities more available for consumption. Second, with liberalization,
discourses of the nation have themselves shifted from Nehruvian productivism to an
explicit consumerist stance, thereby valorizing consumption (and thus the consuming of
brands) as part of the nationalist project (Rajagopal 1999; Fernandes 2000a: 614, 2000b;
Deshpande 2003; Mazzarella 2005; Lukose 2009: introduction, ch. 1). Third, with
liberalization came increased foreign capital ready to invest in the production of branded
goods for export to foreign markets (Chari 2000, 2004; cf. Cawthorne 1995). This
production inevitably leaks into domestic markets, creating a supply-side reason for the

2

What was just as conspicuous as the use of brands among young men was their near total absence among
women. As discussed in chapter 3, section 4, women’s engagement with branded forms is problematic
insofar as branded forms in Tamil Nadu are linked to the notion of style and visibility, both of which have
moral implications for women. Because of this, it is rare to find women’s clothing with visible brand logos
or names among the lower and middle classes. Elite women can and do use brands on their bodies, much
like they might be used abroad. In this chapter I am mainly concerned with male fashion.
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increase in branded forms through export-surplus overruns, defects, and counterfeiting
operations. I look at the production side of the branded form, in particular duplicate
commodities (or dummy pieces) in chapter 7. If liberalization made the circulation of
branded forms, authentic and counterfeit, possible on the supply side, what is the logic
which makes such commodities objects of desire? What fuels their consumption?

2.3. “Brand illa NNaa style ille”: No brand, no style
— Zeiss brand eyeglasses advertisement; Chennai, Tamil Nadu (2008)
What is the allure of the branded form for Tamil youth? In particular, what is the role
of the branded form as part of the visible assemblage that young men construct around
themselves? First let’s consider some examples. It’s common to find the branded form
featured prominently on vehicles—a Bacardi logo on the trunk top, a Jaguar sticker on
the side door, a Nike decal on the back window (photo 6.1), a Suzuki sticker on the
motorcycle’s headlight—or on the display of one’s cell phone or computer monitor—an
Adidas or Nike logo as the screensaver or display background.

Photo 6.1 Nike swooshes on car
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Most conspicuous and common is the presence of branded forms on the body: a
Tommy Hilfiger tee-shirt, Ferrari button-down shirt (photo 6.2), Harley Davidson jacket,
Diesel jeans, G Star shoes, a Nike swoosh stud earring, a Reebok ring, a Levi’s backpack,
a Marlboro belt, or an Adidas bracelet (photo 6.3).

Photo 6.2 Ferrari button-down shirt

Photo 6.3 Marlboro belt buckle and Adidas bracelet
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As the range of examples above shows, the branded form has its own attraction
over and above the commodity form (cf. Halstead 2002; Hoe et al. 2003; Yurchak 2006).
Indeed, as seen above, the branded form often is appended to commodities where the
extension of the brand in question doesn’t apply: for example, the name and logo from
Mercedes Benz on a pair of cargo pants (photo 6.4).

Photo 6.4 Brand use (Mercedes) on novel commodities (cargo pants)

In the above cases, such brand–commodity mismatches aren’t produced by the brand
companies in question. They are counterfeits. Even if the authentic brand has its own
“aura” (see chapter 8) and is seen as being higher quality and more trustworthy than its
copies, the branded form is attractive beyond the question of its authenticity or its
originality, as we will have occasion to see in this chapter and the next (cf. Halstead
2002; Vann 2006; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5). Indeed, most if not all of the examples of
objects youth used which have branded forms on them aren’t originals, but local
duplicates (or dummy pieces), and this is common knowledge.
286

2.3.1 Brands as style, duplicates as style
If brands are seen as higher quality, then why consume duplicates which are clearly
not original items and which often bear no resemblance to the ‘real’ brand commodities
except for the presence of brand logo or name (and even then, often in a distorted form)? 3
Why the branded form more generally?
Besides the obvious answer that fake and export-surplus branded goods are cheap and
easily available (a necessary condition of possibility for youth consumption), the more
interesting and important answer is that the branded form is seen by youth as style, as
being able to status-raise in the peer group. 4 Indeed, the most common answer to the
question of why did you buy, or why are you wearing, this piece of branded apparel was
that the branded form was “style” or “geththu.” This explains why, as one Madurai youth
pointed out, ‘even if some good is fake, youth will prefer the fake branded good over a
non-branded [but authentic] good because it has style.’ As a prominent ad in Chennai put
it circa 2008 “Brand illa NNaa, style ille” ‘If/when there is no brand, there is no style.’
And as far as youth are concerned, this is true of both authentic and duplicate items.
Indeed, when I would ask youth to describe what someone who was style-ish was like,
3

From my own observations it seems that the brand-as-quality discourse is also a kind of alibi, a way of
deflecting too much status-raising. (This isn’t to say that people didn’t believe it or that it wasn’t true;
indeed, local duplicates are of much lower quality.) That is, fetishizing the functionality of the product is a
way of reducing the status element of its use, and thus is a kind of self-status-leveling. To claim that one
bought a Nike shirt because it is of higher quality is to implicitly deny, or deflect, the proposition that one
bought it in order to status-raise (see section 3.3 for more discussion).
4
Yurchak’s (2006: ch. 5) discussion of the use of “empty” indexicals of (former) Western commodities
(labels, empty bottles, boxes, bags) in the construction of the “Imaginary West” is a useful comparison. The
use of such goods to construct an internal exteriority—an exterior space confined within the youth peer
group—is similar to the Tamil case discussed in this chapter (also see Mazarella 2003: 256ff.). Different,
however, is the Soviet fetish of “real contact” and the eschewing of the duplicate, something that isn’t the
case among working- and middle-class young Tamil men. Without knowing the Russian case well, it is
difficult to conclude the reason for the difference, but one possibility is the force, in the Tamil case, of peer
pressure to status-level within the peer group, thus creating the compromise formation of Western brands in
inauthentic forms (see section 3.3 for more discussion). The role of class is another possible difference.
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inevitably branded clothing would figure in the description, branded clothing being an
index of the youth status of that individual (Lukose 2009: 66–69 on Kerala; cf. Halstead
2002 on Guyana). What makes such forms status-ful among youth? As I show below,
branded forms are style because: (a) they foreground the individual who adorns himself
with them because of their visibility; (b) they index exteriority; (c) they are associated
with status-ful figures of personhood in media representations; and (d) they co-opt
alternative schemata of value.

2.3.2 Visibility and foregrounding
Branded forms are style because they are highly visible. They attract attention. As one
particularly style-ish Madurai youth explained to me, because style is about getting
people to notice you, things which aren’t usually worn tend to get attention from one’s
peers. And Western branded forms do just that; they attract attention because they are
seen as neither ordinary nor normal (saathaaraNam). They are different. 5
But different from what? Here ‘ordinary’ non-branded clothing implicitly means, on
the one hand, traditional ‘adult’ clothing (veeshdi, lungi, cotton shirt) and, on the other,
tailored clothing. The latter is considered ordinary and regular largely because of the
availability of cheap, low quality fabrics and labor. In distinction to tailored clothing are
“ready-mades,” which is a stand-in for branded clothing. (Branded shirts are also known
as “company shirts.”) Such clothing is generally more expensive and is connected with

5

This visibility is important both for one’s peers and for the opposite sex. Young men often justified their
use of brands because they claimed that women liked brands (cf. chapter 3, section 2.2.5). One student
explained (obviously hyperbolically) that in Chennai meeting girls and initiating romance with them
(correct paNRathu) was easy; you just have to have on branded clothes, like Reebok or Puma shoes, and
just pretend that you are important person, for example, by talking in front of them on your iphone with a
headset. Girls will instantly fall for you.
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the market changes associated with liberalization. In this way ready-mades, and by their
conflation branded clothing, are historically and sartorially more ‘different.’ 6
As style, branded forms are caught up in the peer pressure and constant surveillance
of youth peer groups. Youth adorn themselves with brands because such brands are
“famous” among youth. As one Chennai student put it, ‘wherever you go you can see
(paakka mudiyum) Reebok, so that is why I also have it.’ Another student noted that
when he first came from Madurai to Chennai for college, he saw that everyone on
campus had Diesel bags. He had never heard of it, but reasoned that it must be popular,
so he picked one up himself so not to be left out, not to seem like a country bumpkin. To
not participate in the economy of status-raising at some minimal level and be unable to
visually monitor its associated forms is to be left out, to be invisible, and thus is
productive of a number of anxieties and studiously avoided (cf. Dickey 2009a).

2.3.3 Indexing exteriority
The branded form is style because it indexes exteriority. 7 It indexes exteriority in a
number of ways. First, branded forms index foreignness in terms of fashion in general
insofar as youth see brands as fashionable in foreign countries. Youth were often
surprised that I didn’t have more branded clothing, thinking it odd that I would go out of
my way to get tailored clothes while they were trying to get ill-fitting ready-mades (cf.
6

To an American, it is ironic that: (a) tailors claim that the fashions that they have to sew today are calqued
from ready-mades; that is, people come to ask them to make their clothes fit more like ready-mades, which
largely means not as well fitted to their body (the index of wealth in the West); and (b) youth claim that
tailors can’t quite get the same fit that one can get with ready-made clothes, and thus ready-mades are more
popular.
7
For similar indexical valences of branded commodities see Tobin 1992 and Creighton 1992 on Japan;
Gondola 1999 on Congo; Halstead 2002 on Guyana; Vann 2005, 2006 on Vietnam; Manning and
Uplisashvili 2007 and Manning 2009 on Georgia; and Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 on Russia. See Tarlo 1996: ch.
2 on a similar dynamic in colonial Indian fashion in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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Lukose 2009: 77). This spatiality is also linked to a particular temporality as well; brands
index the ‘new’ epochal shift of post-liberalization, of a modern India that has ‘caught
up’ with the West (cf. Manning 2009).
Second, brands are associated with specific forms and fashions which come from
‘outside’ of India. For example, the rage among Madurai and Chennai youth in 2007–
2009 was “anti-fit” clothing, which youth associated with American hip-hop music and
artists like 50 Cent and Eminem. 8 Further, such clothing is associated with exterior
media. Such fashions are visually consumed via non-local television channels like MTV,
VH1, V Music and the internet.
Third, specific brands index exteriority because all such brands that are popular
among youth are all “foreign” brands. Here foreign is often collapsed into “Western,”
which itself often simply means “American,” even if the branded forms are neither (e.g.,
Honda, Suzuki are from East Asia; Puma, Pepe Jeans, Diesel, Gucci, Armani, Dolce and
Gabanna are from Europe). Whatever their actual national origin—as we see below,
youth don’t particularly care—what is important is that such brands are seen as coming
from outside of India (cf. Mazzarella 2003: 256; Tarlo 1996). The irony here is that: (a)
most branded forms are duplicates and thus locally produced; (b) even if authentic, they
are most likely made in India under contract with a Western company for export (chapter
7). And while branded forms which actually come from outside of India are considered
to have an aura of style by virtue of being literally exterior, 9 branded forms that aren’t

8

Such artists themselves are popular because they embody a particular kind of exterior geththu that youth
find resonant with the Tamil rowdy, himself an emblem of status-raising (cf. Weiss’ 2002 discussion of
“thug realism” in Tanzania and their re-animation of American hip-hop artists).
9
I found this out when going on a trip back home for a month. Before I left I was barraged by requests for
anything foreign and branded: from liquor to tea to clothing items.
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literally from outside still retained something of that aura because of the aesthetic quality
that they project by indexing exteriority (see sections 2.5 and 2.6). Indeed, because the
branded form is also an aesthetic form, even when it is clearly not foreign it can still
index exteriority and function as style.
This is also the reason why Tamil youth find the concept of style-ish Indian brands
contradictory (at least as far as clothing is concerned). One Chennai youth pointed out
that the phrase “Indian brand” is a contradiction insofar as “Indian” means local, secondrate, and un-status-ful (with respect to Western commodities) while “brand” means
international (and thus not Indian), quality, and style. To combine the two, then, is
oxymoronic (see Halstead 2002 and Vann 2005 for something similar in Guyana and
Vietnam respectively).
This indexical value of exteriority is also the logic of the linkage of the brand with
English. 10 Beyond the brand, though crucially related to it as we will see, English on
clothing (even if nonsense) is seen as style among youth (see chapter 7, section 2.4.4.9
for more discussion). This link is so strong that apparel brands which are Indian almost
always project themselves as foreign (e.g., Viking, Jansons, Viduka). As one informant
pointed out, ‘it’s hip to have an English name on your shirt. If the brand name on your
shirt is “Chandru Shekar” no one will see it as style, but if it’s “Charlie Nichols,” or some
other foreign sounding name, they will.’
Fourth, the branded form indexes exteriority because it is transgressive and nontraditional. Insofar as the aesthetics of the branded form is a figuration of its foreign
10

Of course, the exteriority of branded forms can’t be reduced to English as designs and logos also function
in this way. More accurately, we should say Roman script, for written languages other than English (e.g.,
Spanish, German) also function in this way. For youth, however, all such languages were functionally
equivalent, not to mention likely to be seen, in any case, as “English.”
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origin, or its being part of foreign fashion, brands symbolically diagram exteriority not
only from the ordinary tailored clothes of the everyday, but also from the clothing
associated with ‘society’ and ‘culture,’ the “traditional” clothes of adults (veeshdi,
bunyan, white cotton shirt, matching thuuNdu ‘towel,’ chappals ‘sandals’) which are
plain and externally unbranded. In short, the branded form is a way to show one’s
‘difference’ (viththiyaasam kaamikkiRathu), both from one’s peers and from adults.
Branded forms as style, then, also potentially figure as a kind of challenge and
transgression to adult authority (see chapter 3, section 2.2.4).

2.3.4 Brands and mass media
Brands are also linked to style via the mass media, as noted above. This is both
through the linkage of brands to figures of personhood in foreign mass media—VJs on
foreign music station like MTV and VH1; characters on syndicated television
programming (e.g., shows like Friends) and in “English” films; athletes (e.g., the brands
on Formula 1 racing cars and jackets; on cricket and soccer jerseys, etc.)—and in Tamil
mass media, both television and film. In particular, since liberalization brands are de
rigeur for Tamil film hero-stars’ style-ish dress (photo 6.5).
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Photo 6.5 Actor Suriya sporting Diesel brand underwear

Here it is the link of the branded form to the film star which propagates the branded form
among youth insofar as such branded forms are detachable and (re-)performable by youth
in their own peer groups. As the Nike swoosh/“tick” example discussed in chapter 5,
section 2.4.4 and in section 3.2 below interestingly shows, often it is the hero-star which
is more important to the “meaning” or the pragmatic usability of the branded form than
the brand qua brand.

2.3.5 Co-opting wealth
Authentic branded items perform style or geththu through their literal and
conspicuous display of wealth. This type of usage is rare for most lower- and middleclass youth, however, insofar as few can afford such goods. However, even cheap local
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duplicates are able to index wealth qua style through simulating such goods. As discussed
above, this isn’t because youth confuse such goods with the foreign originals from which
they were calqued. Rather, such duplicates count as status-raising through their figurative
co-opting of wealth and elite fashion (itself an exterior realm of normativity; see section
2.3.3 above on exteriority). That is, such forms take on the aesthetics of elite fashion, and
to this extent imagine themselves as participating in the social realms of wealth and elite
status. This is possible because branded forms are also aesthetic objects, objects which
diagram exteriority and status symbolically; by appropriating elite fashion in one’s own
duplicate garments one can do style (cf. Hebdige 1979).

2.3.6 Summary
So why consume branded forms? Youth consume branded forms because branded
forms are style; they diagram exteriority and difference through co-opting elite and
foreign fashions via forms which index exterior places (and languages) and are associated
with status-ful figures of mediatized personhood; as such they are transgressive of reified
notions of (adult) ‘society’ and ‘culture’ and thus they foreground those who used them
from the background, making them visible and status-ful.

2.4 Branded forms and social class
As mentioned above, whether an item is duplicate or real is not something most
lower- and middle-class youth particularly worry about. Most youth don’t get teased or
made fun of for wearing duplicates. And they certainly don’t avoid buying duplicates. As
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I noted, one reason for this (but not the only one, as we’ll see) is that authentic branded
commodities are priced out of most youth’s spending range. 11
For elite youth, however, authentic branded commodities (be they clothes,
motorcycles, or cell phones) are part of the presupposed ground of participation. Not
having brands, among other things, is a mark of poverty or rural background, and insofar
as social class is partly predictive of peer group formation (see chapter 2, section 4.2.2),
brand use is, to some degree, a line of social difference. As such, elite youth have a
different experience of branded forms than other youth. Their engagement with brands (it
is more active); their knowledge (they are brand conscious and aware largely due to their
English mass-media consumption, trips abroad, etc.); the kinds they buy and where they
buy them (at authorized stores; getting them from abroad from their own travels or those
of their families) make their usage in some ways closer to that of American youth than of
their lower-class peers. Such youth’s overall appearance and sense of style (see chapter 3,
section 2.4) is also qualitatively different, both in terms of the quality of the clothing they
wear and their general aesthetics. Such students look more like representations of
Western fashion from Western media (e.g., an “authentic” hip-hop look), while their
lower-class peers’ aesthetics conform to something closer to representations from Tamil
cinema. For elite students, then, authenticity and brand knowledge as indexes of
11

On rare occasions when one does get something authentically branded, however, it is a point of pride and
joy. As my upwardly-mobile, middle-class Chennai roommate noted when he got his first (Adidas) branded
pair of shoes as a gift from his father, he felt “semma jolly, romba happy” ‘extremely jolly, really happy.’
He explained that he had the feeling, but he didn’t know why, that he had completed or accomplished
something important; that this moment was some sort of landmark for him. However, for most workingand middle-class youth, authentic branded items are a luxury and not particularly common. Moreover,
authenticity of brands while something that individuals care about is not something that is particularly
important at the peer group level (see section 3.3 for more discussion). This was changing as I was in the
field, however, as companies like Nike and Reebok had priced down certain goods—hats, shirts, shorts—to
a price range that more youth could access. It is telling, as we see below, that it is these brands that are seen
as brands more than other brands.
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socialization to “Western” fashion are key for fitting in, while not knowing about brands
constitutes a sign of backwardness.
And indeed, as one moves down the social ladder brand knowledge is less, as is
concern with authenticity in the peer group. Even if they did know, and did have the
money, youth wouldn’t necessarily buy authentic branded commodities. As Yuvaraj, one
of my brand-knowledgeable Madurai hostel roommates, explained, ‘if in the college no
one cares about brand authenticity, why would I spend 900 Rs. (about $20 at the time) on
one “company” piece of clothing when I can get three or four (local) shirts? Among
friends, everyone knows that no one has ‘real’ brands.’ Note that this logic also applied to
elite youth when their peer group mainly included friends whose buying power was lower
than theirs. In such contexts, they would dress down (see section 3.3 for more
discussion).

2.5 Brand ignorance: From brands to the aesthetics of brandedness
While working- and middle-class young men adorn their bodies with branded forms,
while in the field it was curious to me that they largely didn’t know or care, with a few
exceptions, about the brands they were wearing (cf. Halstead 2002; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5).
The exceptions included brands like Reebok, Nike, and Adidas, which youth were
exposed to as Reebok, as Nike, as Adidas through cricket jerseys on TV, prominent
brand meta-discourses (advertisements on television, billboards, print publications),
authorized stores, and priced-down authorized brand products. However, these brands
weren’t the most popular or frequently encountered among youth during my time in
Tamil Nadu. Rather, brands like Diesel, Ferrari, and Tommy Hilfiger which didn’t have
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priced-down products on the market, which didn’t have authorized stores, and which
didn’t advertise in India were more popular. Diesel, the brand most ubiquitous among
Tamil youth between 2007–2009, didn’t even have an official retail market in India at all.
There were no authorized Diesel products in India, except those imported in ad hoc ways
from abroad for boutiques. It was a bit of a puzzle, then, why brands like Diesel were so
common among youth. Even more so because no youth that I met (with the exception of
elite youth who had traveled abroad) even knew what Diesel was. My Madurai roommate
Stephen, who owned a Diesel tee-shirt, canvas bag, and pair of jeans, asked me after my
grilling him about Diesel and other brands, ‘is Diesel a clothing brand or is it a rock
band?’ Similarly for Ferrari, a company that most youth didn’t know about, but readily
adorned their bodies with. Even youth generally curious about the West weren’t
particularly interested to know about such brands, where they were from, what kinds of
companies they were, or what kind of a “brand image” they had.
However, youth did have the access to information to learn about what such brands
were about, either through the internet or by asking me. But with only a couple of
exceptions, they didn’t. That is, non-elite youth were not simply ignorant of brands qua
brands, they were willfully ignorant (both in the sense of ignoring brands qua brands and
in the sense of lacking knowledge about brands). 12 It didn’t matter to them. But how
could it not? This is because, as I discuss below, brands were not construed or consumed

12

Cf. Rajagopal (1999: 136) on the “pseudo-brand’s” consumption as indicating a lack of “brand literacy”
or a sole focus of consumers on “affordable value.”
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as brands per se. That is, the ontology of such objects wasn’t as BRAND, but as something
else. 13
But if not as Ferrari, D & G, Diesel, etc., then as what? Such proper names were
empty indexicals, they pointed to something, but no one knew what. Youth weren’t part
of the brand “speech chain” (Agha 2007a); they knew of no baptismal event that linked
this Levi’s bag to a particular company (the trademark owners of Levi Strauss), a
particular image, or a range of spokespersons and products. But if their status as proper
names, or even as metonyms for larger brand identities, was empty for youth, what were
branded items indexing?
As argued above, branded forms are style. And importantly, because of this, branded
forms are also aesthetic objects. As one youth put it, when he shops he asks himself:
“look-aa irukkaa? style-aa irukkaa?,” ‘does it have that look (does it look good)? Is it
style-ish?’ Such forms are aesthetically attractive to youth: the form of the logo (e.g., the
Nike swoosh, the Ferrari horse, the Diesel “D,” the Adidas stripes), the color
combinations of the branded form (e.g., the red and black of Ferrari), and the English
names, words, and letters are all seen as visually captivating and beautiful. Thus, for
example, it wasn’t uncommon to find the use of brand names or logos in novel designs
qua decoration.

13

I use the small caps BRAND to designate this larger ontological category. See chapter 8, section 3.1 for
more discussion.
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Photo 6.6 Nike swoosh as design element

In photo 6.6 we see how one car driver used the Nike logo to create a novel design by
inverting two Nike swooshes by flipping them vertically. When I asked him why he had
used the Nike symbol, he indicated that it wasn’t because it was the Nike swoosh per se
(it hadn’t even seemed to occur to him), though he was familiar with the Nike logo. He
explained that he liked the curves of the form, that it was style, and thus he had used them
to re-author his own design. The swoosh here isn’t a brand logo at all, but rather a design
element, like a circle or a line, used to create a larger aesthetic design.
In short, by virtue of their status-raising potential branded forms are aestheticized;
they are seen as beautiful because of their connection with some (vague) notion of
exteriority and visual attractiveness. What is interesting here, and what I discuss below, is
that it is their status as aesthetic objects that can entail pragmatic effects (style) and not as
brands per se that is relevant to youth’s experience and use of branded forms.

2.6 Aesthetics of brandedness
By “aesthetics of brandedness” I am referring to what Tamil youth call the “look” of
some object as having a branded form, as seeming foreign/Western, as seeming
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expensive even if the object isn’t branded, foreign, or expensive. This isn’t an issue of
dissimulating or passing (off), but of conforming to, or co-opting, a set of aesthetic
conventions and forms seen as visually attractive. (Indeed, insofar as they participate in
this aesthetics, rather than dis-simulating brands, branded forms among youth come to
iconize ‘youth’ instead.) We might also call this an aesthetic of exteriority, or an aesthetic
of style. I use the phrase “aesthetics of brandedness” because—as will become clearer in
chapter 7—the structure of all the objects that are part of this aesthetics is calqued off of,
though not reducible to, the brand. Indeed, brands aren’t the only kinds of objects which
are part of this aesthetics, which can be made to perform style via this aesthetics. For
example, youth also used garments that had musicians’ or other pop culture figures’
names and faces on them, or the names or symbols of foreign countries (e.g., an
American flag, the proper name “New Zealand”). Further, many forms that participated
in this aesthetics were pseudo-, fictive-, or non-brands, though they had the look of a
branded good (section 2.7).
Such objects—brands, duplicates, pseudo- or non-brands—are all functionally the
same to youth. Projecting exteriority, they are all linked to the not-here and by virtue of
this they function as style. But this doesn’t entail any necessity of knowing positively
what there is. This is why the duplicate in the non-elite peer group isn’t seen as a decrepit
form of the original, the distorted form of the ‘real’: the ontology of the brand among
Tamil youth isn’t founded on notions of authenticity, but on the aesthetics of
brandedness. It is this aesthetics which makes even the cheapest brand duplicates able to
perform exteriority and diagram social difference. It is this which allows the branded
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form to be transported across commodity forms: why a Microsoft logo makes sense on a
pair of pants, or the name 50 Cent on a belt buckle.
It also explains to some degree which brands matter to youth: those that are
maximally exterior and maximally visible. It is branded forms that self-reflexively point
to themselves as exterior, as foreign, as part of this aesthetics that are taken up by youth.
Thus, one doesn’t find shirts with Van Heusen or Peter England 14 —brands that make
formal dress shirts where the brand identifier is found inconspicuously inside the shirt—
but those that are visible and eye-catching: the Nike swoosh, the Ferrari horse, etc.
Noting that the ontology of the branded form among Tamil youth is rooted in an
alternative organization that includes the brand, as well as many other types of
commodity images, we can also make sense of a number of other facts about youth
fashion: (a) the tendency toward distorting and hybridizing branded forms; (b) the
flexibility in iconism between what we would consider the ‘original’ and its copies; and
(c) the fetish of English in youth fashion. Below I discuss the range of objects that fall
under this aesthetics of brandedness in order to show how this aesthetics abides to the
form of the brand but not to the BRAND as ontological category.

2.7 Hierarchy of copies
14

Interestingly, if you ask youth who does care about brand authenticity, they will reply ‘older people who
are working (white-collar jobs).’ Why? First, because unmarried people who work have money to spend on
real brands, so it is actually a possibility for them. Hence, rich kids also care about brands. Second, because
brands are used by young men for peer group status negotiation, which is outside of ‘society’ and fluid,
youth have no objective status or ‘honor’ to defend or maintain in the form of gauravam (‘prestige,’
‘honor’) or mariyaathai (‘respect’). For working people (whom they conflated with adults), however,
concepts of status like gauravam and mariyaathai are important, youth reasoned. Older people are
concerned with prestige, as inherent and perduring, and thus with the brand as ‘authentic,’ as an expression
of actual capital accumulation qua status. Plus, as such people are usually (upper-)middle-class the
authentic brand is part of the status negotiation of their work place with its Westernized and middle-classed
aesthetics. Young men aren’t so concerned with this at this point in their lives, and hence the authentic
brand as such is largely irrelevant for them.
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Figure 6.1 schematizes the range of forms that are included under this aesthetics
of brandedness.
Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of branded forms
Brand ontology
more fidelity
(more specific
reference)

Aesthetics of brandedness
(a)

“Original” branded commodity

(b)

Unauthorized Original from the same factory
with the same materials
Copy of an Original from the same/different
factory with different materials
Copy of the Original design with different
materials, cut, stitching
Copy of just the brand logo or name,
but with different design
Copy of the brand logo or name with
alteration of their form
Hybrid branded forms

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(more vague
reference)
less fidelity

(i)

“style”

Forms which don’t directly reference any
existing brand, but have the branded form
Forms which only loosely have
the branded form

I have organized the forms as degrees of deviation from the ‘original’ branded
commodity, thus intersecting the two ontologies. The fit isn’t perfect, however. While
(a)–(i) are equivalent under the aesthetics of brandedness, only (a) falls under the
ontology of the BRAND proper (as quasi-legal category); while (b)–(g) fall under the
“counterfeit” category (i.e., forms which pass off the intellectual property of the brand
owner, possibly dilute or tarnish the brand, or are “grey market”); finally, (h) and (i)
wouldn’t be considered as part of the BRAND(–COUNTERFEIT) ontology per se as they are
unrelated to actual specific brands, though “inspired” by particular brand aesthetics. I
have indicated these three divisions (authentic / inauthentic / seemingly un-related,
though “inspired”) with dotted lines.
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As we see above, the kinds of objects which function like branded forms—that is to
say, participate in an aesthetic of brandedness—are various. From the perspective of the
BRAND

and (Western) intellectual property (IP) law, there are many deviations from the

authentic branded good (a). The closest in form are those that are produced with the same
materials and stitches on the same machines by the same people in the same factory (b).
These often circulate in local markets because they are export surplus (“overruns”) or
have slight defects. Alternatively, they may be made by an authorized factory producer
but outside of the stipulated contract. Such items are counterfeit in the sense that they
have not been authorized to be sold/exist, as well as because of the fact that the profits
don’t go back to the company that owns the brand’s intellectual property. In form,
however, they are identical to the original.
Often to increase profits or because of a lack of materials or time, duplicates may be
produced by the authorized factory producer with slightly different stitches or materials
(c). These are, depending on the changes, often the same as the original to the undetecting eye. In a further deviation, such branded commodities may be reverse
engineered (or the designs gotten in some other manner) and made by other producers
with alterations, either in the materials, stitching patterns, the cut of the materials, or
some other feature (d).
Cases (b)–(d) are knock-offs of the branded commodity. (e) presents us with a further
deviation. Here it is just the brand name or logo which is duplicated in what is otherwise
a novel commodity or design.
In photo 6.7 the logo and name of a brand, Ferrari, is attached to a wallet in a design
the brand company doesn’t make (not to mention its misspelling). Even more extreme is
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the example of shirt with the Ferrari name and logo faithfully replicated on the back,
while the front has the nonsense concatenation of words: “cross storm: Freedom, Athletic
Cost, when f u scrat ur brain. blazo!”

Photo 6.7 Branded form (Ferrari) in novel form

Similarly, sometimes the logo survives while the brand name disappears. Photo 6.8
shows a tee-shirt with the Ferrari logo prominently in the center. Instead of “Ferrari,”
“Fashion” has been substituted, and the red and black color scheme has been replaced by
blue and black/white. Here a proper name indexing exteriority (“Ferrari”) is replaced by
an noun whose denotation indexes exteriority but isn’t a brand name per se (“Fashion”).
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Photo 6.8 Ferrari logo with brand name substituted for

In a further deviation (f) the brand logo or name is altered in its spelling. Hence, for
example, Diesel becomes Diesal or Chiesel; Levi’s becomes Eevi’s, Live’s, Levie’s, or
Livies; Dolce & Gabanna becomes Dolce & Cabana or Bglce & Gabana; Adidas
becomes Adibas; Reebok becomes Reebek, Peekok, Reebor, or Rerock (photo 6.9); or
Lotto becomes Lottoo (photo 6.10) (cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243).

Photo 6.9 Distorted brand names (Reebok)
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Photo 6.10 Distorted brand names (Lotto)

Alternatively the font or design of the branded form is lost and simply the lexical form is
retained (and possibly distorted; e.g., the “Reebek” shorts in photo 6.9 above). Consider
photo 6.11 which shows a “Levi’s” shirt devoid of logo and distinctive font; only the
brand name remains.

Photo 6.11 Just the brand name (Levi’s) remains
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Related to (e)–(f) are hybrid forms which recombine different brand names and logos
(real and imagined) in a heteroglossia of exteriority (g). 15 For example, the Reebok logo
and brand name combined with the “Ferrari” brand name and logo (photo 6.12). Or, in a
three way hybrid, the TVS brand name and logo crossed with the Nokia brand name
(altered with a different font) and the Nike swoosh (slightly altered in curvature) (photo
6.13).

Photo 6.12 Brand hybrids (Ferrari and Reebok)

15

Such hybrids perhaps fall into two categories: (g1) hybrids which recombine and arrange logos and brand
names to create novel combinations; (g2) hybrids which draw from the aesthetics of the sports jersey or the
racing car, where sponsorship of companies on the body of the athlete/his vehicle creates a pastiche of
branded forms. I only heard this latter interpretation once however, and not in reference to clothing but to a
motor vehicle.
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Photo 6.13 Brand hybrids (TVS, Nokia, Nike)

The brands invoked might not even exist. For example, it wasn’t uncommon to find
brand-hybrid shirts with a Nike swoosh on the top left breast, a Ferrari logo on the collar,
and the word “Next” written in the middle. Or on a bag the fictive brand “Ziya”
accompanied by a (slightly distorted) Nike swoosh (photo 6.14).

Photo 6.14 Brand logo (Nike swoosh) plus fictive brand (Ziya) hybrid
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With (h) the indexical link to actual brands is broken, and we start to find forms
which only have the iconic diagrammaticity of branded forms: PROPER NAME + LOGO (+
WORDINGS/SLOGAN).

Here the form is replicated without any brand content. At one store I

saw a whole line of jeans where the back pocket had a sun design as a brand logo and the
front leg had a proper name, some of which were brands (Suzuki, Honda, McLaren)
while others were American pop stars (Eminem, 50 Cent), famous personalities (Che
Guevara), and even an older Hollywood film name plus the coming year (Titanic 2010).
Tamil films from hit stars were also often presented in the form of branded garments with
a logo plus the film name paired together (photo 6.15).

Photo 6.15 Film name (Villu), actor name (Vijay), and face qua branded form

Items in (h) also begin to shade off into local “original” brands, quasi-brands created by
producers (but often not backed by any kind of meta-discursive regimentation vis-à-vis
marketing, advertising, or trademark registration) (photos 6.16, 6.17).
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Photo 6.16 Fictive brand: “Cargo”

Photo 6.17 Fictive brand: “Force”

With (i) the aesthetics of brandedness further devolves into garments where there is
only a vague iconism with branded forms. Such clothing shades off from the proper name
into simple noun phrases or strings of English words as quasi-names or -logos for nonexistent brands. A pair of cargoes might have the brand-esque name “cargobluegear,”
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both indexing a fictive brand and the type of clothing (also photo 6.16 above). Words
which index style or fashion (i.e., index exteriority in their denotational content) often
stand in for the brand. For example, a bag might have the word “Jeans”—an emblem of
Western fashion—or a shirt may simply have “Fashion World” written across it with a
logo. Photo 6.18 shows a shirt with a concatenation of phrases and numbers loosely
related to the chronotope of urban youth fashion: City, 005, C Point, Wear, 04, Next,
Style, Generation.

Photo 6.18 Noun phrases and numbers as aesthetic design

In addition to being reflexive about their pragmatics and their target audience (i.e., a
style-ish shirt having the word “style” or “youth” printed on it), this reflexivity also
extends to the branded form itself. For example, a shirt with the quasi-brand wording
“LETTERING” invokes the fact that branded forms do indeed involve lettering as part of
the aesthetics of brandedness. Consider photo 6.19 where the tee-shirt pattern is simply
the denotational placeholder “Premium Quality”: “Name and Brand.”

311

Photo 6.19 Denotation as branded form

At the end of this hierarchy—after the indexical proper name gives way to the fictive
proper name which gives way to the fashion-indexing noun phrase—are garments which
simply have noun phrases not particularly connected to anything related to fashion or
youth. For example, shirts might simply have common English nouns like “Gladiator” or
“Sports.” The wordings on such quasi-branded forms may involve nonsense as part of the
design. For example, a shirt might combine a proper name and quasi-reference to a brand
(“Tony Tony Chopper”) with what vaguely looks like English words (“Disquerd,”
“Everinhu Canglong”) and finally simply a string of letters (“asiohdngy”). Consider
photo 6.20 where the design is a series of words (“fresh,” “with,” “mine,” “so,” “BOY”),
quasi-words (“chun,” toybar,” “de”), and strings of letters and numbers (“c,21,” “u&s,
“cotalll”) along with the fictive brand “Us 395”:
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Photo 6.20 Nonsense English as design

From specific reference (the rigid designators of brand proper names) to abstract and
common nouns we come to the English language/Roman script as pure aesthetic object
devoid of any denotational or referential content. In this “nonsense” it becomes clear, in
fact, that across all categories of this hierarchy English is always already an aesthetic
object independent of its denotational content, even for actual brand names and slogans.
Like the willful ignorance of the brand, youth’s aesthetic of brandedness turns the
English language into an aesthetic object independent of its grammatico-semantic
regularity (i.e., as capable of creating semantically meaningful content), or even its
morphological regularity (i.e., as capable of creating word-like lexemes). Youth weren’t
concerned with what was written on their shirts as such. It didn’t matter. English cum
design is style via its connection to exteriority and fashion; and this is sufficient for
youth’s purposes. 16

16

Cf. Tarlo’s (1996: 242–243) discussion of the aestheticization of English among Gujarati women in their
embroidery practices and the proliferation of different spellings of English words like “Welcome.”
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Note that using English on clothing as status-raising—not as code, but as aesthetic
design—makes it possible to get around certain problematics involved with English in the
peer group, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Remember that using English as
communicative code can be seen as alter-focal and thus as implicating others’
competency in English. As such, using English in interaction can be interpreted as a
statement about someone else—for example, that they don’t know English—and thus
grounds for strife within the peer group. Second, using English requires one to actually
have some level of competence in English. On the other hand, treating English as an
aesthetic design in another semiotic medium (clothing) avoids both of these problems: it
is ego-focal and doesn’t implicate others’ English abilities and it doesn’t require actually
knowing any English to appreciate or use it. I would further argue that this is also logic of
actual English use in the peer group. As we saw in chapter 3, section 3.3.2, the tendency
of English use within the peer group is to avoid English that has denotational content,
preferring forms rich in interactional content. Such use of English is purely pragmatic
(versus semantic) and, I would argue, aesthetic.
And note that precisely because brands are part of a larger aesthetics of exteriority,
specific brands are not the basis for social grouping or regularities in consumption or
identity work. There was no brand identity, loyalty, or community. How could you be
loyal to or identify with a brand when it wasn’t a brand in the first place? Rather than
seeing the issue as ‘youth consume and use brands’ we might put it this way: youth do
style and style includes a heterogeneous set of things, only one of which is the branded
form. This makes sense of the apathy of most youth toward brands as particular brands,
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but their obsessions with branded forms more generally as style. 17 Rather than identity
emblems that indicate devotion or group membership (compare, e.g., with the use of a
picture of a politician or deity on shirt or a vehicle), brands and English letters are statusraising signs of style and, as such, aesthetic objects empty of the denotational-referential
content often associated with them.

3. The alternative ontology of the brand in south India
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the brand qua BRAND is bracketed among
youth in Tamil Nadu. While the BRAND is one of the competing ontologies that youth
acknowledge in their engagement with the world of commodities around them, it isn’t the
only one, nor often the most important one (cf. Halstead 2002; Vann 2006; Bick and
Chiper 2007). On the surface of things (i.e., from the visibility of their displays of
branded forms), it would seem that Tamil youth are highly brand aware. And yet, as I
have shown, brand consciousness is highly selective among working- and middle-class
youth. Rather than interest in brands as rigid designators regimented by brand metadiscourses constituting branded commodities as tokens of some brand type (figure 6.2),
for Tamil youth branded forms are regimented by a meta-discourse of exteriority and thus
are part of a larger set of commodity tokens (figure 6.3).

17

A relevant parallel is color. Youth style often involved garish and bright colors designed to attract
attention. However, youth were uninterested in colors qua colors; one found no “fans” of red or “followers”
of sky blue, nor were youth interested in the optics of color or the cultural histories of various colors.
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Figure 6.2 Brand as BRAND
BRAND METADISCOURSE

Figure 6.3 Branded forms as tokens of a different type
BRAND METADISCOURSE

META-DISCOURSE OF EXTERIORITY youth status, aesthetics of brandedness

//

Branded goods
(as rigid indexes)

Branded goods, Duplicates, Fictive brands, Popstars, English code
(as style)

Under this alternative ontology the category BRAND competes with a number of other
modes of understanding—which is to say, a number of other meta-discourses—which
reorganize the world of objects according to different logics. For example, the readymade as opposed to the tailored (as a discourse of production); Western fashion as
opposed to “traditional” clothing (as a discourse of age, alignment with ‘culture,’ and
distance from ‘society’); youth fashion and status (style) as opposed to forms of status
associated with the adult world of white-collar work (“formals”) (as a discourse of
liminal suspension across age sets). In these meta-discourses the branded form is
distributed according to a logic different from branded/unbranded, or
authentic/inauthentic. Hence the flexibility of iconism (with respect to the BRAND) as to
what even counts as a branded form, and the reorganization of such forms understood not
as brands qua branded objects, but as aesthetic objects that have a particular functionality,
that are defined by their ability to status-raise in the peer group and be typified as style. 18

3.2 Example: The Nike swoosh

18

Note that this happens in brand aware societies as well (see Craciun’s 2008 on Romania; Vann 2006 on
Vietnam). We can note, for example, the reappropriation of branded goods for other purposes (e.g., Luvaas
2009 on “remixing” brands in Indonesia), or simply ignoring the brand identity of some product in
everyday use (Agha n.d.). See chapter 8, section 2.4.5.3 for more discussion.
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Here I return to an example from chapter 5, section 2.4.4—the Nike swoosh logo—
that highlights how branded forms among youth in Tamil Nadu are imbued with value
through alternative discourses that formulate branded forms as part of an ontology totally
different from that of the brand qua BRAND.
As we saw in chapter 5, of all the branded logos in Tamil Nadu, the Nike swoosh is
perhaps the most ubiquitous. And yet what I found so confusing was that when I asked
people why they had a Nike logo on their body, or on their vehicle, I was greeted by a
range of answers that seemed incommensurable. Those who were in the know about
brands and fashion would refer back to the brand, Nike, taking the logo as an index of the
company as well as style, invoking the aesthetics of brandedness discussed above. Others
would simply say “style,” thereby bracketing the brand identity.
The most confusing response to the question was: ‘because I’m correct,’ ‘because
whatever I do is right’ (cf. photo 6.21). Because I was attempting to read the branded
form as somehow connected to brands directly or indirectly (how could it not be?) I was
oblivious to the fact, which I eventually learned through my prodding, that for many
individuals the swoosh isn’t the Nike swoosh, as it were, but a check mark (or “tick”)
popularized by the style of Super Star Rajinikanth in his film Pandiyan (1992) (cf. Bick
and Chiper 2007).
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Photo 6.21 Nike swoosh as the “Right” tick

In this film Rajinikanth punctuates his punch dialogues, which themselves punctuate his
victories over his adversaries, by ripping open his button-down shirt, revealing a tee-shirt
which has a check mark (or “tick”) on it (photo 6.22).

Photo 6.22 One of Rajini’s style getups (with tick) in Pandiyan (1992)

His punch dialogue is ‘This Pandiyan is right in everything, everywhere, always’
(“intha paaNdiyan eppoovum, engkeeyum, ethilum right”). Hence being “Mr. Right” in
the film. For these individuals, it is film as a meta-discourse which creates a usable and
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detachable form, the tick/swoosh, which can be redeployed in various contexts as statusraising among one’s peers and count as style. It is under this meta-pragmatic discourse
that both the tick and the swoosh are seen as tokens of the same type, similarly imbued
pragmatically as style.
Of course, Nike has made serious inroads in Tamil Nadu to create brand awareness.
And it has been, to some degree, successful. Indeed, the youngest youth (many who are
unfamiliar with this film) make no such explicit connection of the swoosh to Pandiyan
(1992), though they did to style. And even those who do know the film (mis)remember
the film in two ways: (a) by misremembering that Rajini is wearing a Nike tee-shirt and
not just a shirt with a check; and (b) by attributing their learning of what Nike was to
watching the film, thus merging a personalized brand history with the filmic imbuing of
the check with style. Such individuals explained that Rajini made Nike popular by
wearing the tick/swoosh shirt. But note that even if Nike has made inroads in Tamil
Nadu, the meaning of the swoosh as Nike symbol is still only taken as a token of the
larger discourse of style, emblematized in the persona of Rajinikanth.
As this example shows, the use of the branded form, its “demand,” is often governed
not by the brand as a particular kind of brand type, but through a detachment of a branded
form from its brand meta-discourse and its reanalysis under a different meta-discourse
(figure 6.4). (See chapter 7, section 3.2 for more discussion.) It is this novel sign–metasign relation which grounds the branded form among youth in Tamil Nadu in a different
ontology altogether. Thus, while we can easily observe an almost compulsive use and
circulation of the branded form among youth, it is impossible to conclude anything
without understanding the ontology of objects under an aesthetics of brandedness.
319

Figure 6.4 Alternate ontologies
(1) The world of branded forms
under the ontology of the BRAND
BRANDS

brands x, y, z

=

(2) The world of branded forms under
ontology of STYLE (aesthetics of brandedness)

DUPLICATES

duplicates x1, y1, z1

STYLE

BRANDS . . . DUPLICATES

3.3 Willful ignorance and status negotiation in the peer group
Remember that the male peer group in Tamil Nadu is based on ‘youth’ as exterior to
‘society.’ Thus, youth use semiotic registers that index exteriority—film representations,
signs associated with the rowdy, English, branded forms—in order to diagram that
difference with the aims of creating alternative islands of authority that reinscribe the
objective statuses periya aaL–chinna paiyan (‘big man’–‘little boy’) as relative status
designators within the peer group. Such signs are typified as style. And style is always
played out within the economy of status-raising and -leveling of the peer group, with its
centrifugal and centripetal pressures toward differentiation and conformity. In chapter 3
we noted how the tension of these forces tend to lead to the negotiation and hybridization
of status-ful youth cultural forms like English.
It is in this context that we can similarly understand why Tamil youth are motivated
toward a willful ignorance of brands. While branded forms are style, trying to pass off a
duplicate as ‘real’ or consuming brands too conspicuously is over style. That is,
evaluating branded forms under the ontology BRAND—as authentic/inauthentic—is to
potentially convert ego-focal indexes of status-raising (as aesthetic signs) into alter-focal
indexes of status-lowering (as class-ranking, hierarchical signs). It is to be seen as uppity
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or showing off, as pretending that you are the periya aaL when you aren’t. It risks
transgressing the peer group and thus inviting envy, jealousy, and possible ostracization.
This is also why the lower- and middle-class youth that I spent my time with generally
didn’t tease each other about having duplicate brands except if one tried to pass it off for
real, thereby mismatching one’s status and attempts at style. Thus, in peer groups of
lower- and middle-class youth, branded forms figuratively diagram style through
duplicates. Literally diagramming social difference through authentic brands risks
exceeding the boundaries of the peer group, and thus potentially calls for status-leveling
or expulsion from the peer group (cf. Nisbett 2007).
This isn’t to say that youth don’t want, or don’t use, authentic branded items as such.
But rather that status-leveling within the peer group functions as a counterforce which
reanalyzes branded forms as part of a larger aesthetics of brandedness and not as
instances of brands qua BRAND; it thus defers the issue of ‘real’ versus ‘fake’ while still
allowing branded forms to function as style. Hence brand indifference with respect to
authenticity is a kind of deference to one’s peers. Analyzing branded forms under the
aesthetic of brandedness allows one to do style without doing it too much (being over); it
allows one to perform difference through sameness, to differentiate one’s self while still
being part of the group. 19

19

We can note the same process at work in the West. Consider Hoe et al.’s (2003) discussion of attitudes of
consumers toward counterfeit goods. They see no problem in the use of counterfeit goods per se. This is
especially true if one doesn’t know it is a counterfeit. They also don’t see a problem with “passive”
deception. That is, one knows it is a counterfeit, but wears it because of the connotations of the brand.
However, one makes no commitment to it being a “real” branded good. However, respondents did feel
strongly negative toward individuals who “actively” used fake brands to deceive; that is, who tried to pass
off goods they knew as fake. Such individuals were themselves seen as fake, inauthentic liars or showoffs.
Hence the tendency to admit that one’s goods are fakes (see Philips 2005 on the knowing wink of a good
knock-off), to avoid the issue, or to feign ignorance. To do otherwise is to not show enough deference to
the peer group, to project oneself as better than what other’s see one as, and thus to risk ostracization. In the
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In this way, under an aesthetic of brandedness the branded form among Tamil youth
as a diagram of exterior status (whether it be the foreign, the rich)—and thus a
simulacrum of it—is detached from the objectivity of that simulated status and denuded
purposively so as to convert it into a relative, and thus egalitarian, sign of status. The
branded form qua simulacrum intentionally marks itself as such so as to voice itself
doubly: as a sign of style but not too much style; as status-raising but not too much statusraising.

4. Conclusions
4.1 Summary
I have argued that the construction of youth status and its negotiation in the peer
group motivates the use of branded forms as style. However, this functionality as style is
not derived from particular brand meta-discourses (youth are willfully ignorant of brands
as such), but rather to a more general aesthetics of brandedness. This aesthetics includes a
number of objects, all of which are related to the brand in form, but not in content. I
argued that seeing things from this point of view foregrounds that what is at issue isn’t
brands per se at all. That is, branded forms are part of a different ontological
configuration among Tamil youth.

4.2 A note on the global and the local
From seeing all the branded forms displayed visibly and proudly by Tamil youth, we
might draw conclusions about the state of globalization, the erasure of cultural difference,

Tamil case, because peer groups are priced out of branded goods the push isn’t toward admitting fakes, but
toward the negation of the concept of authenticity itself.
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the growing of cultural homogeneity, the encroachment of cultural imperialism, or the
rise and dominance of the brand. Obviously, from my discussion in this chapter such
conclusions would be misinformed. And yet the branded forms remain.
On the other hand, we might note that while the branded forms circulate, the brand
doesn’t. That is, the brand as the brand would like to be understood, the brand as
presented in its self-reflexive meta-discourses of advertising and marketing. We might be
tempted, then, to argue that there is a kind of localization of the form, brands are made to
serve local interests and purposes, and their deformation in their duplication and tropic
usage reflects that.
I argue, however, that to frame the issue in this way equally misunderstands cultural
globalization because it assumes that particular forms like brands are stable across
contexts. That is, while they may have “global” or “local” meanings, they are still
“brands” in both contexts. Such a view privileges particular forms, inevitably the forms
with which analysts are familiar with, as stable and fixed (i.e., treating them as natural
kinds) in their movement around the world, only to be recombined, slightly altered or
tailored to some other “local” (read: non-natural) context (see Robertson 1995: 38, 2001:
462, 464; Appadurai 1990: 516–517; Pieterse 1995: 53–54; Kearney 1995: 554;
Tomlinson 1997: 181ff., Reger 1997; Watson 1997; Bauman 1998: 42–43; see Stanlaw
1992: 73–75 on a similar argument regarding the concept of language borrowing). 20
This paradigm, then, says for any sign-vehicle X of class U with meaning Y in
place/social domain Z we can enumerate it variants {X1, X2, . . ., Xn} and their meanings
{Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn} in various places {Z1, Z2, . . ., Zn}. Thus, for example, in this paradigm
20

This is, in fact, the same model of engagement with ideological discourses posted in British Cultural
Studies that I critiqued in chapter 3, section 5.2 and chapter 5, section 4.
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the word (U1) “scent” (X1) in America (Z1) means ‘a smell’ (Y1) while in Tamil Nadu
(Z2) the word (U1) “scent(-u)” (X2) means ‘perfume’ (Y2). In this example the ontological
forms to be compared, both words (U1), remains constant.
Indeed, it is because this paradigm is deficient in its semiotic analysis of social forms
that it is unable to theorize that not only forms and their meanings may differ in various
places and for various communities, but more importantly that the semiotic configuration
of such forms is: (a) internally complex, and thus (b) may be of a totally different
ontology. For example, with regards to youth fashion, while English in the U.S. may be a
code for communication of denotation and referential meanings (in addition to indexical
ones), for Tamil youth it is simply a tool, among many, for status-raising in the peer
group, independently of its denotational-referential capability. This is clear in how
English is used, for example, in clothing (though also in peer group communication, see
chapter 3, section 3.3.2): English words on Tamil youth’s clothing aren’t words (U1) at
all, in either grammatical form or construal. Rather, they are aesthetic design elements
(U2). In the same way, the issue isn’t that things like brands have different meanings in
different places, but that they may not even be the same thing at all. Branded forms in
Tamil clothing aren’t brands as the brand meta-discourses would have them to be. They
are aesthetic objects; they are forms imbued not by brand meta-discourses, but by the
meta-discourse of exteriority, of ‘youth,’ of style. Yet this sign–meta-sign relationship is
un-theorizable in a flat semiotic structure whereby only forms and meanings exist, each
stable and unitary unto itself but endlessly re-combinable.

4.3 Ethnographic lesson
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In this is an ethnographic lesson. Indeed, the branded form and the use of English in
garments were most perplexing phenomena to me. Why so many brands? Why so much
English? Why so little knowledge of brands? Why so little concern for meaning in
English? Because I approached such objects as one might in the United States—Nike is a
brand, English is a communicative code, and both of these are stable and inherently
meaningful as such—I tried to make such forms speak to me in ways that they were being
actively silenced by the Tamil youth users of such forms. Operating under the wrong
ontology, such forms were (artificially) foregrounded to me, causing a kind of
confusion. 21 And yet it was only by revealing the larger meta-discursive framework
which make such forms speak style in the peer group that I was able to silence the
ontology of BRAND and code that were so naturalized for me. Again, it isn’t that things
mean different things in different places. It is that they may not even be the same thing at
all. And why that should be the case, and why this should have any kind of (social)
regularity, are questions which can only be answered by linking moments of production
and consumption together in a semiotically-informed, ethnographic analysis. In the next
chapter I look at the production and circulation of such branded forms as a continuation
of the discussion of this chapter.

21

Consider Craciun’s (2008: section 2, paragraph 2) discussion of one informant’s reaction to her research
regarding fake brands: “Nobody is going to openly admit they wear fakes if you ask bluntly. People don’t
really use these words anyway. We just hear them on TV.” Here we see the presence of am alternate
ontology of objects independent of their brandedness as it butts against the meta-pragmatic frame BRAND as
put into play by the researcher and mass-media discourses.
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Chapter 7 – Circulating and Producing (Counterfeit) Branded Forms

1. Introduction
In chapter 6 we saw how youth’s consumption and use of branded forms brackets the
brand qua BRAND. But if consumption, and thus “demand,” is non-specific to brands,
what is the principle of their production and circulation in Tamil Nadu? Why are certain
brands produced and circulated, and others not? Further, why are certain brands which
have no “authentic” presence in India (e.g., Diesel) highly circulated as duplicates and
consumed by youth who have no idea what such brands are all about? To answer these
questions I did research with youth-targeting shop owners in Madurai, Erode, Tiruppur,
and Chennai who sold authentic branded garments (either as authorized brand goods or as
export surplus); with shop owners who sold duplicate garments and/or garments that
participated in the aesthetic of brandedness but without any direct connection to
particular brands as such; with distributors and wholesalers of such goods in Madurai,
Erode, Tiruppur, and Chennai; producers of such goods in Tiruppur, Erode, and Chennai;
a second-hand buying agent in Tiruppur; and a sourcing agent of a portfolio of Western
designer brands in Chennai (including Diesel).
In this chapter I look at the logic of the circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu,
specifically garment production and distribution with respect to lower- and middle-class
youth. First I look at export surplus and then at brand duplicates and other variations on
the branded form. I focus on how the aesthetics of brandedness and willful ignorance of
youth consumers relates to production. I conclude with discussion about the concepts of
“counterfeiting” and “demand” as highly problematic assumptions implicit in the BRAND
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ontology. I argue that such concepts lose their meaning in the Tamil context, thereby
canceling out a host of (Western legal) assumptions about what brands are and how they
work.

2. The circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu
2.1 Introduction
In this section I first look at the export trade of authentic branded goods as one
circulatory path through which branded forms reach Tamil youth. I then look at the
duplicate garment sector as another way that branded forms circulate. I argue that the
duplicate garment sector is coordinated with respect to brands both by global trade vis-àvis the export-surplus sector (which is partly governed by the BRAND ontology) and by an
aesthetics of exteriority (and its bracketing of the BRAND ontology). It is this dual link
which organizes the supply side of branded forms with respect to Tamil youth. It is also
the reason for the creative deviation and formulaic sameness of (counterfeit) branded
forms within a more general aesthetic of brandedness.

2.2 Retail and branded forms
Branded forms present themselves to youth through various kinds of stores which
segment the market by price. From platform merchants, traveling and (semi-)permanent
bazaars, small shops, large outlet-style showrooms, and authorized brand showrooms,
youth can peruse and purchase branded forms. In such stores, authentic branded forms
and duplicates are intermixed to varying degrees. In an authorized showroom presumably
all the commodities are “real,” though of course counterfeits work their way in, usually
by the dissimulation of authentic branded items with identical counterfeits. In
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showrooms, the forms are relatively evenly intermixed, some goods dissimulating the
brand, others loosely borrowing from it but clearly not original. Unlike the authorized
brand showroom, in such stores price meta-communicates the (in)authenticity of the
branded form (Bloch et al. 1993; Phau et al. 2001). From small shops, traveling bazaars,
and platform merchants, low quality garments which loosely borrow from the brand and
make no pretensions to authentic brandedness dominate (here, location metacommunicates [in-]authenticity, Brandtstädter 2009; Hansen and Moeller forthcoming),
though authentic items in the form of export-surplus or defect items are also mixed in.
Some shops specialize only in export surplus, some only in counterfeit or brand-inspired
garments. 1

2.3 Export surplus: From factory to market
While the increase of authentic branded garments in India is linked in the public
imaginary to a glut of imported foreign commodities, the availability of such goods is
still limited to a small minority. And yet liberalization has caused the increased
circulation of Western branded forms beyond that small minority. One reason for this is
that liberalization opened up Indian labor to increased foreign capital, and thus the
increase of export-oriented garment factories producing Western brands (Chari 2000,
2004; cf. Cawthorne 1995 on pre-liberalization Tiruppur; see Vann 2005; Luvaas 2009;
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Thomas 2009; Phau et al. 2001 for discussion of this
process in other contexts). It is this export sector that is ultimately linked to the expansion
1

This points to another axis of difference: between goods that are imported from abroad and those locally
produced in India. While high quality duplicates are imported on occasion from Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and China, most all duplicate garments are produced within India. Authentic items sold in
authorized showrooms are often imported from abroad, while authentic branded items from export surplus
are made in India.
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and circulation of branded forms in India more generally through: (a) supplying local
markets with export-surplus goods; and (b) providing materials and designs for local
duplicate production (section 2.4; see Phillips 2005; Pang 2008; Craciun 2008, 2009 for
discussion in other contexts).
Different areas of India have different specialties in export-oriented production: for
example, Ludhiana and Bombay in north India make sweat-shirt, denim, and tee-shirt
materials, as well as do garment construction; Delhi does baseball hats; Bellari does
jeans; Bangalore produces tee-shirts, jeans, labels, and does garment construction; in
Tamil Nadu, Tiruppur specializes in tee-shirt materials, dyeing, and garment construction
(Chari 2000; Cawthorne 1995); Erode specializes in cotton materials, yarn production,
and dyeing; Sivakasi specializes in cardboard tags and boxes; Ambuur specializes in
leather and shoe production; and Chennai specializes in producing cotton materials,
embroidery, and garment construction.
As each stage of the process takes place in India—knitting, dyeing, cutting, stitching,
compacting, cleaning, embroidery, finishing, checking—there are export-surplus
materials available at each stage of the production process. One can buy export-surplus
tee-shirt material, shirt labels, cardboard tags, yarn, labels, or finished products (with or
without brand logos, tags, labels). And as the industry is relatively decentralized, each of
these export-surplus goods circulates relatively independently (Cawthorne 1995; Chari
2000; cf. Reinach 2005: 45), thus serving as inputs into other local productions. For
example, a producer might buy brand labels to append to shirts that he produced; or buy
cloth which he then puts his design and tags on.
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Importantly, export-surplus goods are sold at prices low enough to cater to markets
that foreign brand apparel companies cannot access for significant profit. This is for a
number of reasons. First, the export-oriented producer has already been paid for the
overage through his contract with the brand company (or the company that contracted
him). The brand company will typically allot for an overage of 5–10 percent, for
example, on the assumption that the production process operates with a 3–10 percent
error rate. Such surplus, then, is already accounted for and the sale of surplus is simply
extra money for the producer. Further, because the amount of export surplus is relatively
small compared to the total size of the contracts and because the opportunity costs of
selling them are relatively high, not to mention sometimes illegal through breach of
contract, buyers of export-surplus goods are in a position to ask for rock bottom prices
(sometimes less than the production cost). Third, the producer may not have independent
access to a market where he can sell such goods, or one may not exist. For example,
trying to sell XXXL winter jackets in south India, even if branded, is exceedingly
difficult. Even if it does exist, often the market cannot bear the full cost of the garment,
so items are sold for whatever local distributors and wholesalers can pay. Fourth, export
overruns often lack the sufficient quantity or “spread” 2 demanded by wholesalers. Thus,
the producer has little flexibility in dictating prices. Fifth, as the brand company has the
right to refuse a shipment if it is late, if the brand company goes bankrupt, or if the
quality isn’t up to standard rejected products often end up getting resold to another
company for export (e.g., by simply attaching a new label and repackaging the good) or

2

“Spread” refers to the distribution of some product by size, color, or other variation. Often the spread of
export surplus, as it is linked to contingencies in the production process, is uneven. There may, for
example, not be enough medium sizes for a wholesaler to be interested in buying some product.
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they are sold on the local market. In both cases the goods are sold at a heavy loss to the
producer. Finally, producers’ contracts with brand companies often require that the
export-surplus goods be marked as export-surplus/damaged, thus not allowing them to
function as authenticated branded commodities in the local market (photos 7.1, 7.2). 3
This further lowers the price of export-surplus garments on the local market and
circumscribes their circulation.

Photo 7.1 Marked tag on export-surplus good

3

Alternatively, they are required to be burned or otherwise destroyed. Sometimes the brand company only
excludes exporting the export surplus, and thus allows sales within India. This is especially true for
companies who have no sizable market in India. Of course, it isn’t uncommon for such contracts to be
broken and goods may be exported either to the intended marked (at a significant risk to the parties
involved) or to another market. I was told by “seconds” wholesalers, for example, that Nigeria and Russia
are popular destinations for goods produced in Tiruppur. I saw groups of Nigerian exporters combing the
streets of Tiruppur looking for good “seconds” deals for export.
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Photo 7.2 Mark on export-surplus defect good

Such export-surplus and defect garment sales are brokered by “seconds” agents who
buy export-surplus and defect goods from a number of producers and then distribute them
to wholesalers for sale as such, or to other producers who use them to create products of
their own. From “seconds” agents finished branded forms move within India via
distributors to showrooms, clothing shops, and traveling bazaars, either as “stock lots”
(hodgepodges of garments which are unsorted by brand) or “fresh stock” (a single type of
branded garment). In the stores I visited, “stock lot” was the most common way that
garments came to them (photo 7.3).
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Photo 7.3 Stock lot of export surplus

In short, because export surplus provides (a) a large profit margin for store owners
due to the low price of purchase (up to 100–150 percent profit, as compared to about 20
percent profit from selling authentic brands and 30–40 percent profit from duplicates) and
(b) often comes in unsorted “stock lots” there is a lack of selectivity about which branded
products make it into retail. While store owners may be aware of which brands are
popular or not (locally and sometimes abroad), because of how the products get to them
when buying one’s stock there is no de facto principle of sorting out brands vis-à-vis
popularity or “demand.” And because the cost of such goods is so low and youth are
open-minded with respect to branded forms (i.e., there is little to no brand loyalty as
such), there is little risk to indiscriminate brand retailing. The result is that most if not all
brands produced in India for export end up on the local market. In short, as a result of the
vagaries and contingencies of global capital’s involvement in textile production for
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export, independently of “demand” and customer and distributor knowledge about
brands, branded forms end up willy-nilly circulating in shops, presenting themselves to
youth and local producers, as I discuss below.

2.4. Brand duplicates and brand-inspired garments
2.4.1 Introduction
In addition to circulating original, though perhaps not authenticated, branded forms,
export surplus is important to the circulation of branded forms in general because export
surplus is the condition of possibility for the production and circulation of duplicate
branded forms and garments which have the branded form without any clear reference to
actual brands (what I call “brand-inspired” garments). Here I am mainly concerned with
garments which are most popular among lower- and middle-class youth, as discussed in
chapter 6. These are produced largely in Tiruppur (tee-shirts) and Chennai (embroidered
cotton button-down shirts, embroidered jeans, cargo pants).
There are a number of reasons why both duplicate branded garments and brandinspired garments depend upon export surplus: (a) export-surplus fabrics, tags, yarn,
labels, and other materials provide inexpensive, but quality materials for duplicate
production; (b) producers of duplicates share the same aesthetics of brandedness as their
youth consumers; or, at least, they recognize consumers’ willful ignorance and produce
accordingly. Such producers, then, also think of branded forms as style, and to that extent
as aesthetically pleasing and economically viable/valuable. Rather than coming up with
designs de novo, for such producers copying existing designs, which they get through
export-surplus models, is a safer bet; and (c) the design of such garments is heavily
influenced by what is already circulating in the market. Producers, as they put it, ‘follow
334

the market.’ That is, they copy what others are doing so as to stay competitive, just as
consumers copy what others are wearing so as to stay current. And as the market has as a
significant portion of export surplus and copies of it, they too copy such forms. This
results in the further recycling and recirculation of export-oriented branded forms. 4

2.4.2 Producing a duplicate
If export surplus provides the models and the materials, the form and substance, from
which counterfeit brands are produced, why is there such a diversity of branded forms
that circulate? Why is it not simply an endless repetition of designs identical to authentic
branded forms? What are the principles that regulate the production and design of
branded forms that aren’t made for export? What are the forces that regiment difference
from and similarity to brand originals?
In the following sections I look at the production process of brand duplicates and
brand-inspired garments. I am particularly interested in creative deviations from exportsurplus brand models, rather than to-the-tee knock-off brand garments, both because they
are more ubiquitous among youth and because they reveal the dynamics of the production
and circulation of branded forms in Tamil Nadu more clearly.

2.4.3 Production cycle
In this section I briefly look at the production cycle of embroidered cotton, buttondown shirts in Chennai of either duplicate-, fictive-, or quasi- brand type. From 2007–

4

Indian national garment brands: (a) are largely not seen as style (and thus less likely to be duplicated for a
youth market); (b) compete in the local market (and often at relatively closer prices) and thus have more of
a stake in preventing counterfeits; and (c) they are in India and thus are more able to detect and prosecute
counterfeiting. In short, duplicate production rests primarily on export surplus for designs.
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2009 such embroidery—minimally, NAME + LOGO/DESIGN—was popular among lowerand middle-class Tamil youth, both urban and rural (photo 7.4).

Photo 7.4 Embroidered shirts (“Rock,” “Ranger Boys,” “Teen Terrores [sic]”)

These garments were produced in relatively small-scale production units in North
Chennai. The bigger units control each step of the production process (except for the
production of cloth, thread, labels, and tags, which they buy either from export surplus or
from local manufacturers), while smaller units tackle one or more parts of the production
process.
Local design agencies (often part of the same companies who do the embroidery)
provide the embroidery design for the shirts. They do this either by creating designs on
their own, which they then pitch to various producers; or they create or copy a design as
requested or provided by the producer (often also the wholesaler) who commissions
them. Such agencies have the roles of: copywriters (who come up with “wordings”),
graphic designers (who come up with design elements), software operators (who translate
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the designs into computer files that the embroidery machines can execute), and operators
of the embroidery machines. One individual may do one or more of these jobs.
Once the designs are ready and approved, tailors cut the pieces of fabric necessary for
the garments. Cuts of fabric which require design are then sent for embroidery (photos
7.5, 7.6). The embroidered pieces are then sent back to the tailors who stitch them
together. The pieces are then finished—labels affixed, cleaned, ironed, folded, and
packaged—and sold/sent to wholesalers who distribute them to stores. If particular items
are successful they are ordered again.

Photo 7.5 Embroidery machine display
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Photo 7.6 Embroidery machine at work

2.4.4. Designing the branded form
While some duplicate producers do attempt high-fidelity knock-offs of authentic
branded items, there are a number of reasons why garments for the local market
systematically deviate from export-surplus models. In this section I look at the logic of
design of such garments, and the forces that maintain difference from and similarity to
brand originals.

2.4.4.1 Exigencies of production and budget
First, the stitches and cuts of a particular brand design may be too difficult for the
tailors given the budget and the time frame of production. Because a majority of
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duplicates consumed by youth tend to be low in cost, the economic margin for
reproducing difficult and labor-intensive stitches is low. Thus, producers usually take a
(brand) “model” and alter the stitching to the convenience and skill level of their tailors
and their budget. Moreover, even as new models arrive, producers tend to be conservative
in changes in the cuts and stitching of the garments. New cuts and stitching take time for
tailors to learn, and thus there tends to be a force toward conserving forms at the level of
garment construction. For this reason, even as the design elements, colors, and brand
names vary across such garments, the cuts and stitching of them are relatively consistent.
Only if elements of garment production are seen by consumers as constitutive of the
“look” will producers go through the effort of reverse engineering a new production
process (as some did, e.g., for the folding button-up cuffs popularized by the shirt worn
by Vikram in the film Bheema [2008]).
Similarly, the fabrics, threads, and other materials used for producing the original
good may not be available, or may be too expensive for the price range of the product the
producer is looking to make. 5 The aspects of the model which are least available to
consumer consciousness are modified: for example, minute stitching differences or subtle
color differences. Aspects which are salient to consumer consciousness, and thus central
to the “look” of the garment, are more likely to be maintained from the original; for
example, the brand name and logo, the brand label, or distinctive color schemes.
With every modification, the form changes and deviates from the original model. The
level of flexibility in this iconism—how much can you change it until it is seen as
different—is both dependent on producer and consumer consciousness and familiarity
5

This is, note, even a principle in high quality knock-offs where shortcuts are taken in dyes, materials,
stitches, and cutting in order to lower the production cost and thus increase profits.
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with the original. As I discuss below, both are willfully low, and thus the degree of
change that accrues over this production process is often great.
Besides the material and economic exigencies of production, what are the creative
principles that govern design? How are designs modified for reasons other than economic
necessity? Where do new designs come from?

2.4.4.2 Principles of design: Brand as template
For producers, one primary principle of design for youth fashion is that the branded
garment made for export is fashion. The brand for export is, by an act of faith on the part
of producers, a guarantee that a duplicate of it can be sold for profit. This is based on a
particular assumption about the political economy of brand consumption in India, one
that producers often narrated to me: lower- and middle-class people emulate the rich, and
the rich emulate the West. Thus, if you duplicate brands from the West you will make
sales. Note that the belief that brands guarantee profits isn’t held to because there is a
“demand” for such and such brands among young men in south India (their primary
market); nor is it held because producers closely follow the sales of such and such brands
in the West or among the Indian elite, because they don’t, except in the most general
sense. Rather this belief is grounded in an aesthetic of brandedness that producers
(believe that they) share with youth consumers. That is, the brand has that look, is style,
and thus is capable of status-raising the wearer.
Hence, as I noticed in my travels between Tiruppur, Erode, Chennai, and Madurai,
any and every product that is being produced for export is being duplicated. Branded
forms are selected for, but with no specificity for particular brands. Local producers get a
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hold of export-surplus items and use them as the basis from which they make their own
products (whether they be faithful to the brand or ultimately original or novel in their
designs). Indeed, the capricious appropriation of branded forms independent of
knowledge by producers and consumers about the brand image, target audience, and
branded product extensions mean that any brand (and even non-brands like pop star
names, college names, and place names) can be pulled into the cauldron of production.
Brands are willy-nilly selected, and this is not based on any principle that has anything to
do with the logic of particular brands as such.
But why, then, are some brands or designs produced more than others? This is
difficult to answer, and requires a brand-by-brand or design-by-design analysis.
However, we can note the following:
(A) For brands which are recognized by youth as particular brands—for example,
Nike, Reebok, Adidas—their own brand meta-discourse is one principle which increases
duplicate production; this is not necessarily because such brands are demanded by
consumers and this feeds back into production (though this is certainly the case some of
the times), but also because producers themselves lift designs from forms which they
often see, whether it be magazine advertisements, catalogues, billboards, the internet,
textile industry conventions where brands showcase their wares, or authorized
showrooms of brands in high-end malls. However, many, perhaps most, of the branded
forms consumed by youth are not of this kind.
(B) Cinema and television provide design ideas for producers. Mass media, then, is
both a principle of brand circulation (see chapter 6, sections 2.3.4., 3.2) and for
introduction of new designs for production in the local market.
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(C) Feedback from sales gives producers some idea of what designs work and what
designs don’t work. Such feedback is extremely weak, however, and always has an afterthe-fact quality as producers do no prospective research.
(D) In lieu of research producers ‘watch’ the market. That is, they monitor and copy
what others are doing. At one level, then, there is an incessant repetition of the same
based on a kind of (peer) pressure not to get left behind in the currency of (cultural)
capital in the market. Once one brand becomes popular—as Ferrari and Diesel did in
2007–2009—there is a frenzy of production to duplicate these brands. At the same time,
by ‘watching the market’ producers attempt to inject (small) difference(s) into the forms
they produced. There is a tendency, then, toward creating different (enough) forms within
the general type of garments that are ‘moving’ in the market so as to avoid stagnation of
sales and to diversify and maximize market saturation (cf. Lury 2002, 2008 on the same
principle in brand “innovation”). By ‘watching the market,’ then, two forces regulate the
production of such garments: a centrifugal force toward newness and difference and a
centripetal force toward sameness and conformity. It is this compulsive movement
toward difference within the formulae of sameness that both introduces and staves off
changes in branded forms.

2.4.4.3 Willful ignorance and the aesthetics of brandedness
But because consumers are willfully ignorant of brands as such, while some brands
are reproduced more than others the liberties that producers take with the branded form
are many. They freely change the design of brands and their logos because, as they put it,
‘the customer does not know the difference; and if they do, they don’t care.’ As I found,
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producers themselves often didn’t know very much about the brands they were copying,
except that they were brands (and sometimes not even that).
In addition to ignorance about particular brands qua brands, producers are largely
(willfully) ignorant of intellectual property (IP) law. 6 Oftentimes producers assume that
the brand qua protected intellectual property doesn’t include the lexical item or the logo
but both together (cf. Reinach 2005: 48 on China). Only an exact replica would be
breaking the law, many reasoned. As such, low-level producers of such duplicates treat
branded logos and names as aesthetic objects, freely able to be borrowed the same way
one might borrow a color palette or geometrical shape. As one producer put it, echoing
the exact same discourse of consumers, ‘the question isn’t the brand per se, but whether
the design has that “look”’ (“look-aa irukkaa?”). Branded forms are used because they
are well designed. A design should be bright, attention grabbing, and interesting. Brand
logos do this because of their attractive visual form and because they are associated with
exteriority, wealth, and fashion. As producers and designers explained, it isn’t the brand
identity that is important, but its aesthetic and functional effects as style.
This position, of course, maintains deniability. However, for some producers at least,
their willful ignorance (their desire not to know, perhaps to avoid the implication that
they were intellectual pirates, or that they may become a target for legal action or other
forms of coercion at the hands of brand companies) dislocates the branded form from any
6

This ignorance may just as well been wishful thinking or feigned. It depends on the producer. Some
seemed to have a clear idea of what is infringement and what is not, while others seemed totally clueless.
Whatever we may believe about their mental states, producers in general act as if they are ignorant. My
own impression given my experiences with them is that they are willfully ignorant of IP law so as to
maintain a stance of deniability. It is important to note, as well, that dilution as a legal paradigm is not itself
totally worked out or coherent in Europe or the West (Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008), and that dilution
protection in statutory trademark law is itself relatively recent in India (Trademark Act of 1999, put into
effect in 2003; see Gangjee 2008 for discussion on the differences in the concept of “dilution” between tort
law and the statutory law, the former depending on the notion of “consumer confusion”).
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particular brand meta-discourse which would attempt to fix the fidelity of the branded
form.

2.4.4.4 Hybrid brand forms and the aesthetics of brandedness
Disregard for the brand qua brand identity and image (i.e., its authenticity) generates
the kinds of brand hybridity we saw in chapter 6. One producer, for example, explained
why he produced his shirts with one brand on the shirt, but with another brand on the
label and another brand on the cardboard tag attached to the garment by saying that
without the label, without the tag, it would look ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ (asingkam), the garment
would look “cheap.” But putting a “Comfort Casuals” label on the collar of a shirt with
“Nike” on the breast would make it look more “royal” and attractive (“look-aa irukku”).
The logic revealed here is that it isn’t consistency of brand identity that matters—because
largely no one cares—but that branded forms have a particular formal structure and
aesthetics, of which the label and tag are a part. Customers expect this structure, though
not the consistency of the subparts.
In talking about a garment that had Adidas’ three stripes logo paired with the FILA
name, one producer noted that he can recombine logos and wordings with no problem as
long as the design elements are aesthetically pleasing, separately and together. And if
consumers recognize at least one of the brand elements qua brand then this fact is simply
a bonus and increases the chances that such an item will be bought. The same producer
noted that such hybridization (as well as his “original” designs that utilized fictive brand
names) always follows the LOGO/NAME + DESIGN + WORDING formula. It is this formula
that is important, not its content as rigid designator of actual brands, he explained. As
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producers reiterated to me, ‘we don’t care what the brands are. We make them because
they sell (“move”) on the market. There is no need to know the brands, because
consumers don’t even know the brands.’
In short, using brand design elements participates in the aesthetics of brandedness,
even if it does not conform to the coherency and consistency demanded by brand metadiscourses, or the ontology of the brand qua BRAND. For producers, then, the brand is a
template, a complex aesthetic design whose subparts can be disassembled and
reassembled with other brand fractions or with other design elements (e.g., from cinema,
from pop culture). While the value that consumers attach to such branded forms as style
is the principle of their coherence, it is the willful ignorance of such forms as such and
such brands that is the principle of their incoherence, which is to say, their recombinability.

2.4.4.5 Misspellings, alterations, and the aesthetics of brandedness
This alternative ontology of the brand common to producers and consumers of
duplicates explains why the branded forms that circulate in Tamil Nadu tolerate a
surprising level of deviation from their brand source material. The diversity of spellings,
alternative designs, hybrids, and creative recontextualizations of designs described in
chapter 6 are a direct outgrowth of producers’ not caring about the fidelity (and thus
identity) of the brand as such (plus the fact that consumer’s apathy toward brand
authenticity makes them economically unaccountable). And producers don’t care because
fidelity to brand identity isn’t what makes such garments status-ful for their youth
customers, and thus profitable for producers. Rather it’s the capacity to be style.
345

For example, one producer showed me a pair of cargo shorts (photo 7.7). Having
found the image of a basketball player on the internet, he downloaded the logo for the
NBA and attached some loosely related sports and youth thematic wording.

Photo 7.7 NBA-inspired cargo shorts

He neither knew what the NBA was per se (just that it had something to do with
basketball), nor what the wordings meant. They too were cut and pasted from the internet
and then altered: indoor Æ evidoor; hoop Æ boop; winner hero Æ winner cero. What
was important was that the overall design fit a branded aesthetic, looked good, and was
seen as style. For this producer, as for many others, his lack of English knowledge
coupled with the fact that he knew that he most likely wouldn’t be held accountable for
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English spelling meant that transcription errors or anomalies that entered the design
weren’t likely to be corrected (see section 2.4.4.9; cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243).

2.4.4.6 Legality, the creativity of duplicates, and brand-inspired garments
Another reason why producers systematically distort the designs of logos and the
spellings of brand names is that such alterations are seen to help evade the illegalities of
counterfeiting. Indeed, when I began my research in this area of Chennai there was a
large amount of suspicion that I was an agent of a brand company out to get duplicate
producers (cf. Craciun’s 2008 fieldwork experience). Companies which had a stake in
retail in India—Adidas, Nike, Reebok—had apparently come down on a local Chennai
producer. This had the effect that: (a) producers were wary of me and denied the idea that
anyone was producing duplicates (or anything illegal), or downplayed the amount of such
production (attributing it to unnamed others); (b) producers switched production to
brands that didn’t have retail in India (e.g., Diesel, Timberland, Billabong); and (c)
producers altered the logos and names of brands in order to make them different enough
so as to not count as counterfeiting (to their mind). Thus, as one producer noted, he
changed Reebok to Rerock and Timberland to Timber Island. Similarly, the Nike swoosh
might be drawn with a more extreme curvature or flipped horizontally; or one of the three
parallel Adidas triangles might be reversed in direction (see chapter 6, photos 6.10, 6.11
for examples).
Alternatively, producers might hybridize their designs, in effect “remixing” them (cf.
Luvaas 2009). For example, one designer reasoned that if he took the design of a
particular brand (which included what he thought was the simple phrase “Pepe Jeans”
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and not a brand name) and put his own brand label on it, it meant he was not doing
anything illegal. While this is, perhaps, a clear case of illegality, the general principle of
deviation from the original as a mode of both creativity and legally protecting oneself
remains.
Here again we see the dual pressure: toward difference (in order to avoid legal
problems) with a coercive pressure toward sameness (in order to maintain the “look” or
aesthetic attractiveness of the copied branded form). While before we saw these
centripetal and centrifugal forces of difference and sameness with respect to market
competition, here we see it with respect to legal (dis-)incentivization.

2.4.4.7 Example: Producing “Columbian” shorts
Below I briefly look at how a particular branded form—the Columbia Sportswear
Company’s brand and logo—made its way from the blustery ski slopes of Oregon, USA
to the blistering heat of the local Chennai market.
During one of my research trips to one of the garment production areas in Chennai, I
struck up a conversation with a small-time producer of Bermuda shorts about his
production process. He gets his fabrics from export-surplus factories and makes a variety
of different kinds of Bermuda shorts utilizing different designs. While the various designs
that he embroiders on the shorts change (e.g., brand logos, wordings, graphic designs),
the cut and stitching of the shorts is conserved due to the time and money lost in teaching
his tailors new designs.
His most current model took the Columbia brand and logo as its inspiration. Fearing
legal problems he altered the name by adding an “n,” thus changing the brand name from
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“Columbia” to “Columbian.” He left the logo and font of the brand name the same,
convinced that this was enough to avoid any legal problems. I inquired as to why he
picked Columbia in the first place. Was it the brand image? Was it because it was popular
with youth (his main target market)? Was it because it had a definite presence in India? 7
In short, was there a “demand” for Columbia? He replied that he had heard of Columbia
and knew it was a legitimate foreign brand, though he had no idea about it beyond that.
Rather, he chose Columbia, he explained, because he was able to acquire 500
kilograms of original Columbia brand cardboard tags (used to affix price tags) for a very
low cost. Therefore he decided to start producing Columbia-inspired shorts for the local
market to which he appended the authentic, export-surplus tags. Here what is interesting
is that the aesthetics of the brand—logo, font, name, label, tag—becomes the operating
principle governing duplicate production only given the contingent availability of some
export-surplus subcomponent of that brand aesthetic. Production here is totally
independent of issues of brand image or recognition, not to mention “demand.” This
small-time producer’s fears of legality and the exigencies of production increasingly
distorted the original brand form, but loosely maintained its overall aesthetic
composition. Moreover, he indicated that it was not uncommon for wholesalers to see his
Columbia-inspired shorts but demand a different brand name, like Adidas or Fila, with
the same design and logo, thus further distorting and hybridizing the form, causing
mismatches between the cardboard tag, the brand name, font, and logo.

2.4.4.8 Producing your own brand, novel designs
7

While Columbia does not have, to my knowledge, a retail presence in India it does contract manufacture
of some of its products in Chennai.
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As we saw, while the branded form is often replicated with some level of fidelity by
producers, such replication isn’t governed by brand meta-discourses per se (or by the
ontology of branded forms qua BRAND) but by a more general aesthetics of brandedness.
This aesthetics, discussed in this chapter and the last, governs the creative design
practices of producers whether they are copying, distorting, hybridizing, or creating their
own brands, thereby maintaining the general structural formula of brand name, logo (or
design), plus “wordings” (a slogan or script-based graphic design). In this section I look
at how producers come up with novel designs that aren’t connected in any direct way to
existing brands, but are informed by this aesthetics.
Like duplicate producers, producers who make their own “original” garments are
inspired by, or copy, existing designs. They get such designs in the same manner as those
who make duplicates. And as with duplicate producers, such inspired designs are also
altered from the source of the inspiration due to concerns with legality, exigencies of
production, transcription errors, and the desire for the distinctiveness of their product
(and thus competitive advantage). In distinction to duplicate producers, however, such
producers append either their own brands (which a few had even trademarked in India) or
noun phrases which sound like and function like brands but are not trademarked and
command no recognition in the market. These are often accompanied by distinctive
design elements and/or longer phrases that function as something like brand slogans.
While a few producers I met were concerned with producing their own brands, many
producers, especially those catering to lower middle-class youth, produced garments that
could only be described as quasi-brands. For example, one producer took the phrase
“Golden Eagle” (which it turns out is a company that makes flashes for cameras) and
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attached it to an embroidered design of an eagle which he downloaded from the internet.
He reasoned that because “Golden Eagle” sounds like a legitimate garment brand, it had a
good chance of selling reasonably well.
Such designs are highly modular, taking up to four or five different elements (quasibrand names, quasi-brand logos, quasi-brand slogans, and general images or designs)
which are combined in various permutations, often internally incoherent. Indeed, each of
these elements might be borrowed from a different source, altered, distorted, and then
recontextualized in a novel pastiche (see chapter 6, section 2.7 for examples). For
example, one producer would simply take headlines from English newspaper sports
articles at random to generate “wordings”—“Brilliant Win,” “Difficult Struggle,” “Final
Race”—and pair them with vaguely thematically related common nouns—“Sports,”
“Gladiator,” “Emperor,” “Winner,” “Champion Boys,” “Cowboy.” He would then pair
these with loosely thematically related designs (a running body, a ball and bat, a horse,
etc.). Another producer generated his fictive brands and slogans through brainstorming
semantically related words to clothing: “Youth Fashion,” “Fashion-21,” “Style,” “Jeans,”
etc. (see photos 6.12, 6.19 in chapter 6, photo 7.4 in this chapter). As we can see, then,
the logic here is that insofar as any lexical item can plausibly function as a brand name
(i.e., are intelligible as rigid designators of possible companies), any word-like thing is
fair game. For example “Zehewutt,” which to my knowledge is a nonsense concatenation
of letters that loosely takes the shape of a word, is one such quasi-brand I encountered
during my fieldwork.
In short, the whole logic of production derives from a general aesthetic of
brandedness but hinges on the willful ignorance or disregard for particular brands as
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such. Hence the seemingly ad hoc character of the design process. In Figure 7.1 below I
schematize the different kinds of brand formations involved in the aesthetics of
brandedness.
Figure 7.1 Brand formations: From quasi- to authentic brands
no brand as such

letters and wordings in
the form of a fictive
brand
“CHAMPION FIGHTER”

authentic (but of different
product type)

authentic brands

borrowed from
another product

cryptoduplicate

known brand
duplicate

“GOLDEN EAGLE”

“DIESEL”

“NIKE”

non-duplicate / duplicate
ignorance / knowledge
local garments

authentic garments

2.4.4.9 English as aesthetic object
The most aestheticized aspect of such branded forms—and this is true for highfidelity duplicates, fictive-, and quasi- brands—is the use of English, or more accurately
the Roman script. 8 From the production point of view, why are all branded forms (and
slogans) in English (cf. Yurchak 2006: ch. 5 in Soviet Russia; Weiss 2002: 102 on
Tanzanian shop names; Stanlaw 1992 on Japanese usage of English)?
I first posed the question to designers and producers as, why not put Tamil words on
shirts? Why not have Tamil language brands for youth garments? This idea was almost
comical to producers. Writing it Tamil was highly problematic, they explained. First of
all, it meant that your garments could only be sold in Tamil Nadu. By contrast, English is
8

Indeed, one producer would borrow proper names from non-English European languages like German and
French to generate his fictive brand names.
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a common language across India and thus transcends linguistic community and
geographical location. More importantly, if you write things in Tamil they have to be
semantically meaningful. This is because consumers will evaluate such writing based on
its denotational and referential meaning (cf. Thomas 2009 on indigenous Mayan brands
in Guatemala). By implication, then, such garments would have an addressivity (i.e., they
would be alter-focal); their semantic content would engage the onlooker and thus present
a danger. They would present a danger because such meaningful wordings can be more
easily rejected as silly, trite, clichéd, offensive, etc. By contrast, English is largely
denotationally opaque for producers and consumers. This isn’t because producers or
consumers don’t understand what the phrases mean (though sometimes they don’t), but
because they don’t care. Or rather, it isn’t relevant to the pragmatic functionality and
aesthetic attractiveness of the signs used (cf. Tarlo 1996: 242–243).
Rather than a communicative code, Roman script is an aesthetic object, and thus does
not address per se but rather functions ego-focally as style. It is precisely because
producers disregard branded forms qua brands and English qua denotational-referential
code, and instead reanalyze both as aesthetic objects pragmatically capable of performing
style, that they make shirts with strings of nonsense English letters without a second
thought (see chapter 6, section 2.7 for examples). English is simply another element of
design. Even if nonsensical, English, as one producer put it, ‘has that look’ (i.e., ‘looks
good’) (“look-aa irukku”). English is used because it is style. As another producer put it,
“English NNaa fashion” ‘If it’s (in) English (then) it’s fashion.’
Given this, it becomes necessary to realize that (duplicate) brand names are always
dually functioning: first, as iconic indexicals of brands; and second, as aesthetic objects,
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as design elements (indexes of brandedness). This is one of the reasons why brand names
are so elastic in the hands of producers. Like a line that can be curved, elongated, and
stretched, English words and brand names can be distorted, letters replaced, dropped,
doubled. Just as a zigzag line might enhance the design of a shirt, so too could a brand
name or equally a string of nonsense letters (cf. Stanlaw 1992: 73–75; Tarlo 1996: 242–
243). It also explains the disregard of brands as proprietary rigid designators. As general
design elements they are common property, not linked to any one person or company.

2.5 Summary
What I have shown in this chapter is that the production and circulation of branded
forms in garments consumed by youth—in export surplus, literal duplication, and in
inspired moments of copying or novel design—is largely incidental to specific brands as
such but highly attuned to brandedness in general. It is determined by particular
movements of global capital—the cheap labor of India making possible export surplus of
branded forms and materials necessary to copy or be inspired by them—and the
seemingly ad hoc logic of the local market (also see Pang 2008 for discussion of
something similar in China; cf. Craciun 2008, Luvaas 2009). Interestingly, both the
vagaries of global capital and local garment production are tangential and insensitive to
the consumption of particular brands as brands in local Tamil markets. First, exportsurplus goods are calibrated to foreign tastes in foreign markets. Second, production for
the local market is calqued off of export surplus. Third, producers for the local market
largely assume, with a few notable exceptions, that any old brand or combination of
English words/letters can achieve success. As such, there is an unruly proliferation of
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brands, seemingly unrelated to consumer knowledge or demand, or the meta-discursive
technologies (like marketing, advertising, consumer research) to inculcate either.
However, the exigencies of production and the indexical value of brands as exterior
(but not necessarily as brand X, Y, or Z) among both consumers and producers explains
why the branded form is central to youth fashion; that is, why style in clothing operates
under an aesthetic of brandedness and not something else. The branded form is central,
first, because the designs and materials that make such production possible literally come
from the debris of global capital as it produces and circulates brands. Second, brands
provide the symbolic materials for such youth forms because the brand is diagrammatic
of concepts of youth status (style) and ‘youth’ more generally, as I argued in chapter 6.
As such, the brand is calqued off of and co-opted, and thus abstracted from and
generalized into a more general aesthetic of brandedness.
As I have shown, the production of branded forms, while seemingly ad hoc and
schizophrenic in relationship to the consumption of particular brands qua brands, is
totally coherent under the alternative ontology of the branded form qua style. Production
is ad hoc and blind as to what brands are or mean because what is relevant for such
production and consumption isn’t the brand per se, but an aesthetic of brandedness and
its pragmatic entailments as style. Under such a meta-discourse, many otherwise
unrelated or disparate semiotic elements (authentic brands, fictive brands, celebrity
proper names, nouns associated with youth fashion, common noun phrases, words with
roughly English morphological shape, strings of Roman letters) are all tokens of the same
type: style. They all are regimented under the same meta-pragmatic discourse. It is the
coordination of moments of production and consumption under this common meta355

pragmatic framework that must be understood in order to make sense of branded forms
among youth in Tamil Nadu; and as I argue in chapter 8, to make sense of the brand in
general.

3. Conclusions
3.1 “Counterfeiting” what?
The social life of the Western branded forms in Tamil Nadu discussed in this chapter
cancels out a number of assumptions about brands that are taken as natural in the
literature on brands and their counterfeits. For example, understandings of what a brand
is and isn’t (specifically in Western trademark law) up until the late 20th century
primarily revolved around the notion that using another’s branded form is counterfeit if
consumers think that a product of branded form X came from someone other than its
authorized producer (i.e., it creates “consumer confusion”) (Lury 2004: ch. 5; Wilkins
1992, 1994; Kriegel 2004 Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008). In
the most recent incarnation, the boundary between the brand and its counterfeit
increasingly pivots around notions of “dis-association,” “dilution,” or “tarnishment” of
brand image (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe 1996; Frow 1996, 2002; Moore 2003; Wang
2003: ch. 2; Lury 2004: ch. 5, 2008; Arvidsson 2005; Pang 2006, 2008; Bently 2008;
Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Dinwoodie 2008; Ng 2008; Griffiths 2008; Manning 2010;
on Indian trademark law and dilution see Gangjee 2008). 9 A product in this newer
understanding is counterfeit if its self-reflexive (or at least, so construed) construction as
such and such a branded commodity reminds customers of the trademark holder’s brand
9

Note that the law, either in the West or India, is not totally coherent or consistent regarding the legal
status of brands, and that both concepts (passing off and dilution) are relevant in contemporary legal
understandings of brands.
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in a way that interferes with that brand’s image, associations, or distinctiveness. Here, the
issue isn’t confusion or dissimulation, but the extent to which someone else’s good can
reduce brand equity as it is played out as a set of associations in consumers’ minds. In
both cases, counterfeiting in the West depends on the mental states of consumers and
those who apperceive branded forms qua brands of such and such a type. And yet, in a
situation where there is willful brand ignorance, as we saw among Tamil youth, neither of
these cases applies. Youth are not confused as to whether a duplicate is real or fake, and
they have no associations attached to particular brands.
To what extent are such garments counterfeit brands then, as opposed to simply
garments? Under such an alternative ontology does the notion of “counterfeit” even make
sense (cf. Vann 2006, Reinach 2005 on the problematics of the concept of ‘authenticity’
and ‘fake’ in Vietnam and China, respectively)? If we abide by the feeling that such
garments are still indeed counterfeits, I would argue that neither view of the brand—as
reliable source-indexical of producer or as brand equity consisting of “mind share” (see
Holt 2004 for discussion and critique of this concept)—is of any help. What is revealed is
simply the brute legal reality that the ontological category of BRAND is underwritten by a
particular understanding of just profit flow: counterfeiting exists when profits aren’t
going to the “right” person (i.e., the person who owns the intellectual property). Even
here the core of the brand is revealed to be a particular meta-semiotic structure of the law
governing particular brand tokens as mediators of profit flow (i.e., as tracing the
commodity chain backwards). This is independent of consumer mental states.
More generally, how is it possible to say that form X1 is a(n illegitimate) copy of
form X, and not simply that we are dealing with two separate forms (cf. Kriegel 2004:
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256–262; Johns 2009 on early debates about copyright and piracy)? I have implicitly
argued that to understand something as a duplicate of something else—for example, a
brand “original”—is to be able to regiment both duplicate and original according to some
meta-semiotic principle which reckons duplicate and original as fractionally (dis)similar
in such and such ways. That is, only with respect to a common classificatory frame can
two such forms be seen as similar or different in the first place. And yet I have argued
that the most relevant meta-semiotic principle for Tamil youth consumers and duplicate
producers isn’t BRAND—which turns on the distinction between “authentic” and “fake”
branded forms (as a truth function)—but the aesthetics of exteriority and style which
distinguish between objects which can and cannot pragmatically entail status-raising (as a
performative function). Under this meta-semiotic principle, then, the function COPY OF
(BRAND TYPE) X becomes less meaningful, as do concepts of brand authenticity more
generally (see Vann 2006).
This isn’t to say that we cannot evaluate such goods as counterfeits. Indeed, we can.
But it isn’t inherent in the forms involved, nor the mental states of consumers or
producers. Rather, to view them as deficient copies is simply to align oneself with a
particularly interested and normative position (the law, the IP owner). Indeed, a large part
of the problem for brand companies in places like India is that many people don’t
evaluate branded forms under the BRAND ontology that underwrites the brand in the West
(or minimally, in Western law) (Vann 2005, 2006; Pang 2008; Manning and Uplisashvili
2007; Manning 2009; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5). A major task for Western governments and
brand companies, then, is the socialization (or coercion as the case many be) of
consumers, producers, and governments to this meta-semiotic principle, to the ontology
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of the BRAND (Bush et al. 1989: 61, 64; McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wee et al. 1995:
41–42; Cordell et al. 1996: 51; Thomas 2009).
To understand how branded forms work in south India, then, requires that we are able
to explicate not simply the forms, but the regimentation of such forms into larger metasemiotic frameworks and how these meta-discourses inform actual events of interaction
involving such forms. As we saw, the meta-semiotic framework relevant for Tamil youth
involves brands, but always only as part of a more general classification of branded forms
as instances of aestheticized exteriority (rather than as source-index or coherent brand
image). This tangential co-opting of the brand is reflected in the input of branded forms
into local economies as themselves tangential, integrated into production in ways ad hoc
to brand identity.
The problem of “counterfeit” or “piracy” as analytical concepts, then, is that they
always already recruit such forms to a highly partial and particular (ethnocentric) metasemiotic framework (Western IP law 10 ), one which may or may not actually be in play
for the relevant social domain of individuals at hand. But to realize that such, essentially
legal, meta-semiotic frameworks are, in many important aspects, irrelevant to
understanding the social life of branded forms in Tamil Nadu it is necessary to bring to
bear an ethnographic investigation of both the production and consumption of such forms
and how they are inter-articulated with respect to each other (cf. Nakassis and Dean
2007; Nakassis 2009 on this methodological point). Moreover, it requires situating such
moments of production and consumption with respect to larger issues unrelated to brands

10

And within the law, which is itself not necessarily internally coherent, to particular views on trademarks
that are historically more recent (i.e., the concept of “dilution”).
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as such (e.g., the construction of ‘youth,’ its projection into concepts of youth status, and
their negotiation in the peer group).

3.2 “Demand” for what?
A similar assumption that we take as natural under the BRAND ontology that is
canceled out by the Tamil ontology of branded forms is that the counterfeiting of brand X
responds to “demand” for brand X (e.g., Bush et al. 1989: 59; Bloch et al. 1993: 28, 35;
McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wee et al. 1995: 19; Phau et al. 2001: 46; Phillips 2005). In
this reasoning, the duplicate is insidious and illegal because it poaches the brand identity
and image that has, through the brand company’s investment of time and capital in
research and development, created demand. The counterfeit, thus, rides off of the demand
of the original branded good.
Yet, in Tamil Nadu at least, for most brands that are duplicated there is no such
“demand.” Taking the Nike swoosh example from chapters 5 and 6, for a sizable part of
the population the consumption of Nike swooshes isn’t driven by “Nike” at all. Rather, it
is driven by concepts of youth status as they are embodied and articulated in
Rajinikanth’s style. If anything, actually, it is Nike which is poaching the brand equity of
Rajinikanth, free-riding off his hard work as an iconic actor.
Moreover, the supply of counterfeits isn’t related to even the idea of such a demand,
either with respect to export surplus (whose supply is totally independent of local
demand) or duplicates (whose supply is simply an extension of whatever is being
produced for export). In production and consumption, it isn’t this or that brand that
people make and consume, but a branded form that conforms to a larger aesthetic of
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brandedness. The brand becomes a pure diacritic, one among many that can index style,
but inscrutable for any specific brand meaning. The branded form in Tamil Nadu, even if
faithful to the brand’s “authentic” form, is empty outside the BRAND ontology as upheld
in Western IP law.
We can see how the concept of “demand” is highly problematic here, precisely
because moments of production and consumption (and thus supply and demand) are so
highly mediated: by foreign markets; by the requirements of global capital; and by Tamil
concepts of status, exteriority, and aesthetics. In such a situation it becomes meaningless
to argue that consumption of commodity X analyzable as a token of the brand type Y
(either as authentic or duplicate) is a result of demand for Y precisely because what is
informing consumption may not be Y at all (i.e., the category that the brand owner is
attempting to discipline the consumer to) but some other principle Z (e.g., style). The
notion of “demand” requires that brand tokens and brand types are tightly regimented and
calibrated, such that some commodity can stand in as a token of the type. Yet such
regimentation, as we noted, is exactly what is absent among Tamil youth consumers and
producers.
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Chapter 8 – Theorizing the Brand: Meta-Semiosis and Simulation

1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
In this chapter I theorize the brand as a semiotic object. I do this from two
perspectives on the limits of the brand: first, from the perspective of the aesthetics of
brandedness discussed in chapters 6 and 7; second, from the perspective of the
counterfeit, or brand simulacrum/simulation. First I give a brief literature review on work
on brands to indicate lacunae that this chapter addresses. Then I look at the semiotics of
the brand, using discussion from chapters 6 and 7 as well as work by others on the brand.
In the last section of the chapter I look at the brand as simulacrum and simulation, based
on my particular reading of Baudrillard. Throughout, my goal is to develop an
ethnographically motivated theory of the brand. I do this, however, by skirting along the
boundaries of this category, focusing as much on when a brand is not as when it is.

1.2 Literature on brands
Work on brands and trademarks spans many disciplines and audiences, from legal
(Bentley 2008; Gangjee 2008; Higgins 2008) and economic history (Wilkins 1992, 1994;
Kriegel 2004); legal theory (Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Ng 2008); the sociology of
brands (Lury 2002, 2004; Moor 2003; Arvidsson 2005); cultural studies (Frow 1996,
2002); anthropologists of cultural (Coombe 1996; Mazzarella 2003; Foster 2005, 2007;
Vann 2005, 2006; Wilk 2006; Leach 2008) and linguistic varieties (Moore 2003;
Manning 2009, 2010; Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Agha n.d.); to the copious
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management and marketing literatures (Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker 1991; Jones 1994;
Alexander and Schouten 1998; Sherry 1998, 2005; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000; Holt
2002, 2004, 2006; Calkins 2005) and polemical works addressed to a more popular
audience (Klein 2000[1999], Quart 2003). 1
While much empirical work has dealt with brands and some have outlined theoretical
accounts of brands (Moore 2003; Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005), there appears a gulf
between the two (Holt 2006: 30). It seems, as per the recent turn in marketing toward
actual moments of consumption (Holt 2002; Arvidsson 2005; Frank 1997), that by and
large the only literatures where the theorization of the brand is empirically driven from
actual instances of consumption are in the marketing and business history literatures.
Ironically, sociologists and anthropologists interested in theorizing the brand have based
their accounts on syntheses of the marketing literature or from analysis of brand metadiscourses such as corporation internal communication, trade journals, marketing and
advertising campaigns, and product hermeneutics (e.g., Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Moore
2003; Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2007; 2008; Manning and Uplisashavili 2007;
Manning 2009) rather than focus on actual empirical work on brand consumption/use. 2
This is unfortunate because anthropologists working on brands—often in regions where
the brand functions most distinctly from brand meta-discourses—are afforded a unique

1

In this chapter I focus on the notion of the brand with the implicit assumption that the brand subsumes the
trademark. We can think of trademark as that semiotic element of the brand that is stably regimented and
protected by legal discourses. By contrast the brand includes a host of other features, some of which fall
under the purview of the law, and some of which do not (e.g., marketing strategies; corporate cultural
identities linked to brand image; untrademarkable elements of brand) (Davis 2008; Gangjee 2008; Ginsburg
2008; Manning 2010).
2
This is doubly ironic because the business literature cites and follows the methodologies of anthropology,
“thick description” and all (Fournier 1998: 344; see Alexander and Schouten 1998; Sherry 1998, 2005,
2008); see Gardner and Levy (1955) for an early cry for qualitative social science research; Sherry’s (2005:
40) “brandthropology”; and Holt’s (2004) symbolic anthropology influenced marketing theory.
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perspective on the brand, as works by Halstead (2002), Vann (2005, 2006), Yurchak
(2006: ch. 5), Craciun (2008, 2009), and Luvaas (2009) show.
One result of relying on brand meta-discourses as descriptions of brands in the world
is a particular kind of apocalyptic anxiety about a fascistic future where the world is
overrun by brands (Casson 1994; Klein 2000[1999]; Quart 2003; see Agha n.d.: 8, 39 for
a similar point). As we will see, this problem is symptomatic of methodological and
epistemological problems, and not necessarily about the social life of brands in the world
per se. In particular, it results from taking brand meta-discourses at face value, and then
literalizing them, projecting their prescriptive meta-pragmatic discourse as descriptive of
the world as such.
To steer clear of these problems I offer three starting points for analysis: (1) locating
the analysis of branded forms outside of the culture where brand meta-discourses are
produced: in Tamil Nadu, India; (2) looking at the actual consumption of brands rather
than brand meta-discourses as such; and (3) looking at the brand from the perspective of
its illicit twin, the counterfeit or duplicate product.

2. Semiotics of the brand
2.1 When is a brand?
How might we theorize the brand from the perspective of the willful ignorance of
Tamil youth and duplicate producers discussed in chapters 6 and 7? What does such
willful ignorance of brands coupled with an orientation to branded forms tell us about the
semiotic composition of the brand? While the brand is a semiotically multi-form object
and thus a heterogeneous category (vis-à-vis the type of products or services associated
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with it, its historical context, its context of use, how it is marketed), I argue that the key
semiotic feature of the brand is its reflexive meta-semiotic structure. Below I develop this
argument vis-à-vis debates in social theory about the ontology of the commodity form in
Western capitalism and its relationship to brands in late(r) capitalism. This genealogy of
the brand in the West is complemented by discussion of contemporary on the ground
engagement with branded forms in Tamil Nadu, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

2.2 From quality to quantity
For those who have theorized capitalism vis-à-vis the ontological status of the object,
the history of capitalism is the history of the increasing abstraction and rationalization of
the object (see Mazzarella 2003: ch. 2 for discussion and critique). Marx’s (1976)
formulation of the commodity and Benjamin’s (1935) formulation of the concept of
“aura” are perhaps the most cited, though we may also note Simmel’s (1978[1907])
concern with the quantification of qualities under capitalism; early Baudrillard’s
(2001[1968], 2001[1970], 2001[1972], 2001[1976]) work on symbolic exchange and the
principle of equivalence; and the situationalists on commodification and spectacle
(Debord 1967; see Best 1994). For all these authors, capitalism fundamentally changes
the ontology of objects.
Marx’s (1976) classic formulation of the commodity form is based on the distinction
of use value and exchange value where the former is based on that which is self-evident,
universal, and natural in objects: its utility and its ability to satisfy (authentic) needs.
Exchange value, by contrast, is historically newer as it is based on particular social
relations of capitalist and laborer. These social relations establish the object as part of a
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set of equivalences (ultimately with money), thus abstracting exchange value from use
value (and in the case of the universal equivalent, converting its use value as value more
generally). In this understanding, use value is singular, unique, uncomparable; by
contrast, exchange value is abstract, universal, and comparable. 3
In a similar vein, Simmel’s (1978[1907]) philosophy of money focuses on the
transformation of the qualities of objects into quantities. Simmel is concerned with how,
in modernity, objects (and subjects) increasingly are quantified, leading to a particular
kind of cognitive orientation toward the world. For Baudrillard (2001[1968], 2001[1970],
2001[1972], 2001[1976]), capitalism is a radical rupture wherein symbolic exchange—
exemplified in the gift, the potlatch, and ritual prestations (Mauss 1954)—forms an Ur
ontology of the object (the substitute for use value, in fact). This ontology is radically
changed through the reanalysis of the world of objects under the principle of commodity
equivalence (i.e., as a pure Marxist commodity) and the structural law of equivalence
more generally (i.e., as a pure Saussurean sign). The history of the object, then, is the
history of abstraction, rationalization, and the emptying out, or implosion of, “authentic”
and “genuine” “meaning”; it is the transformation of the object as that which is
imbricated in social relations of reciprocity (Baudrillard 2001[1976]) to that which
mediates exchange between anomic, autonomous individuals (see Frow 1996).
Benjamin (1935) similarly takes up this issue, but shifts the focus to the reproduction
of objects in general; in particular, how mechanical reproduction and industrialization

3

While the commodity may be fetishized, reintroducing a kind of quantized quality to it (i.e., the seeming
agency of commodities qua exchange values), this is a mystification covering both the abstract nature of
the object and the concrete social relations that are its conditions of possibility. This fetish is not the reconcretization of the abstract, then, but the (seeming) unmediated quality of quantified value embodied in
things (i.e., commodities).
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have radically altered cultural (or artistic) representations. For him it is the ability to
produce exact copies in large quantities that fundamentally changes the object’s ontology.
In earlier epochs (marked by earlier reproductive technologies), objects had an “aura.”
They projected this aura through their unique history, the semiotic chain that links each
individual with respect to the object in question and the object over time. The object is
characterized by its sensuous materiality, indexical origin, and thus its authenticity and
authority. (We might say, following Peirce [1992], its irreducible Secondness.) It is this
ontology that that gives objects meaning and value (especially highly valorized ritual
objects and art). The history of objects is the history of increasingly accurate and exact
reproduction: from coin reproduction, terra cotta, bronze, lithography, to finally
photography, audio recording, and film (cf. Bazin 2004; Kracauer 1960). With each step
the object’s history, its authenticity, its authority is displaced under the (more than)
perfect copy. This links back up with the concerns of Marx, Simmel, and Baudrillard
regarding the quantification of objects and cognition:
“To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception
whose “sense of the universal equality of things” has increased to such a degree
that it extracts even from a unique object by means of reproduction” (Benjamin
1935: sect. 3, para. 2).
Or as Benjamin later states: “quantity has been transmuted into quality” (ibid., sect. 15,
para. 1).

2.3 From quantity back to (simulated) quality
If the history of the object is its increasing quantification, its increasing detachment
from “authentic” social relations—that is, its de-indexicalization—and its conversion into
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the abstract commodity form, what do we make of the brand? The brand is precisely that
semiotic form which attempts to reintroduce “aura” or quality back into the commodity
form (Lury 2004; Frow 1996; Mazzarella 2003: 192; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2005, 2007;
Agha n.d.; cf. Callon et al. 2002). 4
Like the author function (Frow 1996, 2002; Kriegel 2004: 250), and the parallel text
of the movie star (Benjamin 1935), the brand attempts to provide an element of
authenticity, authority (often provided in the last instance by the law), and meaning to the
objects which fall under its umbrella. It figures itself as filling the vacuum of the unique,
“real” history of the object, a history presumably liquidated by its mechanical
reproduction, and transformed and decontextualized from its embeddedness in social
interactions with familiar shop keepers to mere economic transaction among anonymous
agents involving goods of relatively unknown origin and quality (except through the
presence of the brand label) (Wilkins 1994). It is no surprise, then, that modern brands
appear precisely when mass production and distribution emerge (Wilkins 1992; cf. Johns
2009 on copyright).
Through the brand and its reflexive positioning in advertising, marketing, and
packaging, commodities in the era of consumerism are projected as more and more
personal, singular, and unique; and more and more able to satisfy our inner needs and

4

Interestingly, here “aura” is precisely a function of the sameness—the non-uniqueness—of brand tokens
with respect to each other, insofar as this non-uniqueness is productive in instantiating a larger unity, the
brand type. It is the fact that every brand token is the same (or similar) that makes it capable of functioning
as part of the brand type. Rather than the “aura” adhering in the same unique object over diachronic history,
the brand’s aura adheres over multiple tokens synchronically (as part of the brand type) and diachronically
(the brand type over time).
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desires, to be integrated into our individual lifestyles and into “authentic” community
formations. 5
The ultimate aim, of course, is to reorganize a market which is otherwise presumably
organized quantitatively by price (Aaker 1991: x, ch. 1; Jones 1994; Lury 2008) and thus
reintroduce a principle of qualitative difference between commodities which, due to
mechanical reproduction and technical mastery, are increasingly functionally similar
(Rajagopal 1999; Feldwick 1999[1991]: 26; Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker and
Joachimsthaler 2000; Sherry 2005). It is also presumably a principle to preempt
skepticism and resistance to consumerism as coercive, inauthentic, and instrumentally
rational (Holt 2002, 2004; Moor 2003) and replace such skepticism with (quasi)reciprocal (and dependent) social relations (Fournier 1998; Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Holt
2006; Agha n.d.), 6 community (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), and even brand “love”
(Foster 2005; Arvidsson 2005). All this is, of course, in order to provide a competitive
edge and increase profits and brand equity (Aaker 1991; Jones 1994).
The brand, then, becomes a principle whereby supply and demand can be redirected
from functionality or price toward qualitative uniqueness (notionally in the unique
“meanings” associated to the brand; legally as a semiotic monopoly of naming and
product extension [Davis 2008]), and thus how the market can be both segmented
internally and maximized overall (Lury 2008). The brand, then, attempts to direct the
tendency of commodities to maximize their circulation, by linking a set of commodified
5

For discussion of this aspect of brands see: Baudrillard 2001[1968]; Sawchuck 1994; Frow 1996, 2002;
Callon et al. 2002; Lury 2002, 2004; Moore 2003; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2005, 2007; Agha n.d.: 10–26;
in the marketing literature see: Fournier 1998; Cowley 1999[1991]; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Holt 2002,
2004; McGracken 2005. On community formations see: Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Klein 2000[1999];
Coombe 1996.
6
See Leach (2008: 341), Lury (2004), Arvidsson (2005), and Mazzarella (2003: 195) for a critique of the
notion of brand–consumer reciprocity and its asymmetries.
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objects/services under the umbrella of a brand, as a principle of scarcity, in order to
generate profits (Frow 1996).
In this section I have argued that the brand figures itself as reinjecting quality—aura,
authenticity, authority, and meaning—into quantified commodity forms. What is the
semiotic organization of the brand that allows it breathe life into the empty forms of
capitalism from which it is necessarily built up? In section 2.4 I take up the semiotic
organization of the brand qua BRAND, looking at it as a Peircean sign of a particularly
reflexive type. 7

2.4. Semiotic organization of the brand
2.4.1 Introduction
One of the major problems with work on brands is the tendency to focus on the brand
as something mysteriously (im)material (e.g., Lury 2004; Shields 2003: 177; Arvidsson
2005; see Feldwick 1999[1991]: 19, 21 on this tendency within marketing discourse).
Indeed, what is interesting about brands is that they are composite semiotic objects. This
complexity has prompted many a writer on brands to reflect in wonderment—reminiscent
of medieval scholastics’ debates on universals and particulars—at how a brand can be
both physically material (an “object”) and metaphysically immaterial (a set of
associations, concepts, mental states) (see Moore 2003; Manning 2010 for a similar
critique). As I will argue, while brands—like other symbolic signs (including the lexical
item “brand”)—often designate discrete material objects, the semiotic complexity of
7

In my discussion I will be using the Peircean (1992) terms with his technical meanings: qualisign,
token/sinsign; type/legisign in discussing types of sign-vehicles or representamena; icon, index, symbol in
discussing the ground of signs; rheme/rhematic sign and dicent signs as constituents of more complex signs
like propositions; and interpretant for the more developed sign (to a mind). For discussion of Peirce’s
semiotic see Parmentier (1994) and Lee (1997).
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brands has led to a dual tendency by theorists to naturalize and concretize the brand when
it should not be (e.g., Lury’s [2004] “object-ifying” of the brand 8 ) and abstracting from it
too much when it should not be (elevating the brand to a mystical metaphysics).
However, if we are clear on the semiotic organization of the brand, the mystification of
the brand as material/immaterial and the false problems that follow from it can be
avoided.
We need to ask the simple epistemological question: how do we know when we are in
the presence of a brand? At first glance, there are at least two obvious ways: (1) we come
in space–time contiguity with some material thing (e.g., a logo, label, unique form/color
combination) which indexes the presence of the brand; (2) the brand is invoked virtually
through discourse about the brand or other semiotic activity that typifies the brand. In the
first case we are presented with an instance of the brand sensorially. In the second, we are
presented with the brand through a representation of it. Both may happen at the same
time as well.
The point here is that the presumably immaterial thing called “brand” is only ever
knowable and experiencable (and hence has an empirical existence that can be studied)
through instances of it, either as tokens of the brand type or as virtual representations of
either. What are the semiotic features of brands that make it possible to be experiencable
in this way?

8

Indeed, despite her claims otherwise Lury (2004: 16) is guilty of misplaced concreteness. This is revealed
by her treatment of the brand as concretized projection off of virtual descriptions of it by brand metadiscourses. It is noteworthy, then, that all her hedges—of not assuming the brand to be a natural unity, a
single thing, etc.—are located in the “Coda” sections of each chapter. They are literally afterthoughts,
addenda. Moreover, such auto-critiques and qualifications are never taken up in later discussion. They do
not change how she theorizes the brand. They are alibis, deniability clauses.
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2.4.2 As type
The brand is a type (or legisign). Brands are classificatory principles which categorize
some range of signs (objects, services, spaces, experiences, etc.) as tokens (or sinsigns) of
the brand type (what Pang 2008: 128 calls “metonymic displacement”). That is, brands
introduce a principle of differentiation between similar things (which may be organized
by some other classificatory principle; e.g., functionality) while grouping otherwise
distinct things as the same (by the criterion of brand membership), with the hopes of
creating competitively advantageous classes of commodities. (Note that there is nothing
special about the brand in being a type-level sign. We may ask the same question about
any kind of classificatory object: e.g., words in a language, literary genres, or
cultural/functional types of objects.)
To this extent, the brand as type is a regulator of similarity, or iconism, between
objects, regimenting the range of objects which can be seen to be similar (i.e., members
of the type) and excluding others. As we discuss below, it is this regimentation (or [non]flexibility) of iconism which attempts to: (a) differentiate brands from each other; and
(b) ground the authority of the brand through classifications of “authentic” versus
“inauthentic” (as fetishized in the form itself). It is this control of iconism that allows
tokens of the brand to function as instances of particular brand types, and thus exclude
counterfeits and competing brands as not part of the brand type. But how is this
classificatory relationship possible?

2.4.3 As index
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Branded tokens are indexes of the brand type. In addition, the brand type—embodied
most saliently in the trademark—is itself an index, in particular a rigid designator (Kripke
1980), that points to a presumed origin of production or “good will.” This functions
analogously to proper names whereby the brand type and its tokens index its source (or
indexical target) by virtue of the apperceiver of the brand token being acquainted with the
semiotic chain that radiates from some (presumed) “baptismal event” (Durant 2008). To
this extent, any part of the brand type which can be instantiated in tokens of it (e.g., the
brand name or logo; a branded event [Moor 2003, Alexander and Schouten 1998] or
space [Sherry 1998]; or distinctive and recognizable color combinations [Davis 2008;
Ginsburg 2008]) can be indexical of this (presumed) origin. 9 In this way, then, brands
(and more specifically, trademarks) are distinctive diacritics of source/origin (Coombe
1996; Bently 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Durant 2008).
What is important to note here is that brands are particular kinds of indexes, rigid
designators, whose indexicality is a function of socialization to them as such. (This is
because their contiguity is highly mediated by temporally and spatially dispersed “speech
chains” [Agha 2007a].) This is in at least two ways. First, we come to know of particular
brands qua indexes of such and such an origin through socialization to the ontology of
BRAND

more generally; that is, the idea that brands exist and have such and such a being

(see section 2.4.5). Second, we are socialized to specific brands in particular: Nike is a
brand, Reebok is a brand, etc. Such socialization may occur via multiple media: everyday
conversation and word of mouth; or experience of brand tokens themselves, though to
9

See Gandelman (1985); Frow (1996: 176ff., 2002: 62–63); Coombe (1996); Manning (2010) on the
signature as parallel to trademark; as indexical sinsign “I was here”; indexical legisign—the proper name;
and as indexical symbol, the figure associated with the proper name, the author/brand; in sum, as a dicent
symbolic legisign.
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even know these to be tokens (e.g., as a logo) and not as something else (e.g., a simple
design) requires some meta-discourse that informs us of this connection, such as
advertising or the law. It is such socialization which makes the type-level functionality of
brands possible, and thus their rigid designation as well.
It has been noted by many that the trademark as index of producer—earlier, a mark of
liability or quality assurance—is a historically earlier function of brands (Wilkins 1994;
Bently 2008; Higgins 2008), and is less central to the kinds of work that brands do today
(Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008; Lury 2008; Ng 2008; Griffiths 2008; Manning 2010). 10
Indeed, it is the slippage between producers and products that has over time resulted in
the shift from brands being attached to producers (as principle of the brand type) to being
attached to products (as tokens of the brand type) (Leach 2008) and, through metadiscourses of the brand, to the abstracted “meanings” attached to the brand type (and by
extension its tokens), what are called “image” or “personality” in the marketing literature
(Gardner and Levy 1955; Aaker 1991; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Aaker and Joachimsthaler
2000; Mazzarella 2003: 187–192). This slippage is inherent in trademark law. In
trademark law the assumption is that if rigid designating signs that index producer are
protected, this will allow consumers (through their experience with trademarked
products) to induce the reputation of the producer (as a set of associated symbolic
meanings). It is this good will which is ultimately protected and thus what makes the
trademark/brand—if successful in the market—valuable unto itself. This is an example of

10

Indeed, consumers often do not know or care who the actual producer is (Wilkins 1994: 35; Dinwoodie
2008; Ng 2008: 227; Manning 2010) and the brand owner may not even be the producer, or the producers
may be multiple (Klein 1999[1991]; Lury 2008).
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the more general process where the diacritic of difference that stands in for something of
value becomes something of value in and of itself (see Dean 2009, 2010).
Note that this additional layer of indexical meaning—the capacity of the brand
token/type to index a host of symbolic meanings—is sedimented on top of the capacity of
brands to function as rigid designators (perhaps more accurately, signifiers of pure
difference, or diacritics) of the brand type, even if the presumed origin is irrelevant or
unknown (see section 2.3.2 below). That is, to the extent that they are rigid designators
(which itself hinges on them being type-level signs) they can be reanalyzed and
enregistered (Agha 2007a, n.d.) as indexical of a whole set of other (symbolic) values.
But how are these values linked to the brand qua rigid designating legisign?

2.4.4 As symbol
The brand is not simply an index. It does not just designate some company or
person—the presumed author (in Goffman’s [1981: 226] sense) of the brand—but
invokes a set of “associations” or meanings, often focused or emblematized in a
particular figure of personhood, literal or fictive. 11 To this extent a branded token can
function as an index of such a persona and the qualities (s)he (and by association, the
brand) embodies. What is the basis, or ground, of this indexicality? The connection is
symbolic: the brand is connected to a set of associations or meanings by virtue of a
convention, or law to use Peirce’s (1992) terminology.
Interestingly, to the extent that such symbolism is ratified and naturalized, brand
tokens are seen to be iconic with the brand type, the figure of personhood invoked by the
11

For example, Nike’s “image” is linked to the general social persona of the athlete and specifically in the
figure of Michael Jordan.
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brand, and even the consumer him/herself or who (s)he wishes to be (Baudrillard
2001[1968]; Jones 1994; Sawchuck 1994; Frow 2002; Lury 2002, 2004: ch. 4; Moore
2003; Arvidsson 2005; Foster 1995; in the marketing literature see Feldwick 1999[1991],
Gordon 1999[1991]: 33; Agha n.d.: 21). This is what Parmentier (1994: 18) calls semiotic
“downshifting.”
The brand, however, is never purely symbolic, but always maintains a degree of
(rigid) indexicality, or at least is seen to do so. Indeed, the “erosion” of the brand (qua
rigid designator) into a common noun (i.e., a simple symbol) is the negation of the brand
itself, as denoted by the term genericide (Moore 2003: 344–346; also see Klein
2000[1999]: 180ff., Manning 2010). Thus, brands are designed so as to minimally
describe denotationally the tokens (products, services, spaces, experiences) which fall
under their classification (the brand type) (Coombe 1996). Note, then, that the brand type
is never isomorphic with other cultural classifications—for if it is, then it risks becoming
a generic term—and thus is always a sub-, super-, or overlapping-set of other
classifications.

2.4.5. As meta-semiotic
But how are such symbolic connections and their related iconic downshiftings made
possible? This brings us back to the question, how are some set of perceivable signs
regimented to act as tokens of a brand type? In this section I show that it is the metasemiotic regimentation of the brand that serves as the ground for the hierarchically nested
semiotic aspects of the brand discussed above (as token/type < index < [iconically
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downshifted] symbol). This meta-semiotic and reflexive aspect of the brand is itself
complex and multiple.

2.4.5.1 Brand meta-discourses
First, such symbolism is possible through different genres of meta-semiotic discourse
produced by the brand company or proxies of it (e.g., public relations firms, advertising
firms, street teams). In one kind of marketing practice, for example, marketers attempt to
abstract adjectives and phrases which capture the “core” of the “brand essence.” 12 This is
an organizational principle to shape marketing strategy which then attempts to fix such
rhematic values to the brand so that tokens of the brand can function as pragmatically
efficacious signs for consumers. 13 This is accomplished through the meta-pragmatic
discourses of advertising, marketing, packaging (Gardner and Levy 1955; Duckworth
1999[1991]; Lewis 1999[1991]), product placement (from strategic insertion in everyday
conversation to media placement), and event or experience sponsorship (Moor 2003;
Alexander and Schouten 1998). Such brand meta-discourses attempt to prefigure
consumer usage (often in the form itself) as a way to project/entail the presumed desires
of the consumer onto the branded commodity/brand (Callon et al. 2002; Frow 2002; Lury
2002, 2004: ch. 2; Arvidsson 2005: ch. 2–4; Foster 2007; Agha n.d.: 21). The goal is to
alter the experience of branded tokens in particular ways, thus increasing dependency or

12

Compare such meta-rhematic practices with Callon et al. (2002) on qualification. See Holt (2004) on a
critique of this marketing practice and an alternative mode of brand meta-discourse in “myth” building.
13
Thus combining a dicent sign [the brand type] to a rhematic sign [the brand “meaning,” associations] to
form a proposition that functions as a proxy for the consumer’s own status or identity work, itself a kind of
meta-proposition.
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recurrence of brand engagement (Agha n.d.: 23ff.) and thereby profits/brand equity. 14 In
short, brand meta-discourses attempt to regiment the kinds of symbolic meanings that
brand tokens can invoke as socially useful indexes of the brand type. 15

2.4.5.2 Consumer meta-discourses
Of course, brand companies are not the only ones who produce meta-pragmatic
discourses about brands. Consumer advocacy literature, newspapers and trade journals,
online internet forums, and word of mouth are all meta-pragmatic discourses that typify
brands and attempt to affix particular meanings and associations to them, strategically
altering their pragmatic values.
Consumers themselves are interested parties that produce meta-discourses about the
brand through the reanalysis of their own use and experience of brand tokens. What the
marketing literature (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2002, 2004a, b; Vargo and Lusch
2004; see Agha n.d.: 27 on this point) has recently attempted to spell out is the idea that
consumer interactions with brands (as a meta-semiotic principle of brand meaning/value)
can be exploited and converted into (human) capital via research (Gordon 1999[1991]),
feedback (Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005), trend hunting (Quart 2003), and event
sponsorship (Moor 2003; Alexander and Schouten 1998), and thereby increase brand
equity.

14

In the marketing literature (Feldwick 1999[1991]: 24, 25; Calkins 2005) this is demonstrated by “blind”
comparison tests of various products versus tests where the brand identity is shown. The latter often has the
effect of skewing experience of the brand token toward brand meta-discourses. For example, consumers
describe their experience of the same drink placed in various bottle designs in ways that resonate with the
packaging of the bottle, or associations with that packaging (Lewis 1999[1991]: 163).
15
The existence of brands amongst other brands in larger classifications (e.g. “cola”) also lends a principle
of value, akin to Saussure’s notion of the value of the sign (Lury 2004; Frow 2002). Thus, being brands of a
comparable class (e.g., Pepsi versus Coke) means that the fates of such brands and their pragmatic values
are intertwined.
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If consumer interactions with brands were prescribed by brand meta-discourses, and
thus identical with them, consumers’ consumptive labor would be of no value. But they
never are. They are not because like all signs, brands’ contextualized usage entails
pragmatic meanings that are, by degrees, different from (or trope on) the norm of their
usage (see Agha 2007a: 24–27; 295–298 on norm and trope). It is only also at this
interface—actual use in specific contexts—that we can ever broach the question of the
“effects” of brands on, or their articulation with, social life. Moreover, it is in actual use
in context that the BRAND as an ontological form is itself ratified (and branded forms not
constituted as some other type of semiotic object). We noted such radically tropic usages
of branded forms among Tamil youth in chapter 6.
Much theoretical work on brands stops precisely at the norm of the brand (e.g.,
Baudrillard 2001[1968], 2001[1970]; Lury 2002, 2004). This is precisely because such
work is highly product(ion) centric (e.g., Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Wilkins 1994).
Indeed, even if there is a nominal lip service to the consumption of brands, the
boundaries of such discussion again fall back on brand meta-discourses. This is because
works are often only concerned with how brands co-opt consumers’ tropic co-optation of
brands (Arvidsson 2005: ch. 2; Foster 2005, 2007: 718; Zwick et al. 2008; in the
marketing literature, see Fournier 1998; Feldwick 1999[1991]: 21; Holt 2002; Moor
2003). 16 Such work does no empirical work with actual users of brands, and thus is

16

Presumably, this turn to the customer as source register of brand meaning is indicative of an increased
reflexivity in marketers’ own understandings of how consumption works (Arvidsson 2005). Compare this
with earlier source registers of brands which, for example, drew on imagery of alterity and exteriority, such
as the savage and the frontier; that is, all that the consumer was not or could not access (Coombe 1996;
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007).
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unable to theorize the brand from the perspective of its actual use. 17 And yet the question
of consumption cannot be reduced to brand meta-discourses, as noted above.
This point is even more important because brand meta-discourses always presuppose
the BRAND as an ontological form. It is telling, then, that in all discussions of brands and
resistance to them, the issue of willful ignorance is never taken as a possibility except in
work that involves real consumers in acts of actual consumption (Vann 2006; Yurchak
2006). 18 Not doing actual work with consumers, then, literalizes and projects a particular
meta-discourse about a form as a reality in the world. Analytically this is problematic
because it systematically misunderstands how brands as signs work. Indeed, while it may
be true that signs have norms of use it is by no means true that such norms or tropes on
them are derived solely, or even ultimately, from authorized discourses (as Foster 2005:
10 notes). 19 Relying on brand meta-discourses, then, runs the risk of naturalizing them, as
well as their presuppositions about brand meaning and ontology (cf. Miller’s [2002]
critique of Callon’s “economy of qualities”).
Ironically, recognition of the fact that the brand must be situated in the moment of
consumption is the sine qua non of contemporary brand marketing. Marketing today is
largely about folding consumers’ unique, personalized, and idiosyncratic tropic uses in
particular contexts back into the brand. This is ironic because while market research as
central to the brand is something many theorists repeatedly come back to, such theorists

17

For example, Frow (2002: 66ff.) asks why is it that brands have a “non-rational hold” (citing Haigh 1998:
12) on consumer behavior. His next move is revealing: to explain this hold he gives an analysis of brand
advertising and marketing.
18
Thus, even Foster (2007) who looks at how “voicy customers” can disrupt brand value assumes
implicitly that the limits of consumption are contained within the BRAND as a stable ontology (also Klein
2000[1999]).
19
This would be like holding that the meaning of the word is what is in the dictionary; note, an approach
Lury (2004) begins her book on brands with.
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of the brand are unable to appreciate its real significance. Even more ironic because those
involved in brand production and marketing seem to have a better understanding of the
importance of actual empirical consumption practices and their necessity to the
functioning of brands than theorists (see Agha n.d.: 26 on this point). While marketers
constitute their particular brands with respect to market research, theorists like
Baudrillard (2001[1980]), Lury (2002, 2004) and Arvidsson (2005) are content to
theorize the brand based on analysis of brand meta-discourses, deducing consumption
from brand meta-discourses’ figurement of consumption, and thus abdicating actual
empirical research to brand marketers. Such work mistakes another’s highly prescriptive
map for the territory. It is in (bad) faith, then, that Lury (2004: 149) writes that “objects
(co-)produce the social,” because her analysis never actually broaches the social. It is
content to stay within the self-reflexive universe of the brand. This is triply ironic
because this is presumably the dream of every brand: to create a branded social universe
so inclusive one would never have to leave.

2.4.5.3 As meta-semiotic in ontological form
So far I have discussed the meta-semiotic principles that govern how particular brand
tokens come to be seen as tokens of a brand type with various symbolically indexical
values. There is another more fundamental way that the brand is a meta-semiotic object
which undergirds and acts as a condition of possibility on particular brand types acting in
the world. Just as brand tokens are always reflexively figured, implicitly or explicitly, as
members of some brand type, brand types are always reflexively figured as part of the
larger ontological category BRAND. Uses like “Lego brand products” explicit point to this
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meta-level membership, differentiating between Lego as a member of the ontological
category BRAND and lego as a generic class of objects (Moore 2003: 245; Manning 2010).
The legal apparatus of intellectual property (IP) is a meta-discourse whose function is
to ground BRAND as an ontological category (vis-à-vis trademark regulation) distinct from
other ontologies (even if the legal concept of what a brand isn’t totally clear, Davis
2008): generic objects (i.e., those part of the “commons”) and inauthentic and counterfeit
objects. It does so by making (aspects of) branded forms a kind of property of the
company who owns the brand type, thus allowing the brand both to function as guarantee
of quality and origin (i.e., to fix brand identifiers as rigid designators), as well as its
unique sets of meanings (to protect brands from dilution) (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe
1996; Frow 1996, 2002; Moore 2003; Wang 2003: ch. 2; Lury 2004: ch. 5; Arvidsson
2005; Pang 2006, 2008; Bently 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008).
This legal apparatus itself presupposes another order of meta-discourses that work to
legitimize the ontological category BRAND: for example, discourses about the individual
whose primary right is the (dis-)possession of property; and discourses that ground
ideational objects as property and creativity as the source of their value (Lury 2004;
Arvidsson 2005: ch. 3; Pang 2008; Scott et al. 2008).
What is important to note, here, is that brands are not ontologically independent or
natural entities which are then positioned, marketed, imbued with meanings by
consumers, marketers, and other interested parties. Historical work (Wilkins 1992, 1994)
shows that brands emerge precisely from meta-discourses which presuppose their
existence (i.e., performatively bring them into being). Thus the historical coincidence of
advertising, packaging, trademark law, and brands: advertising presupposes something to
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be advertised, which itself requires a label such that purchase can be directed. 20 In short,
brands are semiotic objects which are brought into being precisely through their
typification in meta-discourses which presuppose their ontological existence. It is in this
more fundamental, though seemingly trivial, sense that the brand is a semiotic form
whose internal structure is meta-semiotic.
To return to our genealogy of the commodity and brand in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the
notion of “aura” is the notion that objects before mechanical reproduction are somehow
unique. But this is still true after mechanical reproduction. Indeed, each copy is always
unique in its spatial and temporal dislocation. But why is it, then, that we do not see such
objects as unique (even if we often treat them as such, cf. Kopytoff’s 1986 discussion of
“singularization”; Agha n.d.: 4), instead seeing them as part of an endless series?
Note that any so-construed “unique” object can be reanalyzed as part of a series with
variable classificatory specificity: THE RIVER (1868) < WORK BY MONET < PAINTING < ART
< OBJECT, etc. If it is that case that any object is always already under a particular metasign of identity as of such and such a type, the notion of the Real or aura, then, is that
special meta-sign that typifies some object as the singular member of a set across all
temporal instances. However, it is a type all the same for there is still the need for a

20

As Wilkins writes: “Advertising did not make sense if there were not differentiated products—goods
with trade names. If the consumer was to buy the advertised product, the consumer had to be able to
distinguish that good. The brand—the trade mark—performed that service. Just as advertising carried
information, so did the trademark itself. It was what directed the purchaser to a designated product”
(Wilkins 1994: 19). Packaging emerges when products are produced from increasingly non-local locations
by unknown agents. Packaging removes the product from sensory proximity and it is at this moment that
the mark or brand is created to mediate, and functionally replace both the qualisigns of the object and the
meta-discursive guarantee of the shop-keeper. Finally, the legal protection of trademarks is required
precisely because brands emerge at the time when older guarantees of origin and quality—the local shop,
locally produced commodities (and earlier trade guilds)—are increasingly replaced by market anonymity
and non-local production. The brand as “mark of liability” (Wilkins 1992, 1994) emerges to guarantee
quality and origin. But this is impossible if such products and their marks are not systematically
differentiated from counterfeits and other brands.
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classificatory principle to reckon the differences of the “same” token at different points in
time. By this argument, any object intelligible to us (even as purely singular) must be
reckoned by this sign–meta-sign relation if only to unite all temporal instances of the
object as the “same” thing. 21
If the Real object that can accrue aura is simply a special instance of a sign–meta-sign
relationship reflexively figured as unique and authentic, the question becomes what are
the other possible meta-semiotic relations where the “same” objects can be seen as
meaningful in the full sense of being historically unique and authentic? One important
such meta-semiotic relation is the BRAND. 22 The BRAND is an ontological form which
attempts to reinvigorate the mechanically reproduced commodity through a synchronic
classification of (copies of) objects as instances of a larger type which itself is
(potentially experienced as) unique and personal. While “aura” in the Benjaminian
formulation is a quality of singular objects (where token = type), the brand reorganizes
aura to be a property of many tokens of a unique type (i.e., the “aura” of the type). And it
is through its self-reflexive construction (through marketing and advertising, through the
“authorized” dealer, through the logo and brand name stamped onto the product) that it
attempts to project itself as unique, personal, authentic, trustworthy, etc. Each token of
the type, then, invokes the unique, or as Baudrillard might have put it, the simulacrum of
21

Frow (2002) discusses this as the paradox of the mark (citing Derrida): for any mark (e.g., a signature) to
be seen as the diacritic of some singularity, it must be part of a larger type level, and thus, in principle,
repeatable and part of a (virtual) series.
22
We can note other similar relations. For example, some types of commodities are organized in
functionally similar ways to brands but with different participant frameworks (with respect to producer):
the quality grade of cloth, meats, eggs, precious stones; or the use of locations to qualify commodities
(Vann 2005). In both these cases, like the brand, a range of objects are classified under a particular metasign—quality grade, location—but unlike the brand, not linked to a singular producer. These may partially
overlap, as in the quality-grading of counterfeit brands in Chinese counterfeit markets (Hansen and Moeller
forthcoming). See Jamieson (1999) for a fascinating discussion of different “regimes of value” vis-à-vis
record collecting and its counterfeits that explicates how the same objects can, under various meta-signs, be
differently regimented with respect to auratic originals.
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the aura of the authentic object. I diagram this in figure 8.1, comparing it with the notion
of the auratic object as a type which only has one token at any moment in time (figure
8.2).
Figure 8.1 Meta-semiotics of brand
BRAND (grounded in IP law, discourses of creativity and property, etc.) (meta-type)
Self-typifying as having qualities {X, Y, Z . . .} and as a member of BRAND
via meta-discourses of advertising, marketing, packaging, etc

Brand typex . . . Brand typey

. . . Brand typen (as meta-token [type])

(token-to-type
feedback: market
research, etc.)

token typifying

Brand token1 ~ token2 ~ token3 ~ . . . ~ tokenn

* where “token” includes any embodied
instance of the brand (e.g., proper name:
‘Nike’; logo: Nike swoosh; slogan:
‘Just do it!’; spaces: Nike Town 23 ,
http://www.nike.com; etc.) 24

(as tokens of the brand type*)

Figure 8.2 Singular “unique” object 25
Type: the auratic, authentic object The River
[vs. On the Bank of the Seine, etc.]

=

Token

The River (t0 =1868) = The River (t1) = . . . = The River (tn)
time

One issue, of course, is that such meta-semiotic configurations are always relative to
some context of use and social domain, as we also argued for particular brand types in
section 2.4.5.2. While it happens to be that we often refer back to the brand type (e.g.,
Nike) as the relevant classification of some object (and thus as an instance of the BRAND),
23

See Sherry (1998) on Nike Town.
We can see that even here there is another embedded type–token relation as the Nike swoosh, the Nike
proper name, the slogan “Just do it!,” etc. are type-level signs.
25
And, indeed, presumably there may be many drafts of any one painting (even on the same canvas),
complicating this type–token conflation. I thank Magda Nakassis for pointing this out to me.
24
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we just as often do not, instead employing alternative schemes depending on the context
(e.g., like sneaker, leather good, or weapon of capitalist oppression). In the same way,
while we often treat objects as instances of the singular “unique” object type, we just as
often do not (Agha n.d.: 7). We may, for example, classify The River just as easily as a
painting, as a Monet, as an instance of the impressionist style, or a commodity. We are
prone to treat such singular objects as such because they seem to project their own aura
(their essential, Real, historicity) from within. But, if indeed it is the case that the metasemiotic organization of the “singular” object and the brand are as I have described them,
then it becomes clear that the aura of objects (branded or not) is never internal to them
but is supplied externally by meta-discourses which ground this object as a token of this
type and this ontology in this context for this social domain (cf. Notar 2006: 90). In the
next section I take up the issue of the BRAND having various social domains; that is, the
issue of alternate ontologies.

2.5 Alternate ontologies
The literature theorizing the brand has specified its multiple facets (partially as a
result of the wide definition of what constitutes a brand, Davis 2008; Manning 2010). 26
26

For example: as a mode/means of production (via prefiguring consumption); a medium of
communication; a frame or interface between producers and customers (and exploitation of consumption to
create surplus value); a context for the emergence of the social activities, relations, identities, emotional
attachment, communities/(counter-)publics (Rajagopal 1999; Lury 2002, 2004; Arvidsson 2005; Foster
2005, 2007; Coombe 1996; Mazzarella 2003: ch. 6; Holt 2004); a set of conventions of form (brand name,
logo, slogan, etc.) (Moore 2003); a guarantee of origin/quality; the reputation or public face of a
corporation (or set of products) (Wilkins 1992; Coombe 1996); proprietary property (as trademark; and
thus as monetary value, i.e., brand equity) (Wilkins 1992, 1994; Coombe 1996; Aaker 1991; Pang 2008;
Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; Davis 2008; Ginsburg 2008); the focal point for marketing practices; an
organizational identity for employees and non-employees (Klein 2000[1999]; Manning 2010); an organizer
of producer markets (Lury 2008); a set of associations, images, figures of personhood (Baudrillard
2001[1968], 2001[1970]; Gardner and Levy 1955; Cowley 1999[1991]; Feldwick 1999[1991]; Gordon
1999[1991]); an emblem for a wider social imaginary (Berlant 1993; Coombe 1996; Halstead 2002;
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Manning 2009, 2010; Vann 2005, 2006).
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However, among all these facets it is the sign–meta-sign relation that is central to the
brand, if only because it is at this level that brands can be undone. 27 This is the
fundamental semiotic lynchpin of the brand, both for particular brand types (i.e., the
ability of a brand type to regiment tokens of it) and for the more general ontological
category BRAND (i.e., the ability of brand types to be construed as such). Of course, this is
not apparent to most theorists of the brand because they take the brand as a natural kind,
something pre-given in its form. 28
What I have been arguing—through the ethnographic materials in chapters 6 and 7
and theoretically in this chapter—is that the brand is not pre-given in any sense (either as
particular brand type, or as ontological form), but can be defeased, as we saw in the case
of Tamil youth’s use of branded forms. If branded forms only function to the extent that
they are classified as tokens of the brand type, what are the other meta-signs that can
stand in for the BRAND? 29 As we saw with Tamil consumers and producers it is precisely

27

Moore (2003) breaks the brand down into a brand name and the product, service, and experience. Even if
we take “brand name” to be more general and include things like logos, slogans, or any other set of
qualities that index the brand type, this formulation is still problematic if only because it fails to note that
the brand name/logo and its most immediate object sign (the product, service, experience) are relevantly
part of the brand only to extent that such objects signs are regimented qua tokens of the brand type and the
brand type qua BRAND. It is this missing piece, the meta-sign under which particular branded tokens/types
stand that is crucial.
28
Not making this the central axis for analysis runs the risk of incorporating elements as parts of brands
which perhaps ought not to be. Indeed, Lury (2004), whose analysis is heavily production-centric, ends up
incorporating all sorts of elements into the brand (e.g., market research) which, while central to its
constitution, are logically exterior to it. If the brand is simply a list of its related aspects, it becomes
analytically unwieldy and ultimately mystifying. There are other problems. For example, Lury (2004: 1)
begins her approach to brands with the definition that the brand is a “set of relations between products or
services.” But what is the principle that relates such products? How do they form a unity? What is the
condition of possibility for the brand to function as such? Precisely because the brand is theorized onedimensionally there is no coherent answer to this question. The brand is naturalized as a fixed ontological
form. This flattening of the brand’s semiotic complexity thus leads Lury to mystify the brand, as I argued in
section 2.4.1, because of the inability to reconcile the recursively embedded type–token (i.e., sign–metasign) composition of the brand.
29
We might state this reflexive relation in Lee and LiPuma’s (2002) terminology as a difference in
“cultures of circulation.” And indeed, part of what is at issue is the overlapping, though distinct cultures of
circulation that link particular branded forms to multiple communities in different ways. However, I prefer
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the notions of style and exteriority—in short, the aesthetic of brandedness—that stand in
for the BRAND. It is not that these are additional meanings attached to particular brand
types, but that they substitute in for the BRAND qua meta-semiotic regimentation of
branded forms. Branded forms in the hands of Tamil youth are not tokens of brand types,
but part of a different and more general classificatory scheme (cf. Halstead 2002; Vann
2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; Sylavnus 2007; Manning and Uplisashvili 2007;
Manning 2009).
This alternative meta-semiotic configuration reorganizes objects which are treated as
different under the BRAND ontology (e.g., authentic, duplicate, fictive brands, and nonbranded items) as similar. The brand type is bracketed and the branded form re-signified
under this alternate ontology. Branded forms are stripped of their rigid designation and
their invocation of brand images (their symbolicity). Instead, branded forms invoke the
discourse of style as embodied in different images: the film hero-star, urban hip youth,
the TV VJ, the foreign return/NRI, the foreigner. Within this classification, then, there is
a different flexibility of iconism, a different principle of what is the same and what is
different: hence the distortion, hybridization, and recontextualization of branded forms
with respect to the BRAND ontology.
In this context we can take up Lury’s (2002, 2004; also see Pang 2008: 127ff.) idea
that the brand is performative: that is, that the brand performatively entails a mode of
consumption and being (personal relationship with the brand, loyalty, community, etc.)
to state the issue in terms of the sign–meta-sign relations that make such particular cultures of circulation
different. As they state: “The circulation of such forms . . . always presupposes the existence of their
respective interpretive communities, with their own forms of interpretation and evaluation (Lee and
LiPuma 2002: 192). But the core of this interpretive difference is the alternative meta-discursive reanalysis
of the forms in question to some particular social domain. While Lee and LiPuma are concerned with the
performative foundations of such interpretive communities, I am more interested in how such communities
operate via the ontological foundations of the objects to which they mutually orient themselves.
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by virtue of its composition (via marketing, advertising, the form itself). But as Austin
(1986[1962]) himself realized at the outset, we can only talk of performativity with
respect to conditions of defeasibility and felicity. It is never the case that the performative
does anything necessarily, even if it often seems that way. It is only under particular
conditions—institutional (for a marriage, the priest is authorized by the Church), form
internal (the present-tense, first person, simple aspect of “I do”), and textually (e.g., the
groom says “I do” only after repeating his vows)—that the effect is entailed. Moreover,
as has been pointed out (Agha 2007a; Lee 1997), to understand performativity requires
theorizing how (a) the performative self-reflexively figures itself as an act of such and
such a pragmatic type and (b) how it is taken up and ratified by others. That is, to make
the claim that the brand is performative requires one to locate its socio-cultural
embeddedness in particular instances of contextualized interaction among consumers
(Moore 2003: 335; Agha n.d.: 7).
Yet we are totally unequipped to do this if the assumption is that the brand is
inherently performative. This assumption imputes a magical essentialism to the form
(hence the wonderment about the brand). Few would consciously subscribe to this
assumption. Yet it is part of much work on brands, precisely because such analysis is
product(ion) centric. Such analysis takes the figurement of branded products as
performative in brand meta-discourses as evidence that brands are performative in actual
contextualized usages. Yet taking brand meta-discourse at face value literalizes and
projects the brand as ontologically necessary in the world, and thus leads to essentialism.
It also leads to the assumption that brands are inherently meaningful (or meaningful
in the way that brand meta-discourses project them to be). Remember from our
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discussion in section 2.3 that the brand emerges historically as a reaction to the seeming
meaningless and empty commodity form, the object which only has value because of its
exchange value, because of its same-ness, the object purely defined by supply and
demand (i.e., price). It is this emptiness that the brand attempts to fill through its metasemiosis. In the business literature this is manifested as the anxiety that consumers will
construe commodities by their materiality (utility, functionality) and price (i.e., that
brands will return to simply being “faceless, lifeless” commodities, Aaker 1991: 15; see
Mazzarella 2003: 194), and not as the essence or aura bestowed upon them by brand
meta-discourses (Frow 1996; Klein 2000[1999]: 12–13; Foster 2007: 716; Wilkins 1994:
16). The anxiety of being seen under a different meta-sign than the BRAND is inherent in
the organization of the BRAND itself, both in general—as the 1993 Malboro Friday crisis
and the fear of consumers’ “brand blindness” showed (Klein’s 2000[1999]: 12–13; Jones
1994)—and for particular brand types—as Callon et al.’s (2002: 205–207) discussion of
managing consumer “attachment” and “reattachment” to products and as Moore’s (2003)
discussion of genericide show (also Manning 2010).
To simply assume, then, that brands are meaningful is to assume that the brand metadiscourse is always successful in socializing consumers to it. But as we saw with Tamil
youth there can be no assumption that brand meta-discourses are successful or even
present. Thus to assume the meaningfulness of the brand is to miss the semiotic and
political work necessary such that brands can even be talked of and thus imputed
meaning to. Unfortunately, this fact is lost when one’s methodological approach avoids
actual instances of the use of branded forms. Thus, for example, Lury (2004) is unable to
account for the condition of possibility on the meaningfulness of brands except by falling
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back on brand meta-discourses; or by arguing that brands are auto-poetically organized
into a system that produces their meaning/value. Lury, however, has no analysis of how
such a cybernetic system might work, or any demonstration that brands in fact work in
this way. Because she has eschewed actual empirical work with consumers and because
her theorization of the brand is semiotically flat, she is pushed to align (unwillingly) with
brand meta-discourses’ own reflexive understanding of what they do. The only out
(besides just simple complicity) is to posit the self-organization of brands into a system,
as a set of self-regulating relations between tokens of the brand:
“the activities of marketers…does not adequately describe the brand. Nor indeed
would an account of the practices of designers, or a description of the activities of
consumers…They privilege purposive actions, and do not acknowledge the
significance of the self-organizing elements of the brand as a complex
indeterminate or open object.” (Lury 2004: 51; my emphasis)
Yet clearly the auto-poetic organization of brands is a remainder hypothesis. When all
forms of external control fail to account for some phenomenon, its internal structure is
appealed to. To simply jump to this conclusion as Lury does is suspect, especially as she
never looks at the actual “activities of consumers” (ibid.).
As I have shown, whether or not the brand is performative, whether or not the brand
is meaningful is relative to the extent that brand meta-discourses can self-reflexively
ground themselves. That is, to the extent that they can guarantee their uptake by
consumers as brands. And as we have seen, the willful ignorance of Tamil youth toward
the brand qua BRAND pries apart this meta-semiotic organization so as to reattach branded
forms as tokens of a different type, and thus stand under a different ontology altogether.

391

This implies that the BRANDed-ness of any object is only one among many possible
ontologies, dependent on place (Halstead 2002; Vann 2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007;
Manning and Uplisashvili 2007; Manning 2009; Yurchak 2006: ch. 5) and time (see
Kriegel 2004 on the emergence of IP in Britain as a debate over the ontological
distinctiveness of original and copy); that is, on the social domain of the ontology. This
speaks to our common sense notion that a branded object may be seen from many angles:
a unique object (of nostalgia or sentimentality), a functional object (a pair of shoes), a
cultural object (part of modern Western dress), etc. In fact, there are as many angles as
there are meta-discursive classifications of the object. Objects can move in and out of
their status as branded, as commodities even, depending on their user and contexts of use
and evaluation (Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986; Frow 1996; Agha n.d.). That is,
depending on for whom and under what meta-sign they stand under.30
Note that the issue here is not just that some brand meta-discourses are successful in
regimenting some set of forms as tokens of a brand type and others are not. Rather, what
is problematic in much of the literature is the assumption that brands can be defined
independently of their use. Again, what I have been arguing is that to fully theorize the
brand it is necessary to start from actual contexts of consumption (cf. Miller 1990: 50,
2002). Moreover, the assumption that the ontology of the brand is fixed and stable is
highly problematic. It is not enough to say that particular brand types are not fixed,
30

A corollary to this is the brand’s heterogeneity: there are many different types of brands (product brands,
corporate brands, event brands, community brands, national brands, online brands, experience brands, etc.)
and functionalities of branded phenomena (as lifestyle accoutrement, as functional objects, as experiences,
services, spaces, etc.) as there are meta-discourses which typify particular objects as some kind of brand or
another. This is precisely why the brand as a semiotic form is applicable (with more or less success/fit) to
numerous non-(traditional-)commodities: for example, self or persona (celebrities, politicians) (Hearn
2008); organizations (NGOs, governmental organizations) (Arvidsson 2005: ch. 4; Klein 2000[1999]: ch. 2;
Cowley 1991[1991]: 12); universities, countries, or places (Foster 2005: 8; Arnholt 2004); ethnic groups
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009); and events or experiences (Moor 2003; Alexander and Schouten 1998).
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discrete, or unitary, but that the BRAND itself is not a natural category. It is contingent on
particular (meta-)semiotic arrangements. In the success–failure paradigm, the assumption
is that the form is stable across all contexts. It fails to see that the ontology of the object is
itself a site of negotiation, one backed by (the violence of) the law and thus in no way
certain. This is why it is crucial to look at cases where the brand is negated, defeased, and
erased because it is in such scenarios that the presumed natural link of sign–meta-sign
that is central to the brand is taken apart and reattached, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7.

2.6 The irony of fashion in India
Once we realize that branded forms are semiotically complex we can make sense of
one of the ironies of fashion in India: while branded forms in India are contemporary
with fashion in the West (because they are produced in India before they hit the shelves
in the West), the meta-discourses of brand and fashion are not. Thus, while the
contingencies of global capital and the willful ignorance of local markets guarantee that
branded forms circulate ubiquitously, meta-discourses of brand identity and “meaning”—
advertising, brand events, authorized showrooms, etc.—circulate to a lesser extent. In
some cases, they may be totally absent. 31
This disjuncture of branded form and brand meta-discourse creates a distortion of
supply and demand of brands qua particular brands, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7. For
example, while Diesel may be in low demand as Diesel, objects that index Diesel may
still be in high supply. One irony here is that fashion in India among lower- and middle31

This disproves one of Lury’s (2004: ch. 4) claims that the repetition of logo itself guarantees brand
recognition for indeed, in Tamil Nadu the repetition of brand names and logos does not guarantee brand
recognition precisely because the ontology of brand qua BRAND may not be relevant in the first instance.
One may treat the noun phrase “Diesel” as simply a word or graphic design, not a brand per se. For
repetition to entail brand recognition requires that the BRAND ontology is in play.
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class youth is directly linked to brands but ignorant of them precisely because brand
meta-discourses and the branded forms circulate according to different logics. The brand
company, of course, tries to ensure their fusing so as to coordinate consumption with
production, but there is no necessary guarantee that these two moments can be sutured
together. Thus, at the same time that branded forms are in India before the West, Indian
fashion is ironically behind Western fashion. 32
Further, the branded form and its meta-discourse circulate in different temporalities.
Thus, branded forms in Tamil Nadu are cycled with incredible speed. A branded form
may appear as export surplus or duplicate only to disappear within months, production
having moved on. This cycling is so fast that the possibility for the creation of brand
awareness through the forms themselves is relatively low.
A corollary to this is that while it is tempting to think that fashion in India simply
moves from the West to Indian elites to the middle classes and finally to the poor, the
production of authentic branded products (as export surplus) cycling faster than brand
meta-discourses of fashion (as consumed by elites and the upper-middle classes) means
that while urban elites may consume Diesel because they have seen the ads abroad (i.e.,
based on its brand identity), the rural poor consume it because it is style and it is cheap
and available, and thus consume it independently of elite fashion. While it may seem,
then, that both poor and rich are coordinated in their fashion (evidenced by the same
forms in both social domains), this is complicated by the fact that the same form is linked
32

With regards to the production of duplicates there is also a delay linked to the production process. For
example, for duplicate producers to make duplicates they must get a model of the piece, reverse engineer it,
get their tailors to learn the cuts and tailoring, and get the relevant materials. They also wait to see if certain
forms click in other markets (e.g., producers in Chennai wait to see what gets popular in Bombay). Once a
sample is produced it hits the market, but only in small amounts at first. If it catches on then it increases.
Hence there is delay.
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to different meta-discourses (brand meta-discourses in the case of the elites; style and
simple availability in the case of lower classes). We can only realize these ironies if we
theorize the brand as meta-semiotically organized of de-coupleable parts.

3. Brand and simulation: Theorizing the brand from its duplicate
3.1 Introduction
While above I looked at the semiotics of the brand and the conditions under which the
brand is defeasible, in this section I theorize the brand from the perspective of the
duplicate or counterfeit branded item. I argue that the counterfeit brand can be understood
as a particular kind of Baudrillardian simulacrum, and Tamil youth usage of branded
forms as a kind of simulation, but only if we understand simulation and simulacra as
particular cases of the reflexive sign–meta-sign structure that is central to the brand in
general, as discussed above. 33

3.2 Literature on brand counterfeits
The category counterfeit is highly heterogeneous. 34 I will be focusing on duplicate
Western branded garments and related accessories, of the kinds discussed in chapters 6
and 7. Most of the literature on counterfeiting focuses on the impact of counterfeiting on
the economy and “society” (Kays 1990; Wee et al. 1995; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1996;
33

Few have made this move. Pang’s (2008) consideration of Chinese counterfeiting, Craciun’s (2008,
2009) comments on fake brands, and Sylavnus’ (2007) discussion of “African” wax prints as simulations
are exceptions, though neither consider the sign–meta-sign structure of the brand or of simulation as such.
34
By counterfeiting I mean goods which are illicit because of their transgression of intellectual property
law or because their selling is in breach of the rights of the producer/brand company by contract (e.g.,
illegitimately reselling overruns). Duplicates are goods which are illegal because they misuse proprietary
brand designs (e.g., trademarks), and thus are a subset of counterfeits. See Bamossy and Scammon 1985;
Kay 1990; Bloch et al. 1993; McDonald and Roberts 1994; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1999; Astous and
Gargouri 2001; Phau et al. 2001; Hoe et al. 2003; Wang 2003; Phillips 2005; Pang 2006; Vann 2006;
Craciun 2008; Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009 on different kinds of counterfeit, imitation, and “grey”
goods, and various terminological distinctions.
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Phillips 2005; Rutter and Bryce 2008; Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009) and on ways to
combat counterfeiting in light of that impact (Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Bush et al.
1989; Bloch et al. 1993; Tom et al. 1998; Nia and Zaichkowsky 2000; Phau et al. 2001).
While much of the literature is on the supply side of counterfeiting (Bush et al. 1989;
Chaudhry and Zimmerman 2009), there is also a large literature on the demand side
(Bamossy and Scammon 1985; Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Bloch et al. 1993; Wee et al.
1995; Cordell et al. 1996; Tom et al. 1998; Nia and Zaichkowsky 2000; Astous and
Gargouri 2001; Phau et al. 2001; Hoe et al. 2003; Rutter and Joyce 2008). Unfortunately,
this work employs a naïve psychological idiom to understand counterfeit consumption,
eschewing the larger contexts of consumption outside of the moment of purchase. Such
work is also highly normative (one exception is McDonald and Roberts 1994). There are,
however, a growing number of anthropologists and sociologists (Halstead 2002; Reinach
2005; Vann 2005, 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; Pang 2008; Craciun 2008, 2009;
Brandtstädter 2009; Thomas 2009; Hansen and Moeller forthcoming) working on brand
counterfeits, as well as on digital piracy (Wang 2003; Pang 2006) and other kinds of
fakes (Jamieson 1999 on vinyl records; Notar 2006 on souvenirs).
With a few exceptions (Pang 2008; Vann 2006), little work has been done to theorize
the brand from its duplicate, or to theorize the duplicate itself. This is ironic because the
historical condition of possibility of BRAND (and earlier the trademark) is its legal
differentiation from its duplicate (Bently 2008; Higgins 2008; see Kriegel 2004; Johns
2009 on piracy and copyright). Brand and counterfeit are always already co-eval and codefinitional. Below I look at the leaky boundaries of the duplicate and its relationship to
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its authentic other, the brand. I approach this via Baudrillard’s notions of simulation and
simulacrum, treating the brand and its duplicates as species of them.

3.3. Simulation and simulacrum
3.3.1 Introduction
In this section I give a particular reading of Baudrillard’s concepts of simulacrum and
simulation and apply them to the case of brands and brand duplicates. Through the
discussion of the empirical materials in chapters 6 and 7, and the semiotic discussion of
the brand in this chapter, I argue that simulation is a variant on the meta-semiotic
organization of BRAND more generally.
For Baudrillard the simulacrum is the “alibi,” or ideological underpinning, for some
system—more often than not, capitalism understood as a Saussurean sign system.
Simulation is the abstraction of some (older) sign system; thus it is of a higher order type
than that which it abstracts from. The notion of abstraction here is the idea that the
indexical grounding of the simulated sign system is minimized, and thus appears more
disconnected from the “real.” These two concepts play off of each other in Baudrillard’s
periodization of capitalism.

3.3.2 Capitalism as the history of simulation
For Baudrillard, the history of capitalism is the increasing de-indexicalification of
objects and the social relations they mediate as they are increasingly made to function as
arbitrary Saussurean signs in a larger system of value or “code.” 35

35

Of course, Baudrillard has no theory of indexicality, hence his anxiety surrounding capitalism and
simulation.
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The first epochal break comes with the commodity form and its abstraction from the
contextually grounded and maximally indexical Symbolic Exchange (understood as
primitive society’s reciprocal exchange relations) into de-contextualized exchange (and
sign) values. The functioning of this commodity system (i.e., early capitalism) was based
on the simulacrum of the “real” object under symbolic exchange: that is, the
naturalization of use value as an ideological construct that acts as the “alibi” of exchange
value. This is what Baudrillard calls the simulacrum of Natural Law (Baudrillard
2001[1972], [1976]). Thus, Baudrillard argues that early political economy operated on
the myth that exchange value was a function of utility as the really “real” of how
economies and societies worked. As such, use value’s status as simulacrum (or “alibi”)
grounded the economy to work as a capitalist market driven by circulating exchange
values. It is the system of exchange value, Baudrillard argues, that is actually running
society, unbeknownst to those at its mercy. Use value as simulacrum makes possible,
then, the simulation of symbolic exchange in the new capitalist order of commodity
exchange.
The next historical rupture comes in the current era where the functioning of the
system is detached from even the concept of the Real. This is the era of simulation
(Baudrillard 2001[1976], 1994[1981]). Here the differentiation between the real and the
unreal is transcended in objects whose ontology blurs copy and original (the era of
mechanical reproduction, media implosion). At the same time that the “finalities” of the
older order (capitalist productivism, exchange value) are liquidated as functional
principles driving the previous system, such finalities are resurrected in the form of
simulacra like “production,” “history,” “labor.” Here the previous engines of capitalism
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(which were ideologically covered by the simulacrum of use value and functionality)
have themselves been turned in simulacra, or “alibis,” for the current system of digital
finance capital and computer networks. The role of such simulacra, similarly to the
earlier historical period, is to cover the functioning of the current system. Thus, even as
our lives are run by databases and statistical calculations we believe in the truisms of
production, labor, and work, the previous engines of capitalism and objects of
contestation and struggle.
While simulacra previously functioned to cover the artifice of exchange value and to
discipline production (i.e., the system of that era) through images of the Real, today
simulacra function to hide that the Real no longer exists, that simulation has gone to a
higher order of functionality by typifying themselves as unreal. 36 The “hyper real”—like
Disneyland, which caricatures or transcends the “real” by its hyper-/un-reality—simply
serves to guarantee the reality of everything else (which is increasingly governed by “the
simulation machine” of equivalence). This functions to hide that simulation today is
totally detached from the Real altogether (i.e., that it has zero indexical content)
(Baudrillard 1994[1981]: 12). While it used to be exchange value that governed the
economy, today it is the abstract code of finance capital and the media: capital is freed
from “the finalities of content” into an “escape in indefinite speculation, beyond any
reference to the real” (Baudrillard 2001[1976]: 129). We still think, however, in terms of
political economy, though it is no longer the engine of history but a simulacrum of it.
Thus concepts like revolution are bound to fail, Baudrillard argues.

36

Baudrillard (2001[1976]: 124) writes: “Each configuration of value is resumed by the following in a
higher order of simulation. And each phase integrates its own apparatus, the anterior apparatus as a
phantom reference, a puppet of simulation reference.”
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I summarize Baudrillard’s periodization of simulation in Table 8.1 below.
Table 8.1 Baudrillard’s periodization of simulation
Principle of
semiosis

Symbolic Exchange 37
Natural law of meaning
(meaning is produced by
reference to Nature/the
Divine)

(Production) Capitalism
Commodity law of value
(value is produced by the
exchangeability of objects by
reference to the simulacrum of
Nature)
The Commodity (System)
Quantity (unitized)
Symbolic but grounded in the
“alibi” of the indexical (the
Real), downshifted as icons

Emblematic
object

The Gift (Object)
Quality (analogic)
Maximally indexical
(Real)

Relation to the
Real

Nature/the Real

Simulacrum of the Real (to
ground exchange value)

Engine of
society

Reciprocal exchange (no
production/consumption
per se)

Political Economy
(production/exchange value)
via simulating authentic
objects (qua utility)

Gift exchange

Production (mode of
production)
Mechanical copy (produced as
part of a series)
Metaphysics of energy and
determination (reality is
distorted)
Discipline and surveillance

Types of
simulacra
Metaphysics

Counterfeit (dissimulates
the object)
Metaphysics of
appearance (reality exists)

Forms of
control

Divine/Sovereign power

Era of Simulation
Structural law of value
(value is the pure play
of signs)

The Pure Sign (Code)
Information (digital)
Symbolic, not grounded
in any Real, but
typifications of the
“unreal”
Hyper-real (to conceal
the volatilization of
reality)
Digital finance capital,
digital media, computer
networks via simulating
political economy (qua
labor, work, etc.)
Consumption (code of
production)
Model (copies without
originals)
Metaphysics of
indeterminacy (there is
no reality)
Participation and
solicitation

3.3.3 Simulation, simulacrum, and logical types
While simulation is a process of producing value through pure difference of signifiers
(the logic of capital modeled on the pure Saussurean sign), simulacra “dissimulate the
fact that there is nothing behind them” (Baudrillard 1994[1981]: 5), and serve as an
ideological screen for the actual workings of capital (the system of signifiers). There is a
functional fit between the two: simulacra (the resurrected corpses of the earlier

37

He also substitutes the “Classical Era” as a transition phase from Symbolic Exchange to Capitalism in
Europe that has some of the relevant features of societies of pure Symbolic Exchange (i.e., of “primitive
societies”) (Baudrillard 2001[1976]).
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simulations) prop up simulation as a system (the abstraction from earlier simulations) by
mystification.
For Baudrillard, what is of interest is what happens when simulation operates through
signs where the metaphysics of true–false cease to apply. What happens when the
original and copy are no longer distinct? This applies, Baudrillard argues, in the current
era of simulation where mechanical reproduction, the mass media (and new media like
the internet, databases, and computer programs), and the binary code of finance capital
operate through copies without originals. What is the ontological status of such signs? As
Baudrillard argues, their basic form is as codes that produce models immanent in every
instance of them. That is, they are always already tokens qua types. There is no original
computer program, for example, only identical copies of the same binary code. In this
sense they are tautologically performative and self-reflexive: the model is its own
referent; it is a representation of itself in its totality (cf. the auratic object). 38
By this reckoning, then, simulation operates at a higher logical type than the
simulated, it is a system (or meta-discursive principle of meaning/value imbuement) that
typifies particular (object) signs as tokens of a type. Thus, for example, the concept of
exchange value requires for its intelligibility that two objects be taken as equivalent in
some respect. In that case, then a third thing of a higher logical type, the exchange value,
is brought into existence. Even though Baudrillard doesn’t, we can note that this
abstraction is dependent on its uptake and ratification as social facts; that is, as Marx

38

Of course, though Baudrillard does not discuss this (he takes such simulation as a natural kind), this
performativity (of map that creates the territory) only holds to the extent that this re-ontologizing of objects
and representations as simulation is regimented—for example, by the law, the violence of the state, banks,
etc.—and ratified by those who construe such signs as of such an ontology (or not). I come back to this
point in section 3.3.5.
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(1976: 139) put it, it is “purely social.” The power of simulation, then, is to act as a
higher order legisign principle that classifies increasing numbers of things as the “same,”
as indistinct 39 tokens of the same type and thus inputs to some kind of calculus or social
process, whether it be as exchange value, sign value, or as binary ones and zeros.
By contrast, simulacra (e.g., use value as natural utility satisfying universal desire) are
at the same logical type as their object signs (e.g., actual objects imputed some utility).
They are symbols that represent themselves as icons of that which they are a simulacrum
of. As such, they can be compared with what they purport to be. In this sense they are
ideological distortions. As such they differ from simulation which is neither true nor
false, but rather, if felicitous, performative. While simulation is a condition of possibility
of iconism in general, the simulacrum represents itself under the meta-discourse of (dis-)
identity (i.e., iconism). But because it is at the same logical type as that which it is a
simulacrum of, it can be logically falsified.

3.3.4 As sign–meta-sign
The main problem with Baudrillard is that pure Saussurean signs do not exist. 40 No
one to my knowledge has found any signs that function without indexicality. Leaving
aside Baudrillard’s hypostacized and apocalyptic vision of semiosis gone awry, there are
at least two analytical problems: (a) he is fixated on the Saussurean sign as the model of

39

The issue is distinctiveness, and not being identical. Baudrillard often confuses the criterial factor of
indistinguishability—a concept relative to some legisign principle—from identity—a concept fetishized in
the thing-in-itself. This is a common mistake by Baudrillard to project epistemological issues as ontological
differences. It is also one reason why (along with a tradition from Kant onwards) particular anxieties about
the possibility of grounding oneself securely in knowledge are felt acutely by him.
40
Moreover, even if Saussurean signs worked to describe language, which they were designed to do, the
analogies he proposes, for example, between exchange value:use value::signifier:signified [Baudrillard
2001(1972)] are disanalogous in that differences in exchange value do not produce analogous differences in
signifieds, as the Saussure ratio proposes.
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the world and as his analytical toolkit (thus always already confounding object- and
meta-sign); and (b) he is forced himself to simulate the symbolic exchange of so-called
primitive societies as a position from which to launch his normative critique of capitalism
and thus does not subject it to any analytical investigation vis-à-vis the question of
indexicality. Instead he fetishizes symbolic exchange as the “real” and “authentic.” 41 As
such, he has neither a theory of indexicality nor of meta-semiosis.
While there are many ways to criticize Baudrillard (see Chen 1987; Huyssen 1989;
Gane 1991; Kellner 1994 and chapters within), the question is, how can we reformulate
simulation and simulacra to our use? I propose the following distinctions to steer us clear
from some of Baudrillard’s problems. Simulation and simulacra both have at their core
the sign–meta-sign relationship. Simulation is meta-semiotic in that it involves the
regimentation of type–token relationships. Rather than seeing simulation as a Saussurean
sign system—which Baudrillard never demonstrates in any convincing detail anyway (he
even gives up trying after 1968 with The System of Objects)—let us see simulation as the
case where objects are regimented by a larger meta-discursive principle which figures
them as tokens of a type and, to this extent, the same. Such tokens are members of a
paradigmatic or classificatory set which can be acted upon, for example in a computer
algorithm, or exchanged for each other, for example in economic transactions. Further, in
simulation, the type is historically continuous in some way with the tokens it regulates;
for example, the same forms (exchanged objects) are abstracted into a higher order type
(exchange value). This captures Baudrillard’s observation that through the historic
41

For Baudrillard, primitive “symbols” (not in the Peircean sense) must function as irreducible, because
they must be authentic by definition. Thus they are mystified. As he writes, “Of what is outside the sign, of
what is other than the sign [i.e., Symbolic Exchange], we can say nothing, really except that it is
ambivalent” (Baudrillard 2001[1972]: 94). This is Baudrillard’s thing-in-itself.
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escalation of logical types (from singular object exchanged in reciprocal gift relations to
commodities universally comparable through their exchangeability to operators in a
computer equation) objects are increasingly abstracted (their indexical value is
elsewhere/negated), rationalized, and made comparable. Thus, through continuities of
forms (i.e., that abstraction in simulation is recursively embedded: THINGS < EXCHANGED
THINGS/GIFTS < EXCHANGE VALUES/COMMODITIES < FINANCE CAPITAL)

the social world is

ontologically transformed through simulation.
Simulacra, on the other hand, are objects which are explicitly typified—either by
exterior meta-discourses or reflexively by themselves—in some particular way—more
often than not, as the really “real”—so as to naturalize the type level phenomena, the
simulations, of which they are also tokens (hence motivating the ideological confusion
between types and tokens). Use values, for example, under conditions of capitalism are
always already regimented under the type exchange value; but they are (falsely) typified
as the “real” essence of commodities (e.g., by political economists), and thus function to
naturalize or mystify the social relations that underwrite commodity exchange and the
reality that exchange value runs society.

3.3.5 Where does the indexicality go?
What we can see from this reformulation of Baudrillard is that the central issue is
what happens to the indexical component of the object (an nth order sign) under
conditions of simulation (an n+1th order abstraction). What happens to the component of
the sign’s meaning that is irreducibly linked to its contextual embeddedness, and that
seems to be lost via simulation?
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As one moves up the logical types of simulation, indexicality is both interiorized and
exteriorized. Simulation internalizes indexicality by hypertrophying one aspect of
(otherwise contextually situated) objects—for example, their utility qua satisfiers of
needs; their measurability and exchangability as unitizable objects; their digitizability as
information qua binary values—and semanticizing (symbolicizing) it, making it the core
default value, or dominant meaning, as specified by the type. Thus, for example, while
commodified objects may have the same form of objects under reciprocal exchange (e.g.,
a hammer is a hammer before and after capitalism), ultimately the commodity is more
mediated, asymmetrical, and one-sided because its “value” is increasingly
overdetermined by its exchange value (and not its use/utility). Under capitalism,
exchange value becomes the object’s core attribute. The regress of this is the fantasy of
context-free objects where meanings otherwise indexically grounded in context are
interiorized into the logical form of the object qua “value.”
At the same time, indexicality is exteriorized in meta-discourses which regiment
objects so that they may serve as tokens of the type. Thus, for example, in Baudrillard’s
discussion meta-discourses of the individual as property owner and of Human Nature
more generally (in philosophy, the law, popular literature, and psychology) naturalize the
concept of use value so that it in turn naturalizes economic exchange value and capitalism
(Baudrillard 2001[1972]). Here external meta-discourse makes possible the increased
semanticization of objects under simulation.
Moreover, simulacra and simulation are indexical in their ability to bring to bear on
their own intelligibility a meta-discourse of identity. They point to themselves as being of
such and such a type, often in ways radically different than their actual form and
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function. Thus, as Baudrillard discusses, “work” rather than being part of the struggle of
industrial capitalism (as it was at an earlier era) is increasingly (self-)typified in
contemporary capitalism as part of one’s “lifestyle,” as a commodity, marketed and
designed as such, to be integrated into the self, thereby satisfying needs for creativity and
individuality. Thus, labor “enters the general lifestyle; in other words it is encompassed
by signs” (Baudrillard 2001[1976]: 133). As a simulacrum of “actual” production/work,
then, it functions differently, its ontology is fundamentally different—no longer a violent
struggle, work is simply another part of the consuming self—but it points to itself as of
an older order/ontology. This meta-discourse of identity—the self-typifying “I am
Real!”—is made to seem increasingly natural as the iconism between
simulation/simulacra and their tokens/what they copy is increasingly accurate (more
precisely, the difference is less and less distinct). (This indistinctiveness, of course, must
also be regimented by particular meta-semiotic legisigns.)
The point is that the abstraction and reorganization of some set of signs as tokens of a
functionally distinct type while at the same time obscuring their newfound functionality
by confounding this type–token distinction is only possible given the meta-discourses
which are able to regiment that token–type relationship in the first place so that such
signs can be put to use in concrete contexts. Thus, the social convention of money
(exchange value); the institutional backing of finance (finance capital); the semiotic
division of mass-mediated labor (the imploded media) all must be socially ratified so as
to be pragmatically efficacious for buyers, bankers, and audiences in the various kinds of
contextually embedded activities that they are engaged in. Thus, every simulation
involves not only abstraction and reclassification, but the creation of new indexical
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possibilities, pragmatic values, and contexts of use. Baudrillard cannot see this, of course,
because he has no theory of indexicality or reflexive sign use. Thus, to him it seems as if
signs are simply increasingly abstract, empty, and floating away into an eschatological
teleology even while, inexplicably for him, they are (re)imbricated in social life (i.e.,
have “effects”), troped upon, used, re-animated and recycled.

3.3.6. Simulation and the brand
How can we bring this reformulation of Baudrillard to bear on our analysis of brands
and their duplicates? I argue the following propositions below: (1) the brand is part of the
escalation of logical types under capitalism, and thus is a simulation of the commodity
form (section 3.3.6.1); (2) the duplicate forms both a challenge to the brand as a
counterfeit, but also acts as a kind of simulacrum reinvesting the brand with the “real”
through its typification as “fake” (section 3.3.6.2); (3) the bracketing of the BRAND
ontology by Tamil youth points to a higher order simulation of brands for that particular
social domain; branded forms are abstracted from, and reorganized under an aesthetic of
brandedness (a higher order type) and thus invested with a different ontology and
functionality (style) (section 3.3.6.3). 42 In making these arguments, however, I am
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We can see something similar in Craciun’s (2009) discussion of the role of fake brands in the selfnarrativization of one of her informants, a Turkish producer/distributor of fake brands. Here too the
question of the brand (or its fake) is always relative to some larger meta-discursive frame which figures
such objects in such and such a way (i.e., with such and such an ontology). For this informant—who saw
himself as one who lives dangerously, on the margins of normativity and legality—the duplicate branded
object is a “legitimate object,” “another version of a conventional form” insofar as it functions as his
“assertion of individuality.” Similarly, Vann’s (2006) discussion of Vietnamese concepts of status,
mimicry, and brand duplication indicates that the ontological category of the brand as we know it in the
contemporary West—and its concomitant notion of “authenticity”—is not present in Vietnam, or certainly
not in the same way (also see Halstead 2002; Notar 2006; Bick and Chiper 2007; cf. Jamieson 1999).
Sylvanus’ (2007) discussion of “African” wax prints similarly shows how the same form is variously
“requalified” depending on its insertion in various contexts of production and consumption; that is,
depending on the meta-sign under which it stands (e.g., “Africanity” in the U.S.; or through association
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breaking with Baudrillard’s larger narrative of capitalism. I don’t see this as a new phase
in capitalism. I also don’t see the simulation of brands into an aesthetic of brandedness
necessarily ideologically propped up by fetishized simulacra (i.e., counterfeits as
simulacra), except from the perspective of the BRAND ontology (which in any case Tamil
youth don’t necessarily abide by).
In his periodization of types of simulacra Baudrillard notes three kinds: the
counterfeit, the object of a series (mechanical reproduction), and the model (where copy
and model which produce it are one and the same). The counterfeit dissimulates the real.
It presents itself as the authentic and authorized, but it is not. In this way, it assumes that
the “real” in order to pass itself off as it. The mechanically reproduced object is the
multiplication of the concept of the counterfeit into an infinite series where all members
are identical in form (see Chen 1987: 74ff.; Tseëlon 1994; Shoomaher 1994 for
discussion). Here the issue is not dissimulation, but the displacement of original and
copy. The commodity is the exemplar, the object whose materiality is subsumed by
exchangeability. Finally there is the model, as we discussed above, a further
transcendence of the ontology of the object to a higher logical type, a purification of the
series into the model or code which makes no reference to the “real.” I schematize this in
Figure 8.3 below.
Figure 8.3 Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra
‘Natural’ object
is dissimulated
1st order simulacrum
Symbolic Exchange

counterfeit
the series
the model
is multiplied
is generalized
2nd order simulacrum
Industrial Capitalism

3rd order simulacrum
Era of Simulation

with American soaps like Dallas in Togo). Kriegel’s (2004: 259) discussion of design pirates’ discourse
also shows that this logic was also at play in 19th century Britain as well (also see Johns 2009).
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3.3.6.1 Brand as simulation of commodity
Here I want to recount Benjamin’s narrative about the commodity as reinterpreted
through my reading of Baudrillard: the commodity is an abstraction of, a simulation of,
the singular auratic object whose meaningfulness is grounded in the contextualization
inherent in reciprocal exchange, in its unique historicity, its embeddedness is historicized
social relations. Through this, meaning is converted into value—i.e., reorganized into a
higher logical type of equivalence—and the relationship of the original to the copy is
radically altered. The aura of the object (which the counterfeit dissimulates) is
extinguished.
As I argued in section 2.3, the brand organizes a set of commodified forms into a
higher logical type of brand origin and image, and as such is itself a simulacrum of that
lost aura through the immanent replicability of brand tokens. While the brand does not
project itself as any single unique object, it reformulates itself as the personalization of a
set of objects (the series of identical commodity brand tokens) iconic with the consumer
(as set of desires, needs, lifestyle choices over time). The brand attempts to restore the
meaningfulness of objects, their authority and authenticity, as imbricated in social
relations through its simulacrum of sociality. At an earlier historical moment this is
through the simulacrum of the guarantor of product quality—the shopkeeper—via the
trademark. The brand and its packaging substitute for the face-to-face interaction with the
local merchant. More contemporarily, it is the simulacrum of sociality more generally:
buying a branded good is purchase to a community, a lifestyle, or a kind of self.
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Ironically, it is through the simulacrum of the brand token’s singular history or origin
that capital circulation is reanalyzed as authenticity. That is, the authentic branded good
is that good whose unique commodity path is an inverse icon of (an equally unique)
profit flow from point of purchase to the trademark owner. Here the discourse of origin or
quality (the “good will” of the brand) acts as a simulacrum, setting the conditions which
make branded goods “authentic.” Authorized copies of the brand are backed by the law
and construed as legitimate because they supposedly have the same origin, and this sets
the conditions on how consumers experience branded goods (e.g., as status-ful, as “real,”
as desirable). In doing so it excludes other goods like counterfeits as “inauthentic.”
Through such simulacra the brand is an abstraction from (the mere exchange value
of) commodity forms into a higher order type, reorganizing and reclassifying the world of
commodities as instances of brands. BRAND, then, is a simulation of the commodity, and
does its work through a set of simulacra. And as many have shown, this has entailed a
reformulation of how engagement with objects and exchange in and out of the market
work. This is the most recent phase in extraction of profit under capitalism:
commodification of the right to access types of commodities (Frow 1996, 2002) and the
effects of the consumption of tokens of such types (Arvidsson 2005; Foster 2007).

3.3.6.2 Duplicate as simulacrum
What are we to make, then, of the duplicate under the BRAND ontology? The duplicate
garment is a counterfeit in Baudrillard’s sense. The duplicate is inauthentic. It is not
authorized by the social order (i.e., IP law) in an analogous way that the counterfeit of the
Classical Era was a simulacrum of the natural, divine order. The duplicate falsely
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attributes origin. It is a parasite on brand image and identity, siphoning off profits from
the rightful IP owners (Wilkins 1992; Wilke and Zaichkowsky 1999; Vann 2006; Pang
2008). The duplicate is a simulacrum of a meta-discursive mapping of brand types-totokens, falsely including itself under a type to which it doesn’t belong.
And again, the problem with the duplicate (from the point of view of particular brand
types) is not with falsity of form or material. In fact, a piece of clothing is counterfeit
even if it is the exact same design, with the same cut, materials, stitching, made in the
same factory by the same people as the authentic item, sold to the customer in an
authorized store by employees on the company payroll. Rather the problem is with
profits. If profits do not go to the brand owners it is counterfeit. In this way, then, the
duplicate does not disrupt the law of exchange as made possible by brands, but short
circuits it. That is, it is a challenge to particular brands, but not to the larger ontology of
the BRAND.
Indeed, it is precisely through legal discourse’s labeling as “fake” and “inauthentic”
that the duplicate reinvests the branded form with reality and authenticity. Functioning
like the hyper-real Disneyland, the duplicate serves to legitimate the reality of the brand,
covering the fact that BRAND itself is not a natural category, but one achieved through
various brand related meta-discourses which regiment an order of iconism and
indexicality so that otherwise similar objects are forced into the categories “authentic”
and “inauthentic.”

3.3.6.3 Aesthetics of brandedness as simulation of the brand

411

What are we to make of the aesthetic of brandedness discussed in chapters 6 and 7?
What exactly is the implicit challenge of the duplicate in the hands of Tamil youth (i.e.,
under the ontology of style)? Remember that the brand is founded on its ability to
differentiate signs—i.e., regiment iconicity—out of an otherwise homogeneous range of
so-construed indistinct objects. The duplicate as used by Tamil youth offers an implicit
challenge to that because it blurs the boundaries that brands attempt to regiment. The
duplicate threatens to extinguish the simulacrum of aura and authenticity that brands
instantiate, and thereby reveal their artificiality (cf. Pang 2008).
This is a challenge, though, only to the extent that branded forms are treated
indifferently with respect to their authenticity, that is, to their BRAND ontology. When the
duplicate is accepted as just as good, just as functional, as the authentic brand token, the
ontology of the BRAND is, to use a Baudrillardian turn of phrase, liquidated. But why is
this so? It is precisely because the meta-semiotic basis of the brand as a type that
regiments a set of tokens is scrambled when the duplicate (known to be a duplicate) is
treated indiscriminately with authentic brand tokens (cf. the process of genericide).
This is precisely what happens among young men in Tamil Nadu in their use of
branded forms not as tokens of a brand type, but as part of an aesthetics of brandedness.
In this alternative ontology, the brand is simulated at a higher logical type. As such
brands become abstracted into a larger classification, and their aura of identity and origin
(their “brand image”) is bracketed. Under this new ontology, tokens of the type are able
to perform a different kind of functionality, imbued with new indexical connections and
entailments: performing style in the peer group. Here, under an aesthetic of brandedness
the duplicate makes the BRAND (as a set of brand types) irrelevant. It denaturalizes it by
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swapping out the brand meta-discourse, its figures of personhood, and its associated
meanings with an alternative meta-discourse, figures of personhood, and associated
meanings.
Among young Tamil men doing style, then, brands are simulated. The indexical
connections and images otherwise associated with particular brands are replaced with the
idea of the brand (or as Baudrillard would put it, the “sign” of the brand). Branded forms
are disconnected from questions of authenticity/inauthenticity and true/false and
reconnected to questions of social function (status-raising) and aesthetics (i.e., not the
aura of brand identity, but the aura of exteriority). The surface form remains but it is reontologized within a new functionality and principle of equivalence: can it perform style?
With respect to the BRAND ontology, the branded form becomes a decontextualized shell
of itself, a trope of its older meaning, reinfused with new meaning and recontextualized
by an alternate set of meta-discourses. I chart out the recursion of simulation in Figure
8.4 below.
Figure 8.4 Recursion of simulation
simulacrum of
natural order
Object

simulation of
object as utility

Counterfeit

simulation of commodity/simula- simulacrum of simulation of
crum of “aura” brand identity BRANDedness

Commodity

Brand

Duplicate

Real unto itself Copy as real
Counterfeit

Copy unto itself
Abstraction

Real as copy
Simulation

Copy as real Alternative ontology
Counterfeit
that liquidates the
copy/real dialectic
through simulation

Singular object

Mechanical reproduction

Classical era

Industrial capitalism

ONTOLOGY OF THE “REAL”

Style-ish branded
form

Consumer capitalism

(ONTOLOGY OF BRAND)

AESTHETICS OF
BRANDEDNESS
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Keeping in mind the conditions of possibility for this alternative ontology—the
disconnect of brand meta-discourse from branded form, willful ignorance of brands, the
contingencies of global capital and export surplus, the meta-discourses of the film hero
and style, the peer group dynamic of status-raising as diagrammatic of the experience of
‘youth’ and thus the motivation of the use of brands (among other signs) as style—what I
want to point out is that this simulation is motivated from the ground up and not by any
abstract notion of “system,” or cybernetic, auto-poetic logos of capital or brand (see
Sylavnus’ [2007] for another such example of bottom-up simulation). Simulation, even if
a decontextualization of an older norm/system, is always contextually grounded both in
its genesis and its next turn recontextualization. It is this indexicality that Baudrillard
misses as he only focuses on the process of abstraction. But as I have shown, this is only
part of a larger semiotic process in which simulation is simply a particular sub-phase.
Simulation, while necessarily involving abstraction, always creates new sets of indexical
presuppositions and entailments. 43
One inductive proof that indeed we are dealing with different ontologies (one of
which is the simulation of the other) is to look at the range of forms that are included
within the notion of “authentic” goods, on the one hand, and within the categories of
“inauthentic” duplicates on the other across the two ontologies. When the distinction of
true/false brands is relevant, where the duplicate is a simulacrum, there is a cat-andmouse game between counterfeiters and the brand company where the production of
counterfeits and originals are increasingly similar and the diacritics of difference

43

Another way to put this is that “abstraction” is itself an indexical shifter. It is always “abstraction with
respect to” some semiotic aspect of a form. The de-indexicalification of one aspect of a form opens up new
indexical horizons vis-à-vis other aspects.
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increasingly minute (see Phillips 2005 for some nice examples; see Bush et al. 1989 on
other methods of introducing authentic differences, e.g., bar codes). This is the economy
of exact duplicates, but where ironically such duplicates do not offer a real challenge to
the brand as BRAND, just as to the question of where the profits of particular brand tokens
go. When there is no distinction between the true/false brand, where the brand is
simulated, we find that counterfeits have very low fidelity. Indeed, there is a push
(insofar as differentiation increases market saturation) toward distortion, hybridization,
and differentiation from the model, but contained within a more general aesthetics of
brandedness. This aesthetics expands the flexibility of brand iconism proportionally to
the discerning powers, or lack thereof, of the consumer and producer. 44
To uncover that Tamil uses of branded forms function as simulations of BRAND
however is to move away from the forms themselves to the meta-semiotic conditions of
possibility of such forms as they make such forms intelligible and pragmatically
efficacious in actual moments of use. In this context it is telling that the economics
literature on counterfeits (which is highly production-centric) is fixated on the fidelity of
copies rather than on the indexical and meta-indexical aspects of the uses of copies. We
can also critique Baudrillard on this point: he is obsessed with the fidelity of copies. This
is because he privileges and fetishizes the real and the authentic without any sensitivity to
44

We can compare this situation with the various “regimes of value” that Jamieson (1999) discusses
regarding collector cultures of vinyl records. He distinguishes between two ontological organizations of
counterfeit records, those which fetishize the original object (the records) and those that fetishize access to
the recordings (i.e., the songs on the records) as part of DJ performances of exclusive knowledge. This
parallels our discussion of the ontologies of BRAND and STYLE, whereby in the first “regime” it is fidelity
and authenticity that confer authority while in the second it is performance in the peer group that generates
authenticity. In this second regime, copies do not extinguish aura but increase it (cf. Comaroff and
Comaroff 2009: 20). In the second regime, the duplicate brackets the question of the object per se and
reanalyzes it as part of a different ontology. As Jamieson notes, the difference between the first and second
regime is that the first is based on the “axiomatic knowledge of the primordial character of particular
categories of object” (Jamieson 1999: 9) while the second is not.
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the fact that concepts like “fidelity to _____,” “copy of _____,” and “simulation of
_____” are indexical concepts that are dependent on particular meta-semiotic discourses
put into play in particular contexts of social action. That is, they are not the inherent
qualities of the objects in question.

3.4 Summary
In this section I have shown how the Baudrillardian concepts of simulation and
simulacrum can be applied to the study of duplicate branded goods. Further, I have
shown how theorizing the duplicate as a kind of simulation is crucial to our theorizing of
the brand more generally. This, however, requires us to abstract from Baudrillard’s
concepts (to make a simulation of them, in fact). I argued that a semiotic account of
simulation and simulacrum as the play between meta-semiosis and indexicality allows us
to rescue Baudrillard from a number of problems.
As our discussion shows, the semiotic structure of simulation is not one necessarily
linked to an apocalyptic vision of capitalism as an uncontrollable cybernetic or
Saussurean system of signs tyrannically and invisibly ruling from the top down. Rather, I
argued that simulation (even in the cases discussed by Baudrillard) is always indexically
grounded and dependent on particular meta-semiotic discourses, and thus ultimately
defeasible or tropically reformulatable from the bottom up. The case of Tamil youth
fashion shows how the BRAND ontology is simulatable, and how this principle of value
(style qua exteriority qua youth status) is of a totally different form than the
Saussurean/Baudrillardean system/code of pure equivalences. But to make this move
requires an appeal to the indexicality of the sign and its imbrication in meta-discursive
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frameworks. It also requires empirical work with actual consumers and users of branded
forms in their cultural contexts of use. Otherwise we risk being drawn into the illusory
world of the brand and simulation as the creeping shadows of capitalism.

4. Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that: (a) The brand is a meta-semiotically organized form
whereby a set of tokens are taken as instances of a brand type which is indexical of
source/producer and symbolic of a brand image. Further, the condition of possibility of
brand types is the larger meta-semiotic configuration which grounds and is grounded by
the ontological category BRAND. We saw how this ontology can be defeased in the Tamil
case of youth fashion and style. (b) Simulation and simulacra are also meta-semiotic
forms of the same configuration. There are as many kinds/orders of simulation/simulacra
as there are meta-discourses which reanalyze and recontextualize some set of forms at a
higher logical type vis-à-vis different functionalities and principles of classification. The
brand is a further development of simulation within capitalism. (c) The duplicate in Tamil
Nadu under the aesthetics of brandedness foregrounds this meta-semiotic component and
shows us the conditions under which the brand relationship holds in general. It shows us
when a brand is and is not.
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